Abstract
Next to the problem of evil, the problem of divine hiddenness has become the most prominent argument for atheism in the current literature. The basic idea is that if God really existed, He would make sure that anyone able and willing to engage in relationship with Him (i.e., who are nonresistant towards Him) would have a rationally indubitable belief in Him at all times (since stable belief is a necessary precondition for a long-term, loving relationship). But as a matter of fact we see that the world includes nonresistant nonbelievers. Therefore God doesn’t exist. Here I propose a reply to the problem that shifts focus from the nonresistant nonbelievers to those who are resistant. I claim (along with Morris (Making sense of it all: Pascal and the meaning of life. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1992), Howard-Snyder (Can J Philos 26:433–453, 1996), and others) that for many such people, having God’s reality forced upon them unwillingly might result in significant spiritual/moral harm, inhibiting their ability to develop a positive relationship with God. (I also respond to Schellenberg’s (Relig Stud 41:201–215, 2005a) general critique of any strategy that references the notion of God’s proper non-revelation to the resistant.) If this is true, it could help explain why God refrains from revealing Himself in a rationally indubitable manner not only to the resistant, but even to the nonresistant. Why? Because it may be that under present circumstances God is actually more concerned about the welfare of the resistant than of the willing; and revealing Himself to all of the willing could actually result in the truth of theism being forced on the resistant.
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Notes
Though it’s worth noting that in the end Keller uses the problem of divine hiddenness to argue for process theism (which posits a non-omnipotent God) rather than atheism.
See Aijaz and Weidler (2007), Azadegan (2013a, b, 2014), Brown (2013), Cullison (2010), Cuneo (2013), Dumsday (2010a, b, 2012a,b, 2013, 2014a, b), Evans (2006, 2010), Hick (1981), Henry (2001, 2008), King (2008, 2013), Marsh (2008), McBrayer and Swenson (2012), McCreary (2010), McKim (1990, 2001), Moser (2007, 2008), Murray (2002), Oakes (2008), O’Connell (2013), Poston and Dougherty (2007), Rea (2009), Swinburne (1998, 2004), van Inwagen (2002, 2006), Thune (2006), Tucker (2008), and Weidler and Aijaz (2013).
I use the term ‘defence’ deliberately, wishing to invoke the ‘defence versus theodicy’ contrast familiar from the literature on the problem of evil. In that context a defence is usually understood to be a possible scenario, offered to show that the problem admits of a solution, without necessarily affirming that that really is the solution. A theodicy, on the other hand, is a solution offered as the genuine, true explanation for the existence of evil. The burden of proof is obviously lighter on the former.
He adds another distinction to the mix, namely that between those who are likely to reciprocate but could choose otherwise and those who are certain to reciprocate. I will leave this distinction to one side, as I doubt that the second category could ever be actualized, given human freedom (and a plausible rejection of molinism).
For reasons we needn’t get into here, in his more recent work Schellenberg has switched to the terminology of ‘nonresistant nonbelievers.’
I would add a further, more tentative observation: we tend to think that a direct experiential encounter with Absolute Perfection would ipso facto be an experience of unparalleled wonder, joy, and ecstasy. But what if it could instead be an experience of terror, desolation, and unutterable despair? Theologians have been known to hypothesize the latter reaction as the inevitable result of the non-righteous consciously entering into the presence of Righteousness itself, which idea has led to the well-known (though by no means universally affirmed) understanding of hell not as exclusion from the presence of God but the experience of that presence by the unrepentant wicked. If that hypothesis is at all tenable, it would provide additional justification for why God might refrain from giving most of us experiential access to him just at present—perhaps we aren’t ready for it and would hardly thank Him if He provided it. On this notion of hell see for instance Ware (1984, p. 266): “Hell is not so much a place where God imprisons man, as a place where man, by misusing his free will, chooses to imprison himself. And even in Hell the wicked are not deprived of the love of God, but by their own choice they experience as suffering what the saints experience as joy. ‘The love of God will be an intolerable torment for those who have not acquired it within themselves.’” The quote Ware employs is from Lossky (1957, p. 234).
Different denominations have somewhat different conceptions of this doctrine. Notably, on the Orthodox view Adam’s descendants suffer the consequences of his fall (like corruption and death) but inherit no actual guilt from him, and in consequence are not liable to any punishment simply on account of this—hence the view in Orthodoxy that anything akin to limbo for unbaptized infants must be a serious error. On these points see for instance Pomazansky (2005, pp. 162–169) and Ware (1984, pp. 227–230). Roman Catholic theologians increasingly interpret original sin in a like manner, and it is notable that there is not a single reference to limbo in the new Catechism of the Catholic Church (1995).
At this point Schellenberg could counter-reply by arguing that God should then not allow fallenness, or should override our freedom if we do indeed fall into such a state. And indeed he has argued that given the nature of love, and given the axiological significance of such relationship for us, God would indeed properly override our freedom if in the final analysis it got in the way of such relationship (e.g. in his 2007a, pp. 221–222—though note that there he takes up the issue in the context of formulating a broader dilemma concerning freedom). The doctrinal commitments of the Eastern Orthodox Church exclude that possibility from consideration, as do those of some Protestant groups (Wesleyans for instance) and (arguably) the Roman Catholic Church. From their perspective, that sort of counter-reply will not do; moreover many would object to the idea on deontological grounds (for instance the notion that not even God could violate our basic right to moral autonomy) or from other ethical presuppositions. At any rate, such debates concerning God’s duties with respect to our freedom are familiar from discussions in the context of the problem of evil, and I have nothing to add to them here.
I could plausibly strengthen this claim to a ‘definitely would’ rather than a mere ‘could’, but given that I’m formulating a defence against the hiddenness argument rather than a theodicy, I can get by with the weaker and more easily defended claim.
In fact, in this connection it’s worth mentioning some of the actual empirical data collected by sociologists and psychologists of religion. For a summary of relevant survey data over the past 45 years see Spilka et al. (2003, pp. 299–312). A representative example: in a 1978 study Hay and Morisy sampled 1,865 people in Britain. Thirty-six percent responded affirmatively to the question “Have you ever been aware of or influenced by a presence or power, whether you call it God or not, which is different from your everyday self?” For further data and analysis see also Hay (1994). With respect to multiple such experiences across a single lifetime, Fenwick (1996, p. 170) writes that “although about a third of all people have had the experience, only 18 percent have had it more than twice and only 8% ‘often’ and more.”
This third point of course demands a great deal of expansion; in particular, one might ask how it helps with the question of why God would allow non-belief in theism. After all, mightn’t there be some way He could give us all rationally indubitable belief in theism while not giving us rationally indubitable belief in Christian theism? It is after all supposed to be faith in Jesus that is salvific, not faith in generic theism. I take this up in detail in the course of formulating an alternative reply to the hiddenness problem; see my (2015).
My thanks to an anonymous referee for this objection, which I reproduce here verbatim.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to express my sincere thanks to an anonymous referee for the IJPR for his/her helpful comments. Additionally, this research was undertaken thank in part to funding from the Canada Research Chairs program, for which I am grateful to the government and taxpayers of Canada.
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Dumsday, T. Divine hiddenness and the one sheep. Int J Philos Relig 79, 69–86 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-015-9537-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-015-9537-y