Abstract
In this paper we consider the concept of a self-aware agent. In cognitive science agents are seen as embodied and interactively situated in worlds. We analyse the meanings attached to these terms in cognitive science and robotics, proposing a set of conditions for situatedness and embodiment, and examine the claim that internal representational schemas are largely unnecessary for intelligent behaviour in animats. We maintain that current situated and embodied animats cannot be ascribed even minimal self-awareness, and offer a six point definition of embeddedness, constituting minimal conditions for the evolution of a sense of self. This leads to further analysis of the nature of embodiment and situatedness, and a consideration of whether virtual animats in virtual worlds could count as situated and embodied. We propose that self-aware agents must possess complex structures of self-directed goals; multi-modal sensory systems and a rich repertoire of interactions with their worlds. Finally, we argue that embedded agents will possess or evolve local co-ordinate systems, or points of view, relative to their current positions in space and time, and have a capacity to develop an egocentric space. None of these capabilities are possible without powerful internal representational capacities.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Agre, P. E. (1991), The Dynamic Structure of Everyday Life, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Agre, P. E. and Chapman, D. (1987), 'Pengi: An Implementation of a Theory of Activity', AAAI 87, pp. 268–272.
Aleksander, I. (1996), Impossible Minds: My Neurons, My Consciousness, London: Imperial College Press.
Bermudez, J. L., Marcel, A. and Eilan, N. (1995), The Body and the Self, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Blackburn, S. (1999), Think, Oxford University Press
Brewer, B. (1992), 'Self-Location and Agency', Mind 101, pp. 17–34
Brewer, B. (1995), 'Bodily Awareness and the Self', in J.L. Bermudez, A. Marcel and N. Eilan, eds., The Body and the Self, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Brooks, R. A. (1991a), 'New Approaches to Robotics', Science 523, pp. 1227–1232.
Brooks, R. A. (1991b), 'Intelligence Without Reason', in Proceedings of the 1991 IJCAI Conference, pp. 569–595
Brooks, R. A. (1991c), 'Intelligence Without Representation', Artificial Intelligence Journal 47, pp. 139–169
Cammarata, S., McArthur, D and Steeb, R. (1983), 'Strategies of Cooperation in Distributed Problem Solving', in Proceedings of the 1983 IJCAI Conference.
Churchland, P. S. and Sejnowski, T. J. (1992), The Computational Brain, MIT, Bradford Books.
Clark, A and Chalmers, D. J. (1998), 'The Extended Mind', Analysis 58(1), pp. 7–19.
Evans, G. (1982), The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Freeman W. J. and Yao, Y. (1990), 'Chaos in the Bio-dynamics of Pattern Recognition by Neural Networks', in Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Neural Networks 1, pp. 243–249.
Gibson, J. J. (1979), The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Haugeland, J. (1993), 'Mind Embodied and Embedded', in Proceedings of the International Symposium on Mind and Cognition, Taipei, Taiwan: Academia Synica.
Held, R. and Hem, A. (1963), 'Movement produced stimulation in the development of visually guided behaviour', Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 56, pp. 872–876.
Lesser, V. R. and Corkhill, D. D. (1983), 'The Distributed Vehicle Monitoring Testbed: A Tool for Investigating Distributed Problem-Solving Networks', AI Magazine 4(3), pp. 15–33.
Locke, J. (1960), An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in A. D. Woozley, ed., Collins Fount Paperbacks
Mataric, M. J. (1992), 'Designing Emergent Behaviours; Form Local Interactions to Intelligent Behaviour', From Animals to Animals 2, in J.-A. Meyer, H. Rotblatt, S. Wilson, (eds.) Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on the Simulation of Adaptive Behaviour, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 432–441.
Mataric, M. J. and Brooks, R. A. (1990), 'Learning a Distributed Map Representation Based on Navigation Behaviours', in Proceedings of the 1990 USA-Japan Symposium on Flexible Automation, pp. 499–506.
Maturana, H. R. and Varela, F. J. (1973), 'Autopoiesis: The Organization of the Living', reprinted in H. R. Maturana and F. J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living, Boston: D. Reidel; Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 42, pp. 59–138.
McKenna, T. M., McMullen, T. A. and Schlesinger, M. F. (1994), 'The Brain as a Dynamical Physical System', Neuroscience 60(3), pp. 587–605
Meijsing, M. (2000), 'Self-Consciousness and the Body', Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7(6), pp. 34–52.
Meyer, B. (1996), Object-Oriented Software Construction, Prentice Hall.
Nilsson, N. J. (ed.) (1984), Shakey the Robot, Stanford Research Institute AI Centre Technical Report 323
Payton, D. W. (1990), 'Internalised Plans-A Representation for Action Resources', Robotics and Autonomous Systems 6(1-2), pp. 89–103.
Reynolds, C. (1987), 'Flocks, Herds and Schools: A Distributed Behavioral Model', Computer Graphics 21, p. 25.
Smith, B. C. (1991), 'The Owl and the Electric Encyclopaedia', Artificial Intelligence Journal 47, pp. 251–288.
Stern, D. (1985), The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology, New York: Basic Books.
Strawson, G. (1997), 'The Self', Journal of Consciousness Studies 4(56), pp. 405–428.
Strawson, G. (1999), 'The Self and the SESMET', Journal of Consciousness Studies 6(4), pp. 99–135.
Stuart, S. A. J. and Dobbyn C. (2000), 'Kantian Descriptive Metaphysics and A-Life', in Art, Technology, Consciousness, Intellect Press
Suchmann, L. (1987), Plans and Situated Actions: the Problem of Human-Machine Communication, Cambridge University Press
Wheeler, M. (1995) 'From Robots to Rothko' in C. Marsh and S. Price, eds., The World, the Image and Aesthetic Experience, Bradford Interface
van Gelder, T. J. (1998), 'The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science', Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21, pp. 1–14.
Varela, F. J. (1991), 'Organism: A Meshwork of Selfless Selves', in A.J. Tauber, ed., Organism and the Origins of Self, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers; Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 129.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Dobbyn, C., Stuart, S. The Self as an Embedded Agent. Minds and Machines 13, 187–201 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022997315561
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022997315561