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Divers, J., Miller, A. Arithmaetical Platonism: Reliability and Judgement-Dependence. Philosophical Studies 95, 277–310 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004235625141
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004235625141