Why Pains Are Not Mental Objects

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Dennett, D. (1991): Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
Google Scholar
Ducasse, C.J. (1952): ‘Moore's Refutation of Idealism’, in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, New York: Tudor.
Google Scholar
Grahek, N. (1995): ‘The Sensory Dimension of Pain’, Philosophical Studies 79, 167–184.
Google Scholar
Jackson, F. (1986): ‘What Mary Didn't Know’, Journal of Philosophy 88(5), 291–295.
Google Scholar
Langsam, H. (1995): ‘Why Pains are Mental Objects’, Journal of Philosophy 92, 303–313.
Google Scholar
Melzak, R. and Wall, P.D. (1988): The Challenge of Pain, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Google Scholar
Nelkin, N. (1986): ‘Pains and Pain Sensations’, The Journal of Philosophy 83, 129–148.
Google Scholar
Ryle, G. (1949): The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson and Co.
Google Scholar
Spanos, N.P., Perlini, A.H. and Robertson, L.A. (1989): ‘Hypnosis, Suggestion, and Placebo in the Reduction of Experimental Pain’, Journal of Experimental Psychology 98(3), 285–293.
Google Scholar
Tye, M. (1984): ‘Pain and the Adverbial Theory’, American Philosophical Quarterly 21(4), 319–327.
Google Scholar
Tye, M. (1989): The Metaphysics of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Google Scholar

Department of Philosophy, University of Western Australia, Nedlands, 6009, Australia
Guy Douglas

Authors

Guy Douglas
View author publications
You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Douglas, G. Why Pains Are Not Mental Objects. Philosophical Studies 91, 127–148 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004280711849

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.