Abstract
In a recent paper, Thomas Carnes develops a novel argument for reparations for historical injustices. This Reply shows that Carnes succeeds only at the cost of invoking an implausible formalism. The Reply also presents in brief a simpler argument for reparations.
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Notes
Carnes 2019.
I acknowledge that one could mount a case against reparations, relying on something far weaker than Premise (1). Instead, one could rely on the following claim: one must be causally responsible for an historic wrong in order to bear a duty to compensate for it. Combining this claim with (2) would offer a new version of the HRO, something we might call HRO*. Of course, Carnes does not discuss HRO*, and it would go beyond responding to Carnes for this Reply to engage with HRO*.
Here I draw on Anderson 2010 (p. 74).
I only consider these two alternatives, but my analysis for other possible alternatives (e.g. issuing bonds, chartering a state-run business, raising money through fines or civil forfeitures, increasing the cost of various state products or services) will be much the same.
Formalism is a term used a variety of ways. See Schauer 1988 for an understanding close to that on offer here.
Functionalism is also used in many ways. Cohen (1935 p. 826) offers a slogan that best captures what I have in mind: “A thing is what it does.”
References
Anderson, E. (2010). The imperative of integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Carnes, T. (2019). Historical injustice, collective agency, and compensatory duties. Southwest Philosophy Review, 35(1), 79–89.
Cohen, F. S. (1935). Transcendental nonsense and the functional approach. Columbia Law Review, 35(6), 809–849.
Schauer, F. (1988). Formalism. Yale Law Journal, 97(4), 509–548.
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Donelson, R. Reparations, Responsibility, and Formalism : A Reply to Carnes. Philosophia 49, 643–649 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00237-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00237-y