THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN HUSSERL'S "LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS".

  • DUPRE L
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Abstract

IT IS STATED THAT HUSSERL'S THEORY OF TRUTH IS AMBIGUOUS.WHEN HUSSERL ATTACKED PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS OFTRUTH, A LOGICISM SEEMED TO BE PREDOMINANT; LATER HEINCLINED TOWARD INTUITIONISM, WHERE TRUTH IS CONSTITUTED BYTHE REAL PRESENCE OF THE OBJECT. PURELY LOGICAL RELATIONSIN AN ETERNAL ORDER OF TRUTH, INDEPENDENT OF THINGS, SEEMSTO CONFLICT WITH THE IDEA OF EVIDENCE, WHICH IS APSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT TRUTH IS THERESULT OF AN INTUITION IN WHICH THE THING ITSELF IS GIVEN.FINALLY, PARALLELS ARE DRAWN BETWEEN HUSSERL'S DOUBLE TRUTHAND LEIBNIZ'S TRUTHS OF REASON AND TRUTHS OF FACT.(STAFF)

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APA

DUPRE, L. (1964). THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN HUSSERL’S “LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 24, 345–354.

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