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Moral Responsibility as Guiltworthiness

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Abstract

It is often alleged that an agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case s/he deserves a negative interpersonal response for that transgression, blaming responses such as resentment and indignation being paradigms. Aside from a few exceptions, guilt is cited in recent discussions of moral responsibility, if at all, as merely an effect of being blamed, or as a reliable indicator of moral responsibility, but not itself an explanation of moral responsibility. In this paper, I argue that an agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case s/he deserves to feel moral guilt for that transgression. I argue that this alternative view offers all that the predominant blame-focused view offers, while also solving some puzzling features of moral responsibility. Specifically, it offers a compelling way to reconcile conflicting intuitions about the suberogatory, and allows those who do not understand what Darwall calls ‘second-personal’ reasons to be morally responsible for their immoral acts.

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Notes

  1. See Feinberg (1970, 55–94); Gibbard (1990, 42); Wallace (1994, 76–77); Fischer and Ravizza (1998, 5–8); Strawson, G. (2002, 452); Bennett (2002); Clarke (2005, 21); Fischer (2006, 63); Darwall (2006) and (2013); Shoemaker (2007) and (2011); Waller (2011, 2–5); McKenna (2012, 150); Boxer (2013); Scanlon (2013, 101–102); Pereboom (2014, 2).

  2. For example, Nomy Arpaly (2006, 9–39), Angela Smith (2007), and Tim Scanlon (2008, 122–214) argue that (i) through (iii) are necessary and sufficient. George Sher (2006) argues for a view of blame that only requires (i) and (iv). Michael McKenna argues that all of these conditions are required (2012, 21–29).

  3. For Watson, the only relevant moral deficiencies will be those attributable to the agent’s authentic character, as revealed through the agent’s actions. I think that’s correct. But nothing in this essay hangs on that. So I have worded (i) to allow a broader range of moral deficiencies, including mere thoughtlessness.

  4. Also see Rosen (2015, 67).

  5. Advocates of this view include Strawson (1982); Wallace (1994, 76–77); Watson (1996, 238); Bennett (2002) and (2008); Smith (2007, 477); McKenna (2012, 21–29); Boxer (2013); Rosen (2015).

  6. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

  7. See also Zimmerman (1988, 152); Watson (1996); Arpaly (2006, 9–39); Shoemaker (2011); Nelkin (2011, 34–35).

  8. Shoemaker (2011 and 2015) argues that answerability is a form of responsibility distinct from attributability and liability. Smith (2012) disagrees.

  9. I prefer to follow Michael Zimmerman (1988, ch. 5) and Karin Boxer (2013, 3) in using H.L.A Hart’s term ‘liability’ because to my ear ‘accountability’ suggests that moral responsibility is interpersonal, which I deny. See especially section 2.3 below.

  10. Also see Feinberg (1970); Strawson, G. (2002); Clarke (2005); Waller (2011, 2–5); McKenna (2012, 150); Scanlon (2013).

  11. David Shoemaker (2015, 221) appeals to the ‘fittingness’ of negative responses to explain liability, but speculates that what he calls a ‘fitting’ response may just be another name for a ‘deserved’ response.

  12. Those endorsing this thesis include Feinberg (1970); Zimmerman (1988, 162); Moore (1993); Schmidtz (2002).

  13. Those endorsing this thesis include Ross (1930, 134–138); Sher (1987, 194–198); Bennett (2002); McKenna (2012, 172); Pereboom (2014).

  14. The non-instrumental goodness of a response may not always offer a justification to respond. However, as Derk Pereboom points out, the non-instrumental goodness of a state of affairs typically offers those who are appropriately situated a defeasible justification to bring about that state of affairs (2014, 139). Also see Norcross (2006, 46–47).

  15. For a consequentialist theory of liability, see Smart (1961). For a discussion of other alternatives, see (Boxer 2013, 3–5).

  16. See especially Strawson, G. (2002); Fisher (2006); McKenna (2012); Pereboom (2014).

  17. I consider an emotion towards an agent ‘moral’ whenever it is by virtue of a belief about the moral status of that agent or her actions; e.g. a belief that the agent is virtuous, vicious, good, bad, has acted wrongly or well, etc. This is the kind of belief implicated by moral disapproval (Wallace 1994, 33–38).

  18. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for making this point.

  19. This is one way to interpret Darwall (2006, 71, 112 and 168).

  20. However, I take it a person can genuinely care about moral norms without feeling guilty for unfreely transgressing those norms. See Pereboom (2017, 130–132).

  21. This is another way to interpret Darwall (2006, 168).

  22. I take it that this is one reason why Gibbard (1990, 42) claims that it is both blameworthiness and guiltworthiness that explains moral responsibility. See also Clarke (2016).

  23. For similar cases see Driver (1992) and MacNamara (2013).

  24. This is what Andreas Carlsson (2017), citing Clarke (2013 and 2016), calls ‘the problem of contingent harm’. As I see it, this sort of problem shows that the desert of guilt is insufficient for the desert of blame, a possibility that Carlsson does not consider.

  25. Derk Pereboom remarks that “It might well be appropriate...to feel the pain of grief upon the death of a loved one, while this pain is not deserved” (2017, 131). Carlsson (2017, 111) uses this example to distinguish, correctly I think, between the ‘fittingness’ of a response, and a deserved response. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting the use of this distinction in this example, as well as the analogy to fitting responses to art.

  26. This is one way to read Strawson (1982).

  27. An anonymous reviewer points out that, given what we know from findings in psychology, Robinson is much easier to conceive of as a non-human agent.

  28. The view originates with Strawson (1982).

  29. Gary Watson (1996, 239) offers a different argument to the same conclusion.

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Acknowledgments

The view that I develop in this paper was first presented at the Free Will and Moral Responsibility Conference (Florida State University, 2015). Special thanks to Derk Pereboom, Michael McKenna, Kate Manne, and Michelle Kosch for valuable comments and conversations on drafts of this paper since that time, as well as the participants of my Freedom Center Colloquium presentation (Arizona State University, 2017).

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    A. P. Duggan

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Duggan, A.P. Moral Responsibility as Guiltworthiness. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 21, 291–309 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9863-0

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