¹ ‘Actus intellectus assentientis veritati divinae ex imperio voluntatis a Deo motae per gratiam’ (Aquinas, Thomas, Summa theologiae, tr. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, second and revised edition (London: Oates and Washbourne, 1920)Google Scholar, hereafter: Summa theologiae II-II q. 2 a. 9. The Latin text of Aquinas's works is that of the Leonine Edition [Rome 1888-1948]).

² ‘The object of faith can be considered in three ways. For, since ‘to believe’ is an act of the intellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, as stated above, the object of faith can be considered either on the part of the intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect. If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can be observed in the object of faith . . . One of these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of faith is ‘to believe in a God;’ because, as stated above nothing is proposed to our belief, except in as much as it is referred to God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it is the medium on account of which we assent to such and such a point of faith; and thus an act of faith is ‘to believe God,’ since, as stated above the formal object of faith is the First Truth, to Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent for Its sake to whatever he believes. If the object of faith be considered in so far as the intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is ‘to believe in God.’ For the First Truth is referred to the will, through having the aspect of an end’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 2 a. 2).

³ This tripartition partly corresponds to the distinction between ‘belief-in’ and ‘belief-that’, which is widely accepted by scholars in the field. See for example Price, H., ‘Belief “in” and belief “that”,’ Religious Studies 1 (1965), p. 17.Google Scholar

⁴ Riga, P. J., ‘The act of faith in Augustine and Aquinas,’ The Thomist 35 (1971), p. 168.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ ‘Ea enim quae sunt fidei excedunt rationem humanam: unde non cadunt in contemplatione hominis nisi Deo revelante… Quia cum homo, assentiendo his quae sunt fidei, elevetur supra naturam suam, oportet quod hoc insit ei ex supernaturali principio interius movente, quod est Deus’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 6 a. 1).

⁶ The believer is moved to believe for many reasons, such as miracles and arguments. However, s/he is moved mainly ‘by the inward instinct of the Divine invitation (interiori instinctu Dei invitantis)’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 2 a. 9 ad 3). M. Scherwin shows that the use of the concept of instinctus is the result of changes that, over the years, Aquinas made to his theory of how God moves the believers to the assent of faith. In his earlier works, Aquinas approaches God's intervention only cognitively, and describes the role of will in faith as generated merely by the attraction of a known good. Later, he developed a theory of how grace exerts an influence not only on the natural light of the intellect, but also on the natural inclination of the will (see By Knowledge and By Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington DC: Catholic University of America, 2005), pp. 131ff.Google Scholar).

⁷ ‘Science begets and nourishes faith, by way of external persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper cause of faith (principalis et propria causa fidei) is that which moves man inwardly to assent’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 6, a. 1, ad 1).

⁸ W. Mann insists that faith is not simply cognitive or propositional in nature, and emphasizes a similarity between Aquinas and Luther: ‘For both accounts [Aquinas’ and Luther's], then, genuine faith entails love of God and neighbour’ (Mann, W., ‘Theological virtues.’ In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Craig, E., (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), vol. 9, p. 329)Google Scholar.

⁹ ‘Caritas dicitur forma fidei, inquantum per caritatem actus fidei perficitur et formatur’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 4 a. 3).

¹⁰ See Summa theologiae II-II q. 6 a. 2 obj. 1.

¹¹ ‘Fides informis, etsi non sit perfecta simpliciter perfectione virtutis, est tamen perfecta quadam perfectione quae sufficit ad fidei rationem’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 6 a. 2 ad 1).

¹² ‘Informitas privatio quaedam est. Est autem considerandum quod privatio quandoque quidem pertinet, ad rationem speciei, quandoque autem non, sed supervenit rei iam habenti propriam speciem… Quia igitur cum assignatur causa alicuius rei, intelligitur assignari causa eius secundum quod in propria specie existit, ideo quod non est causa privationis, non potest dici esse causa illius rei ad quam pertinet privatio sicut existens de ratione speciei ipsius . . . Informitas autem fidei non pertinet ad rationem speciei ipsius fidei, cum fides dicatur informis propter defectum cuiusdam exterioris formae . . . Et ideo illud est causa fidei informis quod est causa fidei simpliciter dictae. Hoc autem est Deus . . . Unde relinquitur quod fides informis sit donum Dei ’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 6 a. 2).

¹³ ‘Id quod facit fidem esse formatam vel vivam non est de essentia fidei’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 4 a. 4 ad 2).

¹⁴ ‘Cum autem fides sit perfectio intellectus . . . distinctio fidei formatae et informis est secundum id quod pertinet ad voluntatem, idest secundum caritatem, non autem secundum illud quod pertinet ad intellectum’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 4 a. 4). In line with this, J. Wawrykow says that formed and unformed faith are both ‘gifts of God’ and ‘differ in terms of charity.’ That is to say, ‘when charity is infused with the habit of faith, there is formed faith; when the habit of faith is infused without charity, that is unformed faith’ (Wawrykow, J., ‘The Theological Virtues.’ In The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. by Davies, B. and Stump, E. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 292f.Google Scholar).

¹⁵ ‘. . .per quam voluntas est prompta ad ea credendum’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 2 a. 10 ad 2).

¹⁶ If it lacks charity, faith turns out to be something other than the Christian faith. This is E. Springsted's thesis. While referring to ‘the difference between formed and unformed faith,’ he says that ‘the latter is not Christian faith’ (E. Springsted, E., The Act of Faith: Christian Faith and the Moral Self (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), p. 174,Google Scholar footnote 42).

¹⁷ Summa theologiae II-II q. 2 a. 9 ad 1.

¹⁸ ‘Credere autem est immediate actus intellectus, quia obiectum huius actus est verum, quod pertinet ad intellectum. Et ideo necesse est quod fides, quae est proprium principium huius actus, sit in intellectu sicut in subiecto’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 4 a. 2).

¹⁹ ‘Credere est actus intellectus secundum quod movetur a voluntate ad assentiendum’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 4 a. 2).

²⁰ ‘Quidam dixerunt fidem esse in utraque vi, scilicet affectiva et cognitiva; quod nullo modo potest esse si intelligatur quod in utraque sit ex aequo: unius enim habitus oportet esse unum actum, nec potest esse unus actus ex aequo duarum potentiarum’ (Aquinas, On the Truth, trans. by McGlynn, J.V. and Schmidt, R.W. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953) q. 14 a. 4).Google Scholar

²¹ ‘. . .secundum quod subditur imperio voluntatis’ (Aquinas, On the Truth, q. 14 a. 4).

²² ‘Per caritatem ordinantur actus omnium aliarum virtutum ad ultimum finem. Et secundum hoc ipsa dat formam actibus omnium aliarum virtutum. Et pro tanto dicitur esse forma virtutum’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 23 a. 8).

²³ ‘Caritas dicitur esse forma aliarum virtutum non quidem exemplariter aut essentialiter, sed magis effective, in quantum scilicet omnibus formam imponit secundum modum praedictum’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 23 a. 8 ad 1).

²⁴ ‘Si aliquis operetur iusta, bonum quidem facit, sed non erit opus perfectae virtutis, nisi hoc bene faciat, idest secundum electionem rectam’ (Summa theologiae I-II q. 65 a. 4, my emphasis).

²⁵ ‘Cum enim fidei opus sit credere Deo; credere autem sit alicui propria voluntate assentire, si non debito modo velit, non erit fidei opus perfectum. Quod autem debito modo velit, hoc est per caritatem, quae perficit voluntatem, omnis enim rectus motus voluntatis ex recto amore procedit, ut Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei. Sic igitur fides est quidem sine caritate, sed non perfecta virtus’ (Summa theologiae I-II q. 65 a. 4).

²⁶ The love in question is nothing but charity. For Aquinas it is so important to relate this love with friendship that he starts his reflection on this subject contained in the Summa theologiae by wondering whether charity is a kind of friendship. For more on this, see Mansini, G., ‘Aristotle and Aquinas's Theology of Charity in the Summa Theologiae.’ In Aristotle in Aquinas's Theology, ed. by Emery, G. and Levering, M. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 125.Google Scholar

²⁷ See above, note 7.

²⁸ See below, note 51.

²⁹ See Summa theologiae II-II q. 4 a. 7.

³⁰ ‘Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of perfection’ (Summa theologiae I-II q. 62 a. 4).

³¹ ‘. . . ultimus finis oportet quod prius sit in intellectu quam in voluntate, quia voluntas non fertur in aliquid nisi prout est in intellectu apprehensum. Unde . . . necesse est quod fides sit prima inter omnes virtutes’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 4 a. 7).

³² See also Aquinas, Commentary on Sentences, Bk III d. 23 q. 2 a. 5 ad 5.

³³ ‘. . .per accidens potest aliqua virtus esse prior fide . . . Removere autem prohibens pertinet ad causam per accidens, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII Physic. Et secundum hoc aliquae virtutes possunt dici per accidens priores fide, inquantum removent impedimenta credendi . . . quamvis non sint verae virtutes nisi praesupposita fide, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro contra Iulianum’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 4 a. 7).

³⁴ Augustine, Against Julian, Bk. 4, Chapter 3, tr. by Schumacher, M. A. (New York: Father of the Church, Inc., 1957).Google Scholar

³⁵ ‘Actus voluntatis praeexigitur ad fidem, non tamen actus voluntatis caritate informatus, sed talis actus praesupponit fidem, quia non potest voluntas perfecto amore in Deum tendere nisi intellectus rectam fidem habeat circa ipsum’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 4 a. 7 ad 5).

³⁶ See above, notes 31ff.

³⁷ ‘Vident enim multa manifesta indicia ex quibus percipient doctrinam Ecclesiae esse a Deo; quamvis ipsi res ipsas quas Ecclesia docet non videant, puta Deum esse trinum et unum, vel aliquid huiusmodi.’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 2).

³⁸ ‘Daemonum fides est quodammodo coacta ex signorum evidentia’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 1).

³⁹ According to W. Mann, Aquinas seems to ‘suggest that the evidence is so clear for the demons as to make their assent involuntary.’ Obviously, ‘if Aquinas accepts this position, then he is forced to concede that the demons do not believe; they know’ (Mann, p. 328). The same view is held by O'Grady, P. (Aquinas's Philosophy of Religion (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), p. 78)Google Scholar, Bonino, S. (Angels and Demons. A Catholic Introduction, trans. by Miller, M. J. (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2016), p. 295)Google Scholar, and Rosental, C. (Lessons from Aquinas: A Resolution of the Problem of Faith and Reason (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 2011), p. 128)Google Scholar. However, if the signs are so compelling, it should be said, as J. Hick does, that the faith of demons contradicts Aquinas's doctrine of faith (see Hick, J., Faith and Knowledge: A Modern Introduction to the Problem of Religious Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 21)Google Scholar. A possible solution is provided by E. Stump. That author argues that the evidence that the demons have at their disposal motivates, rather than compels, them. This also can be said of humans (see Stump, E., ‘Aquinas on Being and Goodness.’ In Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, ed. by MacDonald, S. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press), pp. 190f.).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See Summa theologiae II-II q. 1 a. 4 ad2.

⁴¹ R. Cessario, instead, says that ‘the demons . . . recognize the truth of divine revelation’ (Cessario, Christian Faith and the Theological Life (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), p. 141)Google Scholar. As a matter of fact, Aquinas himself may seem to be ambiguous on this. He says for example that the demons ‘are forced by the evidence of signs which convince them that what the faithful believe is true (verum esse quod fideles credunt)’ (my emphasis). This may lead us to think that for Aquinas the demons see the divine revelation or—as Cessario says—‘recognize the truth of divine revelation’. The passage from Aquinas that I have just mentioned, however, continues as follows: ‘These signs do not cause the appearance of what is believed (id quod creditur) so that the demons could on this account be said to see those things which are believed (quae creduntur habere)’ (Aquinas, On the Truth, q. 14 a. 9 ad 4).

⁴² ‘. . . hoc ipsum daemonibus displicet quod signa fidei sunt tam evidentia ut per ea credere compellantur’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 3).

⁴³ ‘. . . in nullo malitia eorum minuitur per hoc quod credunt’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 3).

⁴⁴ Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 2. This is why, ‘belief is predicated equivocally of men who believe and of the demons (credere quasi aequivoce dicitur de hominibus fidelibus et Daemonibus)’ (Aquinas, On the Truth, q. 14 a. 9 ad 4).

⁴⁵ ‘Fides quae est donum gratiae inclinat hominem ad credendum secundum aliquem affectum boni, etiam si sit informis’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 2).

⁴⁶ In this connection, John Calvin maintains that there is no unformed faith as ‘assent rests upon such pious inclination at least, such assent as is revealed in the Scriptures!’ In other words, ‘faith can in no wise be separated from a devout disposition’ (Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006), pp. 552f.)Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Summa theologiae II-II, q. 5 a. 2.

⁴⁸ In fact, (2) is the reason for believing in the case of the ‘faith commonly so called.’ See below, note 51.

⁴⁹ If someone objects that Aquinas is using the word affectus, and not will, it may be mentioned that he employs affectus, as well as related words or phrases such as affective or per affectum, to refer not only to passions, but also to all appetitive acts, whether sensitive or rational.

⁵⁰ According to G. Dawes, ‘the faith of demons is not, it seems, unformed faith, since even unformed faith is shaped by ‘a certain affection for the good’ and is in this sense a gift of God’ (Dawes, G., ‘The Act of Faith: Aquinas and the Moderns.’ In Kvanvig, J. (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, vol. 6 [New York: Oxford University Press, 2015], p. 70,Google Scholar note 21). While commenting on James 2:19 (‘even the demons believe [pisteuousin] that, and shudder’), W. C. Smith says that in the passage in question ‘pisteuo’ simply does not refer to the Christian faith (Smith, W. C., Belief and History (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1977), p. 74).Google Scholar

⁵¹ ‘We distinguish the virtue of faith from faith commonly so called (communiter sumpta), which has no reference to the beatitude we hope for’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 4 a. 1).

⁵² See Luke 17:5 (tr. NRSV).

⁵³ Philippians 1:9 (tr. NRSV).

⁵⁴ Augustine, The Soliloquies (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1910), vol. 1, 1:5.Google Scholar Let me add an interesting reflection by Kierkegaard. He says to the Christian who practices the sacraments: ‘You have come here today because you feel drawn to him, but from this it does not follow that you dare to think that he has already drawn you wholly to himself’. Kierkegaard then concludes by quoting the passage of the Gospel I have cited above: ‘Lord, increase my faith’ (Kierkegaard, S., Practice in Christianity, Hong, H.E. and Hong, E.H. (eds) (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1991), p. 156.Google Scholar)

⁵⁵ ‘Quantitas habitus ex duobus attendi potest, uno modo, ex obiecto; alio modo, secundum participationem subiecti. Obiectum autem fidei potest dupliciter considerari, uno modo, secundum formalem rationem; alio modo, secundum ea quae materialiter credenda proponuntur. Formale autem obiectum fidei est unum et simplex scilicet veritas prima, ut supra dictum est. Unde ex hac parte fides non diversificatur in credentibus, sed est una specie in omnibus, ut supra dictum est. Sed ea quae materialiter credenda proponuntur sunt plura, et possunt accipi vel magis vel minus explicite. Et secundum hoc potest unus homo plura explicite credere quam alius. Et sic in uno potest esse maior fides secundum maiorem fidei explicationem. Si vero consideretur fides secundum participationem subiecti, hoc contingit dupliciter. Nam actus fidei procedit et ex intellectu et ex voluntate, ut supra dictum est. Potest ergo fides in aliquo dici maior uno modo ex parte intellectus, propter maiorem certitudinem et firmitatem, alio modo ex parte voluntatis, propter maiorem promptitudinem seu devotionem vel confidentiam’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 4).

⁵⁶ ‘Videtur quod fides non possit esse maior in uno quam in alio’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 4 obj. 1).

⁵⁷ ‘Ille qui pertinaciter discredit aliquid eorum quae sub fide continentur non habet habitum fidei, quem tamen habet ille qui non explicite omnia credit, sed paratus est omnia credere. Et secundum hoc ex parte obiecti unus habet maiorem fidem quam alius, in quantum plura explicite credit’ ‘(Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 4 ad 1).

⁵⁸ While responding to another objection, Aquinas adds that ‘some submit to it [the first truth] with greater certitude and devotion than others; and in this way faith is greater in one than in another’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 5 a. 4 ad 2).

⁵⁹ When reflects on Aquinas's view of virtues, T. Penelhum points out that all of them, including the infused ones, ‘can be had by individuals in varying degrees.’(Penelhum, ‘The Analysis of Faith in Thomas Aquinas,’ Religious Studies 13 (1977), p. 136Google Scholar) This author appropriately quotes the passage in which Aquinas deals with the objection that the infused virtues ‘are from God Whose power is uniform and infinite.’ To this objection, Thomas responds that ‘God does not work by necessity of nature, but according to the order of His wisdom, by which he bestows on men various measures of virtue’ (Summa theologiae I-II q. 66 a. 1, obj. 3).

⁶⁰ ‘Caritas viae potest augeri. Ex hoc enim dicimur esse viatores quod in Deum tendimus, qui est ultimus finis nostrae beatitudinis. . .Et ideo de ratione caritatis viae est ut possit augeri, si enim non posset augeri, iam cessaret viae processus.’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 24 a. 4).

⁶¹ ‘Primo quidem incumbit homini studium principale ad recedendum a peccato et resistendum concupiscentiis eius, quae in contrarium caritatis movent. Et hoc pertinet ad incipientes, in quibus caritas est nutrienda vel fovenda ne corrumpatur. Secundum autem studium succedit, ut homo principaliter intendat ad hoc quod in bono proficiat. Et hoc studium pertinet ad proficientes, qui ad hoc principaliter intendunt ut in eis caritas per augmentum roboretur. Tertium autem studium est ut homo ad hoc principaliter intendat ut Deo inhaereat et eo fruatur. Et hoc pertinent ad perfectos, qui cupiunt dissolvi et esse cum Christo.’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 24 a. 9).

⁶² Mortal sin is incompatible with charity (see Summa theologiae II-II q. 24 a. 10). Since ‘every mortal sin consists in aversion from God,’ the lowest degree of charity implies ‘union with God’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 24 a. 12 ad5).

⁶³ ‘Omne peccatum mortale contrariatur caritati. Non autem omne peccatum mortale contrariatur fidei vel spei, sed quaedam determinata peccata, per quae habitus fidei et spei tollitur.’ (Summa theologiae II-II q. 24 a. 12 ad5).

⁶⁴ See above, note 57.

⁶⁵ See above, note 15.