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Purity is still a problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 October 2023

Nicholas DiMaggio Open the ORCID record for Nicholas DiMaggio [Opens in a new window] ,
Kurt Gray Open the ORCID record for Kurt Gray [Opens in a new window]  and
Frank Kachanoff Open the ORCID record for Frank Kachanoff [Opens in a new window]
Nicholas DiMaggio
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, USA. nichdima@live.unc.edu kurtgray@unc.ed Department of Psychology, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH, USA
Kurt Gray
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, USA. nichdima@live.unc.edu kurtgray@unc.ed
Frank Kachanoff
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON, Canada fkachanoff@wlu.ca
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Abstract

Our recent review demonstrates that “purity” is a messy construct with at least nine popular scientific understandings. Cultural beliefs about self-control help unify some of these understandings, but much messiness remains. The harm-centric theory of dyadic morality suggests that purity violations can be comprehensively understood as abstract harms, acts perceived by some people (and not others) to indirectly cause suffering.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e302
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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