¹ Lombardo and Gondreau both discuss this topic under the heading of “fomes peccati”; Mark Johnson discusses it under the heading of “law of sin.” See Lombardo, Nicholas, The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotions (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2011), 211‐12Google Scholar; Gondreau, Paul, The Passions of Christ's Soul in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Scranton: Scranton University Press, 2009), 342‐49Google Scholar; Johnson, Mark, “St Thomas and the ‘Law of Sin’,” Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévale 67 (2000): 90‐106CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² It seems that the Medieval theologians used these terms interchangeably, but tended to reserve ‘fomes peccati’ for their discussions of the sinlessness of Jesus and Mary and ‘primi motus’ for their discussions of sins that result from inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite.

³ In his overview of the twelfth‐ and thirteenth‐century discussions of the first movements, Lottin focuses on two questions: whether the first movements were in themselves sinful and, if so, why. See Lottin, Odon, Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et III^e siècles, tome II, pt. 1 (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont César, 1948), 493‐589Google Scholar.

⁴ II Sent., d. 24, q. 3, a. 1‐2; De veritate, q. 26, a. 5; De malo q. 7, a. 6; Quodlibit IV, q. 11, a. 1; ST, I‐II, q. 74, a. 3. All Latin quotations will be taken from the Leonine Edition. All translations are my own. NB: Although Aquinas uses the term ‘sensualitas’ at the heading of each of these questions, this is simply another term for the sensitive appetite. See De veritate, q. 26, a. 1.

⁵ Ibid.: “movetur absque imperio rationis et voluntatis.”

⁶ Ibid.: “a ratione et voluntate ordinatus et imperatus.”

⁷ De malo, q. 7, a. 6, ad 8: “Ad octavum dicendum, quod quia appetitus sensitivus movetur ab aliqua apprehensione, et tamen est virtus in organo corporali, dupliciter potest motus eius insurgere: uno modo ex corporis dispositione; alio modo ex aliqua apprehensione. Dispositio autem corporalis non subiacet imperio rationis; sed omnis apprehensio imperio rationis subiacet; potest enim ratio prohibere usum cuiuslibet apprehensivae potentiae, maxime in absentia sensibilis secundum tactum, quod quandoque removeri non potest. Quia ergo peccatum est in sensualitate, secundum quod potest obedire rationi; primus motus sensualitatis, qui est ex dispositione corporali, non est peccatum, et hunc appellant aliqui primo primum; secundus autem motus, qui excitatur ex aliqua apprehensione, est peccatum. Primum enim ratio nullo modo vitare potest; secundum autem vitare potest quantum ad singulos, non autem quantum ad omnes: quia dum avertit cogitationem suam ab uno, incurrit in aliud, ex quo potest insurgere motus illicitus.”

⁸ While Lottin begins his discussion of the first movements with Lombard, Knuuttila gives a brief overview of the theologians who preceded him. See Knuuttila, Simo, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 178‐95CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ Augustine, , De Trinitate, ed. Mountain, W.J. and Fr.Gloire, , Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, vol 50 (Turnholt: Brepolis, 1968), XII.12 (371‐72)Google Scholar. In the Latin, Augustine simply says ‘appetitus’, but it is clear that he is not referring to the will, but rather to the lower appetite.

¹⁰ De doctrina christiana, Book I, 4.4.

¹¹ Lombard, , Sententiae in IV libri distinctae, 3^rd ed., Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971), book II, d. XXIV, cc. 6‐12 (445‐60)Google Scholar.

¹² Sententiae, book II, d. XXIV, c. 8 (445‐456).

¹³ Sententiae. II, d. 24, c. 8: “Si in motu sensuali tantum peccati illecebra teneatur, veniale ac levissimum est peccatum.” (456).

¹⁴ Regarding this discrepancy, Lottin simply remarks that it is “étranger à l'exposé d'Augustine” and says that Lombard nowhere else defends this reading. Knuuttila explains why Lombard's comment about the sinfulness of the movement of the sensitive part is at odds with Augustine: Augustine distinguished between an “unavoidable initial stage of a movement and its continuation.” The former is not sinful, the latter is. See Lottin, Odon, Psychologie et morale, 496 and Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 182‐83Google Scholar.

¹⁵ E.g., Hugh of St‐Cher thought it clear that the first movements were not voluntary and therefore could not be sinful. Roland of Cremona argued that temptations (which he understands the first movements to be) to which one does not consent are not voluntary and therefore not sinful. See Lottin, Psychologie et morale, 527‐28.

¹⁶ See, e.g., St. Albert the Great, Summa de Creaturis, tract. IV, q. 69.

¹⁷ Simon of Tournai, Disputationes, ed. Joseph Warichez, Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, Études et Documents 12 (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1932), d. XLI, q. 1 (127‐28).

¹⁸ Ibid.: “Motus primus peccati dicitur duplex: primus ad peccatum, vel primus in peccato.”

¹⁹ Ibid,: “Item, primus ad peccatum duplex: primus primitivus, et primus post primitivum in numero peccatorum.”

²⁰ William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, ed. Jean Ribaillier, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 16‐20 (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1980‐87), II.15.1‐5 (vol. ii.2, 525‐34).

²¹ Suma aurea II, tract. XV, c. 1 (526): “Dicimus quod primus motus est peccatum, quoniam primus motus dicitur ille quo homo movetur voluntarie ad illicitum ante iudicium sive deliberationem rationis.”

²² Suma aurea II, tract. XV, c. 1 (527): “quando movetur ante iudicium rationis ad delectandum in re sensibili.”

²³ Summa aurea II, tract. XV, c. 2, q. 3 (530‐31).

²⁴ Summa aurea II, tract. XV, c. 2, q. 2 (529‐30).

²⁵ Ibid. (530): “qui dolet quia non potest comedere bonum morsellum.”

²⁶ It is hard to imagine how a person could feel hungry in the absence of any apprehension, for the experience of hunger seems itself to be an apprehension. It seems, however, that Auxerre has a particular kind of apprehension in mind, since he speaks of estimation alongside apprehension. It seems clear that he is speaking of an apprehension of the internal senses, which is cognitively connected to the estimative power and thus has some participation in reason and entails some evaluation of the apprehended object. The animal concupiscible power, then, must respond to some more basic apprehension of the external senses alone.

²⁷ Summa aurea, II, tract. XV, c. 1 (526): “si cogitasset de Deo et penituisset de peccatis suis.”

²⁸ 493‐589. See also Knuuttila 178‐95.

²⁹ De malo q. 7, a. 6, ad 8: “Ad octavum dicendum, quod quia appetitus sensitivus movetur ab aliqua apprehensione, et tamen est virtus in organo corporali, dupliciter potest motus eius insurgere: uno modo ex corporis dispositione; alio modo ex aliqua apprehensione. Dispositio autem corporalis non subiacet imperio rationis; sed omnis apprehensio imperio rationis subiacet; potest enim ratio prohibere usum cuiuslibet apprehensivae potentiae, maxime in absentia sensibilis secundum tactum, quod quandoque removeri non potest. Quia ergo peccatum est in sensualitate, secundum quod potest obedire rationi; primus motus sensualitatis, qui est ex dispositione corporali, non est peccatum, et hunc appellant aliqui primo primum; secundus autem motus, qui excitatur ex aliqua apprehensione, est peccatum. Primum enim ratio nullo modo vitare potest; secundum autem vitare potest quantum ad singulos, non autem quantum ad omnes: quia dum avertit cogitationem suam ab uno, incurrit in aliud, ex quo potest insurgere motus illicitus.”

³⁰ This point is particularly clear in De veritatie, q. 26, a. 5, ad 5. There, Aquinas says that the first movements of sensuality are sinful even though they precede the judgment of reason because they can be subject to reason and therefore have the ratio of sin.

³¹ Again: II Sent., d. 24, q. 3, a. 1‐2; De veritate, q. 26, a. 5; Quodlibit IV, q. 11, a. 1; ST, I‐II, q. 74, a. 3.

³² Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. III, ch. 11.

³³ A point of clarification. Infelicitously, Aquinas and Auxerre are using different terms to refer to similar concepts. For Aquinas, there are three kinds of appetite in man: natural, animal, and rational. The first pertains to bodily operations such as growth, digestion, generation, and the like. The second has a cognitive component, as when a person apprehends an apple with his senses, judges it with his particular reason to be good to eat, and desires it with concupiscence. The third pertains to things that are proper to man, such as to know and love God. Since appetite follows apprehension, each kind of appetite corresponds to a different kind of apprehension. The natural appetite follows the absolute apprehension that is discussed in this text. The animal appetite follows the apprehension of the interior senses, which can judge a particular thing to be desirable or not. The rational appetite follows the apprehension of the intellect. What Aquinas and Auxerre have in mind are the first two categories, but Aquinas here calls them ‘natural’ and ‘animal’, while Auxerre calls the first kind ‘animal’ and the second kind ‘human’.

³⁴ For Aristotle's discussion of ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ concupiscences, see Rhetoric, bk. 1, pt. 11.

³⁵ ST, I‐II, q. 77, a. 5: “apprehensionem imaginationis, aut alicuius huiusmodi acceptionis.”

³⁶ For more detail, see ST, I, q. 78, a. 4.