Abstract
Frankfurt’s “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” (1969) made an important intervention into the literature on moral responsibility via a classical Frankfurt-type example, arguing that “the principle of alternate possibilities” is false. This paper argues that classical Frankfurt-type examples fail due to the use of agentic counterfactual interventions who lack agency. Using finite state machines to illustrate, I show the models that classical Frankfurt-type examples must use and why they are incongruent with leeway incompatibilist beliefs—the motivating interlocutor for classical Frankfurt-type examples. I then argue that returning agency to the agentic counterfactual intervention also returns alternate possibilities to the actual sequence of events, undermining a core premise of Frankfurt’s. Lastly, I show why a number of potential counterarguments should fail to persuade the leeway incompatibilist.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998). Responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, H. G. (1969). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. The Journal of Philosophy, 66(23), 829–839. https://doi.org/10.2307/2023833.
Hunt, D. P. (2000). Moral responsibility and unavoidable action. Philosophical Studies, 97, 195–227.
Locke, J. (1690). An Essay concerning Human Understanding.
van Inwagen, P. (1978). Ability and responsibility. The Philosophical Review, 87(2), 201–224.
Wilson, P. (2016). Design recipes for FPGAs. (2nd ed.) Newnes. https://www.elsevier.com/books/design-recipes-for-fpgas/wilson/978-0-08-097129-2.
Zhang, P. (2008). Industrial control technology: A handbook for engineers and researchers. 1st ed. William Andrew. https://www.elsevier.com/books/industrial-control-technology/zhang/978-0-8155-1571-5.
Zimmerman, M. J. (1982). Moral responsibility, freedom, and alternate possibilities. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 63, 243–254.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Dwyer, J.d.T. A Fundamental Failure of Frankfurt’s Agentic Counterfactual Intervention: No Agency. Philosophia 49, 633–642 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00240-3
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00240-3