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Michael Detlefsen, What Does Gödel's Second Theorem Say, Philosophia Mathematica, Volume 9, Issue 1, February 2001, Pages 37–71, https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/9.1.37
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Abstract
We consider a seemingly popular justification (we call it the Re-flexivity Defense) for the third derivability condition of the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb generalization of Godel's Second Incompleteness Theorem (G2). We argue that (i) in certain settings (rouglily, those where the representing theory of an arithmetization is allowed to be a proper subtheory of the represented theory), use of the Reflexivity Defense to justify the tliird condition induces a fourth condition, and that (ii) the justification of this fourth condition faces serious obstacles. We conclude that, in the types of settings mentioned, the Reflexivity Defense does not justify the usual ‘reading’ of G2—namely, that the consistency of the represented theory is not provable in the representing theory.