

## Review article

# Reading, implementing and theorising global justice: on some recent work in the political philosophy of cosmopolitanism

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Thom Brooks (ed.) *The Global Justice Reader*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2008, xxii, 741 pages. ISBN 9781405169646

Gillian Brock. *Global Justice: a Cosmopolitan Account*. 1st pub. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, xvi, 366 pages. ISBN 9780199230938

Lea Ypi. *Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, x, 226 pages. ISBN 9780199593873

In the last fifteen years or so, political philosophers have been increasingly busy nurturing their latest darling, *global justice* (hereinafter GJ). There are many reasons why justice, the centrepiece of much political theorising since the 1970s, has spilled beyond the confines of the (nation-)state – from certain inherent features of prominent philosophical accounts of justice to the seemingly morally arbitrary nature of state borders to the perceived or assumed effects of globalisation. In any case, the previously rather scattered reflections on the global dimension on justice-related topics have now moulded into a respected academic enterprise, generating a vast body of mutually interconnected research. Under the broad umbrella of GJ, a wealth of specific problems and/or issue areas have surfaced; for the purposes of the present essay, it is useful to note that the primarily *normative* discussion about justice in the transnational realm (i.e. what is right/wrong and what should be done about it) extends to questions of methodological, epistemological as well as ontological kind which are of wider interest to political philosophy as such.

One reason for such a broadened perspective is that two of the three titles (Brooks and Brock) appeared in print four and five years ago, respectively, and Brock's and Ypi's volumes have already received wide critical attention from within the field.<sup>1</sup> It makes therefore sense to step back and evaluate the respective contributions with the benefit of hindsight, and also perhaps more critically than has been the case with the majority of heretofore published reactions. This is facilitated by the different approaches employed in the respective books, stemming in one case (Brooks) from its *genre*, and from different authorial aims and modes of explication in the other two cases.

## Issues in global justice theorising

What are then the main problems, questions and cleavages that we may expect GJ theorists to address? First, on the normative level, one may lean towards either of two broad camps, that of *cosmopolitans* and that of *statists* (also labelled as *nationalists* or *internationalists*, depending on the specific issues in question).<sup>2</sup> The issue here is the normative relevance of state borders and/or national ties and state sovereignty in deciding the scope and weight of the demands of justice.<sup>3</sup> Brooks' volume provides a useful introduction here,

offering a number of perspectives from both sides, although cosmopolitan views are (at least numerically) more widely represented. Both Brock and Ypi defend an unambiguously cosmopolitan position while attempting to accommodate – or reject, where accommodation seems impossible – the most significant statist/nationalist arguments.

These may, second, apply to numerous substantive issues and/or policy domains, such as socio-economic justice, just war and humanitarian intervention, human rights, poverty in the world, or national self-determination. Again Brooks is especially instructive on this level, because he divides his collection of papers into altogether eleven self-contained micro-debates on particular issues. This is partly emulated in Brock who devotes about one third of her book to what might be called “applied political theory” in areas such as immigration, taxation, poverty reduction, or visions of global democratic governance. Although Ypi shares similar practice-oriented goals, her account is the most “philosophical” one, incorporating substantive discussion into a thick theoretical narrative of how best to *approach* GJ.

This is why her book shines most with regard to the third level of theorising, because she tackles head-on some difficult yet important metatheoretical issues that accompany GJ theorising (we could also speak of “methodology” in the broadest sense): How to interpret the relationship between theory (philosophy) and practice? Is it possible to reconcile the utopian edge of cosmopolitan justice with awareness of real-world constraints on political action and institutional design (which is a major difficulty treated in political philosophy under the twin heading of ideal and non-ideal theory)? Can we pursue cosmopolitan ends without introducing a global coercive political authority, a kind of cosmopolitan Leviathan? Statists usually bring forward non-ideal concerns with *feasibility* and *stability*, and a major task thus awaits cosmopolitans, namely to show how the rather demanding goals of GJ could be achieved in a world dominated presently by states and state-based international bodies. While Ypi’s book is explicitly framed along these lines, Brock does not ignore them either – one of her main aims is to rebut what she calls “Feasibility Sceptics” – but concentrates more on justifying her own normative position and particular institutional solutions to pressing moral issues. Brooks’s volume has little systematic to say on these problems, apart from occasional ventures in several of the selected papers, though this is quite natural given its genre.

Analogous summary applies also to the last level of theorising I will identify here, one that is intimately bound with the previous three: What is the *vocation* of a GJ theorist? After all, due to its being *political* philosophy (thus forming one of the pillars of practical philosophy), the discipline has an obvious *practical* side, attempting not only to analyse and evaluate the social world, but also to provide guidelines to political action.<sup>4</sup> Brock and Ypi take a clearly activist stance, although in their own distinct ways, jointly identifying the insularity of abstract academic reflection on GJ a major reason why little progress has been achieved in the real world. Again, Brooks leaves it to the reader to pick sides, although I believe that enriching his Introduction with a short discussion of these issues would have been a good idea.

## **Reading global justice with Thom Brooks**

I have already hinted to several features of Thom Brooks’s edited collection of, as he puts it, “the best work in the area from contemporary political philosophy and its history” by “the most influential writers on global justice” (p. xii). Towards the end of the Introduction, Brooks reveals what is probably the main aim of the Global Justice Reader (GJR) – namely to “[make] the task of those coming to work in this area for the first time far easier” (p. xxi). It is therefore probably best to conceive it as primarily a teaching resource, and secondly as an invitation to the field for non-specialists, be it researchers outside political philosophy or curious politicians or political activists. Seen from this perspective, it certainly succeeds in the chosen task, though there are several misgivings I will point out below.

GJR is divided into eleven parts plus the Introduction, each consisting of two to five full-length scholarly papers on the respective topics (apart from the occasional document such as excerpts from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)). These are, in order as

they appear in the book, *Sovereignty, Rights to Self-Determination, Human Rights, Rawls's The Law of Peoples, Nationalism and Patriotism, Cosmopolitanism, Global Poverty and International Distributive Justice, Just War, Terrorism, Women and Global Justice, and International Environmental Justice*. As such, the book offers a broad and diverse survey of the philosophical landscape, and it would be generally unfair to try to fish around for topics that should have been included but were not – this is largely a matter of individual scholarly taste. Brooks's disclaimer that "any Reader must be selective" (p. xxi) is certainly relevant here, and he makes up for the potential omissions with an expanded bibliography. That said, I cannot but feel surprised that two major issue areas have not found their way to the GJR, namely *global democracy* (or the question of institutional structures designed to implement GJ) and *(im)migration*. These constitute long-standing problems of political philosophy (unlike, say, environmental justice), and an authoritative volume such as the GJR should have probably paid at least a formal tribute to them – at least in the Editor's Introduction.

A related quibble relates to the sequence of the parts. If understood as primarily a teaching and "invitational" resource, one may reasonably expect the GJR to follow some kind of method in the ordering – for example, chronological ("youth" of the topics), practice-related (regarding the degree of success in implementation), or, what I consider the best alternative, according to the level of generality (most general to most particular). Since unlike in the other two books, there is – quite naturally – no overarching theoretical framework available, a clear method of ordering would have made it easier to apprehend how the different issue areas relate to and influence each other. For example, the part on *Cosmopolitanism* (consisting of texts by Kant, Habermas and Pogge) comes sixth, while it addresses (together with *Human Rights* which come third) perhaps the most general issue of all – that of *moral universalism*. Similarly, one would probably expect the topic of *human rights* (including Peter Jones's piece on group rights) precede that of *Rights to Self-Determination*, given that the latter is itself one of the human rights enshrined in the UDHR and related documents.

Perhaps these are really just quibbles – after all, teachers are free to choose their own ordering of topics and amend GJR with other texts. There is however another dimension to all this: Because the volume presents itself as providing an accessible report on the "state of the (sub)discipline" (i.e. GJ), we would expect a robust explication of how the respective topics relate to *global justice*. Taken as a whole, GJR is at times reminiscent of a general collection of papers on *international ethics* or *international political theory*. It goes without saying that terrorism or national self-determination do somehow relate to justice, and Brooks's Introduction is useful in tracing these links. The thing is, they may be – and most of the time have been – dealt with in complete isolation from what constitutes the basic substrate of contemporary debates on GJ. Without making clear these deeper connections, the book leaves one wondering what is so special about GJ and what makes it distinct from international ethics/political theory in general.

But perhaps again, this is the fate of all readers on immensely complex topics, which GJ certainly is. Let me therefore spend a few comments on the contents of GJR, keeping in mind the difficulties of the editorial job – including the unfortunate fact that no amount of pages can accommodate all the interesting work in the field. On the one hand, Brooks has done a good job selecting some of the most important or most cited texts in the given issue areas, including the occasional venture to classical authors such as Hobbes, Kant or Aquinas. The reader thus gets familiar with, among others, the work of Pogge and Beitz on state sovereignty, of Buchanan on secession, Pogge's critique of Rawls's account of international justice, Singer's famous utilitarian take on famine in the world and corresponding obligations, Walzer's contributions to thinking about just war and terrorism, Okin's feminist critique of multiculturalism, or Caney's focused defence of duties stemming from environmental pollution. All these, as well as the rest I cannot mention here, outline the rich and multi-dimensional nature of contemporary thinking on GJ.

On the other hand, readers familiar with the terrain of GJ theorising may feel that the coverage is somewhat unbalanced. Before proceeding, I wish to recall my earlier comments regarding the absence of an overarching perspective: While not of serious concern in itself, it becomes more problematic with respect to the following observations.

There are two facets to this imbalance. For one, some parts are quite biased towards a certain – in most cases cosmopolitan – perspective. Take, for example, the first part on *Sovereignty*: Besides the 14<sup>th</sup> chapter of Hobbes's *Leviathan*, the reader gets acquainted with Pogge's and Beitz's critiques of Rawls's ultimately statist position.<sup>5</sup> Now both have been of great importance to the development of the debate; however, many interesting and important defences of the normative (as opposed to simply political or legal) significance of states or state sovereignty have been put forward since the Beitz's *Political Theory and International Relations* (1979/1999) and Pogge's "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty" (1992) were published – defences that have gained intense if critical attention.<sup>6</sup> Since sovereignty is one of the main battlefields between cosmopolitans and internationalists, it is curious why none of these contributions have been included *in this part*. True, Nagel's "The Problem of Global Justice" appears in Part VII (*Global Poverty and International Economic Justice*), nevertheless a contemporary argument of this particular kind is sorely missing in Part I (also, Nagel explicitly refers to Hobbes in his paper).

Similar worries apply to Parts IV (*Rawls's Law of Peoples*) and V (*Nationalism and Particularism*): Although Pogge's 1994 critique of Rawls's early eponymous paper<sup>7</sup> is certainly significant in its own right, it (a) addresses the 1993 paper and not the 1999 book from the excerpt by Rawls is taken, and (b) again was followed by a number of important defences that unpacked Rawls's arguments and assumptions. Since Rawls's work on international justice has been, as usual, central to the development of the debate, such an omission seems hard to justify. The same goes for part V which presents only Miller's 1995 defence of the "ethical significance of nationality": Given that the other two papers (by Goodin and Nussbaum) express strongly cosmopolitan (anti-nationalist/patriotic) views, I cannot but wonder why pro-patriotic and pro-nationalist arguments are so heavily underrepresented here (not least when the following chapter on *Cosmopolitanism* continues on the same wave).

My other critical comment on selection of the papers restates the issue with unclear criteria of selection. I proceed by way of examples here: First, although Beitz's "Human Rights as a Common Concern" (Part III) certainly represents a major contribution to the debate on justification of human rights (HR) as well as their connection to the socio-economic face of GJ, what is conspicuously missing here are the positions he attacks (be it libertarians in the normative dimension or foundationalist in the metaethical one). Insofar as HR are regularly conceived of as a (perhaps *the*) proxy of GJ,<sup>8</sup> this is again a strange omission. Second, as James T. Johnson has recently argued, contemporary philosophical accounts of the *just war*, grounded as they are in Anglo-American analytic philosophy, probably do *not* constitute a direct continuation of the "just war tradition" dating back to Augustine or Aquinas (as the Editor claims at p. xii; see also my further comments in the next section). Third, Okin's critique of multiculturalism (Part X) came under heavy attack from feminist circles themselves – for example in Allison Jaggar's article which reframes the discussion on women and non-western cultures in the very context of GJ theorising, adopting Pogge's analytic framework (perhaps one that is most extensively presented in the volume) to reject a narrow culturalist view of the plight of women in non-liberal countries.<sup>9</sup>

From this I derive my final concern with GJR: It is exclusively Western, or Western-political-theory-oriented. Nowhere is this trait more apparent than in Part III on *Human Rights* where one could expect at least a passing mention of the culturalist (e.g. Asian-values) debate on the nature of HR, or of the developing *intercultural dialogue* on HR which aims at eradicating widespread suspicion of cultural and intellectual imperialism. As long as GJ theorising aims to have a truly global reach, this dimension should not have gone unnoticed in a volume that aspires to provide an authoritative overview of the field.

For the third and final time, I admit that my gripes may sound like an exercise in mere cherry-picking, or like incapability of charitable reading. To conclude this part of my essay, let me therefore stress that Brooks's *Global Justice Reader* will serve as an invaluable resource for students, first-comers and non-specialists, as well as a useful quick-reference guide for researchers in the field – not least thanks to its expanded bibliography. Its weaknesses come quite naturally with its *genre* and the need to make editorial compromises, and it is fair to say that I do not presently know of any comparable volume of such breadth and complexity. I will now turn to the other two books which attempt to “patch up” what is missing in GJR.

### Implementing Global Justice With Brock

Gillian Brock sets in her book *Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account* (GJCA) two general and interrelated goals for herself: First, to show “[w]hat... would a globally just world look like” (p. 4), and second, to convince the reader that such cosmopolitan model of GJ can be *viable* – that is, it can coherently combine fundamental respect to individual human beings as the ultimate units of moral concern with the need to leave enough space for *legitimate* particularist affiliations and attachments. Her contribution to the field stands out due to the author's explicit commitment to issues of *implementation* of theoretical solutions, whereby Brock wishes to show that voices doubting their feasibility – who she dubs *Feasibility Sceptic(s)* – are unjustified or plainly wrong.

Brock thus very much focuses on the second level of GJ theorizing identified in the first section of my essay, i.e. one that concerns the relationship between theory and practice (Brock uses the terminology of ideal and non-ideal theory only once, towards the conclusion of chapter III). On my reading, this is the most distinctive feature of her account of GJ, because the other line of the argument, targeting the group of non-believers she calls *Nationalism Sceptic(s)* and contextualizing GJCA on the first level of theorizing, represents a regular and in a sense necessary aspect of any cosmopolitan take on GJ (which is not to say that she does not put forward some interesting partial critiques of the statist/nationalist position).

Brock is a cosmopolitan about justice, which means that she fully accepts two basic ideas – that all individuals have equal moral worth, no matter where they are situated geographically, and that there are certain obligations to all human beings that are binding on us all, again no matter where we live (p. 15) – or more precisely, on all of us who are capable of carrying out these obligations. This is consistent with her main mode of justification of cosmopolitan principles of GJ, that is, a modified Rawlsian *original position* extended to randomly selected representatives of *all* individuals in the world.<sup>10</sup> Brock argues that upon reflection of “urgent global problems” and possible remedies, and while ignorant of their own allegiances and certain important class of information such as the demographics of world population,<sup>11</sup> delegates would opt for a system that guarantees equal *basic liberties* (of the civil and political type) and protection against certain harms threatening *basic needs*. A global governance structure, most likely retaining states as principal actors, and fair terms of global cooperation (including fair ownership of natural resources) would then constitute the necessary means to achieving these ends.

Although Brock intends to reconceptualise the principle of state sovereignty in a fundamental way, so that it allows for what she calls “joint sovereignty” shared between states and supranational institutions (52–53), thus rendering state legitimacy conditional on fulfilling cosmopolitan obligations derived from the wider framework of GJ (Ch. 7), she positions herself *against* more demanding accounts of global *egalitarian* justice (one such account is defended in Lea Ypi's book). By rejecting calls for global extension of Rawls's principles of justice – the *difference principle* and *fair equality of opportunity* – which would entail policies aimed at *equalizing* life conditions worldwide (that is, reducing or eliminating the gap between the rich&powerful and the poor&weak), and preferring a *sufficientarian*

framework, Brock hopes to render her theory more *realistic* (practice-related) with regard to “here and now”, while still retaining a strong *utopian* (ideal and transformational) element.

Here her earlier conceptual distinctions (pp. 11–13) between (a) moral and institutional, (b) extreme and moderate (with respect to both justification and content), and (c) strong and weak versions of cosmopolitanism acquire major importance, because they show how one can be a cosmopolitan about justice yet steer clear of the spectre of world-statism and cultural intolerance – at least in principle, because I will argue below that especially the first distinction most likely cannot do the job it is supposed to. In any case, Brock believes that her account coherently shows how permissible partial affiliations and loyalties are possible in a world regulated by cosmopolitan principles of justice – in other words, that there is no *necessary* conflict between them.

In chapters 5–9, Brock substantiates this general claim by analysing several policy areas that she considers either especially relevant to her project or particularly illuminating as for the problem of implementation: Global poverty and taxation, basic liberties and mechanisms of their protection, humanitarian intervention, immigration, and global economic relations. In each of the chapters she explores both the current situation “on the ground”, often helped by quite extensive empirical data, and concrete mechanisms and institutional structures that would be most conducive to realising her cosmopolitan goals. At least three parts of her discussion are worth praising for their originality (notwithstanding the fact that I remain ultimately sceptical with regard to their persuasiveness): First, her overview of the global taxation regime, including specific taxation instruments and rough calculations of the potential revenue – here Brock elaborates in detail upon tentative suggestions by other cosmopolitans about justice.<sup>12</sup> Second, her insistence on the crucial role of *free press* for securing and protecting basic liberties, which she considers a necessary complement to the external sanctioning and enforcing role of the International Criminal Court. Third, her discussion of *(im)migration*, the upshot of which may come as a surprise to cosmopolitans and anti-cosmopolitans alike: Brock effectively argues for *reducing* immigration flows from poor to rich countries, citing many detrimental effects of “brain drain” on those societies which should be the primary beneficiaries of cosmopolitan justice. Of course, raising barriers for immigration has to be offset by policy changes on the part of rich countries, included expanded material assistance and global redistributive measures aimed at improving life conditions in poor states.

In chapters 10–13, Brock then returns to a more theoretical mode of argumentation, dealing first with reservations of two eminent *Nationalism Sceptics* (David Miller and Yael Tamir), subsequently showing in more detail how her account of GJ accommodates relevant nationalist/statist concerns, and finally explaining in what sense GJCA retains a strong *egalitarian* core, despite her earlier rejection of standard versions of global egalitarianism. Regarding the last point, Brock adopts Elisabeth Anderson’s well-known perspective on genuine *democratic* equality which subsumes redistributionist, goods-based egalitarian theories under a wider conception of equality that is primarily concerned with inequalities of respect, recognition, and power (p. 298). Here Brock gives some flesh to the concept of *moral cosmopolitanism* which forms the core of possibly *any* cosmopolitan theory; that is, the conviction that all human being belong to an all-encompassing *community of humankind* and are therefore endowed with universal claims and obligations.<sup>13</sup> She then argues that this conception of “relational equality” harmonises nicely with her previous notion of *responsive democracy*, that is, her version of global governance structures (309ff.).

This is also where I start developing my critical comments on GJCA. As mentioned above, Brock’s book is meant as a long and detailed answer to two kinds of sceptics, those worrying about feasibility/stability and those concerned with special attachments and loyalties such as national ties. There is, however, a third kind of sceptical attitude towards projects of cosmopolitan justice, one that points to the looming incoherence between their ambitious moral demands and restrained visions of institutional structures that are entrusted with the task of realising these goals. I have argued elsewhere that one cannot “have the cake and

eat it", that is, one cannot propose highly aspiring moral visions of the new global order while simultaneously claiming that they may be brought into existence without establishing a global coercive political authority – not least because there will always be powerful players who oppose such a move.<sup>14</sup>

Now Brock seemingly escapes these charges by rejecting global egalitarianism concerned with the reduction of relative inequalities. That is why she feels justified in claiming that "no dramatic changes in international law" (p. 136, in the context of the global taxation regime) and "no radical institutional transformation" (315) would be required, and that her account of GJ is *moderate* in both justification and content (316; room for "permissible nationality" being a part of the evidence here). There are, however, at least two general reasons why Brock's claim is open to serious doubt: First, her account of "responsive democracy" combines elements from democratic theories of David Held, Daniel Weinstock and Andrew Kuper. Short of straightforward world-statists, however, these "models" of global democracy are epitomes of proposals for a fairly *radical* institutional transformation of the global order. At any rate, neither of these authors considers *states* as the prospectively still central actors of global politics, as Brock – though tentatively – does (p. 53).

While this doubt is perhaps deflectable by switching to more restrained yet still progressive conceptions of global politics – after all, Brock approvingly cites Robert Keohane's work on transparency and accountability in international politics –, my second charge is more problematic for the author, because it concerns Brock's/Anderson's conception of democratic (relational) equality. On the one hand, global redistribution of goods plays an instrumental role in the conception, and as Brock duly notes, also entails attention to burdens of those who will be on the losing end of GJ. On the other hand, securing democratic equality seems to require *extensive* legal, administrative, and control measures or mechanisms, because doing away with inequalities of respect, recognition and power entails changes both in the prevailing institutional structure (domestic or global) and in symbolic and identity frameworks, at least on the part of citizens of rich and powerful countries. This much follows logically from Anderson's position, and, interestingly and most likely causing incoherence in Brock's own account, Brock admits that securing relational equality would require "an array of protections" (p. 313). To drive the point home, a multitude of "protections" implemented globally are hardly conceivable without an all-powerful, coercive global political authority – that is, without a world-state. Put differently, claiming moderatedness does not equal being ultimately moderate.

In this sense, the apparent strength of GJCA consisting in extensive attention to partial feasible solutions very much betrays the deeper difficulties besetting most accounts of cosmopolitan justice, including Brock's. For example, her proposal to establish a global taxation regime which would constitute the metaphorical spine of a just cosmopolitan order relies on the assumption that consent and/or support of "powerful players" (likely covering contemporary powers such as the USA, Russia or China) will not be needed *for the implementation of principles of GJ and their efficient enforcement* (p. 136). I am afraid that this is simply an example of wishful thinking: It may be true that certain steps in the desired direction(s) have been already taken, or that increasingly sophisticated theoretical work has been appearing recently (as Brock repeatedly emphasises). But it is an entirely different thing to extrapolate from these tentative steps a sweeping hope that GJ is about to march forward, attitudes of powerful players notwithstanding. I believe that a more extensive engagement with recent work in (the theory of) international relations would have done great service to the "realistic" face of GJCA, even if it might have toned down its apparent normative optimism.<sup>15</sup>

Similar worries spring up with regard to Brock's claim that GJCA leaves ample or at least sufficient room for *legitimate* special attachments. From the fact that there is no *necessary* conflict between cosmopolitanism and particularist loyalties it does not follow that there *is no*, or that there *cannot be any* serious conflict. Such conclusion holds only if one assumes – as Brock does – that we know beforehand what their desired normative hierarchy is. But this

assumption simply begs the question: Brock frames the issue of national and cultural attachments in terms of *permissibility*, arguing that partiality in moral obligations is contingent on the previous fulfilment of principles of GJ (p. 265). This however sounds persuasive only for those who are believers in cosmopolitan justice in the first place, because the argument implies that only those types of special attachments which are consistent with egalitarian liberalism will be allowed in Brock's world.<sup>16</sup> Given that achieving the goals of GJ seems to be a highest-priority yet long-term enterprise, one might plausibly ask in what sense exactly does GJCA leave ample room for national, religious and other special attachments *and starting when*. It is of little consolation to "nationalists" (among which, as Brock admits, many if not most ordinary people in the world belong) that their "natural" loyalties will be permitted to flourish some time in the future, because for a yet unspecified period they will have to give way to cosmopolitan obligations. I do not think Brock is really realistic here, her constant disclaimers notwithstanding.

There are some deeper theoretical issues here, too. It is not entirely clear why partakers in the global original position should reason in a liberal cosmopolitan individualist mode. Brock accuses the (liberal) nationalist stance of begging the question, arguing that it first needs to be subjected to impartial justification (p. 269). However, the circumstances of justification, i.e. the global original position, are already biased towards liberal cosmopolitan intuitions about fairness and decency – and Brock does not offer any sustained argumentation why this should be so. My hunch is that in order to patch up this gap, she would have to engage in a metaethical defence of moral universalism, or perhaps of a specific philosophical anthropology, without which the edifice of GJCA feels rather incomplete.<sup>17</sup>

The other alternative (pursued forcefully by Ypi) would be to argue that we owe certain cosmopolitan obligations to others by virtue of extensive political, economic and cultural *interaction*, on the basis of which the rich&powerful become increasingly complicit in worsening, or not improving, of life conditions of the poor&weak.<sup>18</sup> After all, her and Anderson's conception of relational equality explicitly *requires* such "joint cooperative" interconnections (303). Although she hints that such analysis of causal responsibilities may serve as a supportive argument in her case against nationalist particularism, recall that her fundamental normative principles (basic needs and liberties) are non-relational. Thus, not only Brock does not explain what makes her preferred normative assumptions evident; it also seems that her vision of a global democratic community requires as its bedrock the very relational analysis she pays only scant attention to.

Lastly, Brock's view of the legitimate bounds of nationalism has the paradoxical consequence of leaving *politics* out of both GJ and political theory of nationalism. The paradox lies in tying political activity fundamentally to the goal of achieving GJ: Although Brock explores many concrete measures and institutional solutions in the abovementioned issue areas, attempting to close the gap between theory and practice, these are in the end mere *administrative instruments* designed to bring about a pre-determined type of (global) society. Put simply, political activity becomes here mostly a function of moral reasoning. For what we know, however, politics as such is a matter of articulation and aggregation of interests, as well as competition among conflicting viewpoints. This is of course just another version of the age-old problem of the relationship between politics and morality, and it may be replied in the context of GJ that what we are after are fair (just) *background conditions* for political activity. It is worth stressing, however, that according clear priority to moral reflection constitutes a *radical* departure from how politics is usually done – the issue of "dirty hands" being a typical example.<sup>19</sup> Thus, although practical on one level, Brock's vision of global politics reveals itself as deeply utopian on this "conceptual" plane.

The worse for traditional politics, one may retort, and it would be a perfectly legitimate response. The problem here concerns Brock's insistence on the *democratic* and *dialogical* nature of GJCA which does not sit well with the latent, and sometimes explicit, *paternalist* strands of her thinking. If the first virtue of politics is to secure justice, if the main justification for global democracy is interest-based (as opposed to "merely" improving conditions for political

agency), and since many if not most people are wrong or misinformed about their genuine interests, or the means of fulfilling them (106), then it makes little sense to let people actually deliberate on what kind of world they would wish to live in. What if they decide contrary to what cosmopolitan justice requires? To repeat, such paternalistic and monological<sup>20</sup> approach is wholly coherent in itself, and the propensity of political philosophers towards it is understandable. What cannot be coherently claimed is its seamless connectibility to politics as we know it.

I will conclude this part of my essay by pointing out some difficulties in particular arguments that Brock puts forward in the course of her book. In her defence of *needs* as the basic “currency” of cosmopolitan justice, normatively prior even to human rights (p. 71ff.), she identifies five dimensions of human agency which are to be covered by the needs-based account of GJ (p. 66–67)<sup>21</sup> as well as corresponding empirical measures employed to assess the degree of their (un)fulfilment. What Brock does not provide, however, is an elaborate account of the “moderate” institutional structures and mechanisms intended to secure the wide array of human needs. When she turns in the next chapter to Held’s, Weinstock’s and Kuper’s models of “democracy without borders”, she either recounts large-scale institutional transformations (such as Held’s idea of a directly elected second chamber of the UN, complemented by a system of regional and local decision-making and deliberative bodies), or quotes approvingly Weinstock’s argument that in real-world democracies we find a “dizzying array” of practices and institutions designed to secure people’s interests (106).

But what exactly would the *global* measures encompass? Are they meant to replicate what we are familiar with in the domestic settings? In such a case we have on our hands a gigantic administrative and sanctioning task of global dimensions. If not, then the institutional middle ground between statism and world-statism remains pretty much unclear, save for general appeals that we must ensure adequate institutional mechanisms as well as selection, empowerment and control of global public officials (p. 108). As usual, the devil is in the detail, and Brock offers only occasional hints in this regard. The same uneasiness about vagueness and something-adequate-has-to-be-done attitude applies to Brock’s discussion of how to prevent potential abuses of power, which is cursory at best given the extensive tasks accorded to global democratic structures.

This paradoxical vagueness is again manifested in several of the policy-oriented chapters. I expressed my reservations about the global taxation regime above; here I wish to comment on Brock’s largely affirmative views of humanitarian intervention (HI), tied as they are to redefinition of sovereignty in terms of responsibility. First of all, although she mentions in passing (n. 2 on p. 186) that there are voices questioning the “we can do attitude” she is so appreciative of (p. 136), she does not give them the slightest critical attention, perhaps believing they are of marginal importance. But these largely Marxian-inspired views present a serious challenge to the prevailing liberal order, linking HI to global capitalism as well as political and cultural imperialism, and ignoring them comes at a price of speaking only to the pre-existing circle of believers.<sup>22</sup>

Second, the policy-oriented nature of her explorations comes down to adopting the Responsibility To Protect (R2P) framework as the contemporary variation on the Just War tradition, amending it with the idea of a “Vital Interest Protection Agency” (VIPO) which would take over HI-authorising powers from the UN Security Council (pp. 174, 185). Not only Brock does not consider the general objection that by adopting R2P-like criteria, we would in fact rid ourselves of the right *not to intervene*; she also considers it an eminently practical and down-to-earth set of guidelines. But this is simply not true if VIPO is to be composed of “representatives of all nations” and its decisions are probably to be reached unanimously (p. 178), the less if we factor in Brock’s earlier conviction that cooperation of “most powerful actors” will not be necessary.<sup>23</sup> How exactly are these rather momentous changes in sovereignty to be promulgated? Who are the agents of change? Perhaps Brock has concrete ideas and proposals up her sleeve, however she does not present them in GJCA. In

this regard, Lea Ypi's account of global political agency is much more sophisticated, as we shall see shortly.

Lastly, as James T. Johnson has recently argued, it is most likely a mistake to conceive of contemporary debates on HI, sparked by Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars*, as simply a modern-day continuation of the *Just War* tradition, grounded as it is (unlike much of contemporary liberalism) in Christian ethics and the sovereign ruler's obligation to promote good in the world.<sup>24</sup> There is thus a strong paternalist background to the tradition which actually coheres quite well with latent paternalism of GJCA; however, the possible linkages could have been probably argued for and not just simply assumed.

Moving on to Brock's case for limits on permissible special attachments, she sets out to criticise the "concentric circles model of responsibility" which she presents as stating that "responsibilities are generally stronger to those physically or affectively close to us". Brock counters this perhaps dominant attitude by claiming that our "basic obligations to others do not diminish with distance" (p. 275), and criticises as unconvincing the nationalist argument from "psychological affiliation": "If we can [feel connected to] groups of, say, 300 million people, it is hard to see how we cannot do this for yet larger collectives" (p. 281). I am afraid this is exactly the point – it is hard to see how to go about achieving this, as the difficulties with forging and cultivating common European identity attest.

Now towards the very end of GJCA Brock invests a lot of hope into the idea of *education for world citizenship* which should provide the "necessary motivation" for seeing ourselves as world citizens, suggesting that school curricula "could be revised to promote understanding of our global problems" and adding that "there is a flourishing movement around the world to do exactly that" (p. 332). Maybe there is, however its impact on national educational legislation is hardly traceable – or Brock at least does not provide any clues. I have a different worry though: The whole edifice of GJCA has been rested on the conviction that major changes can be readily implemented, whereas suddenly Brock admits that the sense of common global identity which is required for reasons of feasibility and stability will have to be gradually introduced via life-long (re-)education. Again, Ypi's analysis is more sophisticated and attentive to detail in this particular regard.

Let me conclude this part on a more sympathetic note: Although I have been at times highly critical both of certain conceptual choices and particular arguments, GJCA is in fact a highly original, well-researched, and systematic book-length treatment of global justice, and will be read with benefit by both specialists and non-specialists in the field. Perhaps Lea Ypi's book offers further remedies to the failings of the previous two volumes? That is what I turn to next.

### **Theorising Global Justice With Ypi**

We have seen that GJ theorising revolves to a large extent around certain distinctions and/or dichotomies that structure our thinking about justice beyond the state. Some of them are constitutive of and necessary for cosmopolitan discourse, such as the alleged independence between moral and political (constitutional) versions of cosmopolitanism. Others are more problematic, however, because they result in tensions between seemingly incompatible positions, and GJ theorists are pressed towards picking sides: Such are the dichotomies between theory and practice, between ideal and non-ideal theory, and between statists and cosmopolitans as such. Gillian Brock presented one attempt to deal with the problem, although in a rather latent fashion, concealed behind explorations of practical and feasible steps towards fulfilling cosmopolitan obligations.

Lea Ypi's *Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency* (GJAPA) approaches the question from the other direction, establishing her argumentation firmly on the third (metatheoretical) level. GJAPA can be therefore most generally understood as a book-length exercise in transcending dichotomies and reconciling opposites, and Ypi employs a

philosophical method which seems especially suited for this purpose – that is, dialectics. Anticipating traditional objections to Hegelian-type dialectics, she stresses that her version is meant as a *heuristic device for normative assesment* – how we can achieve progress in political-philosophical argument, and know for sure that it is progress at all – , rather than as an instrument of revealing objective truth or the internal logic of transformative processes (p. 43). I will have some comments to add below; here I wish to note that she rests her cosmopolitan case on respectable methodological foundations.

In comparison with Brock, Ypi also takes more seriously the tension between ideal and non-ideal theory, which in her view has significant purchase on the reconcilability of theoretical suggestions and real-world constraints on political action – and, ultimately, on the general dispute over legitimacy of nation-states in a cosmopolitan world. Ypi argues, quite convincingly in my view, that both statists and cosmopolitans (or at least most of them) apply the wrong approach to wrong types of question: On the one hand, statists counter normative (principled) defences of cosmopolitanism by stressing how these theoretical accounts ignore facts about the social world (e.g. people are citizens of states and have certain associative obligations which are therefore normatively prior to universal cosmopolitan obligations), and conversely, attempt to derive normative principles from considerations of (the conditions of) effective political agency (i.e. unjustifiably idealising them). On the other hand, cosmopolitans are too satisfied to provide detailed normative argumentation (ideal theory) while underestimating non-ideal issues of agency, that is, how to ensure that these principles will be carried out – which is an echo of the twin problems of feasibility and stability addressed by Brock. Ypi shows that it is only part of a larger set of problems, and in this sense her account is more complex and perhaps more promising, although at first glance less directly concerned with “practical solutions”.

Another commendable feature of Ypi’s book comes with the first chapter, “The Historical Controversy”, where the author reaches back to history of political thought, outlining especially the debate on possibilities and limits of cosmopolitanism that was taking place during the Enlightenment period. This is a useful reminder that contemporary problems of political philosophy are very much just recent reformulations of perennial issues. Ypi skilfully shows the exchange between authors such as Leibniz, Voltaire, Rousseau, and especially Kant, who she believes showed the way how to combine “principled commitments of cosmopolitanism with political agency expressed through membership in the state” (p. 23). Apart from the ability to link fundamental moral principles and political agency needed to implement them, Ypi identifies further strong points of Kantian and Rousseauian approaches to justice: Central importance of conflict for articulating demands of justice; focus on the causes of existing injustices; and the role of popular sovereignty and civic education in ensuring political effectiveness and motivational sustainability of our principled commitments.

Distil all this into the abovementioned dialectical framework, add significant conceptual and political space reserved for a “cosmopolitan avant-garde” that will push the case – again both philosophically and politically – for cosmopolitan justice, and as a result we get a philosophically robust case for cosmopolitan justice that is “both backward looking and forward looking” (p. 63): Sensitive to facts about contemporary societies and their histories, yet always aware of the possibility of transcending the (unjust) status quo. This is, in a nutshell, how Ypi wishes to resolve the tension between ideal and non-ideal theory while escaping the respective charges of *irrelevance* and *status quo bias*. At the same time, her theory of GJ acquires from the very beginning a decidedly *activist* character, within which “the theorist has ceased to be a mere spectator and assumes a politically active role” (p. 65).

In chapters 3–6, Ypi unpacks her general framework in more detail. Her rejection of statism relies precisely on the argument that normative (moral) principles and conditions of political agency are two separate issues; therefore, the current inadequacy of the latter for implementing demanding principles of GJ does not entail that these principles themselves are inadequate or wrong. Although critical of those versions of global egalitarianism which are reliant on the argument from moral arbitrariness of political membership (i.e. to which

country one has been born; p. 121), as well of those which limit their critical focus to certain negative consequences of the status quo (rather than their causes), Ypi shows that moral concerns about relative deprivation, and subsequently about reducing global inequalities, can be rescued in a different way – namely, by showing that there exists a both causally and normatively fundamental link between absolute and relative deprivation of actors in world politics (pp. 97ff.). Ypi believes that this link is provided by global *positional goods*, which she defines as “those goods the absolute value of which is determined by their relative possession” (p. 109). Thus fifth chapter is devoted to convincing the reader that “in specific circumstances of injustice, the claim for sufficiency at the level of individuals triggers a claim for distributive equality (at least) at the level of states” (p. 111). In other words, global sufficientarianism entails global egalitarianism; notice that this is a counter not only to statist such as David Miller or John Rawls, but also to “moderate” cosmopolitans such as Gillian Brock.

For Ypi, *power* wielded by states represents the most important global positional good, not least because it is a plausible concept even for statist/nationalists/realists.<sup>25</sup> In the international realm, power represents the type of means that allows the holder of power to achieve other desired things (e.g. to obtain certain economic goods), and Ypi points, among others, to the WTO trade agenda to substantiate her claim that inequalities of bargaining and/or negotiating power result in legal and economic rules that are heavily loaded in favour of the rich and powerful. Agricultural subsidies and high tariffs on imports are then prime examples of resulting policies that are causally linkable to the absolute deprivation of the weak and poor, as is their dependence on external material assistance in exchange for support for rules and policies which are in fact against their interests.

Getting finally to the issue of political agency, Ypi positions herself against many cosmopolitans by arguing that states, at least for the foreseeable future, will be the main agents of change – that is why she labels her theory “statist cosmopolitanism”. She argues that in order for political transformation to take and remain in place, two important features of modern societies need to be secured – popular sovereignty (i.e. democratic rule) and civic education. Cosmopolitan theories of GJ then represent a set of voices that enter the democratic debate about the “function and purpose of particular institutions” (p. 148), with the aim of tilting public opinion towards cosmopolitan goals. We have seen saw in the preceding section that also in Gillian Brock’s just world, states would probably play an important role backed by gradual “education for world citizenship”; however, Ypi’s contextualization is much more careful and fits quite naturally in the larger theoretical framework. This also applies to her concluding remarks in Chapter 7 on the “cosmopolitan avant-garde” which is the politically active face of cosmopolitan theories of GJ, playing “a crucial role in sensitizing local publics to issues of transnational conflict and global inequality, and in enacting the learning process that gradually leads to challenging and replacing old categories and conceptual resources with new and more progressive ones” (p. 155).

Now for a more philosophically minded type of reader, or someone who is looking for accounts of GJ which are robust on all levels of theorising, Ypi’s GJAPA is the book to go to, at least out of the three titles under review here. That said, certain doubts still loom over the argument, although my exposition will be necessarily limited. Firstly, although Ypi builds her theoretical case very carefully, it seems that there are certain blind, unargued-for spots. One example is provided on p. 92 where she concludes that responsibility-based arguments against global egalitarian principles would, at pains of inconsistency, undermine also redistributive measures in domestic societies. In note 10 she admits that this may be construed as a good reason to weaken redistributionist requirements even on the national level, but dismisses such an idea because her targets are statist *egalitarians*. We may ask then, what about those who *would* take this road – for example some type of statist libertarians? Unfortunately GJAPA does not engage *this* kind of sceptics, and in an important sense her core normative commitments are left without defence, that is, unjustified.

Another example of assuming rather than substantiating the rightness of (global) egalitarianism are hints to the need of complex and difficult empirical calculations of how the alleged global positional goods (above all power) aggravate, or at least obstruct improvements upon, the existing global circumstances of injustice (p. 121ff.). But unless such empirical explorations have been carried out, we cannot actually know whether Ypi is right or not: After all, notable economists have gone on record defending free trade (and perhaps enforceable property rights), not global equality, as the only tested means of doing away with poverty, even if not in an uncritical, total laissez-faire manner.<sup>26</sup> Ypi unfortunately does not offer any sustained analysis, and recounts instead several examples having to do with agricultural production or the abovementioned trade barriers. I have the suspicion, however, that such reflections are too impressionistic and perhaps vague in order to ground the very strong normative conclusions Ypi wishes to defend. In general, her central argument in this part, namely that “the absence of [global] egalitarian obligations is causally fundamental for emergence of absolute deprivation” (p. 100) is so strong that it would need much more systematic economic framework as well as empirical basis. In this sense, her claim that contemporary cosmopolitans ignore studying the causes of poverty and instead focus on remedies for its consequences (pp. 89, 96) is true and false at the same time: On the one hand, it may be true about many cosmopolitan philosophers about justice (although it definitely does not apply to some renowned figures in the field such as Thomas Pogge).<sup>27</sup> On the other hand, it is patently false with regard to the field of development economics, and the problem with her argument is, again, that she simply assumes her non-economic analysis to be right.

My next objection is closely related and concerns Ypi’s understanding and definition of *power* in world politics. Whereas her account of GJ especially on the level of political agency is largely constructivist, meaning that actor’s interests, goals and identities are malleable (though not immediately changeable) through norms, values, and ideas, in her analysis of power in international relations she opts for a neo-realist, zero-sum game delineation of power as a wholly positional good. But this is an arbitrary move triggered by her previous normative commitments, perhaps incoherent with the constructivist perspective, and at any rate the egalitarian conclusion does not follow: Precisely because power need not have to be a zero-sum game, because it need not have to be understood in the sense of one actor manipulating another actor (*power over*) but as a collective capability (*power to*), and because there are many faces of power beside the military one on which Ypi ultimately rests her case, her conclusion that “leveling down” of power on the part of the rich and powerful is the only way how to ensure equal playing field is not warranted.

Lastly, let me spend a few thoughts on the idea of a cosmopolitan avant-garde (CAG). Although this is another original and on the whole inspiring contribution of Ypi’s work, it seems doubtful that we can tell progressive movements from those leading into blind alleys *in advance*. Only after the dialectical process has taken place can we retrospectively discover who was right, and it is quite hard to predict who will be the heroes and the villains in, say, 50 years’ time. A closely related worry stems from Ypi’s latent but necessary assumption that the CAG movement will be able to express a coherent, compatible set of normative and political demands. For as far as we know, it is a quite heterogeneous group – even if we stick to the reviewed books, we have on our hands disagreement between Brock the sufficientarian and Ypi the egalitarian. Are they all aware of themselves being members of the CAG (that is, are they an “avant-garde for itself”)? Do all of them, including non-western actors, share Ypi’s narrative and corresponding goals? What about the (very real) possibility of conflicts *within* the CAG? Ypi suggests that a coherent and complex set of demands of GL could be established on the basis of a careful “case-by-case analysis” (p. 173), but this reminds of Gillian Brock’s hopeful optimism, which is in turn an example of a “reverse naturalistic fallacy”: If something is believed to be right, then it has to be realized.

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My goal in this review essay has been to show the strengths and weaknesses of three recent contributions to the debate on global justice, and to explain how political philosophy can be done on different levels of theorizing. Each of the three books brings to the table assets that the other two lack, and the final verdict about “which one is the best” very much depends on *what kind of reader* actually reaches out for either of the volumes, and *what kind of problems* she wants to have covered or explicated. I have deliberately tried to assess the books on their own merits, without invoking competing normative views (apart from passages where these views have been neglected despite their importance for the argument). Such preliminary “structuring” of the field is useful and perhaps necessary, in my view, in order to pursue one’s own road through substantive debates on promises and drawbacks of global justice, as seen through cosmopolitan glasses. I venture to say that these debates may turn out to have critical impact on how politics, both domestic and transnational, is done in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and since they have been gradually acquiring a systematic framework based on an increasingly firmer groundwork, interested readers are warmly invited to dig deeper and wider.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See for example the symposia on Brock in *The Global Justice Network* 4 (at <http://www.theglobaljusticenetwork.org/journal/issue-4-2011>) and more recently on Ypi in *Ethics & Global Politics* 6(2) (at <http://www.ethicsandglobalpolitics.net/index.php/egp/issue/view/1493>)

<sup>2</sup> It needs to be said that problems of/with *statism* are both analytically and substantively different from those of/with *nationalism*. Practically speaking, however, the suggested changes would target both, not least because we live in a world of *nation-states*. I am aware of all the linguistic and theoretical difficulties lurking behind these categories, though I cannot address them here in any detail. My thanks to Paul Ghils for bringing up this point among many others.

<sup>3</sup> The “middle” category of *transnationalism* which kind of suggests itself is standardly subsumed *cosmopolitanism*, which is certainly a very heterogeneous camp as regards the desired institutions, agents, or identities.

<sup>4</sup> See Norman, Wayne, “Inevitable and Unacceptable?’ Methodological Rawlsianism in Anglo-American Political Philosophy”, *Political Studies* 46(2), 1998, 276–294, for a detailed explanation how this practical aim impacts on how political philosophy is done in Anglo-American academia.

<sup>5</sup> I am of course greatly oversimplifying here; see Rawls’s critical discussion of statism (more precisely of [neo]realism in international relations) and unqualified sovereignty in his *The Law of Peoples, with ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’* (Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), §§4–5, pp. 35–54.

<sup>6</sup> See e.g. Blake, Michael, „Distributive Justice, State Coercion and Autonomy”, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 30(3), July 2001, 257–296; Risse, Matthias, “What to Say About the State”, *Social Theory and Practice* 32(4), October 2006, 671–698; Sangiovanni, Andrea, “Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State”, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 35(1), Winter 2007, 3–39

<sup>7</sup> Rawls, John, „The Law of Peoples”, in: Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (eds.), *On Human Rights* (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 41–82

<sup>8</sup> See Beitz, Charles, “International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent Thought”, *World Politics* 51(2), January 1999, 269–296, at 288.

<sup>9</sup> Jaggard, Allison, “‘Saving Amina’: Global Justice for Women and Intercultural dialogue”, *Ethics & International Affairs* 19(3), December 2005, 55–75

<sup>10</sup> See Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* 2nd Ed. Harvard: Belknap Press, 1999, §4, 15–19; Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, §3, 30–35

<sup>11</sup> This is the famous *veil of ignorance* which filters out partiality and thus ensures procedural fairness of the original position.

<sup>12</sup> See Barry, Brian, “International Society From a Cosmopolitan Perspective”, in: David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin (eds.): *International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998), 144–163; Tan, Kok-Chor, *Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004), 81, 95.

<sup>13</sup> Compare Brock’s first metatheoretical distinction, as well as her second basic principle of cosmopolitanism.

<sup>14</sup> Dufek, Pavel, „Why Strong Moral Cosmopolitanism Requires a World State”, *International Theory* 5(2), July 2013, 177–212.

<sup>15</sup> See eg. Hurrell, Andrew, *On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Krasner, Stephen D. *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1999).

<sup>16</sup> This is similar to Kok-Chor Tan’s account of legitimate nationalism; see Tan, *Justice Without Borders*.

<sup>17</sup> A typical example of such sustained argument is provided by Simon Caney, *Justice Beyond Borders* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), chapter 2.

<sup>18</sup> Pogge, Thomas, *World Poverty and Human Rights* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008)

<sup>19</sup> See e.g. Bellamy, Richard, „Dirty Hands and Clean Gloves: Liberal Ideals and Real Politics”, *European Journal of Political Theory* 9(4), October 2010, 412–430

<sup>20</sup> Compare Brock’s argument that global democratic dialogue can be *simulated*, i.e. replaced by philosophical reflection (304)

<sup>21</sup> These are “(1) a certain amount of physical and psychological health; (2) sufficient security to be able to act; (3) a sufficient level of understanding of the options one is choosing between; (4) a certain amount of autonomy; and (5) decent social relations with at least some others”

<sup>22</sup> For a focused critique of such ideological function of human rights in global politics see e.g. Douzinas, Costas, *Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism* (New York, NY: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007); Chandler, David (ed.), *Rethinking Human Rights: Critical Approaches to International Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002)

<sup>23</sup> See Hurrell, Andrew, *On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 154–164.

<sup>24</sup> Johnson, James Turner, „Contemporary Just War Thinking: Which is Worse, to Have Friends or Critics?“, *Ethics and International Affairs* 27(1), Spring 2013, 25–45

<sup>25</sup> Among other “obvious examples” of positional goods, Ypi counts “inequalities in access to the means of production and exchange in the international labour market, inequalities of purchasing power, inequalities of access to education, or inequalities of access to legal resources in the case of international litigation” (p. 109).

<sup>26</sup> See e.g. Bhagwati, Jagdish N., *In Defence of Globalization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Rodrik, Dani, *The Globalization Paradox: Why Global Markets, States, and Democracy Can't Coexist* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)

<sup>27</sup> See Pogge, Thomas W.M., *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008)

<sup>28</sup> Apart from the wealth of articles in many scholarly journals and the works cited throughout this essay, other recent book-length treatments of similar pedigree include Miller, David, *National Responsibility and Global Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Miller, Richard W., *Globalizing Justice: The Ethics of Poverty and Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Valentini, Laura, *Justice in a Globalized World: A Normative Framework* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Risse, Matthias, *On Global Justice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); and Gilibert, Pablo, *From Global Poverty to Global Global Equality: A Philosophical Exploration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).