Typical Subjectivity: Transcendental Phenomenology and the Possibility of Intersubjectivity

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Abstract: Husserl's theory of types is most often associated with his account of perception. Here, types operate as pre-predicative frames of experience that guide the perception of objects. In this paper, I will argue that Husserl's theory of types is also central to his account of intersubjectivity. More specifically, I will show that a foundational kind of typical subjectivity is entailed by his discussion of the sphere of ownness. It is by way of this type that even a solitary subject can tacitly anticipate the possibility of other subjects. It is also this type that is enriched through interactions between actual subjects.

Introduction

Husserl's theory of types is most often associated with the perception of objects. Here, they function as pre-predicative frames of experience that guide the perception of both new and familiar objects. Yet, they also play a broader role in Husserl's phenomenology. Indeed, Joona Taipale (2016) has already done important work on the central place of types in Husserl's account of intersubjectivity and the perception of other subjects as such. Taipale argues that seeing another as a fellow subject "comes with a *foundational order*: to grasp others in their singularity is to 'see through' the supra-individual (social, occupational, etc.) typicalities that we have already ascribed to them from the outset" (Taipale 2016, 144). My aim here is to follow Taipale's claim about a foundational order to a deeper level of constitution. While Taipale focuses on, for instance, social and occupational types, I will focus on articulating typical subjectivity of a foundational sort.[1]

I will show that this form of typical subjectivity constitutes receptivity to possible others and motivates empathy.[2] Typical subjectivity is, at this level, constituted by internal relations between the embodied subject, objects, and the surrounding horizon. Thus, understanding oneself as a typical subject already entails an understanding of what it is for something to be a mobile subject moving with respect to objects through the spatial horizons of experience. To make this argument, I will present an interpretation of the "sphere of ownness" framed by key passages from *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Texte aus dem Nachlaß*. Many scholars agree that Husserl's discussion of the sphere of ownness is an abstraction that serves a transcendental purpose, but these passages suggest a complex transcendental structure that is often missed.[3]

 I argue that Husserl's discussion of the sphere of ownness is driven by questions concerning motivation, which fall within the scope of his genetic phenomenology. Indeed, in the fifth meditation, Husserl frames his analysis of the lone ego stepping out of the sphere of ownness in terms of motivation.[4] Though Husserl does not fully draw on the rich resources of his genetic phenomenology here, there are clear opportunities to do so. Seizing on these opportunities requires carefully tracking dynamic systems of motivation that result in passive syntheses. Here, reflection on laws of motivation, which determine the forms material facts take, prompts a consideration of counterfactual contexts that static phenomenology does not, and cannot, in any case, sustain. The sphere of ownness is such a context. There is, however, a static dimension to this inquiry as well, one that compliments and directs the genetic inquiry. Static phenomenology describes and clarifies the meaning of objectivity and intersubjectivity, which it shows are essentially linked. Genetic analysis, in turn, explains how objectivity and intersubjectivity, so described, emerge as meaningful categories of experience for us in the

course of experience.[5] This explanation rests on Husserl's discussion of motivation. The first part of the paper is dedicated to clarifying the relationship between static and genetic phenomenology at the level of solitary, pre-predicative constitution.[6]

Working from this perspective, one can apply elements of Husserl's genetic analyses in *Experience and Judgement* and *Analyses of Passive Synthesis* to aspects of his discussion of the sphere of ownness in *Cartesian Meditations* to advance a more cohesive account of its aims and transcendental function. Thus, in the middle portions of the paper, I briefly present key findings from Husserl's genetic phenomenology that help explain the genesis of intersubjectivity. In the final portion of the paper, I focus specifically on temporal, associative, and spatial forms of motivation as I analyze Husserl's discussion of the sphere of ownness in the fifth meditation. This serves to highlight features of the account important for responding to issues in the secondary literature. More specifically, I argue in support of the following three claims.

First, associative syntheses involving the embodied subject in the sphere of ownness culminate in the subject knowing what it is for something to be an embodied subject. Put another way, associative syntheses motivate an understanding of typical subjectivity. This understanding is tacit and constitutes a receptivity to possible others. It follows that the sense in which intersubjectivity is prefigured in the sphere of ownness is minimal.[7] Second, sides of an object not visible to the subject in the sphere of ownness are co-presented through the teleological structure of affect. Unavailable sides of an object are co-presented as affecting the subject *now* precisely as unavailable sides that one strives to bring into view.[8] Finally, determining that one object is like another, genetically speaking, is not a process of comparing two objects whose salient properties have been established and enumerated. Rather, the phenomenon of similarity is motivated by a dynamic process of accommodation in which the

properties of each object influence the properties that emerge as prominent in the other. Thus, when one object comes to be perceived as like another, this similarity is constituted by an internal relationship between what each object comes to mean through the process of accommodation. We should also understand intersubjectivity and empathy, perceiving the other as an other, as motivated by a process of accommodation.[9]

1. Phenomenological Explanation

One of the aims of Husserl's genetic phenomenology is to uncover the rules governing motivation, rules governing how one's current experience indicates something more than what is present.[10] Husserl also discusses motivation under the heading of apperception, or experiences that "transcend their immanent content" as well as "the relations of consciousness intending beyond itself" (Hua XI, 336/624, 337/625 fn. 98). Motivation is distinct from causality as we usually think of it. On a causal explanation of how experience arises, stimuli that are meaningless in themselves affect the senses and initiate a chain of causes and effects that culminate in an output of some kind. To be motivated is to be affected by elements of the experiential field that are already meaningful in some way, or at least "proto-intentional" (Crowell 2013, 136).[11] Moreover, accounting for lived experience via causality would require reducing experiences to a different class of things whose interactions can be observed and described from a third person perspective. Here, we lose phenomenological accuracy, we lose lived experience as such.

With respect to the sphere of ownness, some of the strongest evidence that Husserl's analysis involves a complimentary relationship between genetic and static methods is found in

passages from two of the volumes that comprise *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Texte aus dem Nachlaß*. In these passages, Husserl discusses the distinct ways the ego is analyzed in static and genetic phenomenology. The phenomenological reduction clears the way for a static description of the essential features of subjectivity, "the pure ego and its pure stream of consciousness *that can never be annulled*" (Hua XIV, 306/646). After the reduction, the "empirical *human* – ego" is in brackets, but it can still be considered as something "meant," a correlate of noetic acts. We thus remain free to make judgements about its essential features just as something meant. This includes judgments about how I, as a human-ego, perceive myself, perceive objects as something or other, and perceive these things with a certainty that motivates secure beliefs, what Husserl calls "doxic positings" (305/646). Here, a deeper level of constitution is indicated, one that brings the accidental features of experience under *a priori* laws of formation.

On one hand, the doxa that inform one's experience of reality are a matter of contingency. Perceptions and beliefs can be cancelled in the face of further experience in a way that the essential features of the pure ego cannot. Moreover, experiences that would motivate certain stands on the world or oneself may be unavailable. On the other hand, insofar as one does take perceptual and epistemic stands on things, those stands will have been established according to necessary forms of motivation, necessary forms of genesis. Husserl writes, "the possible forms of the 'empirical contingencies,' of the special apperceptions that genesis has brought about; here it must again be shown *which special genetic forms must occur in an a priori necessary genesis,* that is, which system of forms of genesis must occur and in what order in the unity of a progressively developing ego and egoic stream, and which essential laws govern

genesis there" (306/646). We cannot, then, identify the contingent circumstances of our own

egoic development with genetic laws that hold across all such circumstances.

Husserl observes, for instance, that there is "no essential necessity that the ego encounters

other human-beings and animals" (306/647). This is solipsism in a "certain sense," as a way the

empirical world might have been, a way the facts might have been settled.[12] Because genetic

analysis considers the form that empirical facts take, it remains constrained by possible facts and

does not have recourse to eidetic variation and eidetic possibilities where such facts are set aside.

It must, when required by the demands of phenomenological investigation, explore the

consequences of counterfactual possibilities, including the possibility of a lone ego. Viewed

from this angle, "the problem of empathy could be formulated as a problem of fictive genesis,"

one that assumes "an original environment constituted without foreign subjects, without foreign

bodies appearing in it" (Hua XV, 617). At issue here is how the perception of another is

motivated so that "the perception of foreign bodies is expanded to the perception of others"

(617). This frames Husserl's discussion of the sphere of ownness, which is just an original

environment constituted without foreign subjects, as primarily concerned with uncovering the

motivational conditions for the possibility of empathy. It aims at detailing a fictive genesis.

Nonetheless, static analysis reappears here as part of a multilayered transcendental argument

with the aim of both describing and explaining objectivity.

Approaching the sphere of ownness from a static perspective, I can address the problem

of the lone ego by setting aside "the factually, phenomenologically investigating ego, and form

the idea of an ego as pure ego as such through the eidetic variation of myself." Here one finds "a

possible pure ego as such standing in relation to an open unending multiplicity of other egos as

alien to it, but as standing to it in relationships of empathy and I-you relationships, in

relationships of communicative interaction, reciprocal-ego-determination" (Hua XIV, 307/648). Eidetic variation discloses the essential features of subjectivity but also reveals that those features do not belong to a particular, empirical ego. This opens an *a priori* field of possible pure egos which, as pure egos, will be like me when considered from an eidetic perspective. This investigation yields a static description of a community of egos that "constitutes *one identical world*" (Hua I, 137/107). This world is, then, "the world as an *idea* – the ideal correlate of an intersubjective experience, which ideally can be and is carried on as constantly harmonious – is essentially related to intersubjectivity … whose component particular subjects are equipped with mutually corresponding and harmonious constitutive systems" (138/108). Common objects of experience that I grasp as meaningful in the same ways they are meaningful for others is the ideal of objectivity and demonstrates that intersubjectivity is essentially related to objectivity.

Given this theoretical perspective, it remains to be asked, what could motivate one to experience something other than oneself as *an other*? What could motivate one to see objects as available to others as well? In other words, what are the motivational conditions for the possibility of objectivity? Where the imagined community of egos in my intersubjective sphere of ownness are joined by eidetic generality and possibility, concrete egos beyond that sphere are not joined at the outset in this way. In fact, they are not necessarily joined in any way at all. Thus, "the genuine difficulties (and in fact they are not inconsiderable) are occasioned by the first of the … steps toward constitution of an Objective world: the step taking us to the 'other' ego" (138/108).

2. Motivation and the Genesis of Types

Husserl discusses three intertwined systems of motivation: temporal, associative, and spatial. There is much to say about each, but here I will limit myself to those elements of his analysis most relevant to the genesis of intersubjectivity and empathy. We can begin with the form of motivation at work in temporal syntheses. Retention of passing moments as having passed *motivates* protention, the tacit expectation of what is to come next. Yet, it is also equally the case that protention motivates retention. That is, my expectation of which parts of the experiential field will become relevant keeps me attuned in such a way that what will eventually be retained will be integrated as parts belonging to a whole experience. This motivational structure thus yields a unified, temporally synthesized experience.

As for associative syntheses, affect plays the key motivational role in their genesis. It explains how, for instance, certain objects of attention come to stand in the foreground against a background of other possible objects of attention. For Husserl, the various fields of experience are already structured by similarities and contrasts.[13] A group of similar objects will be seen as aggregated because they share, for example, a similar shape but will be distinguished insofar as each is of a different color. The background to the focal moment of experience is always already organized according to such relations but striking contrasts exercise an allure on attention.[14] They strongly affect us and under certain conditions become prominent in experience.

A ringing bell breaking the silence or a string of lights stretching across the dark road ahead are both likely to exercise an allure and become the focus of one's attention. This counts as apperception because the allure of contrast is a call from beyond what is now focal in experience and motivates an orientation to a new sequence of experiences with its own motivational structure; one finds oneself following the string of lights to where it ends or becoming attuned to the subtle changes in volume and tone as the sounding of the bell

diminishes and one awaits its second tolling. A further level of association involves objects that

have become prominent and familiar. When we run across an object similar to a familiar one,

the familiar object is recalled, or reproduced.[15] Temporal syntheses are also at work here. The

availability of past experiences is made possible by what Husserl calls "far-retention," distant

moments of the temporal horizon that have lost their affective force until interest or association

motivates their reproduction.[16] Past experiences in far retention, when recalled, motivate

protentions in the form of expectations that the present object will have features like those of the

familiar object which it evokes. Yet, temporally ordered and associatively structured experience

is not sufficient to establish objects of attention as distinct from the subject. For this to be

established, the object must be located at a position distinct from the subject as the zero-point of

orientation.

This is achieved through the movement of the body relative to the object.[17] Motivation

enters the picture here in the form of what Husserl calls "kinaestheses," the various sensations

that accompany movement and present the body as vital and capable. Movement, and sensations

of movement, are attached to the regular and rule governed alterations in the appearance of

objects. If I move toward the object, for instance, the visual angle is increased while movement

away from it decreases the angle. If I move around the object, aspects of the object that were

partially or wholly covered come into view, replacing the previously perceived aspect as the

focal moment of attention, and partially or wholly covering other aspects of the object.   Moving

in these ways, and the sensations attached to moving in these ways, thus motivate the expectation

that the visual field will be altered in these regular and rule governed ways. Moreover, in cases

where one's attention and interest is turned toward an object, one grasps from the outset that

continuous movement along certain paths will motivate a series of appearances that will present

the object in a more determinate fashion: "Thus, beginning with the first turning-toward of the ego, perception is animated by the *perceptive tendencies,* tendencies of the continued overflowing of apperceptions into apperceptions, tendencies to run through multiplicities of kinaestheses and in this way to set in motion a flow of 'images'" (Husserl 1973, 84).

We can see types as a further level of apperception whose production is motivated by repeated associative syntheses, associative syntheses that assume an embodied familiarity with objects. The movements required to bring more of an object into view are not always required for one to take the object as possessing all the features now hidden from view. As we explore objects, as we unfold their inner horizons through movement, we become familiar with their "particularities," and this "is not something which concerns only this object itself; it is also that by which, at the same time, is prescribed a *type*, on the basis of which, by apperceptive transference, other objects of a similar kind also appear from the first in a preliminary familiarity and are anticipated according to a horizon." (124).

In short, any object sharing those characteristics by which experienced objects have become associated will be recognized as of the same type. Even newly encountered objects that are like objects we have previously encountered will be seen as possessing the qualities of the familiar object.[18] Thus, types are an example of apperception insofar as the appearance of just some of the characteristics of an object will, by way of the type, indicate those that are hidden or not now appearing. Yet, types are not universals that efface specific differences. Types are indeterminate frames that provide rough guides for the perception of objects, rough because they also caution us to anticipate that there will be, in general, specific differences to be found among similar yet distinct objects. This is built into types insofar as they yield a central place to particularity, or difference, in a way that universals do not.

3. The Dynamics of Affect

A few elements of this genetic analysis should be emphasized before moving into a discussion of the genesis underlying empathy. First, when objects become prominent through contrast, they do so against a background that is already passively synthesized, already organized and cohesive. Moreover, a contrast will remain connected to the background against which it becomes prominent through similarities that contextualize the contrast.[19] A ringing bell is distinct from the gentle hum of the refrigerator, which often goes unnoticed, but both are alike insofar as they are sounds and have properties like loudness and pitch. In fact, it is precisely with respect to shared properties of loudness and pitch that the sound of the bell is distinguished from the hum of the refrigerator.

Second, an object coming to prominence in the field of perception is a dynamic process. What happens to affect one or another person will vary according to interests, habits, abilities, and other factors as well. Yet, once one gives way to the affect, "the inception of an act of turning-toward, of paying attention to what exists, puts into play an activity with a tendency, a striving" (82). This striving is defined horizonally. As an object comes to prominence "*horizons are awakened*; thus, if I see the front of a motionless thing-like object, I am conscious, within the horizon, of the back of the object, which I do not see" (83). Where the "thing-like object" initially affects the ego, in turning toward the object, other sides of it not now visible affect the ego, inciting it to strive to bring those sides into view. Elsewhere, Husserl discusses this striving in terms of optimal givenness.[20] In the case we are considering, there is some series of appearances through which the object will be given optimally as what it is. Optimality is the

telos of striving, and each side to be revealed acts as a local telos, a more immediate end that will function as a means to optimal givenness. Thus, motivation takes on a teleological structure here where the end to be achieved is at work shaping the process unfolding toward that end. The body serves this telos insofar as turning toward an object involves movement relative to it. Here, kinesthetic forms of motivation are initiated and run their course.

Finally, the genetic analysis of similarity reveals complexities that are missed when it is viewed statically.[21] First, we can distinguish between established associations among similar objects and the "primal institution" of such associations. For instance, a blue pen of the same brand as those I used as an undergraduate may catch my attention, affect me. In turning toward it, I will already be disposed to see it as of the same type as those I used, as associated with them by way of features it shares in common with them. Or, walking into my kitchen I will already be disposed to see the aggregate of objects arranged around the table as chairs, each like the others. The primal institution of an associative relation refers to the first time the properties of one object are seen as like those of another. Second, there are degrees of similarity. Even objects that are alike in many of their details will not be perfectly alike. Third, the genesis of associative relations involves processes that are both receptive and productive. Sense fields are already organized in terms of basic similarities and contrasts, and we are receptive to the finer-grain similarities and contrasts these fields make possible. We do not, however, attend to all possible similarities and contrasts. Which similarities and contrasts are alluring enough to motivate turning our attention to them will be a matter of our interests and the contexts within which we move and act. Moreover, where associated objects may count as similar enough in one context, in others the differences between them may firmly set them apart. In these regards, the phenomenon of similarity is produced.

Finally, and drawing together these previous considerations, when an associative relation is instituted, each object is accommodated to the other so that the relation, and neither of the objects, is primary.[22] Similarity is not determined by enumerating the properties of two objects to determine which properties they share. Rather, properties emerge as shared between or among objects as we turn toward one that indicates another. This transforms the sense of each object, what each is perceived as.[23] Because objects may be similar or contrast at several different levels, which similarities and contrasts finally motivate the constitution of objects as similar yet distinct will emerge as we more closely attend to objects that have caught our attention. Similarities that first appeared as significant may fade to the background as other, stronger similarities emerge. Initial similarities may also be overwhelmed by contrasts that appear as more of an object comes into view. And similarities, contrasts, and the play between them in the background will come to motivate and contextualize the similarities that stand in the foreground, specifying the way objects are similar or distinct. These forms of accommodation also pertain to types. Objects with a strong likeness to those of a certain type but which also strongly contrast with those objects in some way may motivate a modification to the type so that the contrast is accommodated and transformed in its sense as it becomes situated in a new context.

4. The Genesis of Typical Subjectivity

So far, I have distinguished between two distinct and complimentary forms of transcendental argumentation in the sphere of ownness, briefly outlined the forms of motivation at work in passive genesis, and highlighted elements of genetic analysis important for analyzing Husserl's discussion of the genesis of empathy. We can begin this analysis by returning to the

moving body and the way it is constituted in the sphere of ownness. Husserl extends reflexivity, which is usually reserved for the mental sphere, to the body and marks the body as available in the sphere of ownness.[24] The body supplies, in contemporary parlance, self-specifying information that is non-conceptual in nature. A body experiencing itself experiences itself directly as both object and animate, as both touching and touched as one hand finds the other.[25] This marks it as distinct from the other objects of its experience; it is that to which sensuous experiences are addressed, that which, in its movements, participates in constituting objects as unified objects of perception, and an object that can be positioned among others. Moreover, "as reflexively related to itself, my animate bodily organism (in my primordial sphere) has the central here as its mode of givenness; every other body, and accordingly the "other's" body, has the mode 'There'" (Hua I, 146/116).

As this body moves, temporal, associative, and spatial syntheses are intertwined as the environment of the lone ego is constituted in terms of what is, and can be, here and there. Husserl writes,

> I can change my position in such a manner that I convert any There into a Here – that is to say, I could occupy any spatial locus with my organism. This implies that, perceiving from there, I should see the same physical things, only in correspondingly different modes of appearance such as pertain to my being there. It implies, then, that not only the systems of appearance that pertain to my current perceiving "from here", but other quite determinate systems, corresponding to the change of position that puts me "there", belong constitutively to each physical thing. And the same in the case of every other "There". Should not these interconnexions, or rather these instances of belonging together, which

are involved in the primordial constitution of "my" Nature and are themselves
characterized as associative – should they not be quite essential to clarification of the
associative performance, experiencing someone else (Hua I, 146/117, my emphasis)?

"Here" and "there" become associated via systems of appearance constitutive of the
object, systems that involve rule governed changes in appearance that unfold as one approaches
and moves around an object. The temporal structure of experience makes the open orientation
toward future views of the object possible while associative syntheses are at work filling in the
similarities and contrasts with respect to it and kinesthetic sensation motivates the continued
movements required to bring further aspects into view. There are also further levels of
association at work here.

Because the same series of appearances can be repeatedly brought into view with respect
to something that is spatially enclosed and localizable relative to the body, the members of that
series become associated and accommodated to each other. This, in turn, motivates seeing the
spatially enclosed and localizable thing as self-same, as an object whose distinct and contrasting
aspects are accommodated to each other as persisting aspects of a single thing. Persistence, then,
is constituted by the repeated availability of aspects of an object from a position that is possible
for an embodied subject, which is always "here" with respect to itself.   At the same time, the
persistence of one's embodied perspective is also constituted as that which remains through
changing experiences. What is "there" is determined as a position from which aspects of the
object covered by it facing aspects will come into view as one's perspective shifts. "Here" and
"there" thus become associated and accommodated to each other as positions from which aspects
of an object become available from one's embodied perspective.

Here, one's embodied perspective is typified as capable of occupying multiple positions over time and incapable of occupying multiple positions at the same time. Yet, this type quickly expands and extends these typifications to the embodied subject in general. Because I grasp every "there" as a position that can be made "here," I can associate every there with a possible "central here," or as possibly occupied by an embodied subject. I understand what it is for *a (typical) subject* to be situated with respect to the world. An embodied subject can occupy multiple positions over time and is incapable of occupying multiple positions at the same time, which means that each embodied subject, though it can move to different positions, must always exclude other possible subjects from occupying the position it now occupies. In understanding myself as of a type, other possible members of that type are also indicated.

This, however, is just a first pass at the role of typical subjectivity in the genesis of intersubjectivity. Its precise nature must still be clarified. Situating my view with respect to Dan Zahavi's account of intersubjectivity and Gunnar Declerk's recent critique of it will provide this clarification. Here, I will draw on the resources developed in the earlier portions of the essay in presenting an account that contains elements of both Declerck's and Zahavi's views.

5. Possibility and Subjectivity

In its broad strokes, Zahavi's (2001) interpretation of Husserl aligns with the interpretation I have offered here. He argues that "an open horizon of indeterminate others is already predelineated" so that "the experience of others takes place within an already available intersubjective dimension" (54, 56). Declerk (2018) challenges this way of approaching intersubjectivity by arguing that other subjects are not predelineated in the horizons of

experience. Declerck argues that Zahavi proposes a kind of Berkeleyan account of perception. To view an object as a whole object, I must posit other subjects as possibly viewing the aspects of the object at the same time I do. The key point is that relying on past experiences, imagination, or anticipations of what will be brought into view will not work, for these do not constitute unavailable aspects of the object as simultaneously actualizable. What we must account for is the presence-now of co-presented aspects, which we can by positing that there could be others perceiving those aspects *now*. Zahavi writes, "it is through the foreign I that the incompatibility of the coexisting profiles become compatible. That is to say, the foreign I can have, as present, the coexisting profile that is absent for me" (2001, 48). His argument, then, rests on the idea that horizontal intentionality entails open intersubjectivity.

Yet, on Declerck's view, "there is nothing to suggest that this type of empty intention constitutively refers to other subjects" (2018, 322).[26] Declerck agrees that an object is constituted as such because its unapparent sides are co-presented as possibly perceived. He disagrees, however, that this possibility must be mediated by other possible subjects. Rather, this possibility is "characterized by a deep form of counterfactuality" (323). Perceptual acts that are impossible for me just now are not "in principle *impossible* to achieve for me" (333). Because of my "being-in-space," I understand that there are other positions I could have occupied other than the one I now occupy. I also understand that had I occupied another position, it would have excluded and replaced the one I now occupy. For Declerck, this is sufficient to grasp unapparent aspects of the object as possibly perceived.

Supporting this view is a certain interpretation of intentionality as involving a form of verificationism. To intend an object is to assume "the accessibility or realizability of the experience where the existential validity of this object would be confirmed in intuition" (331 –

332). A strong version of this verificationism subordinates actualizability to what is actually

possible for an embodied subject, what is within "the effective range of his/her motor and

perceptual powers" (331). A weaker version takes possibilities as ideal in character so that, had

circumstances been different, I would have been able to see things from "there" (332). Declerck

argues that in either case, verification is about what "I" can do and is not mediated by the "we"

or the other. Nonetheless, Declerck's argument is premised on possibilities that are ideal in

character, that bracket the facts as one finds them and varies the position of the subject without

regard for what is or can be in reach for an actual subject.[27] For this reason, Declerck's analysis

treats actual perceptual determinations as if they were motivated by an eidetic and static

understanding of subjectivity. Yet, this confuses one level of analysis with another, as well as

the transcendental roles of the phenomena at issue. Eidetic analysis clarifies meanings while

genetic analysis explains how the emergence of meaning is motivated in the course of

experience. With respect to primal institution, eidetic categories that will become meaningful

down the road cannot be posited as motivating the processes that will result in their own

founding. There are some further, perhaps more decisive, issues to consider here.

By interpreting the genetic process of the synthesis of objects via eidetic categories, we

lose the specific way in which the sphere of ownness operates as a counterfactual situation.

When we consider the subject from within the sphere of ownness, we are considering a subject

for whom the facts are settled in a certain way. Here, possibility is determined with respect to

what is within reach for the embodied subject in this counterfactual context. Declerck might

respond that this would simply mean that a strong form of verificationism is at work here, one

that still does not justify a leap from unapparent sides of objects to other possible subjects. There

is a sense in which Declerck is correct about this. Yet, the role affect plays in the constitution of objects suggests a different account of intentionality and intersubjectivity.

Defining intentionality as a kind of verificationism suggests that the subject imposes conditions of satisfaction on objects, which are then satisfied or not. This is, again, a static way of framing things, one that assumes an object already in view and a subject fully constituted as such. Husserl's discussion of passive levels of constitution complicates this picture. Moreover, Husserl's way of framing the sphere of ownness as an abstraction and as involving a fictive genesis suggest taking the constitution of everything within this sphere as if it were fresh and ongoing. From this perspective, intentions that are directed toward unapparent sides of an object do not originate in a subject and move outward toward the object. Rather, they emerge through receptivity to spontaneous affects originating in possible objects of attention. These affects motivate a "turning-toward" and a "striving" that are teleologically structured. Unapparent sides of an object count as such affects. They are indicated in a general way by the available aspects of the object and the surrounding horizon but are in tension with these indications in remaining, for the moment, concealed. Yet, precisely as concealed aspects in tension with those that are available, concealed aspects affect me *now*. They are already constituted as existing *qua* affect even as what I am to expect from these aspects is shaped by ongoing processes of association and accommodation. The intentions to be fulfilled are developed, altered, sharpened, and perhaps even cancelled as the perceptual sense of the object is constituted. In this process of constitution, which of the object's properties are foregrounded and which fall to the background is determined by layered and interconnected systems of temporal, associative, and spatial motivation and synthesis.

Though this interpretation of Husserl is very different from Declerck's, it achieves some of the same ends. Namely, the constitution of the object as a whole object is not mediated by other possible subjects and can be analyzed in terms of what is possible for an individual subject. This is distinct from Zahavi's view because he argues that the constitution of the object as a whole object *must* be mediated by other possible subjects.[28] Nonetheless, on my interpretation the possibility of other subjects is necessarily indicated by the object as it becomes constituted. Working within Husserl's framework requires thinking about how the indication of other subjects is motivated. Above, I noted that the persistence of an embodied perspective is constituted in tandem with the persistence of aspects of the object, so that the meaning of each is tied to the other. What it means to be a persisting aspect of an object is to be repeatedly available to an embodied perspective. Thus, when concealed sides of an object affect me *now*, they do so as available to an embodied perspective, but not mine due to the impossibility of occupying multiple perspectives at once. It is this tension that motivates the indication of other subjects. This indication is, however, minimal, and I think typical subjectivity captures this minimalism.

A typical subject is indicated, but what is typical of a subject has not been enriched beyond basic ways of relating to objects in space that were first constituted as typical for me. Nonetheless, space becomes constituted as the space of possible perspectives, and this becomes part of a background understanding of my environment. Typical subjectivity is, at this level, constituted by internal relations between the embodied subject, objects, and the surrounding horizon. Thus, understanding oneself as a typical subject already entails an understanding of what it is for something to be a mobile subject moving with respect to objects through the spatial horizons of experience. This understanding is retained and motivates the expectation of other

embodied subjects who can move in the ways that I do. Yet, this expectation is indeterminate and does not yet involve actively imagining or positing an other. It is pre-predicative and constitutes one's openness to possible others. In other words, intersubjectivity in the full sense is not constituted here, but rather the conditions for the possibility for intersubjectivity are established through the constitution of receptivity to other subjects.[29] Others bearing certain perceptible properties will be able to affect me by way of those properties because of this receptivity. So it is that

> the *first determinate content* obviously must be formed by the understanding of the other's … organismal conduct: the understanding of the members as hands groping or functioning in pushing, as feet functioning in walking, as eyes functioning in seeing, and so forth. With this the Ego at first is determined only as governing thus somatically and, in a familiar manner, proves himself continually, so far as the whole stylistic form of sensible processes manifest to me primordially must correspond to the form whose type is familiar from my own organismal governing (Hua I, 148/119).

This first "turning-toward" motivates a process of association and accommodation that is not completed all at once and does not involve anything like a Leibnizian monad, which is absolutely defined in each of its properties, projecting and imposing its properties on others. In the case of the emergence of empathy, the behavior of the other unfolds over time and exemplifies "roughly differentiated typical forms" familiar from the "style of my own life" (149/120). Here, the process of accommodation advances as "every successful understanding of what occurs in others has the effect of opening up new associations and new possibilities of

understanding; and conversely, since every pairing association is reciprocal, every such understanding uncovers my own psychic life in its similarity and difference and, by bringing new features into prominence, makes it fruitful for new associations" (149/120). What determines ego as like the other emerges through a process of accommodation so that what becomes typical of the ego is internally related to what is typical of the other.[30] Again, the relation and not the terms of the relation are primary.[31] Typical subjectivity expands, then, so that it includes internal relations between ego, object, horizon, and the other. Thus, the "analogizing apprehension" of the other is the culmination of a process of accommodation and not itself a process by which two things that are external to each other are related through the search for overlapping properties. My self-understanding comes to include the other, not in the form of a defeasible belief, but an *urdoxa*, a background conviction that makes beliefs of a certain kind possible.

Conclusion

One might argue that because the other's subjectivity is not intuitively present to me as mine is, the background conviction that the other exists cannot hold. We have not really escaped solipsism. Yet here my aim has been to reframe Husserl's discussion of the sphere of ownness by drawing a distinction between two complimentary forms of transcendental argumentation and considering the consequences of that distinction as it plays out in Husserl's analyses. It has not been to assess whether he successfully defeats solipsism. Nonetheless, this analysis does suggest that the inaccessibility of one subject to another emerges through a process of accommodation that necessarily entails intersubjectivity. In the sphere of ownness, the question of intuitive presence or absence is not a meaningful question. The very experiential categories of intuitive

presence and intuitive absence only become meaningful as each takes the other as an other.

There is, then, an internal relationship between what it means for a subject to be intuitively

present and intuitively absent.[32] Moreover, one might argue that Husserl's account is

phenomenologically apt. If we regard the phenomenon of intersubjectivity as it is given and

bracket all else, it is often experienced as the tension between our conviction that there are others

and their intuitive absence. This tension characterizes apperception at the level of empathy and

Husserl's genetic analysis of the sphere of ownness stands as a phenomenological explanation of

that tension. For now, these responses remain gestures toward further lines of research.

Notes

[1] Taipale (2014) is also concerned with a deeper level of constitution in his discussion of *a priori* intersubjectivity. He argues that even in the case of a solitary subject constituting its world, other perceivers would be "*implied* and *emptily intended,*" they would be "projected by the generality of the embodied perceiver" (75). This generality is expressed in the tacit understanding that objects appear as "being perceivable to anybody" (76). My account of typical subjectivity shares Taipale's focus on the solitary subject and the idea that subjectivity can be grasped in its generality by the solitary subject. Yet, my account differs from Taipale's in a few important ways. First, Taipale does not fully explore the way systems of motivation result in the genesis of this generality and continue to modify it as empathetic connections are formed. Second, though Taipale's discussion of the projection of general subjectivity mirrors my account of typical subjectivity and receptivity, my account pairs receptivity with productivity in the process of accommodation, which is transformative of typical subjectivity. The result is that my account of how empathetic connections are formed is distinct from Taipale's. Finally, Taipale does not assign the same transcendental role to genetic analyses as I do. His focus on developmental psychology at least seems to narrow the applicability of these analyses where my focus on the "sphere of ownness" as a counterfactual situation broadens it.

[2] In view of other work on forms of typicality in Husserl, framing these issues in terms of typical subjectivity promises to open avenues of research that demonstrate the central and systematic role of types in Husserl's phenomenology. See, for instance, Lohmar 2003 and Diaz 2020.

[3] See, for instance, Henämaa 2014, 143; Moran 2005, 255; and Welton 2000, 155. My own view is, in part, a development of Natalie Depraz's claim that an analysis of transcendental genesis demonstrates "that subjectivity is truly embodied if it is inhabited by a self-transcending movement, a process through which consciousness exceeds itself" (2004, p.204). I describe this process by focusing on the laws of motivation Husserl describes in his genetic phenomenology.

[4] Hua I, 139/109.

[5] Michael Barber (2010) sees a tension in Husserl's method with respect to the second epoché, the epoché that takes us into the sphere of ownness. This sphere raises the question of whether Husserl's method is a disciplined abstaining from presuppositions or a way of attending to experience through abstraction. One wonders, in other words, which of these is at work in the sphere of ownness. Barber suggests that maybe both are at work and calls the sphere of ownness an "'imaginary abstraction' insofar as what one singles out may never exist independently" (16). Barber's use of the phrase "imaginary abstraction" recalls Husserl's own claim that there is a "fictive genesis" underlying empathy. I attempt to resolve the tension along similar lines by analyzing the sphere of ownness as involving complimentary considerations of eidetic (static) possibilities and counterfactual (genetic) possibilities, the latter of which rest on what one might call imaginary abstraction.

[6] Janet Donohoe (2004) emphasizes the mutual dependence of these two forms of phenomenological analysis. I think she is right in the emphasis, but where my account departs from hers is in its emphasis on the complimentary relationship between eidetic and counterfactual possibilities. She also focuses on presenting a genetic account of temporality, one that forms the basis for her account of intersubjectivity and Husserlian ethics. While temporality is a part of my discussion, my primary focus is on the spatial and affective elements of intersubjectivity.

[7] Lanei Rodemeyer (2006) distinguishes between "structural indications of intersubjective horizons" and intersubjectivity in the full sense, which can only arise through the direct experience of others (pp. 186, 193). She discusses the former in terms of an openness to others that involves affectivity, apperception, association, and retention/protention. I expand on this distinction by organizing my account around motivation, accommodation, and the constitution of this openness as a form of receptivity.

[8] My account is situated between Gunnar Declerck's (2018) and Dan Zahavi's (2001). Like Declerck, I do not think that constituting an object as a whole object requires positing other possible subjects who occupy perspectives other than one's own. Yet, like Zahavi, I do think that other possible subjects are indicated through the constitution of objects as whole objects.

[9] Empathy is sometimes characterized as unfolding in a series of discrete steps. For instance, Zhida Luo (2017) following Klaus Held (1972), describes how a body coming to prominence in the field of experience due to its similarity to my own is then automatically paired with my own. This captures essential features of empathy, but loses the dynamism suggested by Husserl's references to motivation and accommodation in the fifth meditation.

[10] Hua XI, 336/624 -340/628.

[11] Hua XI, 337/625 fn. 98.

[12] Here, one must abstract away from contingent developmental processes.

[13] Steven Crowell (2013) argues that Husserl's discussion of motivation and association does not establish conditions that determine when an associative connection is successfully made and when it is not. As such, on Husserl's account, associative connections cannot carry intentional content. Associative connections simply hold or they do not, but intentions are neither satisfied nor unsatisfied via these connections. Crowell argues that the key to an account of pre-predicative intentionality is to move away from a discussion of consciousness in terms of temporality and of the body in terms of kinaesthesis. What is required is a focus on the body in the context of practical action and practical norms of success and failure. There is not space here to address this criticism. It is worth noting, however, that at certain levels of associative synthesis, the question of success or failure in Crowell's normative sense is not appropriate. Everything in the visual field is alike insofar as it is visible, and this field is distinguished by its dissimilarities to other sense modalities. These associative relations are ontological in nature, they are constitutive of what it is to be, for instance, the visual field rather than the auditory field, and they make finer grain distinctions within sense fields possible. A failure at this level can only be a failure to exist.

[14] Husserl 1973, 71 – 79.

[15] Hua. XI, 121/166.

[16] Hua XI, 288/422.

[17] For a more detailed account of this, see Hua XVI and Drummond 1979 and 1995.

[18] See Schuetz 1959, 150.

[19] Husserl 1973, 74 - 75.

[20] Hua. III, 82/96; Hua. IV, 75/80, 131/139.

[21] Husserl 1973, 74.

[22] "Every overlapping-at-a-distance, which occurs by virtue of associative pairing, is *at the same time a fusion* and therein, so far as incompatibilities do not interfere, an assimilation, an accommodation of the sense of the one member to that of the other" (Hua I, 118).

[23] I think this is what Husserl has in mind when he writes, "with the associative overlapping of the data founding the apperception, there takes place an association at a higher level" (Hua I, 118).

[24] Hua I, 128/97.

[25] The experience of the body as both object and animate is in many instances more global than this example would suggest. This example does, however, serve as a particularly clear example of the reflexivity of embodied experience.

[26] See also Peter Shum (2014).

[27] "More radically, one's being-in-space is characterized by what could be called a sense of *modal ubiquity*, namely the fact that in principle one could have been *anywhere* now: one could have occupied *any* position instead of one's actual position" (Declerck 2018, 333).

[28] Taipale (2014, 76) agrees with Zahavi on this point. My own position can, nonetheless, be seen as an extreme version of the position that Taipale (2012) presents in his discussion of normality. There, Taipale argues that a solitary subject constituting its world will discover the norm of optimal givenness, a norm that will remain even as the subject encounters others and adopts new norms that are social or cultural in nature. Thus, solitary normality is prior to concrete intersubjectivity and its norms. My claim is, in a sense, that a form of solitary normality is logically prior to *a priori* intersubjectivity, even though other subjects are necessarily indicated by this form of normality. The difference between these views rests on opposing accounts of how objects are pre-predicatively constituted as unified and persisting through time and in space. A full rendering of my account in these terms would, however, require further discussion of how the norm of optimality operates in the sphere of ownness. For now, the above discussion of the teleological structure of affect and striving is sufficient to make my suggestion here at least plausible.

[29] Hua XVII, 213/241.

[30] This shares similarities with Depraz's "alterology" in which egos are not treated as substantial unities but as inhabited by many "egoic splittings" (2004, 203). For Depraz, the ego nonetheless remains as self-altered just as the typical subject remains though it is altered through processes of accommodation.

[31] My account of similarity is thus distinct from those who take Husserl's theory of empathy to involve bodily similarity as "a kind of physiomorphy" where "the visual outlook of the other's body overlaps with or resembles the physical appearance of one's own body" (Luo 2017, 46). Luo also develops an alternative account of bodily similarity, one that rests on tactile experience and the "twofold manifestation of the lived body" exemplified in experiences like shaking hands.

[32] This is a slightly different way of putting a point Anya Daly emphasizes in her work on empathy. She writes, "What does it mean to be internally related? The other – whether other subjectivities or the otherness of the world and things – is essential for self-awareness and vice versa. No self can be apprehended without an-other" (2014, 228).

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