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Personhood and First-Personal Experience

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There is a gap between the first-person and third-person perspectives resulting in a tension experienced between psychological science, 'experimental psychology,' and applied consulting psychological practice, 'clinical psychology.' This is an exploration of that 'gap' and its resulting tension. First-person perspective is proposed as an important aspect of psychological reality in conjunction with the related perspectival aspects of second- and third-person perspectives. These 3 aspects taken 'wholistically' constitute a perspectival diffusion grate through which psychological reality is discerned. The reductionistic naturalism of scientifically apprehended reality is examined for the powerful resistances that impede utilizing perspective in psychological investigations with consequences for our understanding of psychological reality. The impediments constructed by Quine, Sellars, Dennett, Metzinger, and cognitive psychology are all examined for their robust intractability to first-person perspective or anything that might seem similar. The conclusion suggested is that they all result from a 'scientific near-sightedness' of a strict naturalism. The result is that any intentionally dependent objects that are real in the lives of persons are eliminated as not real with no ontological significance. The assertion is that ordinary things such as car keys and employment are real and are ontologically significant.

Keywords: first-person, hard naturalism, liberal naturalism, personhood, third-person

There is a tension in the scientific investigation of the human being of general abstract principles of personality or behavior that contrasts to an intuitive investigation of particular individual characteristics conceptualized in psychological literature as *nomothetic* and *idiographic*. The tension is that the idiographic is viewed as moving beyond the general principles of the scientific to an intuitive account of the person and cannot be *scientific*, and is thereby even *antiscientific*. The nomothetic-idiographic controversy dominated the study of behavior and personality to the present and is still significant. The fact to be noted is that psychology as science has always wrestled with the intuitive individual characteristics as contrasted with general scientific principles (see Lamiell, 1987, 1998 for one account of the background concerning nomothetic-idiographic controversy).

That same tension is present between psychology-the-science and psychology-as-practice as the gap between objective third-person perspective and the individuated subjective, often intuitive, first-person perspectival interactions of a consulting psychologist and a client, between a psychotherapist and a client. There is a translation that takes place in a practice setting from objective science to an intuitive subjective particular situation; a translation from a reductionistic scientific conceptual framework to a nonreductionistic experience of a relationship required in a professional practice setting. The question to be explored concerns how such a 'translation' or 'conversion' is made? Further what is it that allows for that translation? How can we understand the relation between what is referred to as third- and first-person perspectives with the nomothetic-idiographic conceptual frame? Although 'idiographic' terminology refers to subjective particular characteristics of an individual, there is no claim that it invokes a first-person perspective of ownership or 'mine-ness.' Idiographic descriptions continue to be objectively third-personal. The commonality is limited to addressing individual and particular

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characteristics pertaining to behavior, but from different directions.

Psychological testing and assessment is the specialized technology of converting, or translating, general principles such as personality traits to predictive information concerning the particularities of an individual. That is, psychological assessment makes a disciplined guess, based on testing data, of the biography of a person that can be judged to be accurate and of predictive value of the behavior of an individual if there is congruence with the already extant biography. A successful psychological assessment is always in an objective third-person perspective, that is a scientific perspective, and first-person perspective and experience enters into an assessment only when, upon receiving an evaluative interactive feedback, the target client of the assessment can report that the testing data is congruent with her experiences and further assists her to better understand the particularities of her own behavior. Such an evaluation is then useful in guiding the planned social interventions that will be helpful in providing support to the target client, or in guiding therapeutic treatment planning of a psychological intervention through psychotherapy.

The level of first- and second-person experience of the interactions engaged requires the skills of a consulting or clinical psychologist that are acquired through an understanding of the relevant general principles of psychological science and mentored training. In addition to the nomothetic-idiographic tension it appears that a second level of tension is encountered in a practical implementation that requires “being” with the client, patient, or problem that involves mutual first-person perspective that is thereby a second-person interaction with a client and which becomes intersubjectivity. This is a subjective, a below cognitive level of encounter when considered in the context mainstream nomothetic-idiographic conceptual context that might be described as a region of *phenomenological psychology* that addresses intrinsic psychological experiences concerning the ‘flow of thinking,’ stream of thought, stream of experience, or stream of consciousness, described by William James.

The problem confronted in this paper is that of first-person perspective in particular, the more general aspects of an immediately present interaction of two people, and a third-

person perspective that is the normative standard of science generally and psychological science in particular, all of which are the special interest of this paper. The questions addressed concern how first-person perspective can become part of the psychological study of a person?; what kinds of adjustments are required in mainstream psychological science to comfortably use perspectival data, if any?; and what are the resistances to perspectival data, specifically first-person perspective, involving intrinsic psychological processes? These are some of the questions addressed in this essay in an examination of one approach to what conceptual accommodations; that is, metaphysical accommodations; are required to employ first-person perspective in the investigation and understanding of a person. The guiding intuition is that only through the full employment of personal perspectives will a fully rich understanding of a person and her lifeworld be approached.

First-Personal Experience and Identity

One difficulty with the idea of a first-person experiencing and its perspective, is the challenge to a purely naturalistic reality that is fully congruent with science and that avoids appealing to magical supernatural entities as such relations prevent causal closure. Science is the standard and the lens through which reality is apprehended, and there is not a straightforward step to an account of subjectivity, first-person perspective, self, person, or personhood, or even an account for those social objects each person encounters in day-to-day interactions like parking meters, overtime, contracts, car keys, and the myriad other everyday ordinary things that require little and get little thought. The ontology of those things that exist provided by science excludes much that make up our daily lives, and that clearly exist in order to make social life possible, an extended ontology that is simply the set of everything that ‘is’ in the course of living. Metaphysics simply applies to how those real things fit together, how they are related, to make up the ontological set posited. A tension is experienced between humanistic and scientific views of psychological events, between a holistic nonreductionistic view of an individual, social events and in-

teractions, and the standard mainstream reductionistic view required by psychological science and more generally by science. Gordon Allport (1955) observes “that for two generations psychologists have tried every conceivable way of accounting for the integration, organization, and striving of the human person without having recourse to the postulate of the self,” for the purpose of building a psychological science ‘self’ was perceived as too close to a ‘soul’ (pp. 36–37). He recognized then that “the tide has turned.” A similar observation applies to the first-person perspective, the necessary part of a constituted self, in these current times with an increasing number of experimental psychological inquiries of first- and third-person perspectives (e.g., Bach, Fenton-Adams, & Tipper, 2014; Legrand & Ruby, 2009; Mattan, Quinn, Apperly, Sui, & Rotshtein, 2015; Rennie, Harris, & Webb, 2014).

It is my assertion, following Lynne Rudder Baker, that a person cannot exist unless a capacity for a first-person perspective is present. Stated alternatively, a person is a person because she exercises a robust first-person perspective. A person emerges when an organism with the structural capacity, the neural capacity for cognition, engages a first-person perspective using language that reflects a self-concept. This is asserted with a firm confidence that reality is materialistic, that is real, without superstitious, magical, or unconnected independent substances as, for example, required by a Cartesian style dualism. More explicitly, there is no independent mental substance needed to account for a naturalistic reality, Cartesian or otherwise.

The assertion of first-person experiencing and the perspective of that experiencing raises a number of questions concerning what it is, and whether it can be fit into the scientific naturalistic frame. A specific argument forwarded by Baker, in a context of a series of carefully constructed arguments concerning the central importance of a liberal nonreductive naturalism and first-person perspective, is that the criteria for inclusion in naturalistic ontology can be softened to include, what she terms, “intention dependent objects, or phenomena” (Baker, 2007, pp. 11–13, 106–110). An intention dependent phenomenon is “any object that could not exist in a world lacking

beings with beliefs, desires, and intentions” (p. 11). Such phenomena, or objects, include promises, credit cards, community expectations, kitchen utensils, garages, and on.

Persons and Psychological Kinds

Before proceeding to the investigation of Baker’s presentation of a first-person perspective, we will examine the robust investigations of Martin and his colleagues whose perspectival orientation account is different and perhaps complementary, but which falls short of that which Baker asserts is a first-person perspective (Martin, Sugarman, & Thompson, 2003; Martin, Sugarman, & Hickinbottom, 2010). Martin, Sugarman, and Thompson ontologically account for everyday objects by recognizing a global emergence of different general levels of reality in a broad cultural context that includes psychological kinds (Martin et al., 2003, pp. 103–132). In their description psychological kinds refer to

human subjectivity, understanding, actions, and experiences, the agentic reality of which we regard as not reducible to sociocultural, biological, or physical levels of reality. We do regard these other levels of reality as requirements for, and constraints on, psychological kinds. (p. 103)

The core idea of emergence is that as the organization of a system becomes increasingly complex they begin to exhibit properties that are entirely novel to the original system introducing a ‘higher level’ of reality with properties that transcend the original constituent systems and are generally not predicted from them (Baker, 2007, pp. 237–239).

An emergence of higher levels of reality transcends the requirement for hard naturalistic reduction and results in a nonreductive liberal naturalism, although that term is not employed by them. Martin et al. argue that including a ‘sociocultural level of reality’ accommodates everyday objects which appear to be the same as those identified as ‘intentionally dependent objects’ by Baker (Martin et al., 2010, p. 82). What seems to be not noticed is that by achieving an open nonreductive liberal naturalism the deterministic constraints on human activities are avoided because it is no longer ontologically and causally closed and deterministic constraints are no longer at issue. Stated more succinctly an ontologically and causally closed nat-

uralism is emergently transcended. That is, the compatibility rationale for freedom of choice occurring in a closed deterministic system is no longer needed and is not relevant. The constraints of a reductionist causal determinism are not imposed in a liberal naturalist context that is open to novel artifacts with the result that a free action of choosing among affordances is more easily recognized as a property of a person.

Persons for Martin and colleagues emerge in human infants who have developed the complex neurology that make possible the cognitive processes and skills that make a reflective personal perspective possible. In their view,

the self, agency, and personal identity of a person require the in-the-world activity of a biological human equipped with rudimentary capacities to sense and orient to, and remember (in a primitive, prelinguistic sense) some of what is encountered in the physical, sociocultural world. (Martin et al., 2003, p. 113)

With the result that “the conceptual self, reflective agency, and personal identity that define personhood emerge from the ongoing participation in the world of human sociocultural practices—practices that are not only linguistic” (p. 113). Their account of emergence succeeds in formulating a nonreductive liberal naturalism that describes the appearance of persons as self-interpreting agents.

A broadly consensual definition of a psychological self is developed which Martin et al. refers to as a perspectival self. Such a self is understood as

an embodied first-person perspective (an “I”), the worldly experiences of which enable a constantly evolving self-understanding (a “me”) with sufficient stability and coherence [an identity] to permit generally effective personal functioning in the biophysical and sociocultural world in which it develops. (Martin et al., 2010, p. 110)

This definition is designed to occupy the middle between a hard naturalism which dismisses nonreductive psychological kinds and which requires determinism, and a radical constructionism which “denies selfhood as fictitious” intending to follow Mead at a sociocultural level of reality (Martin et al., 2010, pp. 110–116). A self arises when one becomes aware of oneself as an object created by the social interactions with other individuals. What is meant by ‘first-person perspective’ is quite different than what Baker identifies as the core elements of a first-person perspective: a sense of sameness and

for-me-ness, and a self-concept. Rather, for Martin and colleagues what is referred to as first-person perspective is stipulated as extrinsically orienting to an other or multiple others in the external social environment or an orienting in a conceptual space. The intrinsic self-feeling that can be characterized variously as a sense of ‘warmth,’ ‘for-me-ness,’ ‘mineness,’ ‘sameness,’ ‘awareness’ is not recognized, and instead “The self . . . is a developmentally emergent, embodied first-person perspective linked to an understanding of a particular existence (self-understanding)” (Martin et al., 2010, pp. 113, 117–135).

Although Baker is acknowledged in respect to first-, second-, and third-person perspectives, the differences between their respective versions of first-person perspective is not explored (Martin et al., 2010, pp. 145–146). In general, following Mead, the distinctions between first-, second-, and third-person perspectives are not made by Martin et al. “Perspectives” are extrinsically described, “broadly as perceptual and conceptual orientations to a situation with a view to acting within that situation” (p. 117). A person’s reality is “a field of perspectives” that is the extrinsic “ongoing interrelation of the individual and environment that yields perspectives” (p. 120). In sum, the intrinsic account of first-person perspective formulated by Baker (2000, 2007, 2013) investigated here contrasts with and is not equivalent to the extrinsic orienting account laid out by Martin and colleagues. It is also noticed that they are not so much competing views of a first-person perspective as referring to different processes. For Martin and colleagues, what is referred to as first-person perspective is a spatial index function in the cultural, environmental, and conceptual spaces occupied by or attended to by a person. The emphasis on understanding and self-interpreting is a narrative format of selfhood that lacks the direct encounter of one person to an other. As such, it is questionable whether the role attributed as first-person orientation should be usefully stipulated as a ‘first-person perspective.’ This is not to deny that their conceptual frame of ‘perspectival structures’ is not complexly rich and, in some ways, thorough; it is not however what Baker, as well as others, asserts is a first-person perspective as a sense of sameness and of being mine with a robust self-concept that is to be described sub-

sequently (Baker, 2000, pp. 130–141, 146; 2013, pp. 127–143).

In a review of their project that is conceived as ‘ontologically significant’ and ‘irreducible to material, organic, or sociocultural properties,’ Sugarman and Martin (2010) state that their goal is to establish a ‘subject matter’ that is genuinely psychological and a psychology that is an independent ‘distinct discipline.’ They characterize their project as *agentic hermeneutics* as the central focus is on a self as a self-interpreting agent that participates in a multiply determined nexus to effect self determination (p. 159). Such a continuous process of self-interpretation and self-understanding inheres in the normative cultural institutional structure and provides the person with always changing meanings in and interplay between a reactive “I” and the objective “Me” that is understood. This bifurcation between “I” and “Me” occurs when a reflexive agent initiates a reflexive self-awareness that positions a person in two or more simultaneous perspectives that establishes the interaction between the subjective “I” and the understood “Me” that “leaves a trail of [objective] “Me’s” in its wake” that constructs a perspectival structure orienting the person to others and to relevant objects in their social environment (pp. 169–170). The “I” then is the reactive and reflexive agent that then results in a string of “Me’s.” They emphasize that “Selves are not substantive or mysterious entities within persons, but rather consist of social and psychological relations of activity and understanding that define individual human beings and their lives” (p. 166).

As noted above, what is a perspective and a perspectival structure refers to extrinsic acts of orienting to a sociocultural environment, and is fundamentally different than what is meant by the first-person perspective that requires a robust self-concept and the “brute fact that a particular experience now is mine and a particular experience yesterday was mine” (Baker, 2000, p. 146). Three forms of ownership can be discerned: possessive ownership relating to such things as cars, houses, bicycles and do not pertain to this discussion; perspectival ownership of a particular position in the relationship to others and the world; and personal ownership of something that is part of oneself and that is oneself. The process of discriminating what is oneself or a part of oneself distinguishes one

from an other person and creates a boundary between what is oneself and what is not. Attributing central importance to a narrating self, the self that is self-interpretive and self-understanding, describes a continuously self-constituting process, but does not address or recognize the ‘subject’ that has an experience that only a particular person can; that has an experience of occupying a perspective or a given perspectival structure. Subjectivity, by which is meant that which frames an experience that one has, requires the recognition of a minimal self that exhibits a sense of sameness and ‘for-me-ness’ rejected by Martin, Sugarman, and colleagues following Mead (Mead, 1934, pp. 172–173; Mead, 1938; Siderits, Thompson, & Zahavi, 2011; Zahavi, 2009). There may also be some benefit to a further consideration of the concept of agency. It is suggested that there may be more to what is ‘agency’ than the constrained stipulation to ‘reactive reflexivity’ or a ‘reactive “I”’ as there is also a passive receptiveness of agency as well as intentional activity with the result that an exact specification of what is meant by agency is inherently uncertain (Gallagher, 2012; Rovane, 2004).

The contrast between the view of perspective proposed by Martin, Sugarman and their colleagues with the first-person perspective intended by Baker, in particular, and others such as Zahavi, Gallagher, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Siderits, and phenomenologists generally require, or at least suggest, some discussion of what is meant by first-, second-, and third-personal perspectives. It may be that such a formalized personal perspectival structure is not exhausted by only three levels of perspective outlooks. In the next section, we will explore a multi-level-person perspective before moving to a specific examination of the first-person perspective. The discussion will not be exhaustive for reasons that will become evident, and only an outline of multiply discriminated levels of perspective is possible here.

Perspectival Diffusion

A brief restatement of general purpose of this investigation is to address the first-person perspective in the context of a scientific naturalism that is now the default conceptual frame, the lens, in which the world is apprehended, and which proposes ontological extensions of an

open liberal naturalism. The goal is to describe what a first-person perspective is and what it does that includes positioning it in relation to the ontological naturalistic context which is described, following Baker, in the following section. The third-person perspective is not so much at issue as it is the normative objective viewing of the world that founds knowledge and is vigorously defended by Daniel Dennett, Wilfrid Sellars, and W. V. Quine and others from a possible contamination from first-person perspectival phenomena. Science is a third-person presentation of a sustained effort to describe a world of mind independent things that includes concepts, and is the methodological commitment of science. Third-person perspective is lucently described by Thomas Nagel as ‘a view from nowhere,’ which is also the title of his well known investigation of the relation of the perspective of a particular person of the world that is part of an objective view, a perspective, of the whole world that includes the person as well as his first-person particular view. “It is a problem,” he says, “that faces every creature with the impulse and the capacity to transcend its particular point of view and to conceive of the world as a whole” (Nagel, 1986, p. 3).

Charles Larmore describes objectivity, a third-person perspective, as emerging from normative cultural pressure on developing individuals who are modeling or otherwise following other more established older individuals of that sociocultural setting and who then mentally abstract what is learned during the cultural learning process to form a concept of a generalized other. A person conforms to the norms, the value expectations, of the culture; then those conformist norms become more stand-alone objective norms that allow that person to achieve some thinking and behavioral independence within that culture (Larmore, 2010, pp. 31–59, 97–109). In sum, third-person perspective refers to our knowledge of the world and of ourselves, and results from a general sociocultural saturation. In general, the third-person perspective is the objective characteristic of knowledge with well established epistemological standards with its various tests and structures of acceptability that is specific to a culture, in our case naturalistic science.

Second-person perspective is much less explored perhaps because it presents a continuing difficulty of an act occurring in the present so

that what is examined is already a third-person perspectival object. As Emmanuel Levinas would say “the saying is lost in the said” as the present can only be pointed to and not captured for examination (Levinas, 1987, p. 126). To paraphrase, the immediate present act is lost in the resulting historical object. The link between personhood and others is occupying a second-person perspective: a direct face-to-face confrontation. A second-person perspective is instantiated when a person engages an other person in conversation or in some other joint activity. Such a relation can be seen as first-person plural or second-person singular, and engages a shared focus of attention. In a general way it is a “We” experience. It is a ‘you-me’ experience in that it is a reciprocating triadically structured interaction in which one person is aware of another person and both are concurrently attending a shared object or project. At the same time the ‘other’ person is aware of a ‘me’ within the same triadically structured experience, and both are aware that the other is aware of oneself. This face-to-face second-person experience establishes the intersubjectivity “through which the world acquires the character of a truly social world” and establishes the complex social relations of a culture (Zahavi, 2014, p. 248). Once a ‘we-experience’ and a ‘we-intentionality’ is established, it will be acknowledged to preempt some recent cognitive formulations of theory of mind accounts concerning how one person understands another referred to as theory-theory and simulation theories of mind (Goldman, 2006; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992, 2012; Zahavi, 2014).

There are other forms of ‘we-intentionality’ in addition to the transitory face-to-face ‘we’ experience described. There is, for example, the “we won” when a college football team wins their homecoming game, or a declaration that “we will win” that is an indirectly derived we-intention that can be said to be parasitic upon the fundamental face-to-face-based we-intentionality. The question that is invited is whether there is a collective ‘we-intentionality’ that transcends the second-person perspective? It turns out that there is a rather vigorous literature asserting that collective intention is relatively common and is supported by a literature which includes J. R. Searle, Alfred Schutz, H. B. Schmid, and L. Schilbach (Brinck, Reddy & Zahavi, in press; Zahavi, 2015, 2014). There are

then, not only a first-, second-, and third-person perspectives, but also a we-person perspective by which a full richness of personhood and sociocultural levels of reality need to be viewed in order to be understood. Perhaps it is not too much of a stretch to assert a type of perspectival sociocultural diffusion grate as necessary to fully apprehend and understand how a person fits in a life world, to use a term from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.

What is the ontological significance of such described perspectival properties and events? Asking that question differently, do perspectivally related events and properties exist? Are they real? As is discussed later, there are many powerful arguments against a first-person perspective that is seen as a “quite radical or revolutionary alternative science” that is not to be taken seriously, but which confronts all aspects of personal perspectives, not only first-person but also a second-person perspective and that ascribes quite specifically to a third-person perspective (Dennett, 2001, p. 1). Scientific naturalism is ontologically complete in that nothing exists outside it. In *The Metaphysic of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism*, Baker challenges that claim and develops systematic arguments for everyday objects that would not exist if it were not for the presence of persons with beliefs, desires, and intentions which she refers to as *intention-dependent* objects or *intention-dependent* phenomena. In general, the claim is that there is ontological novelty in the world that is made probable by an open liberal naturalism made possible by the constitution relation which results in intention dependent objects (Baker, 2007, pp. 231, 240). Restated, liberal naturalism is open because it allows for new ontological entities to come into existence. She asserts that such entities as cars, pay checks, and symphonies are real because they are generally ineliminable and irreducible and which have ontological significance and causal efficacy as do first-personal perspectival properties (Baker, 2013, pp. 109–123). “The upshot,” Baker contends, “is that the world has an ineliminably personal aspect; it is not wholly impersonal, as ontological naturalism would have it” and is irreducible to constituting ontological levels, that is, to neurons and electrons (Baker, 2013, p. 123). I take it, following Baker, that as a first-person perspective is demonstrated to have ontological significance and

therefore causal efficacy, those same arguments apply to second-person perspective which can be concluded as possessing ontological significance and causal efficacy. Further investigation of Baker’s presentation of a first-person perspective is pursued in the next section.

This section is intended to be something of a sketch of what might be referred to as a perspectival diffusion as each: first-, second-, third-, and (it turns out) we-personal perspectives have their own very large literatures, and it seems necessary to briefly review what a full perspectival range can be that is necessary to fully apprehend persons in a lifeworld. In the same way, the issue of the significance of perspectival properties is salient, and is addressed to provide some direction to the curiosity regarding ontology, however unsatisfactory the briefness of the discussion above might be. The purpose of this investigation, to restate it again, is to put forward an account of a first-person perspective that also makes clear the relatively unfriendly naturalistic environment it, first-person phenomena, must find a place. After consideration, it seemed best not to simply step over such important although controversial issues all of which require their own direct inquiries. We are now prepared to move forward on the primary direction of this essay and to examine Lynne Rudder Baker’s detailed account of what a person is and how that person comes to be by means of a first-personal perspective. How a person is ontologically different, on a different ontological level, than a rock, a tree, or other mind independent object.

Reflection and First-Personal Orientation

As Baker says “first-person perspective—however it came about, by natural selection, by accident, or otherwise—makes such a difference that there is a difference in kind between beings that have it and beings that do not” (Baker, 2000, p. 21). Three assumptions are specified in Baker’s inquiry: The first-person perspective occurs in a thoroughly material world and human persons are material beings; second, this world is a temporal world that endures through time and is not merely the sum of temporal parts; and third, identity is a strict identity, to use Baker’s illustration, if x differs from y in any way then x is not equal to y . These assumptions are viewed by Baker as a

good way to investigate how far they can take an inquiry of understanding persons and how large a range of questions regarding human persons can be answered and rebutted when called out (pp. 21–23). As previously noted, in the context of *practical realism* (Baker, 2007), intentionally dependent objects have an ontological significance and require, more than simply deserve, reflection and consideration in our inquiries and deliberations. In addition, the human person is to be considered as a whole; is not reducible to parts that may be contrived to be its constituents. Our first-person experience leads to a first-person perspective that is unique to the human person who experiences, and who now has properties that are not reducible to apparent constituents. It should be noted that such holistic properties have been recognized by others, are not unique to Baker, and is what Martin and colleagues refer as ‘psychological kinds’ (Hacking, 1995, 1999, 2007).

What is it about first-person perspective that gives it the property of creating persons? To begin, it is the ability to see oneself from the inside, it is self-consciousness. The capacity to sense myself and those thoughts, objects, and experiences that identify with that ‘sense of warmth’ unmistakably as my “I” to use a phrase from James. This ‘sense of warmth’ is similar to what Marya Schechtman refers as “empathic warmth” that maintains a connection with one’s past for maintaining those persistent conditions of personal identity (Schechtman, 2003, pp. 245–246). Following James, it is necessary to maintain the distinction between “I” and “Me” in which “Me” is the object one becomes to oneself, a self, or more accurately the selves of oneself. It is this “I” that centers those intentional activities engaged by an embodied human person that is embedded in a sociocultural world, to use Martin and colleagues’s terminology, and medium sized intentional objects, to use Baker’s terminology. These centered experiences are reflected by standard cognitive processes and becomes the content of the selves that make up a life, and continues a ‘loopy’¹ (a term borrowed from Hacking) ongoing reflective recursive cognitive process that becomes one’s inner life. It is this first-person experiencing, self-reflectivity of that experiencing, and its subsequent perspective that makes possible an inner life. It is the “Me” that coheres those constituents as a particular self.

Two processes are to be discriminated. The first is what might best be referred to as reflexivity and is automatic and preconscious, which is also to say preconceptual. It is not subject to the coarse examination of introspection and as introspective sensitivities are conscious and conceptual while reflexivity is not. It may be said to be habitual as automatic, but is not supposed as a reaction of a neuron or any particular neuronal system as affecting muscle groups or behavior. Reflexivity is a holistic process of a stream of thought, or mind, such as described by James. Reflectivity is a deliberate and intended action of viewing oneself in an experience that you have just had, or experiences had in the past. That is, seeing oneself as a concept that is ‘Me,’ from the outside in a third-person perspective much as an other person in the social community would see oneself. It is this splitting of the subjectivity of oneself from the outside world, that is, splitting the first-person “I” from the concept of oneself in the outside world. This splitting becomes embedded in language and in one’s use of language, and is what Baker refers to as ‘the datum’ (Baker, 2000, pp. 60–69; 2013, pp. 64–65). The statement “I think/hope/wish that I* win/go/am not ill” is such an example illustrating the speaker of this sentence experiences herself in two different ways. One is to think of oneself* as oneself, designated I*, which reflects back and represents the speaker of the sentence, and the other is the speaker or thinker of the thought who happens to be oneself, designated I, about who the sentence refers. There is illustrated, then, two different beliefs of oneself. The asterisk of I* (I star) is a practice initiated by Hector-Neri Casteñada² and followed by Baker to indicate the reference to a concept of oneself* as oneself without assistance from an impersonal third-person perspective or referential device. The “I” is a marker of perception and is a weak or

¹ This is a term introduced by Ian Hacking (1995) as the “looping or feedback effect involving the introduction of classifications of people.”

² This is presented in a short collection of essays in *The Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness* by Hector-Neri Casteñada and edited by James G. Hart and Tomis Kapitan. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press. Others have also used the convention of I* to indicate subjective first-person experience and action, for example, Matthews, Gareth B. 1977. “Surviving As.” *Analysis*, 37, 53-58.

rudimentary first-person perspective that is exhibited or shared by any problem solving animal such as a dog, lion, gorilla, and an infant prior to acquiring a competent use of language and an ability to employ an “I*,” a self-reference. A rudimentary first-person perspective is a property of all problem solving organisms that encounter daily circumstantial difficulties such as acquiring food, remaining undetected, and on. An infant or young child also exhibits rudimentary first-person perspective until developing sufficiently to acquire the ability to perceive a concept of herself* as herself in relation to reflectively conceiving of herself thereby exhibiting robust first-person perspective (Castañeda, 1999).

Practical Realism and the Constitution View

In Baker’s psychological philosophy anything that has robust first-person perspective, human or not, is a person (Baker, 2000, p. 91). The requirement for the emergence of a person is an organism, or entity, with sufficient neurological like structures to support the complex cognitive processes necessary for self-consciousness and a robust first-person perspective. The relation between the organism and person is one of material constitution that establishes a union between a body and the entity that is self-conscious, a person that is embodied, but which has a different identity. A human person is in union with the organism that constitutes it, but is not identical to it. The person exhibits a difference from an organism in ‘primary kind’ that has ontological significance by virtue of the property of self-awareness. To refer back to Martin and colleagues vocabulary, a new level of a sociocultural reality emerges which they refer to as ‘psychological kinds’ or as a socio-cultural level of reality, and to Baker as a higher ontological level. For Baker, ontological significant properties create the persistent conditions that set the requirements for survival (Baker, 2007, pp. 218–226).

We now come to the issues of personal identity across time. Our discussion has been concerned with how a ‘person’ that is self-conscious emerges as a result of acquiring a first-person perspective. This is a synchronic question in a context of being present in a net of relations as a perspectival point of view which

cannot arise in the absence of the relations as just discussed. The diachronic issue is how a person at one time is the same person at another time and extends the discussion to what is ascribed as *personal identity* and the requirements for survival. Baker asserts that what is essential in one’s personal identity is a first-personal perspective because describing one’s personal identity by using nonpersonal facts from a third-person perspective cannot address what ‘personal’ identity is or what it consists. In Baker’s words:

We can use sameness of body, sameness of living organism, sameness of brain, and psychological continuity as *evidence* of personal identity, but none of these proposed criteria show what personal identity consists in. Again, this is no surprise: Why would anyone assume (as almost everyone does) that personal identity consists in any *other, nonpersonal facts* anyway? (Baker, 2000, p. 131)

In sum, according to the Constitution View, personal identity over time is unanalyzable in any more basic terms than sameness of first-person perspective. Although the Constitution View has no noncircular (i.e., reductive) account of personal identity over time, it does better than its rivals, and it allows for robust realism about persons and determinacy about questions of personal identity (p. 138).

Personal identity is unanalyzable from a third-person view ‘from nowhere’ not because a *person* is a nonmaterial spiritual substance, but, as Appiah (2005, pp. 58–61) notes in *The Ethics of Identity*, there is no middle ground between first-personal experience and third-personal normative observation. There is an incommensurability of first- and third-person perspectives that can be ignored only in the face of conflation that is similar to that of conflating logical categories, in this case ontological categories. That is, conflating or overlapping psychological categories (or levels of psychological realities?) is a similar error as overlapping logical categories. There is also the fact that what is immediately present cannot be described, that the ‘present’ only can be pointed to; which adds a kind of vagueness, an uncertainty, around the boundaries of first-personal experiences and perspectives described by Baker (2007, pp. 121–141). Baker’s view, the Constitution View, is fully compatible to a practical realism that can be termed a ‘liberal naturalism,’ and is fully accommodated to a mate-

rialistic metaphysic. It should be noted generally that a person, in the Constitution View, is a material constitution that is a broad relation supervenient on an organism with requisite neurological like structures which is a specified process of a general emergent process.

Hard naturalism, it may be noticed when compared with liberal naturalism, constructs metaphysical relations in which a scientific materialism, or naturalism, is exhausted within definite unchallenged boundaries containing it, beyond which boundaries nothing ontologically is present, and, instead, is embedded in the metaphysical relations that forms its own naturalistic environment. This environment is the cultural institutional supports for activities society knows as science. Near naturalism, in comparison, results in a more open ontological framework that is more coherent and harmonious with, and which more faithfully reflects, the circumstances we live our lives in contrast to a rigorously contained scientific materialism, a hard naturalism, that is taken to exhaust reality and which to that extent is monistically solipsistic. Science as an activity, and a social entity, occurs in a cultural and social context that empowers its institutional presence. The near, soft, or liberal naturalism seeks to capture the state of affairs that reflects a person's act within the space of reasons in a context of intention dependent objects (Ganeri, 2012, pp. 19–21).

Perspectival Maintenance

The last two sections has been about how first-person perspective constitutes a person and relates to the survival conditions of identity with a result that reveals those relations to be dependency. As Baker says there is circularity to a first-personal identification of personal identity, but that this way of explaining is superior to third-person impersonal attempts to accomplish that purpose, which in fact it cannot, at least with any satisfaction to closure. This section discusses Baker's psychological philosophy which accomplishes some closure of the liberal naturalism issue though not without controversy. There are several areas of rather intense controversy to include the rejection of the hard naturalism as arbitrated by the natural sciences and the reductionism that it requires, and subsequently the rejection of the methodological and epistemologically normative third-person

description of a monistic reality. There are other philosophers who have similar approaches to person, agency, relationships, and attitudes such as John Macmurray that are not inconsequential, however my choice in this discussion is Lynne Rudder Baker's corpus for clarity and specificity (Macmurray, 1957, 1961). For this reason, the 'Constitution View' is not presented as the only correct solution to an untenable, in my view, reductionistic mainstream psychological science, rather a probable affordance for resolving the largely unspoken tension between first-person owned experience and impersonal third-person detached descriptions of that experience.

This investigation traces a tension between the particular characteristics of a person that are framed in a first-person perspective, and the general characteristics of a person framed by a third-person perspective. Included is an examination of Martin and colleagues significant and robust presentations of an extrinsic perspectival and self-interpretive account that, although depends on a central feature of perspectival structures, does not employ and seems to avoid a first-person perspective with core properties of a sense of sameness (mineness) and a self-concept that are judged, for example by Baker, to be essential to a first-person perspective. Rather than frame the particular characteristics of a person in a first-person perspective, Martin and colleagues frame the particularities of person narratively through self interpretation and understanding. Baker's presentation of a robust first-person perspective is then examined that includes the properties of sameness and a self-concept that is reflected linguistically. There is agreement between Martin and his colleagues with Baker concerning the inability of scientific naturalism to accommodate adequately those objects actually encountered in everyday living, objects that are encountered daily with little thought, and a necessary requirement of an organism with sufficient neurological structures that support reflective cognitive processes living in a sociocultural world. Following Baker, it is asserted that a robust first-person perspective successfully provides for personhood, an inner life each of us has, and a person's embeddedness in a sociocultural environment. This is controversial as there are significant forces which deny that such a thing as first-person perspective exists or that it has significance.

A full consideration of robust first-person constituted personhood requires some understanding of the complex issues addressed by those arguments marshaled against first-person phenomena that are guided by an intent to prevent what apparently to many to be a degradation of the scientific pursuit of knowledge and its third-person perspectival methodology. The cumulative technological successes of the last century are credited to be a powerful argument for continuing current scientific conceptual framework and practices. Indeed, this scientific success is unquestioned although it may be questioned that an expanded metaphysical framework, a liberal naturalism, will degrade this technological success. Rather, the goal is to expand this success to what may be recognized as the human sciences, and perhaps a phenomenological psychology, as a part of this expanded success. This conjecture is, of course, controversial. The background for this controversy is briefly examined in the next two sections.

Quining the First-Person Perspective

There are strong, and for some compelling, reasons raised resisting what is seen as a degradation of objective scientific reality by the intrusion of incompatible nonreductive first-person events into a scientific reality. There is no tolerance for an irreducible first-person perspectives or irreducible first-person facts. The resulting attempts to naturalize 'first-person perspective' consist of either eliminative or reductionist strategies that are threaded by Baker's discussion and in which, it is asserted, the ineliminable nature of first-person perspective is convincingly established. Denying the ontological existence to an entity is to attack at the level of its foundation. However, as pointed out by Flanagan (1992, p. 21), denying the existence of something that everybody thinks exists occurs with enough frequency in philosophy that it is recognized by being named. Quining is a gerund of the verb 'to quine' in honor of W.V.O. Quine, and means to deny resolutely the existence or the importance of something that is usually taken as real or significant (Dennett, 1988; Flanagan, 1992). Dennett is concerned with 'qualia' whereas Flanagan with 'consciousness.' Evident from the discussion in the preceding sections, our concern is the notion

of perspective, and in particular 'first-person perspective' and the facts relating to it. The goal of this section is to explore the several ways naturalistic science is unreceptive and sometimes simply hostile to first-persons phenomena. Beginning the discussion with W. V. O. Quine and Wilfrid Sellars confronts two, perhaps, of the default formulations of a philosophy of scientific ontological naturalism. In their two quite different formulations of science it will be seen that there is simply no conceptual space for first-person perspectival phenomena even though the importance of psychology is recognized. What is psychologically interesting is how each accommodates or not psychological processes and especially the enlistment of psychology as a central epistemological tool of science.

Philosophy of Science and the First-Person

How is it that the first-person perspective challenges or compromises scientific naturalism? The guiding intuition seems to be that the ontological inclusion of first-personal facts obscures, or is seen to obscure the scientific epistemological process, perhaps, by including relationships inimical to a scientific naturalism that anticipates appropriate causal closure, and the inclusion of *I's* and a subjectivity which appear to be outside a naturalistic ontology. The mutual goal is to describe reality as accurately as achievable within the metaphysical constraints encountered by both positions of a hard naturalism or of a more relaxed liberal naturalism that can accommodate first-person perspectival phenomena.

As it became clear that truth or reality could not be expressed, or perhaps contained, mathematically and analytically, Quine advocated a turn to psychology as a natural science. Said differently, scientific epistemology now has to rely on psychology, on psychological process, as having an access to experiential sensory input to provide the connection between observational evidence and theory that Quine considers the central concern of epistemology which "falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence natural science" (Quine, 1969, p. 82). This is an interesting position that defines an essential role for psychology in naturalistic science whether or not such a position is sought. It provides validity to Hume's dream, or perhaps

insight, that psychology is, or should be, the foundation of scientific knowledge.

It is significant that psychological science is concluded to be necessary to the practice of science as a required replacement of epistemological functions of mathematics and logic. Such a position picks the psychologism side of a deep divide between allowing or rejecting psychological explanations of empirical and logical issues. What is included as a ‘psychologism’ is widely varied with little agreement of what it was, and currently is, as shown by Martin Kusch (1995, pp. 95–121), but originally referred to the attempts to base philosophical concepts on psychological explanatory accounts. The principle was to defend the analytic self-sufficient integrity of logic and mathematical reasoning from the uncertainty of psychological events such as observations of behavior (Kusch, 1995, pp. 95–121). Quine showed that the attempt to establish unquestioned analytic integrity and to maintain a certainty of truth failed (Quine, 1969, pp. 28–29, pp. 71–72). It turns out that logic and mathematical reasoning were unexpectedly not equal to the analytic task set for it so that the uncertainty introduced by psychologism is required according to Quine.

This should not be interpreted as a receptiveness to first-person phenomena. While creating a space for scientific psychology, Quine conceives a naturalistic psychology that can be and, in fact, is occupied presently by cognitive psychology and neuroscience. There is no ontological space for, or recognition of, perspective and especially not of first-person perspective as there is scarcely a recognition of intention and agency. Quine’s naturalistic metaphysics firmly excludes perspective as well as intention. What is interesting is Quine’s direct appeal to psychology which conjoins with language to establish pragmatic theories of science that can be strengthened or falsified in their turn (Hylton, 2014, pp. 31–32).

Folk Psychology and Science

Wilfrid Sellars approaches psychological concepts differently by regarding them as any other theoretical concept which are then acceptable to science. Meaning in this theoretical frame is then functionally defined by the terms and definitions of a theory so that referential issues of normative language need not be ad-

ressed. Sellars is firmly on the antipsychological side of that divide opposite Quine. He avers that first-person authority belongs to

concepts pertaining to such inner episodes as thought and essentially [are] intersubjective, as intersubjective as the concept of a positron and that the reporting role of these concepts—the fact that each of us has privileged access to his thoughts—constitutes a dimension . . . [of] . . . this intersubjective status. (deVries, 2015, pp. 24–26; Sellars, 1963, p. 172)

For Sellars, thinking is preceded by language and the creation of an intersubjective world. Folk psychology, Sellars ‘manifest view,’ is separate or superseded by the scientific view because folk psychology, like any theory, will be replaced so that folk psychology that is concerned with daily living does not address understanding the realistic world that science confronts and evolves as a view independent of a scientific view. With this basic reasoning Sellars declares:

I am quite prepared to say that the common sense world of physical objects in Space and Time is unreal—that is, that there are no such things. Or, to put it less paradoxically, that in the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what it is not that it is not. (Sellars, 1963, p. 158)

For Sellars the normative event of language situates what would be recognized as first-person data in a communitarian frame that is implicitly a normative third-person context. In such a context first-person perspective need not be considered or at best is folk psychology that ‘is unreal’ and irrelevant to science as he notes above. This is the move that Sellars finds necessary in the reconstruction of empiricism (deVries, 2015, pp. 6–8, 42–44; Sellars, 1963, pp. 153–155).

The relevant question is whether the varied and strong, to some compelling, scientific naturalism described by Quine and Sellars obviates first-person perspective of participation and of experience? Their framing of the presuppositional foundation of science leave no space for consideration first-person phenomena. Their influence is significant. In particular, deVries (2015) credits the Churchland’s, Paul Churchland a former student of Sellars, rigorous elimination of first-person perspective and the development of a theory theory of mind counter to first-person experience is to be attributed to the influence of Sellars (P. M. Churchland, 1995;

P. S. Churchland, 2002, 2011; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992, 2012).

Naturalizing the First-Person Perspectives

Naturalizing refers to showing that an entity or concept that is perceived as incompatible to science, in our case first-person perspective, can be adequately explained and accounted for in a naturalistic context without a first-person reference. The two ways of incorporating phenomena that appear incompatible into scientific naturalism are to show that they are reducible to more primitive entities such as neurons, atoms, and electrons, or to eliminate them by showing them to be ontologically nonexistent and not real. The purpose of this section is to show that such accounts are often ingenious and significantly attractive although unsuccessful, and with the result that a first-person perspective is irreducible and ineliminable to a full and rich psychological understanding of a person, both oneself and others. That is, stated more simply: good psychology requires adequately accommodating the levels of perspective. It is argued that it is in this way that subjectivity and agency can be harmoniously appropriated and structured in a psychological space of understanding.

Three representative examples of significant and robust accounts to naturalize first-person perspective are selected for discussion. The first is Metzinger's detailed and in some ways relatively thorough Phenomenal Self Model which complexly combines eliminative and reductionist strategies that denies first-person perspective as a fully functional entity by incorporating it into a third-person scientific account. The second example is of an explicitly eliminative account by Daniel Dennett and what he refers to as heterophenomenology. Third is representative of a cognitive science account, this one by Peter Carruthers, that works to reduce first-person phenomena to a third-person naturalistic science. These three examples provide a good background to the strategies used to reduce or eliminate first-person phenomena and shows as well that main stream psychology is not all that open to first-person perspective.

Phenomenal Self Model and the Self Illusion

We begin with Thomas Metzinger (2000, 2003) who proposes a neuroscientific transparent self model that functions to apprehend the qualitative contents of conscious experience such as 'inside' or 'outside,' as 'mine' or 'not mine,' a 'centered presence' in an environmental context, and a 'nowness' or 'presence' (Metzinger, 2000, pp. 288–289; 2003, pp. 116–211). Metzinger's phenomenal self model provides an apparent account of first-person perspective that he describes as a virtual process that emphatically denies a self; asserting that the experience of having a self is an illusion. A person, a subject that receives experience, is an artifact of a computational information-processing system that transiently appears, but is not real and no ontological status. That is, a person as a person is not real and does not exist. Metzinger attempts to provide a viable parallel account of adaptive functioning with what he describes as a phenomenal self model with recourse to a self concept, but a self concept without one of the core features judged to be necessary to personhood, the sense of sameness, that is, a sense of mineness. In this way, first-person perspective is to be retained in a third-person account and is fully reduced into scientific naturalism.

That problem and others emerge which make the Phenomenal Self Model account untenable (Baker, 2013, pp. 95–99). Baker points out that when thoughts are intentional and engage an environmental goal that thought cannot only be accounted as the firing of specific neural correlates, but also requires an indexed reflexivity when tracking on one's own activity in a social context, such as when communicating to another, and as well the internal dialogue of those interactions. That is, personhood requires a concept of self conjoint with a sense of sameness. In this context, the strictly phenomenal content supervenient upon the neural correlational pattern fails to fully capture intentional behavior. The overlay of the arguments militating against Metzinger's Phenomenal Self Model, as he designates it, can be more thoroughly examined in Baker (2013, pp. 80–100).

Heterophenomenology and Third-Person Science

First-person perspective is confronted entirely differently by Daniel Dennett. He, simply, denies that such a thing exists by generally attributing it to a myth of folk psychology, as does Sellars, which is the everyday, nonscientific, account of intentional actions and thinking and is entirely unrelated to science (Dennett, 1991, 2001, 2003, Huebner & Dennett, 2009). First-person accounts are no more than a special kind of third-person account of an action or interaction that "... exploits an experimental subject's capacity for verbal communication" (Dennett, 2003, p. 6). It might be noticed that Dennett did, perhaps was compelled to, use the term 'subject' despite his stated eschewal of such an entity as a 'subject' (p. 3). Examine, "like another dimension: the private, subjective, 'first-person' dimension" that is a "quite radical or revolutionary alternative science?" or rather:

a straightforward, conservative extension of objective science that handsomely covers the ground—all the ground—of human consciousness, doing justice to all the data without ever having to abandon the rules and constraints of the experimental method that have worked so well in the rest of science. This third-person methodology, dubbed heterophenomenology (phenomenology of another not oneself), is, I have claimed, the sound way to take the *first* person point of view as seriously as it can be taken [that is, not seriously]. (p. 1)

The resulting implication is that 'subject' and 'first-person perspective' are difficult to be, and perhaps simply cannot be, ignored by one's choice despite the determined imperative pursued by Dennett (Dennett, 2001). Why that may be is interesting and poses a difficulty that Dennett is determined not to apprehend but that arises none-the-less. Dennett avers that it is only the contents of mental thought that is to be determined as existing and that then can enter into a propositional framework to be evaluated as true or not true.

The only access to another's behavior and experience is by questioning the person about her first-person experience, and, then second, to submit the result to an intentional and propositional evaluation. Using Gallagher and Zahavi's description, heterophenomenology proposes a black box psychology that is a third-person version of phenomenology (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, pp. 13–19). The point asserted by Dennett

is that there is no such thing as phenomenology which is supposed as a systematic examination of first-person experience. There are several difficulties with this extreme position and one of the more salient is overlooking the significance of linguistic indexicals. If, for example, an experimental participant says that 'I see a moving dot,' the scientist's report of that datum is 'She says that she* sees a moving dot' or the equivalent statement 'She sees a continuously moving dot.' This example is used by Baker (2013, pp. 74–80) to illustrate that the linguistic index of who is reporting is inescapable if the scientist is to accurately track the data he is collecting. That is, if he is to accurately distinguish his reporting of her reporting from the reporting of his experimental participant. It is not so certain that such situational markers are successfully translated into a supposed third-personal equivalent as claimed by Dennett. Baker observes that there is a significant difference between 'she' and 'she*' that performs an important and even crucial function in daily adaptive living and cannot be eliminated in scientific and philosophical communications concerned for the veridicality of their descriptions of psychological reality.

Reductionist Naturalism and Cognitive Psychology

The interdisciplinary relation of cognitive science and neuroscience reflects on a firm 'codependence.' This dependence expresses an adherence to hard naturalism's reductionist commitment. The inherent third-person perspective results in an emphasis on epistemology and a vigilant search for an 'epistemic warrant' with little concern for the metaphysical and ontological constraints that result. This unbalanced methodological stance excludes intention dependent artifacts that, as expressed above, are necessary to full and rich living in, what has been called, a lifeworld.

A representative example and cognitive theoretical scientist of some achievement is Peter Carruthers who explicitly and vigorously denies first-person perspective. In a review of two defining presentations of phenomenal consciousness by Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to be a Bat?" and *A View From Nowhere*, Carruthers clearly and explicitly denies a sense of 'mineness,' a first-person perspective (Carruthers,

2000, pp. 31–32; Nagel, 1974, 1986). Nagel presents the phenomenal problem as: “How I can be a particular person?,” a two part question that is (a) “how *can* I be a particular person?” and (b) “how can I be *merely* a particular person?” These can be restated as ‘How can ‘me/TN’ be an I?’ and ‘How can I be a ‘me/TN’?’ when TN designates Thomas Nagel or any living person. That is, the same question is asked in two different directions: from the direction of a social context to a subject, and from the direction of a I-subject in a social context. The ‘subject’ is spoken of in the first-person while the ‘me’ constituted in the social context as a social object is referenced in the third-person. The fact to wrap our understanding around is that we are located in an immense spatiotemporal world with other entities to include other ‘me’s’ that is without a center, which “should have produced me, of all people—and produced me by producing TN” (Nagel, 1986, pp. 54–57). These distinctions are those made by James and that have been and are now the center of our discussion (James, 1890, pp. 314–317, 323; James, 1892, pp. 201–203).

Carruthers, as do mainstream cognitive scientists generally, objects that although the first-person statement “I am TN” is a special kind of statement, it does not contain any information, any ‘truth’ that cannot be stated in a third-person perspective which designates the special context it occurs and that is acceptable science. He finds Nagel’s argument, as well as Wittgenstein’s similar one, “unconvincing” that there is a sense of ‘mineness’ of one’s experience that identifies it as one’s own and not someone else’s. Carruthers asserts that, first, introspection is sufficient to account for any information relevant to describing a ‘first-personal’ situation, and that, second, self-understanding is achieved by observing our own behavior in the same way we observe and come to understand any other person (Carruthers, 2009, 2011; Wittgenstein, 1922, 5.64, 5.641).

An examination of the his argument purporting the insufficiency of Nagel’s reveals the thin assertion that “This argument is, too, unconvincing” (Carruthers, 2000, p. 32). Carruthers does not accept or examine the semantic indexical, the ‘I,’ datum. The meaning of a ‘I am *x*’ statement depends on *who* makes it, on a person’s perspective. That is, it depends on the positional, or the perspectival, context it is

stated which can be noted in a third-person statement, but cannot be duplicated by it as asserted by Carruthers. In Nagel’s words, “This cannot be used to manufacture a metaphysical mystery” (Nagel, 1986, pp. 57–60). TN or *x* does not need to know objectively who s/he is in order to make ‘I’ statements. The term ‘indexicals’ include such pronouns as I, she, it, and that; adverbs as here, now, and today; adjectives as my, her, and actual that are necessary for communication and thinking, first-person and otherwise (Braun, 2015; Prosser, 2015).

It is not clear, other than the assertion of preference, what Carruthers’ reasons for rejecting Nagel’s description of first-person statement of ownership might be except the assertion that it can be restated in a third-person perspective. Nagel argues that there is something left out, a gap between a first-person statement and its third-personal translation while Carruthers, and mainstream cognitive science generally, denies such a gap or the significance of any such gap. Baker’s ‘datum’ would seem to illustrate that gap more clearly by the discrimination of an ‘I’ and ‘I*.’ Recall that the statement “I think/hope/wish that I* win/go/am not ill” illustrates two different beliefs of oneself without assistance from a third-person reference, that is, a person speaks of oneself* as oneself, a person refers to oneself. This act, it is asserted and which Carruthers denies, does not translate to a third-person equivalent statement. The reluctance of cognitive science generally to admit a more liberal naturalism that would accommodate a nonreductionist first-person perspective is driven by the intuition to move beyond the particulars of first-personal experience and pursue a universal good, to pursue methodological epistemic altruistic goal of universal truth. Or, might it be a much more mundane concern that a reluctance of science, particularly cognitive science, to step from, not necessarily abandon, a pervasive methodological third-personal perspective to include a first-personal perspective reflects an anxiety of losing an established identity of a science, an identity of a naturalistic reductionist science. That is, “These. [first-personal perspectives as presented by Nagel and Wittgenstein] are supposed to be inaccessible from the objective [third-person perspective] standpoint of science” (Carruthers, 2000, p. 31).

This narrow methodological limitation need not be the case if a more liberal naturalism allowed for an ontological presence of a ‘first-person perspective’ and ‘intentionally dependent objects’ as proposed by Baker (1995, 2000, 2007, 2013) and others with related proposals (Martin et al., 2003, 2010). First-person perspective is not a magical, mythological, or theological process just as a person is not magical or mythical entity, but is the result of natural processes resulting in a person that is constituted and emergent: emergent upon a biological base and constituted by a robust first-person perspective. It is asserted that a full richness a person’s lived life cannot be conceptually apprehended without a full perspectival range that includes first-, second-, third-personal, and perhaps me-personal perspectives. One approach to such a goal is that proposed by Baker.

Summing Considerations

It may be instructive to recollect William James’s observations when introducing the “Stream of Thought” chapter in *The Principles of Psychology*. In the Principles he refers to the ‘stream of thought,’ in the *Briefer Course: Psychology* he refers to ‘stream of consciousness,’ and elsewhere he refers to ‘stream of thinking’ and ‘stream of pure experience’ all essentially equivalent phrases but with subtly different emphasis (James, 1890, pp. 219–220; James, 1892, pp. 151–152; James, 1912, pp. 18, 23, 44). Most ‘books’ on psychology begin, James observes, with sensations as the simplest mental facts and then build ‘synthetically’ the “higher stage from those below it.” He objects that “No one ever had a simple sensation by itself.” Such a procedure, a chosen methodological procedure, commits what seems “at the outset apparently innocent suppositions, that nevertheless contain a flaw. Bad consequences develop themselves later on, and are irremediable.” Elaborating in the *Briefer Course* he says that while sensations are sequentially first, “Psychologically they might better have come last.” He asserts that “We begin our study of the mind from within,” and that “our study must be analytic.” In James’s view “The only thing which psychology has a right to postulate at the outset is the act of thinking itself . . . , and that *The first fact for us, then, as psychologists, is that thinking of some sort goes on.*”

The conclusion suggested is that the ‘debate’ central to cognitive psychology, but which nevertheless is ignored by some and is intolerable to others, appears to have been anticipated by James, and is a consequence of what he described as a synthetic methodology of building the more complex psychological process and entities from atomistic sensations. To paraphrase Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), people are being accused of being introspectionists, heterophenomenologists, neurophenomenologists, and, even worse, phenomenologists (pp. 13–17). Using an objective third-person restricted methodology requires that the particularities of the first-person perspective are averaged out. What are the results of this ‘averaging out’? One consequence is that the ‘averaging out’ of individual particularities that is then overlaid or absorbed by the general abstract principles of a third-person descriptive science is the tension that is experienced in applied applications such as psychological practice of clinical, medical, or consulting professional psychologists who must, at some point, implicitly factor in the officially unacknowledged particularities of their clients. A second consequence is that these ‘averaged out’ particularities cannot, thereby, be evaluated by reductionist naturalistic science despite the inventiveness of such thinkers as Metzinger, Dennett, and Carruthers. The sense is that this is not a confrontation that can proceed in a hermeneutic fashion to a reasonably consensual resolution. Rather there appears to be a general stasis of extremes, the result of which two independent nonparallel directions will be pursued and one, possibly, both will either fade from prehension and new alternatives will emerge, or one will substantially remain to provide the future theoretical framework for psychological inquiry. To say this differently, there appears to be no intuition, no evidence in view of an apodictic proof that will resolve the confrontation in favor of one or the other if the evidence of semantic indexicals are not acknowledged. It is our, transparently obvious, assertion that perspective is part of our reality: first-, second-, third-, and possibly we-personal perspectives of experience must all be included to achieve the most veridically productive understanding of persons and their intersubjectivity along

with the development of a liberal naturalism that can recognize the ontological novelty of new *intention dependent objects*.

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