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Tossing the Rotten Thing Out:Eliminating Bad Reasons not to Solve the Problem of Moral Luck

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 November 2005

Darren Domsky
Affiliation:
Auburn University, Alabama

Abstract

Solving the problem of moral luck—the problem of dealing with conflicting intuitions about whether moral blameworthiness varies with luck in cases of negligence—is like repairing a dented fender in front of two kinds of critic. The one keeps telling you that there is no dent, and the other sees the dent but keeps warning you that repairing it will do more harm than good. It is time to straighten things out. As I argue elsewhere, the solution to the problem of moral luck is finally revealed. Our task now is twofold: to hold a magnifying glass up to the initial problem, so that all might finally see it; and to dismiss unfounded fears about solving that problem, so that all might finally stop grinning and bearing it.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2005

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