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This paper has benefited from seminar discussions at the Universities of Wollongong and Queensland, Monash University, and The Research School of the Social Sciences, Australian National University. As usual, in developing my ideas, I was much helped by discussions with André Gallois.
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Dunn, R. Attitudes, agency and first-personality. Philosophia 24, 295–319 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02379960
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02379960