Abstract
This paper is concerned with the practical importance of different forms of paternalism for educational theory and practice. Contrary to the traditional treatment of paternalism as a sometimes necessary and rather messy aspect of educational practices, I demonstrate that paternalism is to be regarded as an “indigenous concept” (Herbart) of educational theory and as the ‘indigenous model of justification’ that underlies the structure of educational practices. Based on an analysis of the intricate nexus between autonomy-oriented forms of paternalism and educational forms of autonomy-based perfectionism I furthermore argue that a perfectionistically structured conception of autonomy provides a more adequate evaluative framework for justifying autonomy as an educational aim than alternative educational regimes of autonomy can deliver. Finally, I discuss some major theoretical problems of bridging the gap between general ethical principles and their application in practical fields.
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Notes
Anderson specifies the term regime as follows: “(…)a ‘regime’ comprises (1) a specification of both what gets you the deontic status and what it gets you, (2) a scheme of how to implement or institutionalize the attribution (and contestation) of statuses, and (3) an understanding of what justifies both the specification and the institutionalization of the deontic status. What will typically be especially central to characterizing a given regime will be the views and policies regarding how much of the relevant capacities individuals must have to gain certain entitlements in particular social practices. To speak of a regime is to speak of this entire, more-or-less consistent network of normative interrelations and modes of implementing them” (Anderson 2013, p. 5).
There is also an historical connection between the rise of autonomy-oriented forms of education and the beginning of theoretical forms of reflection on educational practices. The need to theorize education as a social practice and the rise of autonomy as an educational ideal became endemic in a time in which traditional social orders and corresponding forms of intergenerational reproduction began to be regarded as contingent.
I use the terms ‘philosophy of education’ and ‘educational theory’ interchangeably. Even though philosophers of education in the German tradition of educational theory (`Allgemeine Pädagogik´) usually justify the existence of their discipline and the significance of their theoretical work with reference to the ‘object’ of their study (e.g. an analysis of the basic structure, the ‘formal-object’ or fundamental problems of education relevant for all the other educational disciplines), neither the methods used nor the questions asked differ substantially from ‘philosophical’ methods and questions. Thus, apart from the difference between what an educational theorist claims to do and actually does and apart from the fact that educational theoreticians differ substantially in the way they construct the tasks of the discipline (there seem to be as many conceptions of the tasks and the raisons d'être of educational theory or ‘Allgemeine Pädagogik’ as there are theoreticians of education), whatever they do in the end can be subsumed under the label: philosophy of education.
Although it is reasonable to analyze the three issues separately, I nevertheless defend the more general position that the descriptive and normative aspects of all three structural problems can be reconstructed more adequately on the basis of a more complex and theoretically differentiated view on competing conceptions of autonomy and their differing functions and roles within different social spheres intertwined with the educational domain (e.g. the political domain, the market).
As a preliminary remark it should be noted that in the following I am primarily concerned with the theoretical status and practical significance of general rationales (e.g. different versions of paternalism and perfectionism) and thus with theoretical fundamentals and not with the justification of particular arrangements or acts in specific domains (e.g. the justification of state coercion by compulsory schooling for instance or the justification of paternalism in the relationship between parents and their children: cf. Mullin 2013).
It should be noted, however, that I am not attempting to develop a whole new theory of autonomy here. Instead this paper should be understood as a contribution to the discussion of the autonomy-theoretical basis of education, as it is cultivated in classical (e.g. Benner 1987) and newer approaches (e.g. Giesinger 2005) in the German tradition of Allgemeine Pädagogik and in the tradition of philosophy of education (e.g. Brighouse 2006).
This characterization of pedagogical paternalism does not claim to capture all relevant forms of pedagogical paternalism in all relevant contexts and therefore solely has a heuristic function.
This does not imply that paternalistically motivated policies could not be based on concern for the well-being of particular communities. Paternalism towards groups presents intricate questions for most traditional conceptions of paternalism that I have to skip in this paper.
Thus, pedagogical agents who believe to be anti-paternalists necessarily misunderstand themselves or are not pedagogical agents. This common theoretical and conceptual misunderstanding probably is not only due to paternalism´s “bad press” in scientific and popular debates alike, but also due to the identification of paternalist rationales with particular educational practices that are either equally unpopular or are regarded as increasingly objectionable (e.g. authority, discipline, coercion). The fact that the very concept of a pedagogical anti-paternalism can be regarded as a contradictio in adiecto certainly is one reason for the increasing suspicion that educational interventions attract in recent times (cf. Giesinger 2005). Nevertheless, it does not make much sense for philosophers of education to solely refer to the general `dangers of paternalism´ or to equate paternalism with illegitimate paternalism—as if the relevant justificatory problems pedagogical paternalism poses could be disposed of this way and as if paternalism were something that could (or should) per se be avoided in educational practice.
Thus, Grill makes an important point when he states that “paternalism is independent of conflicting theories of the good. Paternalism is interfering with a person for her good, regardless of what that good consists in exactly. However, which theory of the good one adopts affects how much room there is for paternalism” (Grill 2011, p 12).
The term ´objectively´ in this context can either refer to the position that a trait is good, independent of the mental state of the agent, or to the position that certain values are worth promoting and intrinsically valuable independent of the preferences of the agent (Schramme 2009). It can also refer to the weaker position, that certain values are intersubjectively valuable and thus not independent of the social contexts in which they are supposed to be realized (Henning 2009, p. 178; see also Krüger 2012).
See for the important distinction between ontological and neo-pragmatist approaches to autonomy: Anderson (2008).
Especially because the educational domain is closely connected with different other domains (e.g. economy), a domain-specific conception of educational autonomy has to take considerations into account “regarding the complex implications of regimes of autonomy for other domains, where regimes are centered on other values, such as freedom or efficiency. For it might turn ought that some regimes of autonomy are much more compatible with the most compelling candidate regimes in other domains, and this would give us reason to prefer it” (Anderson 2013, p. 13; cf. this problem already the approach of: Benner 1987).
Due to reasons of space I do not discuss different rationales that are based on hypothetical consent, future consent or consent under ideal epistemic conditions.
The widespread tendency to advocate conceptions and ideals of autonomy that operate with overly demanding requirements overlooks that the stronger the requirements for autonomous agency, the less probable is that developing and not yet fully autonomous agents conform to the corresponding autonomy-ethical standards. Therefore, contrary to the view that paternalism and autonomy are incompatible polar opposites, the ever growing justificatory weight put on conceptions of autonomy in educational theories potentially allows for the legitimation of more autonomy-oriented forms of paternalism in educational settings, not less. In the endeavor of reconstructing normative requirements for autonomous agency/agents an educational theory of autonomy thus has to mediate between too weak conceptions of autonomy that are compatible with impositions of autonomy even in the most questionable contexts and too demanding, often over-intellectualized conceptions of rational autonomy, that are either empirically impossible to live up to for finite and socially dependent beings or do not allow the determination of plausible limitations on pedagogical paternalism (often bearing on “characteristics which are more likely to be found in twentieth-century intellectuals than in other groups or cultures” (Dworkin 1988, p. 17).
Dworkin (2010).
Conly (2013).
R. Dworkin (1989).
Dworkin (2010, p. 4).
Luhmann (1973, pp. 44–45).
Forst (2012) uses this notion with reference to the concept of toleration.
Correspondingly, MacCallum (1967) has shown, that all disputes about the concept of freedom refer to the basic scheme “x is (is not) free from y to do (not do, become, not become) z”. Furthermore, it can be regarded as an empirically valid insight of behavioral economics that a non-neutral way of structuring choice architectures that does not affect the choices of the beneficiary is impossible.
E.g. due to the problem of adaptive preferences or to problems described in “happy slave scenarios”: e.g. the cases described by Oshana (1998).
Problems of differentiating between constitutive and facilitating requirements of autonomy (Christman 2011) that are relevant for the evaluation of these examples, describe permanent and unsolved difficulties in the theoretical debate about autonomy.
This diagnosis is not very surprising, because philosophical reflection was and always will be to a certain extent a theoretical systematization and methodized explication of thought situated in everyday experiences.
Empirical research e.g. on different understandings of the person, autonomy and responsibility within different cultural settings: Lotter (2012).
Empirical research e.g. on the limits and possibilities of participation and self-determination in educational settings: Kurth-Buchholz (2011); Budde (2010); research on the ways the upbringing within fundamentalist religious groups affects the recipients ability to opt for the exit option: McAvoy (2012); research on the ways parents from different socio-economic backgrounds choose schools in the debate about school choice and educational justice: Ben-Porath (2010).
Empirical research e.g. on the way real—and not idealized—people choose: Trout (2005), research on ‘bounded rationality’ Kahneman (2012) and Thaler and Sunstein (2008) and on the way different rationales for interferences with autonomy are used and evaluated by agents: Blumenthal (2013); research on the way people choose under conditions of poverty: Banerjee and Duflo (2012).
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Drerup, J. Autonomy, Perfectionism and the Justification of Education. Stud Philos Educ 34, 63–87 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-014-9426-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-014-9426-3