

CORRIGENDA

- ⁴ This is to reject the claim made by some redundancy theories of truth that “‘P’ is true” means the same thing as ‘P’, a claim which is difficult to sustain given that the former is about a sentence while the latter is not. For the point that the redundancy theory denies that “‘P’ is true” is a statement about ‘P’, see Horowich [1990, p. 39].
- ⁵ Of course, given the logical equivalence of ER and ER*, the truth of ER entails the truth of a semantic thesis, namely, ER*. But to say that the truth of ER entails that of ER* is not to say that once can be derived from the other without further non-logical assumptions.
- ⁶ To spell the point out more fully: take the sentence ‘Protons exist.’ Given the T-scheme, the sentence ‘Protons exist’ if and only if protons exist. But if to be true is to cohere with a system of beliefs, ‘Protons exist’ if and only if ‘Protons exist’ coheres with a system of beliefs. Substituting the latter for the former, we get: ‘Protons exist’ coheres with a system of beliefs if and only if protons exist. But this makes the existence of protons conditional on the coherence of set of beliefs. Note that similar reasoning applies to other truth-theories which make truth a matter of epistemic evaluation, such as verificationism and pragmatism.
- ⁷ There is, in general, no conflict between the mind-independence aspect of entity realism and deflationary theories of truth, such as disquotationalism, the redundancy theory, and Horowich’s minimalism.

Robert Dunn

Attitudes, Agency and First-Personality

PHILOSOPHIA Vol. 24, Nos. 3-4 (1995) 295-319.

Replace all occurrences of ($\$x$) and ($\p) by the corresponding existential quantifiers, ($\exists x$) and ($\exists p$) respectively.