Abstract
Luciano Floridi presents Information Ethics (IE) as an alternative to traditional moral theories. IE consists of two tenets. First, reality can be interpreted at numerous, mutually consistent levels of abstraction, the highest of which is information. This level, unlike the others, applies to all of reality. Second, everything, insofar as it is an information object, has some degree of intrinsic value and hence moral dignity. I criticize IE, arguing that Floridi fails to show that the moral community should be expanded beyond beings capable of suffering or having preferences. Next, I look at Floridi’s extended case against consequentialism generally and utilitarianism in particular. I try to show that his criticisms are flawed. Third, I argue that, for the most part, it is not clear what IE’s practical implications are. I conclude with a critical discussion of the one area of information ethics, traditionally conceived, that Floridi has written about at length, privacy.
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Notes
However, this does not mean that everything is of equal worth. “Responsible agents,” that is, agents capable of evaluating their actions in the light of moral principles, deserve the “highest degree of respect because they are the only ones capable both of knowing the infosphere and improving it according to their self-determined projects…” (Floridi 1999, p. 50).
I would like to thank Jane Carter for her comments.
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Doyle, T. A Critique of Information Ethics. Know Techn Pol 23, 163–175 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12130-010-9104-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12130-010-9104-x