Abstract
When choosing a voting rule to make subsequent decisions, the members of a committee may wish this rule to be self-selected when it is the object of a choice among a menu of different possible voting rules. Such concepts have recently been explored in Social Choice theory, and a menu of voting rule is said to be stable if it contains at least one self-selective voting rule at each profile of preferences on voting rules. We consider in this article the menu constituted by the three well-known scoring rules {Borda, Plurality, and Antiplurality}. Under the Impartial Culture assumption, which proposes an a priori model to estimate the likelihood of the profiles, we will derive a probability for the stability of this triplet of voting rules.
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Diss, M., Merlin, V. On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules. Theory Decis 69, 289–316 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9187-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9187-6