

A NOTE ON NYĀYA-VIEW OF INDICATIVE STATEMENTS

N. S. DRAVID

Some clarification seems to be called for regarding the Nyāya-view of the indicative statement and its several types. There appears to be a misconception that according to Nyāya subject-predicate statements, identity-statements and relational statements are of types different from one another. It needs therefore to be clearly stressed that not only Nyāya even other Indian philosophical schools hold the subject-predicate-statement to be the only type of indicative statement and the other two referred to above as falling under this very category. Every indicative statement is a subject-predicate statement and it is also relational. Since every indicative statement is the assertion of a predicate (which is unasserted) about a previously-unasserted term which is the subject, there has to be a predicate and a subject in every indicative statement. The indicative statement has to be relational too because its predicate is ascribed (and is only ascribable) to a certain relation to its subject. No ascription can be without some relation or other. Even identity called 'Tādātmya' in Sanskrit is a relation. (Identity can be treated even as a property). Generally in the representation by modern logical symbols an indicative statement is symbolised as 'Fa' where 'a' stands for the subject and 'F' for the predicate. There is no symbol for the relation in this symbolisation. The reason for this which is not generally realised by logicians is that in all cases of subject-predicate statements the subject is mistakenly taken to be identical with the predicate and identity is not treated as a relation (and very often not even as a property). It is true that if in a subject-predicate statement the predicate is equated with the term that is characterised by the predicated property then the subject and the predicate in the statement would be identical with each other. For example in the statement 'The tablecloth is blue' the predicate 'blue' may be taken either in

the sense of 'the blue colour' or 'a thing that is endued with blue colour'. If the latter sense be taken then the subject 'the tyablecloth' becomes identical with the predicate, 'A thing that is endued with blue colour'. But in so rendering and then symbolising the subject-predicate-statement the important distinction, holding between a statement stating total identity and that stating partial identity between the subject and the predicate is conveniently forgotten. 'The morning star is the evening star' is a statement of total identity between the morning star and the evening star but the above statement. 'The tablecloth is blue' does not state total identity between the table-cloth and a thing endued with blue colour, there being many other things endued with blue colour. In cases like this it is more appropriate to treat the statement as not a statement of identity but of a relation like inherence holding between a quality and a thing endowed with the quality. So the symbolisation of the statement as 'Fa' would not be proper. A symbol for the special relation holding between the subject and the predicate would have to be interposed between the symbols for the predicate and the subject. While doing this a very important point mentioned in this connection by Indian logicians has to be taken note of. The great Indian logician and semanticist Gadādhara says in his wellknown treatise on logical semantics (called *Vyutpattivāda*) that in verbal cognition resulting from indicative statements the relation of subject and predicate terms is *manifested* syntactically, it is not denoted by any word as the subject and predicate are. The grammatical arrangement of the subject and the predicate-term does itself suggest or manifest the kind of relation that is supposed to bind the two terms. In the foregoing example, although no word denoting the inherence-relation occurs in the statement, the relation is suggested by the subject-term and the predicate-term occurring with their proper case-endings in the sentence. Grammarians with logicians have laid down the general rule that in a sentence with both the subject and the predicate-terms occurring in the nominative case it is the relation of identity between the subject and the predicate that is expressed by the statement. In sentences where the two terms occur with different case-endings, relations like conjunction, inherence etc. holding between the subject and the predicate are expressed by the statements signified by the sentences.

It needs here to be clarified that just as 'Fa' is not an accurate symbolisation of the indicative statement 'a Rb' also is not its accurate symbolisation for the above reason itself. The relation of 'a' and 'b' or the subject and the predicate is not asserted but only expressed or manifested in the statement.

But the capital 'R' suggests that the relation is quite prominent—perhaps more prominent than the terms in the statement—which absolutely is not the case. The relation is as explained, quite subdued in the statement. As it is, the symbolisation would rather represent the predication of a relational property of the subject. In a statement like 'Dasaratha is the father of Rāma', the relational property fatherhood in relation to Rāma is predicated of Dasaratha and this is precisely symbolisable by 'a-Rb'. Even here the inherence relation of fatherhood to Dasaratha is only manifested syntactically and not denoted by any word in the statement. A properly representative symbolisation of the subject-predicate-statement would be somewhat like 'a-B' in which the subdued position of the relation is shown by placing the 'r' below 'a' and 'B' and the prominent position (as being asserted) of the predicate is shown by the capital B. 'Fa' is good only to represent the 'a' presumed as asserted, to be 'b'. If the assertion-sign is added to the symbolisation then there would have to be there a symbol for the unasserted but syntactically-manifested relation.

Thus it is amply clear that the so called identity-statement is as much a subject-predicate-statement as any other relational or relational property statement is. Not only Nyāya but all other Indian philosophical schools maintain that all indicative statements are of the subject-predicate type simply because in every indicative statement there is something which is presumed to have been known or given as such and such about which some relational property, quality or pure property is being asserted, this assertion being the only purpose of making the statement. Even in a so called identity-statement identity with the predicate is asserted of the subject which is presumed to have been already asserted. There is therefore no reason to class apart the identity-statement as different from the subject-predicate statement. There is however one kind of identity-statement which is absolutely unacceptable to every Indian philosophical school. It is the tautological statement like 'p is p' which is not regarded as a statement at all by Indian logic and philosophy because there is no assertion of the unasserted in tautology. There is only repetition of the subject-term which is taken as already asserted when it is taken up as the subject term. Only what is not unasserted and not presumed to have been asserted can be asserted in a significant statement. This is both a common-sensical and a logical rule. However a statement referring to identity as a property of a thing need not be treated as tautological and therefore meaningless. 'The pot is identical with itself' is not a tautology because it is not

'itself' but identical with itself that is predicated of the pot by a relation other than identity. A statement which is reducible to tautology like ' $p \supset p \vee p$ ' need not therefore be regarded as tautological or meaningless in the view of Indian logic. If the repeated assertion of what is already asserted or presumed to have been asserted is treated as significant then like ' p is p ', ' p is is p ', ' p is is p is' could as well be treated as significant. There are only two or three assertions of the same predicate in the two statements.

This discussion brings us to the Nyāya interpretation of identity-statements which are significant and not tautological. The recognitive statement like 'This is the same person whom I met the other day', states the identity of a person characterised by two different and even partly opposed characteristics. A person seen sometime back and noticed as possessing certain specific features then obtaining cannot be identified as the very person who is being seen as exhibiting certain features not noticed earlier. This is possible only if certain previously perceived features of the person are ignored and only the features that remained constant from the past to the present are attended to. But if the past features of the person are ignored his perception cannot be of the nature of recognition which is by its very nature the synthesis of the past and the present percepts. But just as recollection cannot be synthesised with perception, so also the contents of these disparate types of cognition cannot be synthesised with each other. To ward off this difficulty Indian logicians take recourse to the notion of the marker attribute or what is called 'upalakṣana' in Sanskrit. Attributes or properties of things may broadly be divided into four different types namely, the strict determinant (called aavacchedaka' in the Nyāya terminology), the qualifier (called 'Viśeṣaṇa' in Sanskrit), the marker or occasional qualifier and the accidental locatee (called 'Ādheya' or Vṛttimat'). To illustrate these four types of attributes we may take certain attributes or properties of a pot. Potness or a specific shape being fashioned from clay (if it is a claypot) is a strict determinant of the being of the pot. The particular colour that the pot is painted is its qualifying attribute. The colour does not determine the being of the pot but it qualifies it so long as it lasts. When the colour has faded it acquires the status of a 'marker-attribute' as those who have seen the pot as of that colour would surely remember it to have been of that colour. Water poured in the pot or anything else put in the pot would be just its accidental locatee. Such locatees are only temporarily and externally associated with the pot.

In the above example of recognitive cognition it can be maintained that the present percept is synthesised with the past recollected content treated as its marker but not as a qualifier or determinant. The present entity need not be characterised by pastness and the associated features when it is being perceived. It is enough if it is cognised as only having been endowed with the past features. A problem may however arise here in the interpretation of the recognitive statement. Pastness or the recollected features of the present entity which are connoted by words occurring in the sentence cannot be dismissed just as the markers of the former to make the synthesis possible. Nyāya has therefore no go but to resort to the suggestive mode of meaning (called *Lakṣaṇā* in Sanskrit) to properly interpret the sentence. This very mode of meaning with some modification Nyāya can adopt to interpret the *mahāvākya* in which both the subject and the predicate-terms need to be taken in the suggestive mode of meaning which is not the case with the above recognitive sentence. So according to Nyāya the *mahāvākya* should mean that what is marked (not qualified) by empiricity is marked (not qualified) by universality (which means that the empirical self is the same as the universal self). Advaita goes a step further in reducing the meaning-content of the two terms in the *mahāvākya*. It simply does away with the connoted properties of the subject and the predicate retaining only their respective denotations. Empiricity and universality do not remain even as markers (or *upalakṣaṇas*) in the final meaning of the *mahāvākya*.

Here an important question may be raised. If both the subject and the predicate-terms in the *mahāvākya* mean exactly the same thing by being shorn of their connotations doesn't the *mahāvākya* amount to a tautology of the type 'p is p' which no Indian philosophical school admits as meaningful? Advaita's answer to the question is couched in the form of a unique theory known as the theory of verbal immediate cognition or verbal intuition. According to this theory the *mahāvākya* is not intended to produce verbal cognition (which is known to be tautological). Its main purpose is to induce direct introspective awareness of Brahman itself from which all distinctions (even that of the subject and the predicate) are eliminated. This is not even identity-cognition. It is the self-luminous universal consciousness itself.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. XXVIII

NUMBER 1 : JANUARY 2001

A. KANTHAMANI	: What Is It to Be a Witness Consciousness (SĀKṢIN)?	1
NICHOLAS F. GIER	: Last Judgment As Self-Judgement (Kant, Autonomy and Divine Power)	15
AKM SHAMSUR RAHMAN	: Russell and Wittgenstein On the Bearer Theory of Meaning : Some Reflections	33
ARCHANA BARUA	: On Strawson's Foundation of Moral Reality	41
KUMAR NEERAJ SACHDEV	: Are Virtues "Relative" to Culture?	49
RAJASHRI JOBANPUTRA AND P. R. BHAT	: On Why We Cannot Escape Higher Order Vagueness	57
ARUNDHATI MUKHERJI	: On Creating a Poem	69
R. N. KARANI	: A Note on Existential Instantiation	81
DISCUSSION I		
N. S. DRAVID	: A Postscript to the discussion On The Mahāvākyas	93
DISCUSSION II		
A. KANTHAMANI	: Are Dravid's Māhavākyas Fregean Māhavākyas?	97

NUMBER 2 : APRIL 2001

CHHANDA CHAKRABORTI	: Conditionals, Frank Jackson, and The Assertibility Thesis	105
KANTILAL DAS	: Justification Of Rules In Quantification Logic	119
BENULAL DHAR	: Moore's Theory Of Goodness And The Phenomenological Theories of Values : An Interface	139
SANJYOT D.PAI VERNEKAR	: Moral Status of "Informed Consent" In Medical Practice	153
ABHA SINGH	: Varṇadharmā Through The Prism of 'Social Justice'	167
YOGINI G. NIGHOJKAR	: Nature of Truth	175
SATRUGHNA BEHERA	: Is 'Naming' Just Playing A 'Game'?	183
LAXMINARAYAN LENKA	: The Paradox Of Rule-Following	195
V. K. BHARADVAJA	: Śāṅkarācāryas' Argument From Śruti	201
JAGAT PAL	: The Concept of Niṣkāma Karma : Teleological Or Deontological?	215
RAJENDRA PRASAD	: Rethinking The Two Faces Of Svarāja : Pre-Independence And Post-Independence	227
PALLAVI VAID	: Kant's Morality And Williams' Ethics	243
BOOK REVIEWS		
MEENAL KATARNIKAR	: <i>In Defense Of Pure Reason</i>	257
S. V. BOKIL	: <i>Varṇadharmā, Niṣkāma Karma and Practical Morality</i>	272

NUMBER 3 : JULY 2001

F. N. NDUBUISI	: Edmund Husserl on Phenomenology	283
KANTILAL DAS	: Hare on Moral Universalizability : A Critical Survey	297
R. P. SINGH	: Modern And Postmodern Philosophical Quest : A Methodological Analysis	315
MUHAMMAD KAMAL	: Critique of Heidegger's Understanding of The Meaning of Being	323
SUDNYA KULKARNI	: The Categorical Imperative : Its Epistemological Status	333
REKHA NAVNEET	: Ecological Ethics : Ethics of Sustenance	343
RISHIKANT PANDEY	: Why To Distinguish Performative And Constative Utterances ?	353
RAGHUNATH GHOSH	: Is Samānya Real ? A Critique of the Vaiśeṣika View	363
JAGAT PAL	: The Theory Of Birth And Death in Early Buddhism	375
GOPAL KRISHNA SINHA	: Absolute Idealism Having Pragmatic Colour : A Critique of Royce's Approach	385
G. VEDAPARAYANA	: The Perspective of Truth with Special Reference to J. Krishnamurti	399
N. S. DRAVID	: Non-Cognition As an Instrument of Cognition	409
DISCUSSION I		
GOPAL SAHU	: Whose Framework ?	421
DISCUSSION II		
S. H. KELSHIKAR	: Quine on Ontological Commitment	425

NUMBER 4 : OCTOBER 2001

RANJAN K. GHOSH	: Rethinking Svarāj In Ideas	433
INDRANI BHATTACHARJEE	: Competence and Language Acquisition : Determining the Conceptual Limits of Chomskyan Nativism	443
SUSHIT KUMAR SARKAR	: Buddhyapekṣam In Kāṇāda Sūtra - 1.2.3	455
MARTIN A. BERTMAN	: Beauty : Kant's Disussion	463
SARAL JHINGRAN	: Self and Others In Moral Discourse Kant, Existentialists, Liberals and Communitarians	471
ABHA SINGH	: Social Philosophy Of Rāmānuja : Its Modern Relevance	491
RAMAKANTA BAL	: Wittgenstein On Relativism	499
AMIT KR. SEN	: A Reply to 'Apology For Bivalence'	507
ARCHANA BARUA	: Technology and The Centrality Of Person	517
H. M. JOSHI	: Nature Of Human Destiny In View Of Radhakrishnan's Reflections	529
S. M. BHAVE	: Vyāpti and Sets	541
N. S. DRAVID	: A Note On Nyāya-View Of Indicative Statements	549

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY**Individual Life Membership**

382. Dr. G. Kulathuran
Associate Professor
School of Philosophy
Tamil University
Thanjavur 613005 (TN)
383. Dr. V. Prabhakaran
Shri Visakh
Thekkegramam Road,
Ankode Chittur
Palakkad-Kerala 678 101
384. Dr. Sudnya N. Kulkarni
A 137 Madhuvan
Delhi 110 092
385. Dr. Karnel Singh Gill
836/2 Kot Atma Singh
Amritsar 143 001
386. Ms. Rupali Majumdar
C/o Mrs. Anu Majumdar
P. O. DIBRUGARHA
Central Chowki dinghee
Ruplal Dutta Path
Dibrugarh, Assam 786 001
387. Prof. D. N. Tiwari
107, Up stairs, Hindustan Pharam
Lalbagh, Darbhanga 846 001

388. Fr. S. Stephen Jayard
Papel Seminary
Ramwadi Pune 411 014
389. Fr. Kuruvilla
Papel Seminary
Ramwadi Pune 411 014

Institutional Permanent Membership

The Principal
Dharnidhar College
Keonjhar 758 001

B O O K S R E C E I V E D

1. Chakravarti, Sitansu S. : *Modality, Reference and Sense - An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*, New Delhi-55, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, Pvt. Ltd., 2001 pp. XII + 148, Price Rs. 300/-
2. Joshi, H.M. : *Traditional and Contemporary Ethics*. Delhi-7, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 2000, pp. xiv + 437. Price 450/-
3. Kiran R.N. : *Philosophies of Communication and Media Ethics*, Delhi-35, B.R. Publishing Corporation, 2000, pp. xxxiv + 342, Price 750/-
4. Menon, Sangeetha *et.al* (Eds.) *Scientific and Philosophical Studies on Consciousness*, Bangalore -12, National Institute of Advanced Studies, 1999, pp.x + 392, Price Rs. 350/- - in India & U.S.\$ 30/- outside India.
5. Muppathichira, Thomas : *Confucius Beyond Times*, Blandijnberg-2 Ghent (Belgium), Communication and Cognition-Uni. of Ghent, 1999, pp.vi + 277
6. Pradhan, R.C. (Ed.) *Philosophy of Wittgenstein-Indian Responses*, New Delhi, Decent Books, 2001, pp.x + 213, Price Rs. 350/-
7. Pradhan, R.C. : *Recent Developments in Analytic Philosophy*, Indian Council For Philosophical Research, 2001, pp.xx + 516. Price Rs. 650/-
8. Robinson, Helier, J. : *Relation Philosophy of Mathematics, Science and Mind*, Furgus, Ont. Canada, Speedside Publishing, 2000, pp.vi + 346.
9. Sharma, Thakur D. : *The Science and Logic of Absolutely Pure*, Emerson. N.J.G.J. Corporation-86 Wortendyke Ave, 1999, pp.xxvi +357.
10. Swamigal, Sri Jñānananda Bharathi : *Thoughts From the Gitā*, Chennai - 600 004, Sri. Vidyateerth Foundation, pp.x + 140, Price Rs. 40/-
11. Vardarajana, C. : *The Divine Life of Sri Sitārāmdās Omkārnāth*. Kolkata -35, Kinkar Rameshchandra-Mahamil Math, pp.x + 87, Price Rs. 60.