Abstract
Climate change and many environmental problems are caused by the accumulated effects of repeated actions by multiple individuals. Instead of relying on collective responsibility, I argue for a non-atomistic individual responsibility towards such environmental problems, encompassing omissions, ways of life, and consequences mediated by other agents. I suggest that the degree of causal responsibility of the agent must be balanced with the degree of capacity-responsibility determined by the availability of doable alternatives. Then, the more an agent has powers as a group member, the more she is responsible to design the social structure and the infrastructures of the group towards sustainability. Finally, one can hold another agent responsible only if the accused is not in a vulnerable position and if she is capable to take reparative and adaptive actions.
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Notes
I use the feminine as gender neutral.
This list of questions is inspired by Nancy Fraser who describes three abnormalities of justice with the questions What, Who and How, 2008.
Attfield already suggested that responsibility can be mediated through the actions of others, spatial and temporal distances, uncertainty and diffusion. I use the word mediated in a more limited meaning, restricted to mediation by other agents.
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Acknowledgements
Monbukagakusho (Japanese Government) Scholarship N.150559.
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Funding was provided by Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Monbukagakusho (Japanese Government) Scholarship N.150559.
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Droz, L. Environmental Individual Responsibility for Accumulated Consequences. J Agric Environ Ethics 33, 111–125 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-019-09816-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-019-09816-w