Uneasy VirtueThe predominant view of moral virtue can be traced back to Aristotle. He believed that moral virtue must involve intellectual excellence. To have moral virtue one must have practical wisdom - the ability to deliberate well and to see what is morally relevant in a given context. Julia Driver challenges this classical theory of virtue, arguing that it fails to take into account virtues which do seem to involve ignorance or epistemic defect. Some 'virtues of ignorance' are counterexamples to accounts of virtue which hold that moral virtue must involve practical wisdom. Modesty, for example, is generally considered to be a virtue even though the modest person may be making an inaccurate assessment of his or her accomplishments. Driver argues that we should abandon the highly intellectualist view of virtue and instead adopt a consequentialist perspective which holds that virtue is simply a character trait which systematically produces good consequences. |
Contents
1 The Aristotelian Conception of Virtue | 1 |
2 The Virtues of Ignorance | 16 |
3 Dubious Virtue Psychology | 42 |
4 A Consequentialist Theory of Virtue | 63 |
5 Virtue and the Will | 84 |
Conclusion | 109 |
Notes | 111 |
| 125 | |
| 131 | |
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Common terms and phrases
account of virtue argue Aristotelian Aristotle Aristotle’s behavior believe blind charity chapter character trait characterized claim conception considered context correct perception count counterfactual courage crucial deliberation desire developed discussion disposition distinction epistemic example external fact factors fails feel function generosity good-producing harm hold Huckleberry human flourishing Hume ibid important individual intellectual virtue intentional action internal internalist intuitive Jane Bennet Kant Kantian lack maximize Melanie Wilkes Michael Slote mixed view modest person modesty involve moral luck moral quality moral virtue morally relevant motive nature necessary for virtue Nicomachean Ethics normal objective consequentialism one’s Oxford Philippa Foot phronesis plausible pleasure possesses practical wisdom problem psychological reason regard reliability requirement response Rosalind Hursthouse seems self-worth sense simply social someone sort theory of virtue things tion underestimation University Press vice view of virtue virtue epistemology virtue ethics virtue theory virtues of ignorance virtuous action virtuous agent