Abstract
This article discusses the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors of a cooperative TU-game, also known as the Selectope. We reconsider some results on Harsanyi payoff vectors within a more general framework. First, an intuitive approach is used, showing that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is the core of an associated convex game. Next, the set of individual rational Harsanyi payoff vectors, the Harsanyi imputations in short, is considered. Existence conditions are provided, and if non-empty, we provide a description as the core of a well-defined convex game, and show that it is an externally stable set.
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Acknowledgments
This study was partly done whilst Valeri Vasil’ev was visiting the Department of Econometrics at the Free University, Amsterdam. Financial support from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) in the framework of the Russian-Dutch programme for scientific cooperation, is gratefully acknowledged. The third author would also like to acknowledge partial financial support from the Russian Fund of Basic Research (Grants 98-01-00664 and 00-15-98884) and the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund (Grant 02-02-00189a).
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Derks, J., van der Laan, G. & Vasil’ev, V. On the Harsanyi payoff vectors and Harsanyi imputations. Theory Decis 68, 301–310 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9124-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9124-0