Abstract
If God exists, and if our ultimate well-being depends on having a positive relationship with Him (which requires as a first step that we believe He exists), why doesn't He make sure that we all believe in Him? Why doesn't He make His existence obvious? This traditional theological question is today much-used as an argument for atheism. In this paper I argue that the answer may have something to do with God's character, specifically God's humility.
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Notes
Found in Velimirović, N., Saint (2008, p. 304).
It is worth noting that while Keller rejects traditional theism, he is open to alternative models of God (specifically, process theology) and employs the problem of divine hiddenness more in support of such an alternative model (one on which God is not omnipotent and so may not have the power to reveal Himself to all) rather than atheism per se. My thanks to an anonymous referee for this point.
To draw an analogy with the problem of evil: Schellenberg’s formulation is closer to the logical problem of evil, whereas those of Drange, Keller, and Maitzen are more like versions of the evidential problem of evil.
See, for instance, Aijaz and Weidler (2007), Cullison (2010), Dumsday (2010a, b, 2012), Evans (2006, 2010), Henry (2001, 2008), King (2008), Howard-Snyder (1996), Marsh (2008), McBrayer and Swenson (2012), McKim (2001), Moser (2008), Murray (2002), Oakes (2008), O’Connell (2013), Poston and Dougherty (2007), Rea (2009), Swinburne (1998, 2004), van Inwagen (2002, 2006), and Tucker (2008).
As suggested by Howard-Snyder (1996).
As in Cullison (2010).
I’m ignoring complications that would arise if the incarnation were brought into the discussion.
For a more detailed case against the possibility of divine humility, see Campana (1992).
My guess is that the same holds for many Jewish and Islamic treatments of humility, but since (to my discredit) I am unacquainted with these, I will speak only of my own tradition.
Aquinas (1920) Summa Theologiae, IIa IIae, q. 161, art. 6, resp.
Aquinas (1920) Summa Theologiae, IIa IIae, q. 162, art. 4, resp.
Aquinas (1920) Summa Theologiae, IIa IIae, q. 162, art. 5, resp.
Aquinas (1920) Summa Theologiae, IIa IIae, q. 161, art. 1, ad. 4.
In Orthodox iconography one never finds a signature of any kind.
Though King (2008) argues that even direct religious experiences of the sort suggested by Schellenberg would carry with them serious obstacles as routes to supposedly indubitable belief in God – obstacles inevitable even for an omnipotent being. If King is right, this goes a very long way to addressing the problem of divine hiddenness. For the sake of argument, I will assume throughout that Schellenberg is correct in thinking that God can reveal Himself unambiguously and indubitably as God to any rational being via direct religious experience.
I am assuming that God does not possess middle knowledge. If He did, part of my approach here would not work, though other approaches to the hiddenness problem would open up, as Marsh (2008) shows.
Just how long does the ‘as long as possible’ here refer to? That will depend to some extent on one’s views concerning the afterlife and the possibilities for development and repentance after death. Differences here have the potential to make a substantial impact on one’s views concerning the problem of divine hiddenness, though their relevance has not been much explored in the literature.
Studies by sociologists of religion have consistently shown that religious experiences are quite common across the population, with more than a third of all people having at least one in the course of a lifetime. For a brief summary of 45 years’ worth of international survey data, see Spilka et al. (2003, pp. 299–312). Naturally, not all of these experiences are explicitly theistic in content, but quite a large proportion are experiences of a Being possessed of attributes traditionally ascribed to God. I encourage the reader to examine this and related empirical sources.
An anonymous referee casts doubt on this reading of the Abraham narrative, writing as follows: ‘I have some reservations about the author’s claim that God’s making a covenant with Abraham shows humility. In the ancient Near East many great sovereigns made treaties with their subordinates (e.g., suzerainty treaties) indicating not humility on the part of the great ruler but his generosity and desire to make his name more widely known. Remember that Abraham is promised that through him all nations on earth would be blessed.’ I think though that the analogy with suzerainty treaties can only be carried so far, given the important fact that Abraham was genuinely free to walk away and reject the covenant being suggested. This is not, I think, a feature of typical suzerainty arrangements and bespeaks God’s willing subordination of His plans to the free choice of a single mortal.
My thanks to an anonymous referee for this objection, which I have reproduced here verbatim.
My thanks to another anonymous referee for this objection.
Though it is worth noting that Saint Paul also seems much more optimistic about what the resources of natural theology are capable of providing us, if we are open to them, than is supposed by many proponents of the problem of divine hiddenness. See Romans 1:18-20.
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My sincere thanks to several anonymous referees for their valuable comments.
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Dumsday, T. Divine Hiddenness and Divine Humility. SOPHIA 53, 51–65 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-013-0381-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-013-0381-1