Abstract
This chapter discusses some philosophical assumptions in the use of transcendental arguments in Alan Gewirth’s method of dialectical necessity. With this method Gewirth aims to show that agents must hold some beliefs in order to understand themselves consistently. Firstly, it is argued that this method is not in the first place used to convince the sceptic, but rather that the aim is gain a reflective understanding of ourselves. Since the methodology investigates ‘judgments’ and their role for the subject, we should see it as part of a hermeneutical enterprise to gain a form of reflected practical self-understanding. Secondly, the paper questions the distinction between ‘dialogical’ and ‘monological’ forms of transcendental justification in ethics. It is argued that the investigation of dialectically necessary judgments of the subject has the aim of showing in which ways the subject must respect the other in order to understand himself consistently. Those normatively committed subjects must be presupposed by discourse ethicists as well, otherwise the dialogue will not reach its goal of generating normatively acceptable outcomes. Finally, the chapter sketches some consequences of seeing the role of transcendental arguments in gaining a reflected form of practical self-understanding. If moral commitments are based in ‘judgment’, the power of judgment is of crucial importance and we must consider how the institutional and individual conditions needed to protect and develop this basic capacity can be protected and increased.
