Date of Award

6-9-2006

Degree Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts (MA)

Department

Philosophy

First Advisor

Dr Andrew Altman - Chair

Second Advisor

Dr Peter Lindsay

Third Advisor

Dr George Rainbolt

Abstract

Rossian moral pluralism’s rejection of a founding moral principle and use of ‘prima facie duties’ as opposed to absolute duties makes it unique from most other major ethical theories. It has been attacked in a myriad of different ways because of this. Brad Hooker has proposed two objections based on these ideas. The first is that moral pluralism is lacking justification because of its rejection of a founding moral principle. The second is that because of this, and its lack of absolute duties, moral pluralism is an indeterminate theory. In this paper I will look at Hooker’s objections as well as two responses that have been proposed as solutions. Having shown these solutions to be insufficient I will then propose a way to look at Ross’ moral pluralism that saves it from Hooker’s objections and clearly lays out Ross’ understanding of how we should deliberate about moral matters.

DOI

https://doi.org/10.57709/1059738

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Philosophy Commons

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