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Valerio Rohden

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Palavra do Editor

Tendo em conta as comemorações pelo tricentenário da morte de Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz [nascido em Leipzig a 1o. de julho de 1646; falecido em Hannover, a 14 de novembro de 1716] e a notória importância de sua obra, em campo filosófico como científico, também para Kant, **Estudos Kantianos** apresenta nas páginas a seguir um fascículo inteiramente dedicado a vários dos muitos aspectos das relações entre ambos esses pensadores.

A concepção, preparação e introdução geral ao conteúdo do presente fascículo é inteiramente devida ao Dr. Gualtiero Lorini, um dos três Editores Associados de **EK**, a quem a revista, assim, é muito especialmente agradecida. Grato também a todos os que prestam sua colaboração neste fascículo, saúdo os leitores de **Estudos Kantianos**, desejando-lhes uma ótima leitura e um excelente 2017!

Editor's Note

On the occasion of the third centenary of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's death (Leipzig, July 1, 1646 – Hannover, November 14, 1716), and considering the well-known importance of his work, both in the philosophical and scientific domain, even for Kant, **Estudos Kantianos** presents in the following pages a special issue entirely devoted to some of the many features characterizing the relationship between the two philosophers. The project, preparation and general introduction to the content of this issue is entirely due to Dr. Gualtiero Lorini, one of the three Associate Editors of **EK**, to whom the journal is thus especially grateful. Thanks also to all who have collaborated to this issue. I greet the readers of **Estudos Kantianos**, wishing them a great reading and an excellent 2017!

Introduction

During 2016, the year of the three hundredth anniversary of G.W. Leibniz's death, a great amount of initiatives have been carried out all around the world in order to celebrate the last "universal genius", as he was often defined after his death. Through the universality of his *ingenium* Leibniz has offered intellectual stimuli to the most diverse fields of human knowledge, which was reflected by the heterogeneity of the tributes he received last year. The figure of Leibniz as a philosopher is of course the most suitable to express the open range of his interests and his vivid curiosity, but underneath and sometimes beyond this image, he was a genial mathematician, a brilliant politician, a refined jurist, just to scratch the surface.

This state of affairs is very effectively expressed, for instance, by the subtitle of the conference organized on the 3rd and 4th of November by the "Oesterreiche Akademia der Wissenschaft": *Leibniz heute lesen: Wissenschaft, Geschichte, Religion*. As the description of the conference-presentation explains, speakers have come from the 4 academies of sciences inspired by Leibniz's conception of a scientific community, namely Berlin, Leipzig, Moscow, and Vienna.

Moreover, the deep and original link between pure science and metaphysics in Leibniz has been the core of several conferences. Among others, it is worth remembering here the event in Milan (7th-8th October): *Mathesis quaedam divina seu Mechanismus Metaphysicus. Leibniz and the Sciences*, as well as the conference at the Max Planck Institute of Leipzig (14th-16th November): *Leibniz and the Sciences*.

Apart from this, Leibniz's interest for the oriental culture, and in particular for Chinese theology, has been celebrated in 2016, since this year also celebrates the three hundredth anniversary of the *Discours sur la Theologie naturelle des Chinois*. On this topic, two events deserve our attention: the conference *Leibniz e a China: Comemoração dos 300 anos do Discurso sobre a teologia natural dos Chineses* (12th-14th September 2016, at the University of Campinas, BR), and the conference at the Leibniz Universität Hannover: *G. W. Leibniz und die europäische Begegnung mit China 300 Jahre Discours sur la théologie naturelle des Chinois* (30th September – 3rd October 2015). Although this event was held in 2015, it is worth remembering it, since it was part of the initiatives organized by or at the Universität Hannover as a preparation for the great 10th Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress, hosted by this university between the 18th and the 23rd July 2016, and whose inspiring sentence was the Leibnizian motto "ad felicitatem nostram

alienamve" [*for our happiness or the happiness of others*].

This Leibnizian year has also provided the occasion for reflecting on sometimes neglected moments in Leibniz's life. This was for instance the case of the Mainz-"Tagung" *Leibniz in Mainz – Europäische Dimensionen der Mainzer Wirkungsperiode* (2nd-4th June 2016), which focused on the period 1668–1672, which Leibniz spent at the service of the Archbishop of Mainz.

Yet, we should not forget the meetings of the Leibnizian Societies all around the world, which this year have unavoidably assumed a particular significance. It is worth mentioning here the conference of the *Société d'études leibniziennes de langue française* (10th-12th March, ENS Lyon), dedicated to the topic *Leibniz et l'harmonie*, as well as that of the *Leibniz Society of North America* (4th-6th November at the University of Houston) and devoted to *The Leibniz-Caroline-Clarke (Newton) Correspondence*.

We would like to conclude this brief overview of the conferences celebrating the Leibnizian anniversary with the *3rd Brussels Seminar in Modern Philosophy*, whose title gives an apt idea of the actuality of the debate concerning Leibniz's thought, as well as how long the debate will still go on in time: *Comment (ne pas) être leibnizien ? Editions et réceptions de Leibniz après 1716* (15th April, Université libre de Bruxelles).

2016 was also characterized by some special issues of scientific journals celebrating Leibniz's anniversary. It is the case of "Philosophie" 2016/2 (N°129). This special issue was devoted to the phenomenological interpretations of Leibniz, and represented the ideal counterpart of number 92, published in 2006 and entitled *Lectures de Leibniz: Husserl*. Another important French contribution, yet with a more historical accent, is constituted by Les Études philosophiques 2016/3 (N°163), entitled *Leibniz en 1716: une dernière philosophie*.

Approaching the relationship between Leibniz's and Kant's philosophies, we have to report the workshop *Kant and Leibniz on Substance*, hosted on the 15th November 2016 by the University of Illinois at Chicago, as well as the forthcoming collective volume edited by B. Look on *Leibniz and Kant*.

At the end of such an important year for Leibnizian studies, *Estudos Kantianos* provides its contribute to this vivid debate. In accordance with the Kantian spirit of the journal, we have decided to devote this special issue to the topic "Kant and Leibniz". This is of course a widely discussed theme, which is often adopted as a chronological point of reference, since the years that separate the work of these two philosophers can be regarded as the fundamental transition between the "modern" post-Cartesian age and 18th century-philosophy, decisively marked by German Idealism. In this sense, one can think of the posthumous collection of essays by G. Tonelli, edited by C. Cesa: *Da Leibniz a Kant. Saggi sul pensiero del Settecento* (Napoli, Prismi, 1996).

No doubt, speaking about Leibniz and Kant means to delve into the multicolored panorama of the so-called Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition, or even more specifically into the so-called Wolffian school. Indeed, it is often by means of this tradition that Kant faces Leibniz's thought, which poses some historical problems with regard to the extent to which Kant was

effectively and directly acquainted with Leibniz's own positions on determined topics.

This is, for instance, one of the themes on which M. Fichant's essay focuses in this special issue. He departs from one of Kant's most famous references to Leibniz, namely the statement in the "Remark to the amphiboly of concepts of reflection", according to which "Leibniz intellectualized the appearances" (KrV, A 271/B 327). Through a detailed analysis of Leibniz's position concerning the status of space and time, Fichant clearly shows that the main features of the doctrine of sensibility that Kant attributes to Leibniz are actually not Leibnizian. Thus the author considers the historical circumstances that have mediated Kant's receptions of Leibniz's thesis on these topics, and points out the extent to which Wolff's thought has conditioned this process. Indeed, Wolff's project aims not only to present Leibniz's philosophy in a more systematic way, as many simplifications have contended over the years, but also to establish new internal relationships within the parts of the system itself. As Fichant interestingly highlights, this methodological passage was accompanied by, and sometimes even realized through, the establishment of a German philosophical lexicon. If on the one hand, this operation has contributed to the flourishing of a new philosophical age in Germany, it has also significantly influenced the reception of authors who, like Leibniz, had basically written in Latin and French. Ultimately, although Kant has taken as Leibnizian a theory of sensibility that was essentially Wolffian—argues Fichant—he has recognized that Wolff's theory of the simple corporeal elements did not suit Leibniz's monadology. However, Kant's attempt at rehabilitating the meaning and the value of the Leibnizian concept of monad does not avoid conceiving it as an intelligible substrate of the sensible intuition. Therefore, even this rehabilitation does not escape the limit represented by the inaccessibility of the human being to this supposed intelligible substrate.

S. Di Bella starts in his article from Kant's attack against Leibniz's philosophical framework placed in the *Amphiboly* chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He puts this attack in opposition to a *Remark* contained in the *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, in which Kant suggests a positive appreciation of Leibniz's monadology, by sharply distinguishing it from his Wolffian allegedly heirs and assimilating Leibniz's intention to his own view. Di Bella shows the evolution of this re-evaluation also through the polemics between Kant and Eberhard, and stresses that meanwhile Kant had nonetheless re-proposed his *Amphiboly* without any correction in the second edition of the *Critique.* The author shows the relevance of the historical analysis in order to clarify this puzzling theoretical passage, and faces questions like "which *direct* knowledge did Kant actually have of Leibniz, over and above what had been filtered by the German *Schulmetaphysik* in which his philosophical training had took place?"

The essay by C. Tolley deals with the wide range of meanings and values of the concept of "perception" within Kant's *Erkenntnislehre*, as well as with the sources by which it could have been influenced. The author argues that Kant's use of the term *Wahrnehmung* is continuous in key respects with how the term is used both among German translators of Leibniz and among the later Leibnizians themselves, insofar as they all also associate *Wahrnehmung* with the consciousness or apperception of sensory representation, rather than with the elementary sensory representation itself. Furthermore, Tolley shows a continuous commitment to

the imagination and its synthesis playing a mediating role in between mere sensation and *Wahrnehmung* (apperception). On this point, the author faces a very topical debate. Indeed, the key issue here is whether or not Kant departs from the Leibnizian tradition in allowing for there to be consciousness (or apperception) prior to any activity of the understanding, and this is directly linked with the question whether Kant allows there to be any synthesis either, without the understanding.

More broadly, Kant's reference to Leibniz's thought is intrinsically and for many reasons linked to the Wolffian tradition in its own right. The first one concerns the great influence exerted by this school on the German universities since the age of Kant's academic formation. Secondly, one should remember that the same manuals employed by Kant as a teacher for important disciplines, like logic and metaphysics, can be framed within the Wolffian area. At the same time, it is true that by commenting Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* as well as Meier's *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, Kant was able to defend many anti-wolffian theses on several points. These features are here mainly investigated by C. Dyck, M. Favaretti Camposampiero and myself.

C. Dyck's text addresses Kant's praise of Wolff's "general logic" since the lectures on logic of the late 1770s, in order to clarify what Kant means with the label "general logic", and to ascertain what exactly in Wolff's articulated conception of logic earned Kant's praise. First Dyck retraces the most innovative features of Wolff's logic not only by considering Wolff's German and Latin *Logics*, but also by collecting those elements, useful to a complete reconstruction of this discipline, which are disseminated in other, even minor, works. In doing so, he carefully highlights the point on which the Wolffian project must be taken as absolutely original, insofar as it differs, for instance, also from Baumgarten's and Meier's positions. Afterwards, through a thorough analysis of Kant's lectures on logic, the author points out that despite Wolff's innovation on many topics of the traditional logic, Kant challenges most of them. However, this same analysis of Kant's logical corpus reveals the decisive feature on which Kant endorses Wolff's treatment of logic, namely his analysis of the operations of the mind. One remarkable result of this analysis consists in highlighting Kant's acceptance of Wolff's position as regards the primacy of judgment among the activities of the understanding, which can be regarded as anticipating the "discovery" of the transcendental logic.

M. Favaretti Camposampiero provides an analysis of the Kantian concept of "Ens imaginarium", an expression that Kant employs in the third position of the "Table of nothing" at the end of the *Transcendental Analytic*, and that he defines as an "empty intuition, without an object" (A 292/B 348). Besides the discussions about the consistency of this concept in the internal economy of Kant's Critique, the author emphasizes the greater attention that the origin of this expression would deserve. Not only Favaretti sheds some light on the pre-Kantian theories of the "Ens imaginarium", but he also highlights those further, often neglected, passages, in which this concept can be found beyond Kant's employment in the first Critique. By keeping together these two approaches, the author provides a remarkable methodological contribution: he demonstrates the relevance of the history of sources to assess the theoretical value of the concept of "Ens imaginarium" in Kant. In this sense, through the analysis of how

Kant employs this concept as regards space and time, Favaretti shows that Kant's reappraisal of the traditional concept of "Ens imaginarium" goes hand in hand with a rejection of the meaning it had in this tradition, especially in the "Wolffian school".

My own article aims to provide an overview of Kant's approach of the main theories of causality which were proposed and discussed in his time. The goal is to show that, since the pre-critical period, Kant has never simply accepted the theories of causality that he could find in the rationalistic sources, which he often takes as Leibnizian, although they are sometimes closer either to Wolff or to Baumgarten. Yet he has always tried to develop an original position. Indeed, starting from a general acceptance of the theory of the "physical influx", Kant tries to amend this theory, as it had been roughly provided by Knutzen and Crusius. Further on, the paper tries to shed light on the way in which the critical conception of space allows Kant to fulfil his original theory of causality as an amended version of the "physical influx".

In turn, C. Fugate provides a more theoretical and direct confrontation between Leibniz and Kant on a determined point, namely the concept of "negative magnitudes". The focus of Fugate's discussion is represented by the text devoted by Kant to this topic in 1763. The author maintains that this text represents Kant's point of maximum proximity to Leibniz' own position and that it could interestingly provide a likely Leibnizian answer to Wolff's conception of the principle of sufficient reason. Differently from the Wolffian tradition, Leibniz seems to search for a demonstration of this principle beyond the formal limits of the principle of contradiction. This has important consequences to Leibniz's conception of the distinction between necessary and contingent truths, which plays a crucial role in the economy of Fugate's interpretation. Indeed, he defends that Kant's concept of negative magnitudes rests upon a framework that is close to Leibniz's earlier account of contingent truths. More specifically, Kant shares Leibniz's idea that two predicates can belong to the same thing and mutually cancel their effects without being logically contradictory, a thesis that Wolff could never accept. In his reconstruction of Kant's way towards this position, Fugate highlights some important elements of continuity of the Essay on the *Negative Magnitudes* with both the *New Elucidation* and the *Only Possible Argument*.

Andree Hahmann also adopts an approach oriented to a direct thematic confrontation between Leibniz and Kant. He considers two important attempts to pair Leibniz's and Kant's thought, namely those by R. Langton and E. Watkins. Langton proposes an original way of interpreting Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves, which would represent an alternative to the two major theories on this topic. In her view, things in themselves should be regarded as internal properties of substance, whereas the phenomena would display relational and external properties, which nevertheless, quite differently from Leibniz, could not be reduced to internal properties of the substance. Instead, Watkins points to Kant's conception of causality. He defends that this concept, even in the formulation of the KrV, should be understood on the basis of the rationalistic, mainly Leibnizian, background Kant is strongly acquainted with since the pre-critical period, rather than as a reaction to Hume. Therefore, Watkins' interpretation focuses mainly on the causal activity of the substance, and puts a remarkable emphasis on the third "Analogy of experience" in order to better grasp

Kant's dealing with causality. However, after having exposed and analysed in detail Langton's and Watkins' positions, Hahmann argues that both omit some important differences between the pre-critical and the critical phase of Kant's thought, which do not allow for such a strong juxtaposition of his critical position with Leibniz's tenets on these topics. Interestingly enough, Hahmann's essay departs, as does M. Fichant's, from Kant's famous and sharp judgment on Leibniz's supposed "intellectualization" of the appearances. However, Hahmann develops this reference in a quite different direction, thus demonstrating the variety of possible research-developments even on such a well-known and sometimes even misinterpreted passage.

Finally U. Pinheiro proposes a careful analysis of Leibniz's position concerning the role of memory in the constitution of the personal identity. The common thread of Pinheiro's line of thought is represented by Leibniz's comment of Locke's thesis in the *New Essays*. The author clarifies that, on the one hand, Leibniz seems to agree with Locke, insofar as he considers memory as a necessary condition of personal identity, even if memory is conceived in the form of "small perceptions" [*petites perceptions*]. On the other hand, Leibniz rejects Locke's idea that such memories can be regarded as conscious cognitions for individuals who are able to individuate them. From this state of affairs, the author deduces that the concept of unconscious "small perception" should be regarded as an instrument through which Leibniz achieves results that are significantly different from those obtained by Locke in his *Essay*. More specifically, in Pinheiro's view, Leibniz's whole polemic against Locke's critic of innatism should be understood by considering the way Leibniz characterizes the unconscious dimension. In the last part of his essay, the author addresses Kant's consideration of unconscious representations in the *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view*. Pinheiro contends that, despite an apparent adherence to Locke's rejection of this kind of perceptions, in the end Kant cannot avoid to implicitly adopt the Leibnizian identification between unconscious and "lowest conscious".

All the research lines outlined by the essays in this special issue share the basic assumption concerning the centrality of Leibniz's figure in the development of Kant's thought. This is no thing of small importance, insofar as it significantly contributes to mitigate, as some of these texts clearly state, the influence of English Empiricism on Kant as regards themes like, for instance, causality as well as the nature of the objects that can be put into a causal relationship. This is even more important if one considers how constantly the figure of Leibniz—though sometimes mediated and also betrayed by the Wolffian perspective—is present both in Kant's pre-critical and critical period. This is testified not only by Kant's lectures, where crucial references to Leibniz can be found until the late phase of Kant's teaching activity, but also by a posthumous writing that Kant had conceived for the "great public": *What real progress has metaphysics made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff?*

Moreover, this special issue is enhanced by a fine review by S. Grapotte on L. Denis' and O. Sensen's *Critical Guide* to *Kant's Lectures on Ethics*, and by some other reviews. Among them we have to underline a recent collection of essays by H. H. Holz on Leibniz's influence upon German classical philosophy, a collection edited by J. Zimmer and here reviewed by A. Lyssy. Furthermore, we are glad to present M. Lequan's review of the French parallel translations (by L. Langois) of Kant's *Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie* and Baumgarten's *Initia*

philosophiae practicae primae. L. Gasperoni and F. V. Tommasi provide two exhaustive and very useful accounts of two further instruments for Kant-scholars, respectively A. Cohen's *Critical Guide* to *Kant's Lectures on Anthropology* and *The Bloomsbury Companion to Kant* (edited by G. Banham, D. Schulting and N. Hems).

As editor of this special issue, it was for me a privilege to coordinate such a distinguished collection of texts by so many reputed scholars, to whom I would like to express, once again, my deep gratefulness.

This issue of "Estudos Kantianos" is dedicated to the memory of Prof. Juan Adolfo Bonaccini. Unfortunately, I had few opportunities to spend time with him, but it was enough to appreciate his deep rigor as a scholar, and his warmth as a human being.

Gualtiero Lorini (Alexander von Humboldt postdoctoral fellow
at the Institute of Philosophy of the Technische Universität Berlin)
"Kant and Leibniz" Guest Editor

Leibniz a-t-il "intellectualisé les phénomènes" ?

Eléments pour l'histoire d'une méprise[1]

Michel Fichant

1. La sensibilité selon Leibniz : la thèse de Kant

« D'un mot : Leibniz intellectualisait les phénomènes » (KrV, B 327).

Telle est la formule dans laquelle Kant concentre la caractérisation de la philosophie de Leibniz comme la construction d'un « système intellectuel du monde » (KrV, B 326). Les substances simples ou monades sont les éléments de ce monde intelligible, les choses mêmes y sont des « substances intelligibles (*substantiae noumena* » (KrV, B 332), qui ne peuvent être connues que par la pensée d'un entendement pur, sans aucune référence sensible. Cette fiction métaphysique résulte selon Kant du traitement réservé par Leibniz à la sensibilité, qu'il n'aurait pas reconnue comme une source originelle et nécessaire de toute connaissance. Selon Kant, comme on sait, sensibilité et entendement sont « deux souches de la connaissance humaine […] par la première desquelles des objets nous sont donnés, alors que par la deuxième ils sont pensés » (KrV, B 29). La sensibilité est une réceptivité de l'esprit ; l'entendement un pouvoir de spontanéité. D'autre part, la sensibilité fournit des représentations qui sont des intuitions, c'est-à-dire des représentations immédiates et singulières de leur objet ; l'entendement produit des concepts, ou représentations médiates et générales de leurs objets. « Pour nous hommes », il n'y a pas d'autre intuition que sensible. La conséquence, résultat principal de toute la *Critique*, en est que « entendement et sensibilité ne peuvent en nous déterminer des objets que par leur liaison. Si nous les séparons, nous obtenons des intuitions sans concepts ou des concepts sans intuition, mais dans les deux cas des représentations que nous ne pouvons référer à aucun objet » (KrV, B 314).

Cette dernière formulation en forme de bilan de toute la *Critique* provient du chapitre

qui conclut toute l'Analytique transcendantale et qui est consacré à la « différenciation de tous les objets en général en phénomènes et noumènes ». Son Appendice expose l'« Amphibologie des concepts de la réflexion », présentée comme une erreur savante de l'entendement, qui n'est pas encore l'illusion transcendantale commune et naturelle de la raison.[2] Par suite du défaut d'une « topique transcendantale » (KrV, B 324), assignant aux représentations et connaissances leurs localisations distinctes dans deux sources indépendantes, la sensibilité et l'entendement, deux erreurs symétriques peuvent se produire : tout rapporter à la sensibilité (Locke), tout assigner à l'entendement (Leibniz). L'assignation d'une représentation à une source qui n'est pas la sienne constitue justement une « amphibologie » ; le tableau systématique des concepts de la réflexion ordonne le champ d'exercice de cette erreur. Si donc Leibniz a rapporté tous les objets au seul entendement et aux concepts abstraits de sa pensée, il se trouve que

> Notre table des concepts de la réflexion nous offre l'avantage inattendu de mettre sous les yeux le caractère distinctif de sa doctrine dans toutes ses parties et simultanément le motif conducteur de cette manière spécifique de penser » (KrV, B 326).

Leibniz, et après lui toute la « philosophie leibnizo-wolffienne », aurait donc ignoré la fonction originaire de la sensibilité, en la considérant comme n'étant que « la représentation confuse des choses […], qui contient simplement ce qui leur revient en elles-mêmes, mais seulement sous un amoncellement de caractères et de représentations partielles que nous ne séparons pas de façon consciente » (KrV, B 60).

Ainsi la différence entre la sensibilité et l'entendement se réduit à celle de la confusion ou indistinction et de la distinction des représentations. Mais c'est là une différence seulement logique, elle n'est que formelle et graduelle : elle ne rend pas compte d'une différence de contenu rapportée à une diversité d'essence, comme l'est celle de l'intuition sensible et du concept intellectuel.

Moyennant cette dégradation de la sensibilité à un mode subalterne de connaissance, Leibniz a pu se croire autorisé à explorer le monde à l'aide de « noumènes » pris dans le sens positif, c'est-à-dire comme des objets qui seraient connaissables par le seul entendement. Les monades leibniziennes, substances simples parce que sans parties, inétendues et caractérisées par le seul état interne de représentation, sont, dans ce monde intellectuel, les véritables choses en soi dont l'étude pourrait se parer du « nom orgueilleux d'une ontologie » (KrV, B 303).[3]

Les « phénomènes » (*Erscheinungen*) que Leibniz aurait en cela indûment intellectualisés doivent être d'abord compris au premier sens sous lequel le terme est introduit dans la *Critique de la raison pure*, dans les toutes premières lignes de l'*Esthétique transcendantale* : « L'objet indéterminé d'une intuition empirique s'appelle phénomène (*Erscheinung*) » (KrV, B 34).

L'intuition empirique est celle qui se rapporte à l'objet « par sensation », laquelle résulte de l'affection produite par l'objet sur la réceptivité sensible. L'objet est dit ici « indéterminé » parce qu'il est considéré uniquement sous le rapport de la sensibilité, l'entendement mis à part. L'objet sera déterminé lorsqu'il sera de plus pensé et ordonné par concept.[4] « Intellectualiser les phénomènes » signifierait donc que Leibniz aurait voulu que les seuls concepts de l'entendement

soient valables pour les phénomènes « parce qu'il n'accordait à la sensibilité aucune espèce propre d'intuition, mais qu'il cherchait dans l'entendement toute représentation des objets, même leur représentation empirique et ne laissait aux sens rien d'autre que la vile occupation d'embrouiller et déformer les représentations de l'entendement » (KrV, B 326).

Il y a plus. C'est un point décisif pour Kant que de distinguer dans l'intuition empirique ou sensible d'un objet une matière et une forme. Relativement au contenu senti des impressions, on peut dire de cette forme qu'elle doit « résider a priori toute prête dans l'esprit » et qu'elle doit pouvoir y être considérée « séparément de toute sensation » (KrV, B 34). Comme on le sait, cette forme, relativement au sens externe, est l'espace, relativement au sens interne le temps.

La question est donc de savoir ce que Leibniz, par son traitement de la sensibilité comme facteur négatif d'indistinction des représentations, aurait indûment intellectualisé dans les objets indéterminés de l'intuition empirique : la matière ou la forme ? Les deux sans aucun doute. Les lignes suivantes l'attestent :

> L'entendement réclame d'abord que quelque chose soit donné (du moins dans le concept). Par suite dans le concept de l'entendement pur la matière précède la forme, et c'est pour cela que Leibniz admit d'abord des choses (monades), et à l'intérieur leur faculté de représentation, pour ensuite fonder là-dessus leur relation externe et la communauté de leurs états (c'est-à-dire des représentations). Par suite espace et temps n'étaient possibles, le premier que par la relation des substances, le second que par le lien de leurs déterminations les unes aux autres comme principes et conséquences (KrV, B 322-323).

Il en résulte donc en premier lieu que la matière de toute sensation repose en dernière analyse sur les éléments simples dont le contenu senti est une représentation faussée. En ce sens, Kant n'hésite pas, dans une note de son projet de mémoire sur les Progrès de la métaphysique en Allemagne, à tirer cette conséquence paradoxale, « que par exemple l'intuition d'un corps fournirait, dans la conscience intégrale de toutes les représentations qui y sont contenues, le concept du même corps comme un agrégat de monades », et mieux encore « que de cette manière la proposition : "les corps sont composés de monades" pourrait provenir de l'expérience, simplement par la décomposition de la perception, si seulement nous pouvions voir de façon assez perçante (avec la conscience convenable des représentations partielles » (FM, AA 20: 278).

De la même façon, les formes de la sensibilité que sont l'espace et le temps sont elles aussi intellectualisées dès lors que :

> Leibniz concevait l'espace comme un certain ordre dans la communauté des substances et le temps comme la suite dynamique de leurs états. Mais ce que l'un et l'autre semble avoir en eux de propre et d'indépendant des choses il l'attribuait à la confusion de ces concepts (KrV, B 331).

En résumé, la thèse que Kant attribue à Leibniz, s'exprime par la conjonction des propositions suivantes :

1 : La sensibilité ne diffère de l'entendement que par le degré de distinction, elle est un mode confus de représentation des choses telles qu'elles sont en elles-mêmes.

2.1 : Les substances simples ou monades sont pour l'entendement les choses telles qu'elles sont en elles-mêmes.

2.2 : Les corps sont composés de substances simples ou monades. Par conséquent, en droit la perception empirique d'un corps devrait pouvoir être analysée jusqu'à faire venir à la conscience les éléments simples qui y sont analytiquement contenus.

3.1 : L'espace est la représentation de la coexistence des choses telles qu'elles sont en elles-mêmes, i.e. des monades.

3.2 : Le temps est la représentation des états successifs des choses telles qu'elles sont en elles-mêmes, i.e. des monades.

Toutefois, et principalement en raison de leur continuité et de l'indistinction de leurs éléments simples :

3.1.1 : L'espace est la représentation *confuse* de la coexistence des choses telles qu'elles sont en elles-mêmes, i.e. des monades.

3.2.2 : Le temps est la représentation *confuse* des états successifs des choses telles qu'elles sont en elles-mêmes, i.e. des monades.

Leibniz reconnaîtrait ainsi indirectement l'appartenance de l'espace et du temps à la sensibilité pour autant que celle-ci serait par excellence le site des représentations confuses.

La coordination de ces propositions, sans qu'elles forment proprement un système, est toutefois suffisamment forte pour que le constat de la fausseté de certaines d'entre elles permette de mettre en doute l'ensemble, et donc d'apporter une réponse négative à la question posée : Leibniz a-t-il vraiment intellectualisé les phénomènes ? Or le constat est facile à faire : Leibniz n'a certainement jamais caractérisé les deux notions d'espace et de temps comme *confuses* : au contraire, elles sont pour lui des notions parfaitement distinctes. Assurément, il s'agit bien, par cela même, de notions intellectuelles, formées par l'entendement et susceptibles d'une analyse conceptuelle détaillée et d'une construction définitionnelle rigoureuse. Sans entrer dans le détail d'une question bien connue, je me bornerai ici à renvoyer, s'agissant de l'espace, à l'article 47 du *Cinquième Écrit* contre Clarke (GP 7, 400-402). Leibniz y définit conceptuellement l'espace comme « ce qui résulte des places prises ensemble ». La notion de place à son tour reçoit « une espèce de définition » à partir de la relation (que nous appellerions aujourd'hui une relation d'équivalence, c'est-à-dire à la fois symétrique et transitive) « être à la même place que … », qui enveloppe elle-même le rapport de coexistence. Lequel à son tour repose sur la situation ou distance. Leibniz insiste sur l'analogie du procédé définitionnel qu'il met en œuvre avec celui d'Euclide, définissant le terme de « raison » (*logos*) dans le sens des géomètres à partir des « mêmes raisons ».[5] On a donc la séquence bien articulée de concepts précis et distincts : distance ou situation, être à la même place que…, place, d'où l'on parvient à l'espace comme ensemble des places. Reste une dernière étape, qui vise à détacher la relation, et avec elle l'espace, des termes sur lesquels elle a été identifiée. L'abstraction ou idéalisation intervient parce que « l'esprit non content de la convenance cherche une identité, une chose qui soit véritablement la même et la conçoit comme hors de ces sujets ; et c'est ce qu'on appelle

ici place ou espace ; cependant cela ne saurait être qu'idéal, contenant un certain ordre où l'esprit conçoit l'application des rapports ». Une raison ou proportion entre deux lignes L et M peut être comprise soit comme un attribut du sujet L, soit comme un attribut du sujet M, soit « comme quelque chose d'abstrait des deux […] sans considérer lequel est l'antérieur ou le postérieur, le sujet ou l'objet ». En ce sens, le rapport pris en dehors des sujets « étant ni substance ni accident, cela doit être une chose purement idéale ». Comme on le voit, ce que l'espace, pour reprendre les mots de Kant, « semble avoir de propre et d'indépendant des choses », et que Kant appelle aussi son idéalité, ne relève nullement de la confusion de son concept, mais bien plutôt d'une opération logique dont les éléments sont parfaitement distincts.[6]

Mais quels sont ces *sujets* qu'on suppose d'abord pour ensuite en faire abstraction ? Quel est le le domaine de l'*application* de ces rapports ? Le texte apporte une réponse parfaitement claire : on ne suppose en aucun cas la donnée préalable de la multiplicité des monades pour plaquer après coup sur elle un ordre dont la continuité viendrait rendre confuse cette multiplicité dans une unité fictive. Ce qui est demandé, c'est simplement une base indéterminée pour l'imagination dans la représentation générale de mouvements quelconques dans un référentiel pris à discrétion. Voici le texte que j'interprète ainsi :

> Voici comment les hommes viennent à se former la notion de l'espace. Ils considèrent que plusieurs choses existent à la fois, et ils y trouvent un certain ordre de coexistence, suivant lequel le rapport des uns et des autres est plus ou moins simple. C'est leur situation ou distance. Lorsqu'il arrive qu'un de ces coexistants change ce rapport à une multitude d'autres, sans qu'ils en changent entre eux, et qu'un nouveau venu acquiert le rapport tel que le premier avait eu à d'autres, on dit qu'il est venu à sa place, et on appelle ce changement un mouvement qui est dans celui où est la cause immédiate du changement. […] Et supposant ou feignant que parmi ces coexistants il y ait un nombre suffisant de quelques uns, qui n'aient point eu de changement en eux, on dira que ceux qui ont un rapport à ces existants fixes tel que d'autres avaient auparavant à eux, ont eu la même place que ces derniers avoient eue. Et ce qui comprend toutes ces places, est appelé Espace. Ce qui fait voir que pour avoir l'idée de la place, et par conséquent de l'espace, il suffit de considérer ces rapports et les règles de leurs changements, sans avoir besoin de se figurer ici aucune réalité absolue hors des choses dont on considère la situation (Leibniz, GP 7 : 400).[7]

Ces « choses dont on considère la situation » ne sont pas, ne peuvent en aucun cas être des monades, qui seraient d'ailleurs aussi des sujets d'une « réalité absolue » ; il est évidemment absurde de prêter du mouvement au monades qui échappent à toute figuration imaginative.[8] Comme Leibniz le souligne nettement dans une lettre à Des Bosses, elles sont indistinctes les unes des autres et il est tout aussi impossible de se les représenter dispersées que concentrées en un point local :

> […] L'espace est un ordre des phénomènes coexistants comme l'espace l'est des phénomènes successifs ; il n'y a aucune proximité ni distance spatiale ou absolue des monades, et dire qu'elles sont englobées dans un point ou disséminées dans l'espace est recourir à des fictions de notre esprit, quand nous nous autorisons à imaginer ce qui ne peut être que conçu intellectuellement.[9]

Autrement dit, la base définitionnelle et le domaine d'application de la construction de l'espace (et par là aussi du temps) comme concept distinct ne relèvent de rien d'autre que

du plan des phénomènes, et en aucun cas d'un monde intelligible de réalités absolues au sens où Kant l'identifie à l'univers de la monadologie. L'espace et le temps sont pour Leibniz les concepts d'ordre que l'entendement établit *dans les phénomènes*, *et non entre les monades*.

Par conséquent, l'une au moins des propositions étroitement associées dans l'interprétation donnée par Kant de la conception leibnizienne de la sensibilité est fausse. Le soupçon peut donc légitimement être étendu à l'ensemble de cette interprétation.[10]

Il serait parfaitement vain de faire reproche à Kant de n'avoir pas connu des textes qui étaient inaccessibles à son époque et n'ont été publiés que postérieurement. La seule question qui intéresse l'histoire est celle de savoir comment Kant, en interprétant ce qu'il pense être une méprise de Leibniz a pu lui-même se méprendre sur Leibniz. Quant à l'histoire de cette méprise, Kant lui-même en a fourni un indice en reprenant à son compte la dénomination d'une philosophie leibnizo-wolffienne ».[11] Or ce trait d'union est un trait de confusion.

On trouve assez souvent un résumé de la thèse de Kant dans l'emploi de la formule lapidaire selon laquelle pour Leibniz, le sensible est de l'intelligible confus.[12] Parfois même, la phrase est mise entre guillemets, comme s'il s'agissait d'une vraie citation. Mais elle n'est jamais, et pour cause, assortie d'une référence précise à une source textuelle. Car Leibniz n'a jamais rien écrit de tel, pour la bonne raison qu'il ne le pouvait pas : la grammaire philosophique qui détermine chez lui l'emploi des mots et des concepts fait de l'expression « intelligible confus » un pur non-sens. C'est ce qu'il s'agit maintenant d'établir.

2. La sensibilité selon Leibniz : l'origine d'un héritage

Cette question a déjà été abondamment traitée dans les études leibniziennes. L'article en particulier de G.H.R. Parkinson « The "intellectualization of appearances" : aspects of Leibniz's theory of sensation and thought »[13] me semble avoir apporté une réponse décisive à beaucoup d'égards. Je suivrai donc ici une voie complémentaire un peu différente.

La terminologie utilisée par Kant de la distinction (*Deutlichkeit*), indistinction (*Undeutlichkeit*) ou confusion (*Verworrenheit*) des représentations hérite des traductions établies dans la Logique allemande de Wolff,[14] qui ont été retenues pour fournir les équivalents allemands d'un lexique classificatoire mis en place par Leibniz dans les *Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis* de 1684. Ce court article comporte une caractérisation des diverses sortes de « notions » aux fins d'une explicitation de « la variété des connaissances » (Leibniz, *DM*, art. XIV). Leibniz ne cessera de s'y référer comme à un acquis définitif. En 1685-1686, il en donne une transposition partielle dans le *Discours de métaphysique* (aux art. XIV et XV). En 1702, la *Lettre touchant ce qui est indépendant des sens et de la matière*, sans citer les *Meditationes*, en reprend l'essentiel (Leibniz, GP 6 : 499 ss.). Dans les *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain*, il en donne une nouvelle version (II, chap. 29, 31 et 32), tout en faisant remarquer qu'on pourra trouver « dans ce petit Essai, mis dans les *Actes de Leipzig*, les fondements d'une bonne partie de la doctrine qui regarde l'entendement expliquée en abrégé » (III, 4, § 7 ; Leibniz, A VI, 6 : 297).

Ce lexique met en place, comme on le sait, les dichotomies qui ordonnent le champ

des notions ou connaissances : obscur/clair, confus/distinct, inadéquat/adéquat, symbolique/intuitif. C'est ici le second couple seulement qui retiendra notre attention : nous avons une connaissance claire quand nous sommes en état de pouvoir reconnaître la chose représentée (par exemple en différenciant une couleur d'une autre), mais elle est

> *confuse*, quand en effet je ne peux pas énumérer séparément les caractères suffisants à faire discerner la chose des autres, bien que cette chose comporte en effet de tels caractères et réquisits dans lesquels sa notion puisse être décomposée : c'est ainsi que nous reconnaissons assez clairement les couleurs, les odeurs, les saveurs et d'autres objets particuliers des sens, et que nous les discernons les unes des autres, mais par le simple témoignage des sens et non par des caractères énonçables. C'est pourquoi nous ne pouvons pas même expliquer à un aveugle ce qu'est le rouge, ni ne pouvons faire connaître aux autres de telles qualités, sinon en les mettant en présence de la chose.[15]

Il ne s'agit aucunement en cela d'une thèse générale sur la nature de la sensibilité comme telle. Les « objets des sens » sont simplement associés à titre d'exemples familiers à la zone du clair-confus. Il n'y a pas de définition nominale de ces objets ou des qualités qui les manifestent, pour autant qu'une telle définition serait l'énumération discursive de marques conceptuelles suffisantes à la décomposition analytique de la notion. C'est pourquoi, la constitution de ces qualités nous demeure cachée : en ce sens, on peut parler de « qualités occultes » (Leibniz, GP 6 : 499). En revanche, seront rendues « manifestes les notions qui sont susceptibles de recevoir une définition nominale ; et là où une telle définition est possible, nous obtenons une notion distincte :

> Mais une *notion distincte* est pareille à celle que les essayeurs ont de l'or, par des caractères et des examens suffisants à discerner la chose de tous les autres corps semblables : nous en avons habituellement de telles à l'égard des notions communes à plusieurs sens, comme celles du nombre, de la grandeur, de la figure, ainsi qu'à l'égard de nombreuses affections de l'âme, comme l'espoir et la crainte.[16]

Sur ce point, la *Lettre sur ce qui est indépendant des sens et de la matière*, après avoir rapporté dans les mêmes termes la caractérisation des notions claires et confuses des qualités sensibles, formulera avec plus de précision le statut « des qualités plus manifestes, et qui fournissent des notions plus distinctes », qui « sont celles qu'on attribue au sens commun, parce qu'il n'y a point de sens externe auquel elles soient particulièrement attachées et propres » (Leibniz, GP 6 : 500)[17]. Plutôt que de sens commun, c'est d'un « sens interne » qu'il faudrait parler « où les perceptions de ces différents sens externes se trouvent réunies ». Ce sens interne est aussi l'instance de l'imagination :

> C'est ce qu'on appelle l'imagination, laquelle comprend à la fois les notions des sens particuliers, qui sont claires mais confuses, et les notions du sens commun, qui sont claires et distinctes. Et ces idées claires et distinctes qui sont sujettes à l'imagination, sont les objets des sciences mathématiques, à savoir de l'Arithmétique et de la Géométrie, qui sont des sciences mathématiques pures, et de l'application de ces sciences à la nature, qui font les mathématiques mixtes (Leibniz, GP 6 : 501).[18]

Cependant, la caractérisation des notions que nous avons des objets des sens ne suffit pas

encore à déterminer ce qu'est la sensation elle-même, que Leibniz nomme aussi « sentiment » dans un sens aujourd'hui vieilli. Pour y parvenir, il faut partir de plus haut, de la thèse métaphysique fondamentale selon laquelle toute substance simple ou monade est un sujet percevant qui représente ou « exprime » tout l'univers. La perception est précisément « l'état passager qui enveloppe et représente une multitude dans l'unité ou dans la substance simple » (*Monad.*, art. 14). Très tôt, Leibniz a aperçu cette idée d'un enveloppement des sensations dans l'horizon universel d'une perception quasi-omnisciente, qui, précisée, demeurera au centre de toutes les élaborations ultérieures de sa métaphysique : dès 1676, il écrivait :

> Il me semble que toute âme est omnisciente, confusément. Et que chaque âme perçoit simultanément tout ce qui arrive dans le monde entier ; et que ces perceptions confuses de multitudes infinies simultanées donnent les sensations que nous avons des couleurs, des goûts, des touchers.[19]

Mais si la perception constitue en général, du point de vue métaphysique, la nature même de la substance simple ou de la monade, il est aussi vrai qu'elle ne se concrétise de fait, au plan physique, que par la médiation du corps organique auquel la substance est toujours et inconditionnellement unie selon les lois de l'harmonie entre l'âme et le corps. [20] Dans un monde matériel plein et divisé à l'infini, où la moindre particule reçoit les impressions de tous les corps de l'univers, le corps affecté à chaque monade fait porte soutient la correspondance entre elle et toutes les choses en dehors d'elle :

> Et par conséquent puisque tout corps organique est affecté par l'univers entier de relations détermines à chaque partie de l'univers, il n'est pas étonnant que l'âme même, qui se représente les autres choses selon les relations de son corps, soit une sorte de miroir de l'univers, représentant les autres choses pour ainsi dire suivant son point de vue .[21]

Sur le plan physique, c'est donc la nature et la spécificité des organes qui déterminera ce qui différencie la sensation ou perception sensible de la perception en général. Car la sensation ou « le sentiment est quelque chose de plus qu'une simple perception » (art. 19). Ce surplus dépend de la complexité des organes par lesquels le corps organique auquel toute monade est unie répond à tout ce qui se passe dans l'ensemble du monde physique :

> Mais quand la monade a des organes si ajustés que par leur moyen il y a du relief et du distingué dans les impressions qu'ils reçoivent, et par conséquent dans les perceptions qui les représentent […] cela peut aller jusqu'au sentiment, c'est-à-dire jusqu'à une perception accompagnée de mémoire, à savoir, dont un certain écho demeure longtemps pour se faire entendre dans l'occasion ; et un tel vivant est appelé animal, comme sa monade est appelée une âme (*PNG*, art. 4).

Autrement dit, la sensation ou, en termes kantiens, la sensibilité (*Sinnlichkeit*) est commune à tout le monde animal, et elle est pour chaque espèce diversifiée par la nature particulière des organes (d'autres animaux peuvent avoir des sensations toutes différentes des nôtres). Dans le cas de l'homme, il s'agit donc des sens de la vue, de l'ouïe, du toucher, de l'odorat et du goût. De façon générale, la sensibilité ainsi caractérisée comportera deux faces, l'une du côté de l'objet senti, l'autre du côté de l'âme percevante : rejetant l'idée que les qualités

sensibles n'appartiendraient qu'à l'âme qui les projeterait indûment sur les objets, Leibniz précise de la façon la plus nette que

> ces qualités sensibles sont des manières ou modifications des corps et non pas de notre esprit ; et nos sensations sont à la vérité des façons d'être de l'âme, mais qui représentent celles du corps (Leibniz, GP 4 : 576).[22]

A l'occasion, Leibniz dit aussi de la sensation qu'elle apparaît quand la perception, expression du multiple dans l'un commune à toutes les formes, est « plus distincte ».[23] Sur le fond de la représentation forcément confuse de l'univers « en raccourci », quelques plages se différencient et se détachent :

> De là vient qu'une âme créée a nécessairement bien des perceptions confuses, car représentant l'assemblage des choses externes innombrables, mais qu'elle perçoive distinctement les choses plus proches ou plus en relief accommodées aux organes.[24]

Toutefois, l'emploi des termes « distinct, distinctement » ne coïncide pas ici avec celui qui a été défini dans les *Meditationes* par opposition au confus. En elle-même, la sensation fait apparaître sur le fond d'un champ perceptif qui enveloppe tout l'univers quelque chose qui s'en détache, se met en avant, prend du relief : un bruit, une couleur, une odeur, etc. Mais le contenu de la sensation demeure confus en ce sens qu'il est impossible de le décomposer en éléments qui pourraient être énumérés dans une définition nominale du type « la couleur rouge est A et B et C ». C'est que ce contenu intègre dans l'unité apparente d'une image ou d'un « fantôme » [25] une multitude véritablement infinie d'autres perceptions qui restent inaperçues. Ce point, qui renvoie à la conception leibnizienne des « petites perceptions », est assez connu pour qu'il soit inutile d'y insister.[26] Parkinson résout l'apparente difficulté du double emploi du terme « distinct » en tirant de son examen des textes la conclusion qu'une perception distincte (au sens où la sensation en est une) « is a perception that is noticed » et qu'avoir une sensation « is to notice confused perceptions » : autrement dit, ces perceptions confuses sont distinctes et donc senties en tant qu'elles sont remarquées ou aperçues. Il ajoute : « This leads to the apparently paradoxical conclusion that a sensation (a distinct perception) is a confused noticing ».[27]

Il me semble que Leibniz donne lui-même une explication terminologique qui permet de lever le paradoxe. Quand il reprend dans les *Nouveaux Essais* les acquis des *Meditationes de cognitione*, il fait appel à deux emplois du verbe « distinguer » d'où vient l'adjectif « distinct ». Rappelant que « les idées des qualités sensibles, affectées aux organes, comme celle de la couleur ou de la chaleur » sont à la fois claires et confuses, il ajoute qu'elles « sont claires, car on les reconnaît et on les discerne aisément les unes des autres, mais elles ne sont point distinctes, parce qu'on ne distingue pas ce qu'elles renferment. Ainsi on n'en saurait donner la définition ». De cette façon les idées claires-confuses distinguent déjà un objet d'un autre et en ce sens on peut dire qu'elles « sont bien distinguantes ». Leibniz préfère alors réserver la dénomination de distinctes à « celles qui sont bien distinguées, c'est-à-dire qui sont distinctes en elles-mêmes et distinguent dans l'objet les marques qui le font connaître, ce qui en donne l'analyse ou définition » (Leibniz, *NE*, II, 29, § 4, A VI, 6 : 255). La conclusion de Parkinson pourra donc être reformulée de cette manière : la sensation est une

connaissance (ou représentation) distinguante qui n'est pas distinguée.[28]

Leibniz, tout en notant « la grande différence qu'il y a entre les pensées confuses et les distinctes », (Leibniz, GP 4 : 575) précise cependant que cette différence ne va pas jusqu'à celle du genre et que c'est à tort « qu'on a cru que les pensées confuses diffèrent toto genere des distinctes, au lieu qu'elles sont seulement moins distinguées et moins développées à cause de leur multiplicité » (Leibniz, GP 4 : 563). Cette gradualité de la différenciation dans le champ de la pensée en général [29] intègre le cas de la sensation, comme Leibniz le reconnaît explicitement : « Dans le fond, les pensées confuses ne sont autre chose qu'une multitude de pensées qui sont en elles-mêmes comme les distinctes, mais qui sont si petites que chacune à part n'excite pas notre attention et ne se fait point distinguer. On peut même dire qu'il y en a tout à la fois un nombre véritablement infini enveloppé dans nos sentiments » (Leibniz, GP 4 : 574-575). C'est là le résultat de la façon dont le corps uni à l'âme reçoit les impressions de tout l'univers : « Les perceptions de nos sens, lors même qu'elles sont claires, doivent nécessairement contenir quelque sentiment confus, car, comme tous les corps de l'univers sympathisent, le nôtre reçoit l'impression de tous les autres, et quoique nos sens se rapportent à tout, il n'est pas possible que notre âme puisse attendre à tout en particulier ; c'est pourquoi nos sentiments confus sont le résultat d'une variété de perceptions qui est tout à fait infinie » (Leibniz, *DM* : art. 33).

La question est alors de savoir s'il peut exister un moyen d'analyser au moins en partie ce contenu infini des sensations pour y expliciter ce que Leibniz appelle « ces idées distinctes cachées dans les confuses » (Leibniz, *NE*, IV, 17, § 9 ; A VI, 6 : 487) ? Ce serait aussi répondre à l'invitation d'en « venir à leur analyse par d'autres expériences et par la raison, à mesure qu'on peut les rendre intelligibles » (Leibniz, *NE* II, 2 ; A VI, 6 : 120). Dès les *Meditationes de cognitione*, Leibniz soulignait à propos des qualités sensibles qu' « il est certain que les notions de ces qualités sont composées et peuvent être analysées, puisqu'elles ont leurs causes ».[30] Mais en quoi consistent ces causes ?

Leibniz a toujours eu en tête le programme de ce que Ernst Mach appellera plus tard l'analyse des sensations, établissant la relation du physique au psychique.[31] Il y a travaillé selon l'indication fournie elle aussi à la fin des *Meditationes* :

> Lorsque nous percevons les couleurs ou les odeurs, nous n'avons en tout cas pas d'autre perception que celle de figures et de mouvements, mais tellement multiples et ténus, que dans son état présent notre esprit n'est pas en mesure de les considérer distinctement un à un, et que par suite, il ne remarque pas que sa perception est composée des seules perceptions des figures et des mouvements les plus minuscules.[32]

En d'autres termes, il y a ce que Leibniz appelle aussi une « analyse physique » dont le secret « consiste dans ce seul appareil que nous ramenons les qualités confuses des sens (à savoir chaleur et froid pour le toucher, saveurs pour le goût, odeurs pour l'odorat, sons pour l'ouïe, couleurs pour la vue) aux qualités distinctes qui les accompagnent, qui sont nombre, grandeur, figure, mouvement, consistance ».[33] Dès 1677, cette méthode a été mise en œuvre dans « une résolution expérimentale des attributs confus en d'autres attributs » [34] qui trouvera finalement son écho dans de nombreux passages des *Nouveaux Essais*, où la confrontation avec Locke

conduit Leibniz à prêter une attention particulière à la question de la nature des sens, dans des remarques nourries de tout un acquis de recherches définitionnelles et analytiques en physique. En cela, il s'agit bien toujours de s'inscrire dans un programme qui, de Descartes à Boyle, a été celui de la « philosophie mécanique » des modernes :

> Car ceux qui tachent d'expliquer distinctement les qualités sensibles, ont toujours recours aux idées de mathématique, et ces idées renferment toujours la grandeur ou la multitude des parties (Leibniz, GP 6 : 501).

Le résultat le plus manifeste en est que ce qui n'est pas susceptible de définition nominale (une couleur, par exemple) peut cependant trouver jusqu'à un certain point une définition réelle. C'est ainsi que les termes qui

> ne sont simples qu'à notre égard (parce que nous n'avons pas le moyen d'en faire l'analyse pour venir aux perceptions élémentaires dont ils sont composés), comme chaud, froid, jaune, vert, peuvent recevoir une définition réelle qui en expliquerait la cause : c'est ainsi que la définition réelle du vert est d'être composé de bleu et de jaune bien mêlés, quoique le vert ne soit pas plus susceptible de définition nominale qui le fasse reconnaître, que le bleu et le jaune (Leibniz, *NE*, III, 4, § 4 ; A VI, 6 : 297).

L'analyse n'opère donc pas sous la forme d'une décomposition interne du contenu mental de la sensation, mais sous celle d'une résolution causale plus ou moins hypothétique. Dans le cas général, s'il s'agissait par exemple de définir réellement le bleu ou le jaune, elle consiste à dégager, au niveau des parties minuscules et non directement observables des corps, les conditions de grandeur, figure, mouvement qui sont associées à l'émergence de telle ou telle sensation :

> Ces idées sensitives dépendent du détail des figures et mouvements et les expriment exactement, quoique nous ne puissions pas y démêler ce détail dans la confusion d'une trop grande multitude et petitesse des actions mécaniques qui frappent nos sens. Cependant si nous étions parvenus à la constitution interne de quelques corps, nous verrions aussi quand ils devraient avoir ces qualités, qui seraient réduites elles-mêmes à leurs raisons intelligibles (Leibniz, *NE*, IV, 6, § 7 ; A VI, 6 : 403).

Sans doute est-il vrai qu'une « entière explication [des sensations confuses] passe nos forces, à cause de la trop grande multitude des variétés enveloppées », mais il est vrai aussi qu'« on ne laisse pas d'y pénétrer de plus en plus par des expériences qui y font découvrir des fondements des pensées distinctes, dont la lumière et les couleurs nous fournissent des exemples » (Leibniz, GP 4 : 575). Or c'est aussi là que se noue la correspondance non arbitraire entre les sensations dans l'âme et ce qu'elles représentent dans l'objet donné aux sens :

> Ces sentiments confus ne sont pas arbitraires non plus, et on ne demeure point d'accord de l'opinion reçue aujourd'hui par plusieurs, […] qu'il n'y a point de ressemblance ou rapport entre nos sensations et les traces corporelles. Il paraît plutôt que nos sentiments les représentent et les expriment parfaitement. Quelqu'un dira peut-être que le sentiment de la chaleur ne ressemble pas au mouvement : oui, sans doute, il ne ressemble pas à un mouvement sensible, tel que celui d'une roue de carrosse, mais il ressemble à l'assemblage des petits mouvements du feu et des organes qui en sont la cause, ou plutôt il n'est que leur représentation (*ibid.*).

Il n'est pas nécessaire d'entrer ici dans le détail de ces analyses.[35] Il convient en revanche d'en souligner deux caractères qui sont essentiels pour notre sujet.

Premièrement, l'agencement des concepts distincts qui rend plus ou moins intelligible la sensation confuse ne se substitue pas à elle et ne fait pas disparaître sa confusion. En d'autres termes, l'obtention d'une définition réelle d'une qualité sensible ne rend pas pour autant possible d'en donner une définition nominale :

> Je ne nie point qu'on n'ait fait beaucoup de découvertes sur la nature de ces qualités occultes, comme par exemple nous savons par quelle manière de réfraction se font le bleu et le jaune, et que ces deux couleurs mêlées font du vert. Mais nous ne saurions encore comprendre pour cela, comment la perception que nous avons de ces trois couleurs, résulte de ces causes. Aussi n'avons nous pas même des définitions nominales de telles qualités, pour en expliquer les termes (Leibniz, *Lettre sur ce qui passe les sens*, GP 6 : 500).

Les notions distinctes, selon le terme même de Leibniz, « accompagnent » les confuses, mais elles ne les annulent pas. De même, quand nous savons que les couleurs de l'arc-en-ciel sont produites par la réfraction des rayons lumineux traversant des gouttes d'eau en suspension dans l'air, ce savoir ne nous empêche pas de continuer à percevoir les couleurs dans leur plénitude sensible. Dans la suite du même passage, Leibniz dit très bien à propos des concepts distincts enveloppés dans l'analyse qu'« il ne serait jamais dans notre pouvoir de les *reconnaître sensiblement dans ces idées sensitives*, qui sont un résultat confus des actions des corps sur nous » (souligné par moi). La confusion du sensible, effet de l'imperfection ou de la finitude de notre nature, est en ce sens indépassable et irréductible :[36] la nature de « cette perception sensitive confuse […] est d'être et de demeurer confuse » (Leibniz, *NE*, IV, 6, § 7 ; A VI, 6 : 403).[37] L'explication physique qu'on en donne s'y superpose sur un autre plan. Grandeur, figure, mouvement, sont des concepts et ne sont pas sentis ni n'ont à l'être. Couleur, chaleur, sont des sensations dans lesquelles aucun développement interne ne révèle des concepts cachés ou ce que Kant nomme des représentations partielles.[38] Comme l'écrit excellemment Daniel Schulthess, « on ne peut pas, sous le régime du confus, avoir accès au distinct. On ne peut pas, sous le régime du distinct, retrouver le confus ».[39] Il serait contradictoire de tenter de plaquer les deux plans l'un sur l'autre :

> […] car de vouloir que ces fantômes confus demeurent et que cependant on y démêle les ingrédients par la fantaisie même, c'est se contredire, c'est vouloir avoir le plaisir d'être trompé par une agréable perspective, et vouloir qu'en même temps l'œil voie la tromperie, ce qui serait la gâter (Leibniz, A VI, 6 : 404).

Deuxièmement, si l'on peut dire que l'analyse rend intelligible le sensible en l'expliquant par ses causes, ce n'est certainement pas au sens où elle nous ferait accéder à un *monde intelligible* qui serait celui des monades, et dont le sensible serait une représentation tronquée et faussée. Car les concepts requis dans cette analyse n'atteignent pas ce monde-là. Dans les objets qui correspondent aux sensations, l'analyse dégage les déterminations de grandeur, figure, situation et mouvement qui en donnent l'explication distincte au moins partielle. Mais ces concepts, grandeur, figure, situation, mouvement ne sont évidemment pas des propriétés des monades,

mais bien des phénomènes d'un monde perçu qu'ils rendent cohérent. Autrement dit, les deux plans conjugués, celui du sensible toujours essentiellement confus, et celui des concepts distincts qui l'expliquent, restent l'un et l'autre au niveau du seul monde des phénomènes.[40]

3. L'héritage détourné : la sensibilité selon Wolff

D'où vient historiquement la méprise de Kant ? Son attitude à l'égard de la philosophie de Leibniz n'est pas univoque : tantôt il l'intègre au bloc formé par la « philosophie leibnizo-wolffienne », et c'est notamment le cas quand il s'agit de l'identification de la sensibilité à la confusion des connaissances, — tantôt il suggère qu'il faudrait retrouver un Leibniz plus authentique, indépendamment d'une « monadologie mal comprise (*übelverstandenen Monadologie*) ».[41]

Il faut donc se tourner vers la façon dont Wolff a traité de la sensibilité.[42] Dès la « Logique allemande » de 1713, Wolff a repris à son compte la classification des connaissances formulées par Leibniz dans les *Meditationes de cognitione*.[43] Il y apporte quelques différenciations nouvelles, il développe davantage les exemples et il fournit des règles d'application, — mais ces ajouts ne concernent pas directement notre sujet.[44] C'est ici que sont posées les traductions de « confusum, confusio » par *verworren*, *Verworrenheit*, de « distinctum, distinctio » par *deutlich*, *Deutlichkeit*, de « notio » par *Begriff*, et de « nota » par *Merkmal*. S'agissant de la confusion et de la distinction, elles sont caractérisées exactement de la même manière que dans les *Meditationes* de Leibniz.[45] Il en sera de même dans le traité latin *Philosophia rationalis sive Logica* (1728). Des distinctions épistémiques et un vocabulaire sont ainsi fixés de manière à pouvoir s'appliquer de façon univoque à un domaine autre que celui de la logique des concepts au sens restreint. Par cette univocité déterminée, l'emploi des termes gagne sans doute en rigueur, mais perd en souplesse d'application par rapport au langage leibnizien, plus mobile et expressif. Partout où ils seront transposés, des termes comme « confus » et « distinct » relèveront de la même définition. Ce sera notamment le cas avec les deux traités majeurs de psychologie, *Psychologia empirica* (1732) et *Psychologia rationalis* (1734).[46] Ce qui nous conduit à la doctrine du sens et de la sensibilité exposée par ces deux textes.[47]

La psychologie empirique établit par l'expérience les principes qui rendent raison de ce qui se passe dans l'âme (Wolff, PE, § 1) ; son unique fondement est la conscience que nous avons à tout moment de nous-mêmes et des choses hors de nous (Wolff, PE, § 11). La connaissance (*cognitio*) est définie comme l'acte par lequel l'âme est consciente de soi et des autres choses hors de soi. Elle enveloppe la perception, acte de l'âme qui se représente un objet quelconque et l'aperception, au sens même que Leibniz a donné à ce terme, par laquelle l'âme est consciente de sa perception (Wolff, PE, §§ 23-26). Après ces préliminaires, Wolff examine dans la section suivante la « partie inférieure de la faculté de connaître », en commençant par ce qu'il nomme la différence formelle des perceptions. Sous ce titre, Wolff entend la transposition à toutes les perceptions des différences établies dans la *Logique* à l'égard des notions ; elles seront exactement dans le même sens obscures ou claires, confuses ou distinctes. Il faut attendre presque la fin de cette section pour trouver la définition de la faculté de connaître dite inférieure.

Celle-ci repose sur la définition de l'idée (*idea*) comme la représentation d'une chose en tant précisément qu'elle se réfère à son objet (Wolff, PE, § 48). L'idée prend le nom de notion ou concept (*notio*) quand il s'agit de la représentation des choses en général, par genres et espèces. La connaissance proprement dite peut être alors redéfinie comme l'action par laquelle l'âme acquiert l'idée ou la notion d'une chose (Wolff, PE, § 52). Wolff note que les différences des notions, dont les principales sont celles de l'obscur et du clair, du confus et du distinct, sont les mêmes que celles des perceptions et a ont déjà été longuement étudiées dans la *Logique*. C'est de là que résulte la division entre une « partie inférieure » et une « partie supérieure de la faculté de connaître » : l'inférieure est celle qui est concernée par les idées et notions obscures et confuses ; supérieure, celle qui acquiert des idées et des notions distinctes. La faculté inférieure de connaître comprend ainsi la sensibilité, l'imagination, la fiction et la mémoire. La faculté supérieure se définit par l'attention, la réflexion, l'entendement. Cette topique établit indirectement que sensibilité et entendement se différencient comme la connaissance confuse et la connaissance distincte.

L'étude du sens s'inscrit d'emblée sous la présupposition générale de la donnée d'un monde physique dans lequel se séparent le corps que nous disons « nôtre » et les corps qui nous sont « présents » (*praesentia*). Nous appelons « notre corps » celui « dont dépendent les perceptions que nous avons des choses matérielles dans le monde observable » (Wolff, PE, § 58) ; nous sont présents les corps qui ont le pouvoir de susciter un changement dans notre corps (Wolff, PE, § 59). Les sensations (*sensationes*) sont les perceptions dont la raison, — et ici raison équivaut à cause physique —, est contenue dans les changements qui arrivent dans les organes spéciaux dont notre corps est pourvu (Wolff, PE, § 65) : la vue d'un objet résulte du changement qui se produit dans notre œil. De façon générale, la faculté de sentir (*facultas sentiendi*) ou le sens (*sensus*) est « la faculté de percevoir les objets externes induisant le changement dans les organes sensoriels en tant que tels, conformément au changement produit dans l'organe » (Wolff, PE, § 67). Wolff souligne qu'il n'est pas au pouvoir de l'âme de sentir ou de ne pas sentir un objet : dès lors que l'objet sensible agit sur l'organe sensoriel normalement constitué, la sensation s'impose nécessairement (Wolff, PE, § 79). D'où l'on peut énoncer dans sa généralité une « loi des sensations » : « Si dans un organe sensoriel se produit un changement provenant d'un objet sensible quelconque, dans l'esprit coexiste une sensation explicable de façon intelligible par ce changement, en connaissant en lui la raison suffisante pour laquelle la sensation est et est telle » (Wolff, PE, § 85). Encore une fois, on constate clairement que cette raison suffisante n'est rien d'autre qu'un enchaînement causal de nature physique. La Psychologie empirique de Wolff expose une interprétation entièrement physicalisée de la sensibilité. C'est ainsi qu'on appellera enfin « idées sensibles » (*ideae sensuales*) celles qui « existent dans l'âme sous l'effet de la sensation, ou qui sont en acte dans l'âme, parce que tel changement est déjà arrivé dans l'organe sensoriel » (Wolff, PE, § 95).

L'exposé de la Psychologie rationnelle va fournir la justification de cette théorie physique. Le passage de l'étude empirique à l'étude rationnelle est celui qui va des données d'expérience à la seule possibilité de ce qui arrive dans l'âme humaine. A ce titre, la Psychologie rationnelle reçoit ses principes de démonstration à la fois de l'Ontologie, de la Cosmologie générale et de la Psychologie empirique (Wolff, PR, § 3).[48] Plus précisément, son objet sera de rendre

compte des acquis de la Psychologie empirique en les réinterprétant à partir des concepts fondamentaux de l'Ontologie et des thèses principales de la Cosmologie. Qu'en est-il quand il s'agit de la sensibilité ?

La doctrine générale de l'étant comme tel exposée dans la *Philosophia prima sive Ontologia* (1730)[49] a, dans la seconde partie, développé la théorie du simple et du composé, qui est en quelque sorte la réinterprétation de la monadologie leibnizienne, même si Wolff ne reprend pas à son compte le terme de monade. Il existe deux espèces d'êtres, les êtres composés, qui consistent en parties, et les êtres simples, qui n'ont pas de parties. Or « s'il y a des êtres composés, il y a nécessairement des êtres simples, ou encore : sans êtres simples les composés ne pourraient exister » (Wolff, Ont, § 686). On reconnaît là l'argument fondamental qui soutient chez Leibniz la thèse monadologique.[50] La preuve est fondée sur la reconnaissance que la notion du composé ne contient pas la raison suffisante de la composition. Dans une note historique, Wolff évoque à la fois les monades de Pythagore et les atomes d'Epicure, avant de renvoyer à la traduction latine de la *Monadologie* de Leibniz parue en 1721.[51] Mais Wolff accomplit par rapport à la conception leibnizienne de la monade un tournant radical : depuis la préface de la seconde édition (1722) à sa « Métaphysique allemande », il a pris parti pour une interprétation franchement dualiste de l'harmonie préétablie entre l'âme et le corps,[52] et la *Psychologia rationalis* confirme cette option.[53] Là où Leibniz pouvait neutraliser en quelque sorte la question de la substantialité des corps,[54] Wolff pose l'existence de deux sortes d'êtres simples fondamentalement réels, de deux sortes donc de substances : des substances simples de nature psychique, ou des âmes dont la nature consiste dans leur capacité représentative ou perceptive, et des substances simples de nature physique ou corporelle. C'est à la *Cosmologia generalis* (1731)[55] qu'il revient de traiter de façon détaillée de la composition des corps. La thèse centrale en sera : « Les corps sont des agrégats de substances simples » (Wolff, CG, § 176), et cela suffit pour qu'on puisse les considérer comme des « substances composées » (Wolff, CG, § 179, cf. Ont, § 794). Ce sont ces seules substances simples que Wolff désigne proprement comme des « éléments ».[56] Les choses simples ayant par nature des propriétés différentes de celles des choses composées, les éléments possèdent presque toutes les caractéristiques de la monade leibnizienne, ils sont inétendus, sans figure, sans grandeur, ils ne remplissent pas d'espace, et ils ne se distinguent que de façon qualitative, — mais ils n'ont pas de perception ou de faculté de représentation. Au lieu de cela, ils sont dotées d'une force active élémentaire (Wolff, CG, §§ 182, 191, 196), qui est la source permanente des changements ordonnés par lesquels ils se différencient les uns des autres et le fondement de la force active qui se manifeste dans les composés (Wolff, CG, §§ 198, 201) ; ils possèdent en outre une puissance passive, par laquelle ils subissent l'action de tous les autres, dans un « nexus elementorum » qui est le fondement du « nexus » universel qui constitue le monde dans son ensemble (Wolff, CG, §§ 207, 208). Ainsi, le dualisme wolffien impose-t-il de reconnaître ce que Leibniz niait : l'existence d'éléments de la nature corporelle.[57] Il est inutile ici d'entrer plus avant dans le détail de la composition du monde physique, où Wolff distingue plusieurs états de composition des corps à partir des éléments, associés pour former des « corpuscules primitifs », qui à leur tour se groupent en « corpuscules dérivés », tous inaccessibles à l'observation directe.[58]

A partir de ces acquis, la sensation dans la *Psychologia rationalis* reçoit une autre définition

que celle donnée dans la *Psychologia empirica* : elle peut désormais être caractérisée comme « la représentation du composé dans le simple » (Wolff, PR, § 83) : les composé, c'est-à-dire en général les corps, le simple, c'est-à-dire ici l'âme. Si on entend par « image » la représentation d'une chose composée quelconque (Wolff, PR, § 86), les idées sensibles sont donc des images qui doivent représenter leur objet selon un principe de similitude tiré de l'Ontologie (Wolff, Ont, § 195[59]) : « Les attributs qui sont distingués dans l'objet sont les mêmes que ceux que l'on peut distinguer dans l'image et réciproquement » (Wolff, PR, § 91). Or dans les corps comme êtres composés, il n'y a d'abord, au plus près du plan observable, rien d'autre à distinguer que des parties qui se différencient par leur grandeur, leur figure et leur situation. C'est donc aussi là tout ce que représentent les idées sensibles. D'où une nouvelle manière de différencier les sensations distinctes des confuses : « Si nous distinguons les figures, grandeurs et mouvements dans les choses que nous percevons, les sensations sont distinctes » (Wolff, PR, § 93) ; et si nous ne le pouvons pas, elles sont confuses (Wolff, PR, § 94). De fait, toutes nos sensations sont en elles-mêmes mêlées de sensations confuses et de sensations distinctes. Mais un niveau plus profond doit encore être pris en considération, puisque toutes les déterminations des corps comme agrégats de substances simples proviennent du changement continuel d'état des éléments (par suite de leur force active) : toute diversité dans les corps dépend de la diversité des éléments (Wolff, CG, § 194). Selon le même principe de similitude, il doit donc y avoir aussi dans les idées sensibles des déterminations intrinsèques qui répondent au changement de l'état interne des éléments des corps. Mais chacun expérimente en lui-même qu'il ne parvient pas à connaître séparément ces déterminations et qu'il les confond en une seule représentation : « Quand nous sentons, l'âme se représente les modifications intrinsèques des substances simples, mais confondues en un » (Wolff, PR, § 98). On remarquera que pour Wolff, même armé des instruments grossissants les plus puissants, le sens ne peut jamais parvenir à distinguer les corpuscules dérivés, et donc encore moins les corpuscules primitifs et les éléments (Wolff, PR, §§ 99-101). La confusion inhérente à la représentation sensible est donc essentielle et irréductible, puisque tout en ayant comme corrélat physique les éléments des corps et leurs formes les plus originaires de composition, elle n'atteint jamais rien de plus que le plan des phénomènes observables. De là la définition donnée par la *Cosmologia generalis* : « Est appelé phénomène tout ce qui est perçu confusément en se donnant à la sensibilité » (Wolff, CG, § 225).[60]

Il en résulte enfin que rien de ce qui appartient proprement aux choses matérielles n'est perçu distinctement par le sens, et que la nature des choses est soustraite à son investigation (Wolff, PR, § 102). Ce pourquoi la Cosmologie, tout en remarquant que cela s'expliquerait mieux par la suite dans la psychologie, relevait que « nous n'avons jamais de concepts distincts en physique, mais nous nous arrêtons toujours à ce qui est confusément perçu, car ce qui est distinctement perçu n'est jamais complètement tel, mais enveloppe bien des choses que nous ne percevons que confusément » (Wolff, CG, § 225 note). Toutefois, les notions de la pluralité des éléments et de leur liaison persistent au sein de cette confusion. De là proviennent les idées sensibles de l'étendue et de la continuité (Wolff, PR, § 103 – Cf. CG, § 224). D'où résulte enfin la genèse de la représentation sensible de l'espace : quand l'âme se représente confusément la liaison des éléments sans les distinguer séparément et en les fusionnant dans une image continue, elle retient cependant l'idée d'un ordre qui consisterait dans une union apparemment

indivisible, indifférenciée, pénétrable et illimitée. Mais telle est l'idée de l'espace imaginaire, ainsi qu'il apparaît à la sensibilité. « L'idée sensible de l'espace naît de la représentation de la liaison des choses dépendant de l'état interne des éléments » (§ 104) : à ce titre, il ne peut s'agir que d'une représentation confuse.

4. L'héritage restitué : deux voies de la finitude

Comme on le voit, la conception wolffienne de la sensibilité se comprend dans la corrélation qui associe cosmologie et psychologie, ou si l'on veut analyse de la matière et analyse de l'esprit, et cette corrélation exprime le dualisme métaphysique du corps et de l'âme. Wolff assume de la sorte l'ensemble des thèses qui soutiennent solidairement l'interprétation kantienne de la sensibilité selon Leibniz. En assignant sensibilité et entendement respectivement à la faculté inférieure et à la faculté supérieure de connaissance, il admet que leur différence s'expose comme celle de la confusion et de la distinction. Il y a donc bien pour lui une perception confuse du phénomène comme tel tout comme il y a une représentation sensible de l'espace comme appréhension confuse de la multiplicité des substances simples. Les corps sont des agrégats de ces éléments, que cependant il se refuse à nommer « monades » pour éviter de les identifier aux monades leibniziennes : ils sont dénués de la faculté représentative qui constitue ces dernières.

Kant a bien compris qu'il y avait en cela un déplacement de l'inspiration authentique de la monadologie. Il s'agit bien plutôt avec Wolff de ce que Kant appelle « une atomistique transcendantale » alors que

> La signification propre du mot monade (selon l'usage de Leibniz) devait bien s'appliquer seulement au simple qui est donné immédiatement comme substance simple (par exemple dans la conscience de soi), et non comme élément du composé, qu'on pourrait mieux appeler l'atome (KrV, B 469-470).

Il est vrai que Kant avait d'abord lui-même adhéré à cette conception quand, dans une « Monadologie physique », il tentait encore en 1756 d'arbitrer le conflit entre la géométrie, qui démontre la divisibilité à l'infini de l'espace, et la métaphysique, qui compose la matière d'éléments corporels simples.[61] Revenant trente ans plus tard sur ce conflit, il en dénonçait le caractère illusoire lié à une méconnaissance de la nature de l'espace :

> Dans cette mésinterprétation, on se figurait toujours l'espace comme une propriété attachées aux choses en dehors même de notre faculté de représentation, mais que le mathématicien ne pense que d'après des concepts généraux, c'est-à-dire confusément (car ainsi définit-on communément le phénomène [62]), et l'on attribuait le théorème mathématique de l'infinie divisibilité de la matière, une proposition qui présuppose la plus haute distinction dans le concept de l'espace, à une représentation confuse de l'espace, en quoi il restait donc loisible au métaphysicien de composer l'espace de points et la matière de parties simples et d'apporter ainsi (suivant son opinion) la distinction dans ce concept » (MAN, AA 04: 507).[63]

Or, on ne saurait tenir Leibniz pour responsable d'une telle méprise. Kant le remarque fortement dans son écrit contre Eberhard :

> Est-il croyable que Leibniz, un si grand mathématicien !, ait voulu composer les corps de monades (et par là l'espace aussi de parties simples) ? Il ne visait pas le monde corporel, mais son substrat pour nous inconnaissable, le monde intelligible, qui réside uniquement dans l'idée de la raison et en lequel nous devons nous représenter tout ce que nous y pensons comme substance composée comme consistant en substances simples » (ÜE, AA 08: 248).[64]

La correction qu'il faudrait donc apporter à la philosophie leibnizo-wolffienne pour retrouver l'inspiration authentique de la monadologie leibnizienne indique la direction à suivre, qui mènera Kant à reconnaître finalement que « la Critique de la raison pure pourrait bien être alors la véritable apologie de Leibniz lui-même, à l'encontre de ses partisans qui le vantent avec des louanges qui ne lui font pas honneur » (ÜE, AA 08: 250). Le diagnostic peut alors être prononcé avec la condamnation d'une « monadologie mal comprise » :

> La raison de l'égarement réside dans une Monadologie mal comprise, qui n'appartient absolument pas à l'explication des phénomènes de la nature, mais est un concept platonicien du monde, introduit par Leibniz, en soi exact, dans la mesure où le monde n'est absolument pas considéré comme objet des sens mais comme chose en elle-même, et qu'il est un objet de l'entendement, qui cependant se trouve au fondement des phénomènes des sens (MAN, AA 04: 507).[65]

Il fallait citer tout au long ces textes pour comprendre comment Kant a procédé dans sa tentative de reconstruction d'un système de Leibniz dont l'Amphibologie des concepts de la réflexion fournit la matrice. Il attribue à Leibniz l'essentiel d'une doctrine de la sensibilité qui est en réalité celle de Wolff. Mais reconnaissant que la conception wolffienne des éléments corporels simples trahit le sens authentique de la monadologie, il cherche à amender la doctrine en substituant à ces éléments les « vraies » monades. D'où la réhabilitation relative de la monadologie comme idée « platonicienne » d'un substrat intelligible du monde sensible. Mais comme l'intuition sensible, telle qu'elle est donnée à l'homme, ne donne aucun accès à ce substrat, elle reste caractérisée par la confusion intrinsèque de ses représentations, que Leibniz ne pouvait dépasser qu'au prix de l'« intellectualisation des phénomènes ». Le désaccord touche ici à une divergence essentielle, et qui ne se situe pas sur le plan cosmologique de la composition du monde physique : Kant juge que la limitation de l'entendement par une sensibilité conçue comme une source indépendante et originaire de connaissance est une donnée indépassable de la finitude de l'homme dans un monde dont le rapport au Dieu échappe au savoir pour ne plus relever que de la foi pratique.

Sans doute aussi, Kant, en séparant sensibilité et entendement comme « deux souches de la connaissance humaine », laissait encore entrevoir la possibilité d'une « racine commune », mais qui resterait inconnue de nous (KrV, B 29). On pourrait dire que Leibniz a à sa manière identifié cette racine commune, en ne reconnaissant qu'une source unique de toutes les connaissances, notions ou idées dans une spontanéité de la substance pour qui toutes ses perceptions ou représentations, y compris celles qui semblent s'imposer à elle par les sens, viennent de son propre fond : « iI y a de la spontanéité dans le confus, comme dans le distinct » (GP 4, 565). Alors que pour Kant, le *Je pense* est un pouvoir vide de liaison qui doit recevoir du dehors, par la réceptivité sensible affectée, le multiple qu'il unifie pour en faire son objet de connaissance,

Leibniz rassemble dans l'unité intérieure de la monade le *Je pense*, *ego cogito* et le *varia a me cogitantur*, *il y a une variété de mes pensées* [66] : c'est justement dans cette corrélation connue par une « immédiation de sentiment » qu'apparaît le phénomène. Car la variété, qui exprime l'horizon de l'univers entier, peut être plus ou moins confusément, plus ou mois distinctement perçue. À partir de ce foyer unique, il s'opère un partage ou une polarité s'établit, qui distribue les représentations, soit du côté de la distinction, où se trouve « ce qui n'est qu'intelligible comme étant l'objet du seul entendement » (Leibniz, GP 6 : 501)[67], soit du côté de la confusion, où le sensible se manifeste « dans une sorte de chaos de nos perceptions »[68] par une apparence ressentie de dépendance à l'égard des phénomènes selon les lois de l'harmonie entre l'âme et son corps organique. C'est ainsi qu'« une substance qui est d'une étendue infinie, en tant qu'elle exprime tout, devient limitée par la manière de son expression plus ou moins parfaite » (Leibniz, *DM*, art XV). Une expression plus ou moins parfaite est aussi une expression plus ou moins distincte. La confusion est toujours présente, inéluctable, car « toute substance exprime, quoique confusément, tout ce qui arrive dans l'univers […] ce qui a quelque ressemblance à une perception ou connaissance confuse » (art. IX).[69]

La polarité qui s'ouvre ainsi se définit selon deux axes : l'un en quelque sorte vers le bas, où l'on trouverait la plus complète obscurité des perceptions, l'autre vers le haut, vers la distinction intégrale, ce qui assigne à chaque être son rang dans un ordre universel. En Dieu, tout est distinct ; dans les monades les plus rudimentaires, tout est obscur. Dans l'entre-deux, la connaissance humaine se partage en raccordant les deux versants qui définissent le champ du travail sans fin de la connaissance, composant expérience et raison, ordonnant les phénomènes des sens par le réseau cohérent des notions distinctes. C'est alors qu'une monade qui est un esprit,

> c'est-à-dire une âme capable de réflexion et de science, sera en même temps infiniment moins qu'un Dieu et incomparablement plus que le reste de l'univers des créatures ; sentant tout confusément, au lieu que Dieu sait tout distinctement, sachant quelque chose distinctement, au lieu que toute la matière ne sait et ne sent rien du tout.[70]

C'est une autre conception de la finitude, mais la présence en nous de l'inextricable et indépassable confusion des sensations, écho de notre appartenance au monde, en est bien encore le signe.

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GM = Leibnizens mathematische Schriften. Hrsg. von C. I. Gerhardt. Bd. 1-7. Berlin (puis Halle) 1849-1863 (Réimpr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1962).

GP = Die philosophischen Schriften von Leibniz. Hrsg. von C. I. Gerhardt. Bd. 1-7. Berlin 1875-1890 (Réimpr. : Hildesheim, Georg: Olms, 1960-1961).

DM = *Discours de* métaphysique, cité par numéro d'article.

Monad., PNG = *La Monadologie*, *Principes de la nature et de la grâce fondés en raison*, cités par numéros de paragraphe.

NE = *Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain*, cités par Livre, chapitre, paragraphe et pagination

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ABSTRACT: The present paper starts from Kant's well-known statement, according to which "Leibniz intellectualized the

appearances" (KrV, A 271/B 327), and considers the historical circumstances that have mediated Kant's reception of Leibniz's philosophy, with a particular emphasis on Wolff's role in this mediation. The goal is to highlight that, although Kant has taken as Leibnizian a theory of sensibility that was essentially Wolffian, he has recognized that Wolff's theory of the simple corporeal elements did not suit Leibniz's monadology. However, Kant's attempt at rehabilitating the meaning and the value of the Leibnizian concept of monad does not avoid conceiving it as an intelligible substrate of the sensible intuition. Therefore, even this rehabilitation does not escape the limit represented by the inaccessibility of the human being to this supposed intelligible substrate.

KEYWORDS: Leibniz, Wolff, sensibility, appearance, monad, intuition.

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Notes

1 Article initialement paru dans *De la sensibilité. Les Esthétiques de Kant*, sous la direction de François Calori, Michael Foessel et Dominique Pradelle, Rennes : Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2014, pp. 37-70.

2 Cf. Parkinson, 1981: 2-3 ; Schneider 2004.

3 Sur ce point, cf. Fichant 2008.

4 Le « phénomène » ou *Erscheinung* peut être entendu au sens de l'objet indéterminé (hors forme catégoriale) de l'intuition empirique ou à celui de l'objet déterminé (par la forme catégoriale) de l'expérience. Une fois seulement Kant a recouru dans la *Critique* à une distinction terminologique qui lèverait l'équivocité du terme, mais qu'il n'a pas conservée dans la seconde édition : « Les apparitions (*Erscheinungen*), pour autant qu'elles sont pensées comme objet selon l'unité des catégories, s'appellent phénomènes (*Phaenomena*) » (KrV, A 248). Sur cette question, voir la remarque de Guillermit 1968, p. 123, note 19, dans l'annotation de sa traduction des *Progrès de la métaphysique en Allemagne depuis Leibniz et Wolff*, qui suggère pour « Erscheinung » la traduction « apparition » au sens de l'apparition d'une comète.

5 Euclide 1994 définit en effet la notion de « raison » par les conditions sous lesquelles quatre grandeurs quelconques peuvent être dites « en même raison » dans la Définition 5 du Livre V (le terme logos est traduit par « rapport »).

6 Le principe employé par Euclide et remis ici en usage par Leibniz a été explicité sous le nom de « principe d'abstraction » par Russell 1937, pp. 166 ss. En voici la formulation donnée par Couturat 1905, p. 49 : « S'il existe entre deux objets quelconques d'une certaine classe une relation symétrique et transitive [i.e. une relation d'équivalence], cette relation peut être ramenée à une relation uniforme que ces objets ont avec un même terme. Ce principe […] a pour effet de ramener toute relation symétrique et transitive à une espèce d'égalité (c'est-à-dire d'identité) ». C'est ce même principe qui avait été utilisé par Frege pour définir les nombres cardinaux.

7 D'un point de vue kantien, on fera valoir que la présupposition de la distance, de la situation et du mouvement, implique déjà une représentation préalable de l'espace : c'est précisément ce préalable que Kant explicite dans l'*Esthétique transcendantale* par l'« exposition » du concept d'espace (KrV, B 37-41). Mais le propos de Leibniz est autre : il s'agit pour lui de construire une définition conceptuelle exacte de l'espace comme ordre idéal des phénomènes, muni d'une métrique et d'une topologie. Il ne serait pas absurde de considérer que les deux démarches sont complémentaires, à condition de considérer que l'espace de l'*Esthétique transcendantale* est soustrait à toute surdétermination catégoriale, comme j'ai tenté de le faire ailleurs (cf. Fichant 1997, 2004).

8 « […] in universum substantiae simplices seu monades sensibus et imaginatione comprehendi non possunt, quia partibus carent » (Leibniz, GP 7 : 483).

9 « […] Spatium fit ordo coexistentium phaenomenorum, ut tempus successivorum; nec ulla est monadum propinquitas aut distantia spatialis vel absoluta, dicereque, esse in puncto conglobatas, aut in spatio disseminatas, est quibusdam fictionibus animi nostri uti, dum imaginari libenter vellemus, quae tantum intelligi possunt », lettre à Des Bosses du 16 juin 1712 (Leibniz, GP 2 : 450-451). De même, les monades n'ont par elles-mêmes pas de situation réelle les unes par rapport aux autres, c'est-à-dire au-delà de l'ordre des phénomènes, auquel elles se rapportent par la médiation de leur corps organique : « Monades enim per se ne situm quidem inter se habent, nempe realem, qui ultra phaenomenorum ordinem porrigatur », au même, 26 mai 1712 (Leibniz, GP 2 : 444).

10 En rappelant que la conception commune de la théorie leibnizienne de l'espace fait de celui-ci un mode confus de connaissance, Cassirer 1902, pp. 163-164 remarquait que les motifs en proviennent d'une certaine vision de la métaphysique de Leibniz. Or cette conception est en contradiction insoluble avec l'œuvre du mathématicien qu'était aussi Leibniz. Dès lors, ajoutait-il, le souci de

respecter la cohérence de la pensée de Leibniz doit conduire à une autre interprétation de sa métaphysique.

11 L'emploi de cette dénomination semble remonter au moins à Feuerlin 1725-1726.

12 Citée sans référence par Sève 2004. – Cf. aussi Alquié 1974, p. 162 note et p. 505. On pourrait trouver chez les auteurs les plus estimables bien d'autres occurrences de ce lieu commun.

13 Publié la première fois dans Hooker (éd.) 1982, pp. 3-20.

14 Wolff 1713.

15 « *Confusa*, cum scilicet non possum notas ad rem ab aliis discernendam sufficientes separatim enumerare, licet res illa tales notas atque requisita revera habeat, in quae notio ejus resolvi possit : ita colores, odores, sapores, aliaque peculiaria sensuum objecta satis clare quidem agnoscimus et a se invicem discernimus, sed simplici sensuum testimonio, non vero notis enuntiabilibus; ideo nec caeco explicare possumus, quid sit rubrum, nec aliis declarare talia possumus, nisi eos in rem praesentem ducendo » (Leibniz, A VI, 4 : 586).

16 « At distincta notio est qualem de auro habent Docimastae, per notas scilicet et examina sufficientia ad rem ab aliis omnibus corporibus similibus discernendam: tales habere solemus circa notiones pluribus sensibus communes, ut numeri, magnitudinis, figurae, item circa multos affectus animi, ut spem, metum (Ibid., 586-587).

17 Sur ce texte, voir De Buzon 1991.

18 Les mathématiques relèvent donc bien d'une « imagination distincte » : « Mathesi subesse videtur quicquid imaginationi subest, quatenus distincte concipitur » (Leibniz, GM 7 : 205). Cela vaut de la représentation de ses objets, nombres, figures, mais aussi symboles d'un calcul (Leibniz, GM 7 : 355 sur l'*analysis situs*). Mais en tant que sciences démonstratives, elles ont leur source dans l'entendement : « Il est vrai que les sciences mathématiques ne seraient point démonstratives, et consisteraient dans une simple induction ou observation, […] si quelque chose de plus haut, et que l'intelligence seule peut fournir, ne venait au secours de l'imagination et des sens » (Leibniz, GP 6 : 501).

19 « Mihi videtur omnem mentem esse omnisciam, confuse. Et quamlibet Mentem simul percipere quicquid fit in tuto mundo ; et has confusas infinitarum simul varietatum percptiones dare sensiones illas quas de coloribus, gustibus, tactibusque habemus » (Leibniz, A VI, 3 : 524).

20 « L'âme avec ses fonctions est quelque chose de distinct de la matière, mais […] cependant elle est toujours accompagnée des organes de la matière, et […] aussi les fonctions de l'âme sont toujours accompagnées des fonctions des organes, qui leur doivent répondre, et […] cela est réciproque et le sera toujours » (GP 6, 533) ; « Les corps organiques ne sont jamais sans âmes, et […] les âmes ne sont jamais séparées de tout corps organique […] Les créatures franches ou affranchies de la matière, seraient détachées en même temps de la liaison universelle, et comme des déserteurs de l'ordre général » (Leibinz, GP 6 : 545-546).

21 « Et proinde cum omne corpus organicum a toto universo determinatis ad unamquamque universi partem relationibus afficiatur, mirum non est, animam ipsam quae caetera secundum corporis sui relationes sibi repraesentat, quoddam universi speculum esse, repraesentans caetera secundum ipsum, ut sic dicam, punctum visus » (Leibniz, C : 15) ; et *Monad.*, § 62 : « Quoique chaque monade créée représente tout l'univers, elle représente plus distinctement le corps qui lui est affecté particulièrement […] : et comme ce corps exprime tout l'univers par la connexion de toute la matière dans le plein, l'âme représente aussi tout l'univers en représentant ce corps, qui lui appartient d'une manière particulière ».

22 Cette correspondance est par ailleurs naturelle et exclut tout arbitraire, comme il sera précisé ci-dessous note 24.

23 « Patet etiam, quid perceptio sit, quae omnibus formis competit, nempe expressio multorum in uno, quae longe differt ab expressione in speculo vel in organo corporeo, quod vere unum non est. Quodsi perceptio sit distinctior, sensum facit » (Leibniz, GP 7 : 317).

24 « Hinc autem fit, ut anima creata necssario plerasque perceptiones habeat confusas, congeriem quippe rerum externarum innumerabilium repraesentantes, quasdam autem propiora vel extantiora organis accommodata distincte percipiat » (Leibniz, C : 15).

25 « Les idées des qualités sensibles, comme de la couleur, de la saveur, etc. (qui en effet ne sont que des fantômes) nous viennent des sens, c'est-à-dire de nos perceptions confuses » (Leibniz, *NE*, IV, 4, § 1 ; A VI, 6 : 392).

26 Un point mérite d'être plus spécialement mentionné : c'est par les « petites perceptions » impliquées à l'infini dans toute perception notable que l'on reconnaît, contre Descartes, les cartésiens et Locke, le caractère non-arbitraire de la correspondance entre ce qui est senti et les propriétés résidant dans l'objet physique lui-même, au travers du mécanisme lui-même infini du corps organique : « Ce sont aussi les parties insensibles de nos perceptions sensibles qui font qu'il y a un rapport entre ces perceptions des couleurs, des chaleurs et autres qualités sensibles et entre les mouvements dans les corps qui y répondent, au lieu que les Cartésiens avec notre Auteur, tout pénétrant qu'il est, conçoivent les perceptions que nous avons de ces qualités comme arbitraires, c'est à dire comme si Dieu les avait données à l'âme suivant son bon plaisir sans avoir égard à aucun rapport essentiel entre ces perceptions et leur objets : sentiment qui me surprend et qui me paraît peu digne de la sagesse de l'auteur des choses qui ne fait rien sans harmonie

et sans raison » (Leibniz, *NE*, Préface ; A VI, 6 : 56. – Cf. II, 8, § 13, II, 20, § 6, IV, 3, § 28 (où Philalèthe-Locke résume la position de Leibniz !) ; A VI, 6 : resp. 131, 165-166, 390. La correspondance naturelle des sensations à ce qui est dans l'objet passe par le corps affecté à l'âme, pour autant qu'il communique avec un monde matériel divisé à l'infini : « Ce qui ne se pourrait pourtant pas s'il n'y avait partout des sous-divisions actuelles à l'infini, à fin que tout se puisse ressentir de tout autre. Et par ce moyen toute Ame ou Unité de substance, en représentant originairement son corps, est représentative de tout l'univers suivant sa portée. Ainsi il s'en faut beaucoup que les perceptions de l'âme et les mouvements du corps n'aient qu'un rapport arbitraire », lettre à Costes, 4 juillet 1706 (Leibniz, GP 3 : 383).

27 Parkinson 1981, pp. 10, 12.

28 Ce qui se ramène à ce qu'énonçait la *Lettre sur ce qui est indépendant des sens et de la matière* : « C'est pour cette raison qu'on a coutume de dire que les notions de ces qualités sont claires, car elles servent à les reconnaître ; mais que ces mêmes notions ne sont point distinctes, parce qu'on ne saurait distinguer ni développer ce qu'elles comprennent. C'est un je ne sais quoi, dont on s'aperçoit, mais dont on ne saurait rendre compte » (Leibniz, GP 6 : 500).

29 Le terme de « pensée » est pris ici dans l'acception large qui ne se limite pas aux seules connaissances intellectuelles, mais englobe aussi l'imagination et les sens, comme déjà chez Descartes.

30 « … certum [est], notiones harum qualitatum compositas esse et resolvi posse, quippe cum causas suas habeant » (Leibniz, A VI, 4 : 586).

31 Mach 1885.

32 « Cum colores aut odores percipimus, utique nullam aliam habemus quam figurarum et motuum perceptionem, sed tam multiplicium et exiguorum, ut mens nostra singulis distincte considerandis in hoc praesenti suo statu non sufficiat, et proinde non animadvertat perceptionem suam ex solis figurarum et motuum minutissimorum perceptionibus compositam esse » (Leibniz, A VI, 4: 592).

33 « Analyseos physicae arcanum in hoc uno consistit artificio, ut qualitates sensuum confusas (nempe calorem et frigus, pro tactu ; sapores, pro gustu ; odores, pro olfactu ; sonos, pro auditu ; colores, pro visu) revocemus ad distinctas quae eas comitantur, quae sunt numerus, magnitudo, figura, motus, consistentia » (Leibniz, A VI, 4: 1962-1963).

34 « Quaedam Attributorum confusorum resolutio experimentalis in alia attributa » (ibid. 2005). Cette formule est extraite d'un texte dont j'ai donné la traduction française (1993) sous le titre « Pensées sur l'instauration d'une Physique nouvelle (1679) (*Cogitata de nova physica instauranda*) » ; on y trouvera l'exposé du programme d'analyse des sensations aux pp. 16 ss.

35 Cf. Duchesneau 1993 (références dans l'Index à « analyse physique » et « qualités premières et secondes » ; Brandt Bolton 2001, pp. 139-146 ; Schulthess 2009.

36 Sur ce qu'on appellera avec lui « les limites principielles de la connaissance humaine » chez Leibniz, voir le beau livre de Gurwitsch 1974, pp. 144 ss.

37 Des organes plus déliés pourraient fournir des sensations différentes, mais sans faire disparaître la confusion intrinsèque du sensible. Dans les *Nouveaux Essais*, à Philalèthe-Locke qui observe que « si nos sens étaient assez pénétrants, les qualités sensibles, par exemple la couleur jaune de l'or, disparaîtraient, et au lieu de cela nous verrions une certaine admirable contexture des parties », Leibniz réplique : « Cependant la couleur jaune ne laisse pas d'être une réalité comme l'arc-en-ciel, et nous sommes destinés apparemment à un état bien au-dessus de l'état présent et pourrons même aller à l'infini, car il n'y a pas d'éléments dans la nature corporelle. […] Au reste, si quelques couleurs ou qualités disparaissaient à nos yeux mieux armés ou devenus plus pénétrants, il en naîtrait apparemment d'autres : et il faudrait un accroissement nouveau de notre perspicacité pour les faire disparaître aussi, ce qui pourrait aller à l'infini comme la division actuelle de la matière y va effectivement » (Leibniz, *NE*, II, 23, § 12 ; A VI, 6 : 219).

38 C'est à dessein que je suis parti de l'exemple de l'arc-en-ciel, qui est aussi celui que Kant exploite pour mettre en évidence comment on doit distinguer « dans les phénomènes ce qui relève essentiellement de leur intuition et vaut en général pour tout sens humain de ce qui ne leur convient que de façon contingente, en ce que cela n'est pas valable en rapport à la sensibilité en général, mais seulement à une situation ou organisation particulière de tel ou tel sens » (KrV, B 62). Dans le cas de l'arc-en-ciel, la vue de ses couleurs relève de ce second rapport ; son explication physique par la réfraction de la lumière dans les gouttelettes d'eau renvoie au premier. Il est donc permis de formuler cette différence comme celle de l'apparence et d'une chose en elle-même, à condition d'interpréter cette dernière « physiquement » et non comme un objet transcendantal. Car les gouttes d'eau avec leur figure arrondie et l'espace même où elles tombent sont de « simples phénomènes » ou des « modifications de notre intuition sensible » (KrV, B 63). Mais Leibniz ne dit pas autre chose à sa manière : les dispositions de grandeur, figure, mouvement qui expliquent les qualités sensibles à partir de notions distinctes communes à plusieurs sens ne révèlent pas un arrière-monde de monades, mais la mise en forme des phénomènes.

39 Schulthess 2001, p. 365.

40 On ne pourrait donc parler ici de « monde intelligible » que dans un sens que Kant désigne comme celui que l'on rencontre « dans les écrits des modernes » (KrV, B 312), et qu'il juge inapproprié : on entendrait par là, par opposition aux données de l'observation (par exemple en astronomie), la « connexion des phénomènes d'après des lois universelles de l'entendement » (le

système copernicien du monde et son explication par la loi newtonienne de la gravitation). Ce prétendu monde intelligible ne l'est pas au sens propre, comme s'il était donné au seul entendement et non aux sens. En fait ces lois qui rendent intelligibles les phénomènes relèvent de « l'usage empirique de l'entendement », et non d'un usage transcendantal qui s'appliquerait au noumène. Mais si l'on admet que les monades seraient des noumènes, Leibniz ne dit pas autre chose relativement à l'explication intelligible des données sensibles : elle ne vise elle-même que l'expérience des phénomènes.

41 L'expression figure dans les *Premiers principes métaphysiques de la science de la nature*, Deuxième remarque à la fin de la Dynamique, MAN, AA 4: 508.

42 L'œuvre de Wolff est encore mal connue en France, souvent caricaturée et taxée de dogmatisme par l'emprise persistante d'un kantisme délavé à usage scolaire. On se plaît d'autant plus à saluer l'apport de J. École à l'édition des *Gesammelte Schriften*, et son recueil d'études : cf. École 1985, ainsi que les développements précis qu'on trouve dans le livre de Puech 1990, et la contribution récente de Paccioni 2006.

43 Dans la Préface de la première édition, Wolff relate l'effet que fit sur lui la découverte de cet article : « Je dois reconnaître qu'alors qu'au début de ma réflexion sur les forces de l'entendement, je ne pouvais pas me satisfaire sur bien des questions et qu'en quelques passages j'étais tombé sans nécessité dans des détours, les pensées pénétrantes de M. de Leibniz sur la connaissance de la vérité et les notions dans les Actes de Leipzig de l'année 1684, p. 573, m'ont apporté de façon inespérée une grande lumière, de sorte que je m'étonne de ce que d'autres, qui par la suite ont osé écrire sur la même matière, n'y ont pas prêté attention » (Wolff, DL, p. 109).

44 Cf. Paccioni 2006, p. 76 sq.

45 « Lorsque la notion que nous avons suffit à reconnaître de nouveau les choses quand elles se présentent, comme lorsque nous savons que c'est justement cette chose sous tel ou tel nom, que nous avons vue en tel ou tel lieu, la notion est alors claire » (chap. 1, § 9, éd. cit., p.126) ; « Si notre notion est claire, soit nous sommes en mesure d'énumérer à quelqu'un d'autre les marques par lesquelles nous connaissons une chose, ou du moins de nous les représenter à nous-même en particulier les unes après les autres, — soit nous nous trouvons dans l'incapacité de le faire. Dans le premier cas la notion claire est distincte, mais dans le second elle est indistincte » (§ 13, p. 128).

46 Les deux traités ont été édités par École 1968 et 1994.

47 Sur le statut de la psychologie dans l'œuvre de Wolff, voir Paccioni 2006, chap. VII, p. 159 sq.

48 La Psychologie rationnelle ne peut venir qu'*après* la Psychologie empirique, dont elle accueille les données. La formule fameuse de Kant, dans la critique du « paralogisme de la Psychologie rationnelle », selon laquelle « *Je pense* est le texte unique de la Psychologie rationnelle, à partir duquel elle doit exploiter toute sa science » (KrV, B 401), tombe complètement à côté de Wolff. Selon lui, on dirait plutôt que la Psychologie empirique fournit tout le texte dont la Psychologie rationnelle extrait l'interprétation qui l'intègre au système de la métaphysique.

49 Éditée par École 2001.

50 « Il faut qu'il y ait des substances simples, puisqu'il y a des composés ; car le composé n'est autre chose qu'un amas ou agregatum des simples » (Leibniz, *Monad.* § 2).

51 Traduction dont il est désormais bien établi qu'elle est de Wolff lui-même. Cf. Lamarra, Palaia, Pimpinella 2001. Lamarra observe que « Wolff a cherché à favoriser une lecture de la *Monadologie* filtrée à travers sa propre métaphysique » (p. 95).

52 Wolff 1720.

53 Wolff interprète l'harmonie préétablie entre l'âme et le corps selon une grille que lui fournit une classification des positions philosophiques fondamentales : la première division sépare les sceptiques, qui nient tout savoir certain des choses, des dogmatiques, qui en reconnaissent la possibilité et la légitimité. Les dogmatiques sont ou bien monistes, qui ne reconnaissent qu'une seule sorte d'êtres, ou dualistes, qui en admettent deux. Les monistes sont ou idéalistes, ou matérialistes. Les premiers « n'admettent que des esprits ou des êtres qui ne consistent pas en matière, et dont relèvent ceux qui sont appelés par nous êtres simples, telles les unités leibniziennes ; mais ils tiennent le monde et les corps qui s'y trouvent pour de simples représentations des choses simples, et ne les considèrent pas autrement que comme un rêve réglé » (Wolff, DM, *Vorrede zu der andern Auflage*, non paginé). Autrement dit, selon les termes de la *Psychologia rationalis* : « Sont idéalistes ceux qui n'admettent qu'une existence idéale des corps dans nos âmes et qui par conséquent nient l'existence réelle du monde et des corps » (Wolff, PR, § 36). Les matérialistes au contraire ne reconnaissent que des corps et considèrent l'âme ou l'esprit comme une sorte de force physique, et non pour un être subsistant. Enfin les dualistes admettent l'existence sur le même plan de substances matérielles et de substances immatérielles, et ils peuvent à la fois soutenir l'existence réelle des corps en dehors des idées, et l'immatérialité de l'âme (Wolff, PR, § 39). — Wolff interprète Leibniz comme un métaphysicien dualiste, parce que, selon lui, l'interprétation correcte d'une harmonie préétablie réelle et non apparente suppose de donner raison à la fois à la thèse idéaliste et à l'antithèse matérialiste. Les matérialistes n'ont pas besoin de l'harmonie préétablie puisqu'ils tiennent les idées, les représentations, les états mentaux pour des propriétés des corps eux-mêmes. Les idéalistes ont besoin d'une harmonie préétablie, mais apparente seulement, pour rendre compte de la manière dont l'esprit perçoit des corps comme en dehors de lui. Mais l'harmonie préétablie *réelle* exige que les corps perçus par l'esprit existent effectivement comme tels en-dehors de lui, tout en excluant une influence physique entre deux ordres de réalités qui se

correspondent exactement. Sur la torsion ainsi imposée aux thèses monadologiques, et dont les marques se retrouvent jusque dans la traduction latine de la *Monadologie* par Wolff, cf. Lamarra, Palaia, Pimpinella 2001, pp. 104 ss.

54 La position de Leibniz, comme on sait, est marquée par ce que l'on a pu appeler une « disjonction » : ou bien, les corps en général ne sont pas du tout des substances, mais de purs phénomènes « comme l'arc-en-ciel », – ou bien il y a des substances corporelles qui sont constituées par une substance simple (monade) et le corps organique qui lui est uni : seuls relèvent de ce régime de substantialité les corps organiques, pour autant qu'ils déterminent le « point de vue » d'une substance simple. Mais l'analyse des sensations et du sensible chez Leibniz se déroule sur un plan physique où ce problème métaphysique peut être laissé en suspens.

55 Éditée par École 1964. On consultera l'excellente présentation d'ensemble donnée par le même École 1985.

56 Dès la Préface de la *Cosmologia*, Wolff a souligné qu'il n'avait pas à s'intéresser à la différence spécifique des éléments relativement à d'autres substances simples relevant du même genre, car cette question est étrangère à la physique : « C'est pourquoi je laisse à Leibniz sa thèse sur les monades […] Il m'est en effet indifférent que l'on fasse grand cas des monades leibniziennes, ou qu'on les condamne et rejette » (p. 14*, cf. § 243 note).

57 Cf. le texte cité supra note 32 (Leibniz, *NE*, II, 23, § 12 ; A VI, 6 : 219). Comme le note École, c'est ce qui « permet à Wolff d'échapper au panpsychisme leibnizien » (cit., p. 39). C'est entre autres l'un des arguments qui permet à Wolff de se fixer une ambition tout autre que de simplement mettre en systèmes les conceptions dispersées de Leibniz (Wolff, Ont, § 760).

58 On remarquera seulement que la cosmologie générale justifie l'explication des phénomènes observables par ce qui se passe au niveau des seuls corpuscules dérivés, sans avoir à remonter jusqu'aux corpuscules primitifs ni, a fortiori, aux éléments : tel est le principe de la « philosophie corpusculaire », « aujourd'hui partout reconnue, à tel point qu'on ne trouve pas de physicien de quelques autorité qui n'y souscrive » (Wolff, CG, § 230 note). De là aussi l'indifférence de la cosmologie à l'égard de la question de savoir comment les éléments se spécifient par rapport à d'autres substances simples, telles que seraient des « unités leibniziennes » ou monades (Wolff, CG, § 182).

59 « *Similia* sunt, in quibus ea eadem sunt, par quae a se invicem discerni debebant : ut adeo *similitudo* sit identitas eorum, per quae entia a se invicem discerni debebant ».

60 Dans la note au § 226 de la *Cosmologia*, Wolff insiste particulièrement sur le fait que la signification qu'il donne au mot « phénomène » n'est en rien celle des idéalistes, qui « appellent phénomène ce qui apparaît seulement exister, mais n'a pas vraiment de réalité en dehors de l'esprit ». Dire de la couleur qu'elle est un phénomène, c'est dire seulement que l'esprit ne distingue pas les innombrables réflexions et réfractions de la lumière sur les molécules constituant la surface des corps, toutes choses qui existent bien en dehors (Wolff, CG, § 224 note).

61 *Metaphysicae cum geometria iunctae usus in philosophia naturali, cuius specimen I. continet monadologiam physicam* (MoPh, AA 01: 473-487).

62 On reconnaît la définition déjà citée de Wolff au § 225 de la *Cosmologia generalis.*

63 Remarque 2 à la suite du Théorème 4 de la Dynamique dans les *Premiers principes métaphysiques de la science de la nature* (1786).

64 Le titre complet du texte généralement cité comme « Réponse à Eberhard » est : *Sur une découverte d'après laquelle toute nouvelle Critique de la raison pure doit être rendue superflue par une plus ancienne* (ÜE, AA 8: 185-252).

65 D'où l'on peut aussi rendre à Leibniz une interprétation plus correcte, du moins en termes kantiens, du statut de l'espace : « C'est pourquoi l'opinion de Leibniz, autant que je la comprenne, n'était pas de définir l'espace par l'ordre d'êtres simples juxtaposés, mais de les poser à côté de lui comme lui correspondant, mais en appartenant à un monde simplement intelligible (inconnu pour nous). Il n'affirmait rien d'autre que ce qui a été montré ailleurs, à savoir que l'espace avec la matière dont il est la forme, ne contient pas le monde des choses en elles-mêmes, mais seulement son phénomène (son apparition) et n'est que la forme de notre intuition sensible externe » (MAN, AA 04: 508).

66 C'est là ce que Leibniz désigne comme « des vérités primitives de fait, [qui] sont les expériences immédiates internes d'une immédiation de sentiment » (*NE*, IV, 2, § 1 ; A VI, 6, 367). Cf. déjà la lettre à Simon Foucher de 1675 (A II, 1, 388, 390) ; *Animadversiones in Partem Generalem Principiorum Cartesii*, I, ad 7 (GP 4, 357) ; GP 4, 327 ; *De modo distinguendi phaenomena realia ab imaginariis* (A VI, 4, 1500) ; et aussi A VI, 4, 124, 1395.

67 Formule qui confirme, s'il en était besoin, le non-sens du prétendu « intelligible confus ».

68 Selon la formule utilisée dans la lettre à Hansch du 4 juin 1710 : « Deus omnia simul adaequate videt ; in nobis paucissima distincte noscuntur, caetera confusa velut in chao perceptionum nostrarum latent », *Opera omnia, studio Ludovici Dutens*, II, 1, Genève, 1768 [Repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1989], p. 223.

69 Thèse entièrement maintenue dans la doctrine monadologique finale : « Chaque monade, dont la nature étant représentative, rien ne la saurait borner à ne représenter qu'une partie des choses, quoiqu'il soit vrai que cette représentation n'est que confuse dans le détail de tout l'univers, et ne peut être distincte que dans une petite partie des choses, c'est-à-dire dans celles qui sont ou les plus prochaines, ou les plus grandes par rapport à chacune des monades ; autrement chaque monade serait une Divinité. Ce n'est pas

dans l'objet, mais dans la modification de la connaissance de l'objet, que les monades sont bornées. Elles vont toutes confusément à l'infini, au tout ; mais elles sont limitées et distinguées par les degrés des perceptions distinctes » *Monad.* § 60.

70 « Double infinité chez Pascal et Monade », titre donné par Grua 1948, p. 555 à ce morceau. Sur ce texte, avec un essai de reconstitution plus exacte du manuscrit très imparfaitement édité par Grua, voir de Buzon 2010.

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Kant's reevaluation of monadology:
A HISTORICAL - PHILOSOPHICAL PUZZLE

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Introduction

In the *Critique of pure reason* (1781), as is well known, Kant offers a schematic presentation of Leibniz's philosophy, interpreted as a paradigmatic case of conceptual "*amphiboly",* where the fundamental distinction between the conditions of sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge is missed: accordingly, Leibniz's mistake would consist in handling phenomena, i.e. the objects of sense, as if they were 'things in themselves', modeled on pure intellectual cognition. Among other theses, the monadological view would directly arise from this mistake: more precisely, from the idea that simple beings would be prior to composite ones, and their intrinsic properties would be basic with respect to their external, i.e. spatial, relations (KrV A 260/B 316).

This devastating attack to Leibnizian philosophy appears without any change also in the second edition of the *Critique* (1787), and since then it has shaped the standard reading of Kant's critical reception of Leibniz's philosophy. Still, between these two dates, one can find a quite different evaluation of Leibniz's stance, in Kant's work devoted to the critical foundation of physical science, the *Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science*.

In fact, in *Remark* 2 to *Proposition* 4 Kant approaches Leibniz's view to his own, which is presented, in its turn, as the correct interpretation of the monadological insight of his eminent predecessor, against the common reading of the so-called Leibnizian-Wolffian school (MAN, AA 4: 505-508, trans. pp. 217-219).

This attempt at sharply distinguishing the 'true' Leibniz from his followers is taken again

by Kant four years later, in his polemic with one of these Leibnizean epigones, Eberhard: thus, in *On a discovery*, Kant goes as far as to state that his own 'critique' is the true 'apology' of Leibniz (ÜE, AA 8: 248-249, transl. p. 334).[1]

In the case of the last discussion, of course, the rhetoric or strategic attitude adopted is likely to play a major role in determining Kant's assessment, with his rather strained assimilation of Leibniz's stance. Such motivations, while not to be excluded, should not be as decisive in explaining the sense of the first reference in the MAN, in a doctrinal, not polemical context. As a matter of fact, Kant's true motivations, and the global sense of his reassessment of Leibniz's stance, raise several questions.[2]

In what follows I shall reconstruct, first of all, the general argumentative line of Kant's *Remark*; in so doing, I shall limit myself to evoke in a very schematic manner the underlying historical-philosophical scenario. In the second part, I shall focus especially on the questions raised by Kant's reevaluation of Leibniz and try to give a coherent account of it.

1. A complex Remark

Between mathematics and metaphysics: infinite divisibility in the MAN and behind

Proposition 4 of Kant's *Dynamics* in the MAN proves the infinite divisibility of matter: a debated issue at the boundaries between mathematics, physics and metaphysics. Whereas the mathematicians assumed the infinite divisibility of geometrical extension and space, the application of this property to physical extended things was intensively disputed; in particular, metaphysicians in the Leibnizian tradition usually emphasized the need of relying on some simple, indivisible elements in order to ground the reality of bodies.

In the Wolffian version of Leibnizianism monads were introduced exactly with this aim; accordingly, monadology received a decidedly physical interpretation: Wolff, indeed, left explicitly aside Leibniz's originary characterization of monads through mental predicates, by substituting their representative activity through purely physical forces.

One of Kant's earlier works, the *Physical Monadology* (1756) turned out to be firmly rooted, already by its title, in this tradition.[3] Kant, however, in that work tried to reconcile monadology with the contrasting data and claims of mathematical knoweledge: a task the more urgent, as the monadological account, so far prevailing in German philosophy, was then under strong pressure due to the success of Newtonian science. Thus, few years before an essay contest of the Berlin Academy had given occasion to a large debate on the topic; the prize had been won by a pamphlet which totally disqualified the monadological view.[4] Leonhard Euler, one of the most important mathematicians of the century and also one of the inspiring figures of this attack, in several writings argued vigorously on behalf of the reasons of mathematics against the 'sophistic arguments' of metaphysicians.[5] According to Euler, Newtonian space has

an objective reality insofar as it is presupposed by the laws of mechanics, and its properties – infinite divisibility included – are necessarily shared by things in space, or bodies. Hence, monadology has to be simply given up.

Faced with this clash of theories, the young Kant in 1756 looked for a middle way, by pursuing the difficult task of reconciling Newtonian and Wolffian claims. In order to preserve his physical monads from infinite divisibility, he claimed that they fill space only through their dynamical activity: accordingly, the expansion of their activity sphere would not imply a divisibility of their substance.

Bearing this background in mind, it is evident how *Proposition* 4 of the MAN does represent, first of all, a disawoval of Kant's own pre-critical solution. The main point of the theorem, in fact, is to show that the divisibility of space *does* imply that of material bodies and of their 'substance', so that the way out suggested by the *Physical Monadology* is entirely blocked and the simplicity of its alleged 'elements' is dissolved.

One might think that this result had been already firmly acquired by Kant since his final abandonment of the Leibnizian (relational) theory of space and its substitution with the view of space as a subjective form of sensible intuition, hence at least since the *Dissertation* of 1770 and, obviously, the *Transcendental Esthetics* of the first *Critique*. This, however, would miss another key point of Kant's move in the MAN. In a first *Remark*, in fact, he stresses that proving the infinite divisibility of space – the bedrock of mathematical argument – does *not* immediately entail that of material substance, by itself and without further argument. Material substance, indeed, does not fill space simply through its existence/presence, but through its dynamic activity. Accordingly, dynamical considerations are fundamental, in the MAN like in the *Physical Monadology*. Only, now the reality of force is no longer contrasted by Kant to the phenomenal nature of space, but is entirely shifted to the phenomenal level. Notice that the proof of *Proposition* 4 is independent of the results of transcendental idealism; it defeats the thesis of the earlier physical monadology by remaining fundamentally on the same ground.

This point – I mean, the impossibility of extending immediately the mathematical properties of space to matter - is taken again at the beginning of our *Remark* 2, where Kant warns:

> To be sure, mathematics in its internal use can be entirely indifferent with regard to the chicanery of a misguided metaphysics, and can persist in the secure possession of its evident claims as to the infinite divisibility of space, whatever objections may be put in its way by a sophistry splitting hairs on mere concepts. However, in the application of its propositions governing space to the substance that fills it, mathematics must nonetheless accede to an examination in accordance with mere concepts, and thus to metaphysics. The above Proposition is already a proof of this. *For it does not necessarily follow that matter is physically divisible to infinity, even if it is so from a mathematical point of view … For so far it cannot be proved that in each of the possible parts of this filled space there is also substance*… Thus something without which this proof could not find secure application to natural science was until now still missing in the mathematical proof, and this deficiency is remedied in the above Proposition (MAN, AA 4: 505-506).[6]

In this way, Kant marks its distance not only from his earlier monadological stance, but also from Euler's typical move of immediately applying the properties of Newtonian space to

the actual material bodies.

Once clarified this point – hence having established where mathematics needs to be integrated by philosophical arguments ("metaphysical", but in the sense of his critical metaphysics), in order to project infinite divisibility into material things (or phenomena) – Kant can well pass to the proper point to be made in *Remark* 2, that is to say to the defense of infinite divisibility against some further unjustified objections possibly coming from (old) metaphysics:

> Now, however, when it comes to the remaining metaphysical attacks on what will henceforth be the *physical* Proposition of the infinite divisibility of matter, the mathematician must leave them entirely to the philosopher, who in any case ventures, by means of these objections, into a labyrinth, from which it becomes difficult for him to extricate himself, even in those questions immediately pertaining to him […] (MAN, AA 4: 506).[7]

The usage of the terminology of 'labyrinth' contains a clear reference to a way of charcterizing the problems of the continuum, whose popularity went back chiefly to Leibniz himself.[8]

What are the possible philosophical objections Kant has in mind? As he goes on to illustrate, the infinite divisibility of a given physical whole – to which one is committed, as a result of *Proposition* 4, if one accepts the infinite divisibility of space - would entail the possibility of achieving an infinite totality: a task, however, which is held to be contradictory. The premise of the inference is that, if a whole is given, also all of its parts must be given. Kant observes that this assumption certainy holds for 'things in themselves', and only for them. As a result, the philosopher, in order to avoid the *reductio ad absurdum*, is faced with a dilemma: (a) either giving up the infinite divisibility of space, or (b) admitting that material beings are not things in themselves.

The move of giving up the infinite divisibility of space, however, is blocked by the unshakable force of mathematical proof. Therefore, only option (b) – unpalatable as it may be for common sense – can allow an escape from the difficulty: if material things were not be taken as things in themselves, but as mere phenomena for our sense experience, then their division could (and need not) to be held as completed, but as an indefinitely potential one, where parts are given only in the progress of division itself.

It is worth noting that the impossibility of admitting infinite divisibility is not argued for in the same way as in the thesis of the Second antinomy, but by relying directly on the properly critical view concerning the difficulty of conceving the totality of an infinite regression. Alternative (b), for its own part, clearly echoes the transcendental solution to the Second antinomy. So far, so good. It is only then, in the third step of this complex reflection, that the explicit consideration of monadology comes to the fore, with the qualified reference to Leibniz and the distinction drawn between a good and a bad way of taking 'monadology'.

Who is the 'great man'? A hypothesis

In the passage from the MAN, the exposition of the transcendental solution is followed without interruption by an intriguing historical reference:

> A great man, who has contributed perhaps more than anyone else to preserving the reputation of mathematics in Germany, has frequently rejected the presumptuous metaphysical claims to overturn the theorems of geometry concerning the infinite divisibility of space by the well-founded reminder that space belongs only to the appearance of outer things. But he has not been understood (MAN, AA 4: 507).[9]

This figure of eminent mathematician would have anticipated the way out of labyrinth presented by Kant in the preceding lines, and consisting in distinguishing the level of things in themselves from that of phenomena.

Some reflection is in order about the identity of this 'great man'. Although many identifications have been proposed, the most credited among interpeters is with Leibniz himself – most of all, given that in the rest of our text his thought is presented as being in tune with the correct intuition attributed to the 'great man'. Still, the structure and wording of text does not give a fully convincing evidence. Another candidate, however, who at first sight might correspond at best to the qualification of a man who 'preserves the reputation of mathematics in Germany', that is Euler, can hardly harmonize with the stance ascribed to this figure. Admittedly, Euler had championed more than anyone else the mathematical view of space against philosophical challenges based on the problems of continuum; but he was far from endorsing, to this aim, the phenomenal nature of space. On the contrary – while being actually puzzled by the ontological status of space – he repeatedly defended, especially in his most popular writings on the topic, its objective reality, required and confirmed by the unshakable necessity of mathematical evidence and the success of mathematical physics. Thus his position could hardly be presented in this way.

What about Wolff? The fact that he could hardly be considered a great mathematician is not a decisive objection, insofar as Kant's expression is more nuanced: even if not a great mathematician, Wolff might well be considered as a person who had contributed to German mathematical culture. From the point of view of the position which is attributed to him, however, the identification turns out being problematic, for quite opposite grounds as in the case of Euler.

Differently from Euler, in fact, he actually maintained that space has a phenomenal status; but his aim was clearly that of defending the metaphysical view of corporeal substance against the implications of mathematical claims, and not conversely. Briefly, it would be quite implausible, and directly opposed to Kant's clear intention, to credit him with the "correct" sense of phenomenism that Kant has in mind.

A more promising candidate could be a mathematician of Kant's time, Abraham Gotthelf Kästner (1719-1800). While not a 'great mathematician' like Euler, he also could well deserve, even better than Wolff and others, the title of a person who "preserves the reptutation

of mathematics in Germany", through his activity as an author of successful textbooks and his work in the history of mathematics and in several fields of scientific-mathematical inquiry. As is well known, Kästner is cited as an influential source in these fields in several of Kant's works, of both the precritical and critical period. Moreover, Kästner was involved in defending Leibniz's heritage; in this role, he will be also involved in the anti-Kantian enterprise of Eberhard's *Philosophisches Magazin*.[10] But even in this context, his confrontation with Kant will remain moderate and constructive. In a way, Kästner could well figure as an ideal connecting figure in at attempt of a closer dialogue with the Leibnizian tradition.

Could we find in Kästner the interventions Kant seems to refer to (he speaks about frequently rejected attacks to mathematical knowledge)? To my knowledge, the German mathematician refers to the mathematical-philosophical discussions about the continuum at least in two of his most popular works, the *Anfangsgründe der Arithmetik, Geometrie etc.* and the *Anfangsgründe der Analyse des Unendlichen*:

> *It is not necessary, to be involved in the metaphysical inquiries about space and continuity. The concept of geometrical extension is an abstract concept, which remais perfectly sound, independently of how one wants to thinks about those issues.* One has to accept a continous filling of space, provided one ignores the particular structure of the things which fill this space. Conversely, however, nobody is warranted in shaping metaphysical concepts according to the geometrical ones, or in applying the infinite divisibility to physical extension, only because it belongs to the geometrical one (Kästner 1758, *Die Geometrie*, *Erklärungen*, 3, p. 177).[11]

> That geometry should draw infinity from the natural science, this is so wrong, that on the contrary people tried to put infinity into nature by way of reasoning, drawing it from geometry. I have already said what I think about these reasonings. The ancient philosophers already got involved in aporias by those inferences, so that Fromond gave the title of 'Labyrinth' to a book where he collected many of these thoughts. Biancani warned … that the inquiry concerning indivisible beings and their presence in nature must be carried out according to different principles than those of geometry: *a warning, that several adversaries of monads should have read, before publishing mistaken inferences as if they were geometric proofs* […] (Kästner 1761, pp. XII-XIII).

The opening lines of these quotations can well match with Kant's *Remark*: in particular, the literal wording of the first is echoed in Kant's passage. Still, although as a mathematician Kästner is interested in preserving the basic concepts of geometry from dialectical attacks, his main concern, especially in the second quotation, seems directed against the extension of mathematical conclusions to the physical or matephysical field, rather than conversely.

As much ambiguous is another occurrence, even more interesting for our concern, insofar as it appears in Kästner's *Preface* to the Raspe edition of Leibniz's work:

> *That the real universe is quite different from how it appears, is a truth one can no longer doubt since Descartes … Leibniz's metaphysics always appeared to me to be grounded on this principle.* Those who blame it for some allegedly impenetrable obscurity … claim that the way by which Mr. Leibniz conceived the origin of extension is unexplicable. They argue through some geometrical proofs for the absurdity of considering the body as a sum of points. *How can one charge with this absurdity the man, to whom continental Europe owes the calculus? … Leibniz did not want to build up the body from his simple beings; only he wanted to give an accont of the phenomenon of extension by saying that*

> *we represent confusedly to ourselves a big number of non-extended beings.* The telescope shows us some clusters of stars, where only some spots of light appear to the naked eye. This spot is not made up of stars like a whole is made up of its parts: it is an appearance, which offers itself to eyes that are too weak to be able of distinguishing the stars. These are Leibniz's elements. Is it not true, that those who have criticized them by geometrical reasonings, which Leibniz doubtless was able to make as well as they are, simply lost their efforts?[12]

Notice that, if the *Preface* is a somehow short and hurried text, we possess a parallel text by the same Kästner, where the same considerations are exposed for a bit more at lenght: his eulogy of Leibniz, published in 1769.[13] In both texts, Kästner is clear in attributing to Leibniz a view of extension as a phenomenon. Moreover, he emphasizes the need of distinguishing this phenomenal extension from the physical (or metaphysical) grounding reality composed of simple beings, that is to say of Leibnizian monads. As we shall see, this line of thought harmonizes with the favourable interpretation Kant wishes to give of Leibniz in our *Remark* of the MAN. At the same time, Kästner's reading of Leibniz seems firmly committed to the view of sensible knowledge of phenomena as a form of confused knowledge – a view targeted by Kant. It is important to note, however, that this view is distinguished by Kästner from any idea of a part-whole relationship between the 'confused' appearance and the postulated simple beings.

In any event, also in this case the possible reference to Kästner is not devoid of problems. All this prevents us from a sure identification; still, I find possible, and even probable, that Kästner be the figure Kant is referring to.

Anyway: if one prefers to stay with the prevailing identification with Leibniz – what I do not wish to categorically exclude [14] - one should feel at least as much as strange as in the case of the Leibnizian Kästner, to attribute to Leibniz himself – the undiscussed inspirer of all later 'monadists' – the aim of introducing his own theory in order to defend mathematical knowledge against metaphysical claims; especially if one considers that every scholar in Kant's time knew his vigourous criticism against the adequacy of "mathematical philosophy" in his discussion with Clarke. True enough, in the course of our inquiry we shall find some possible Leibnizian occurrences which might justify Kant's presentation.

Phenomenon: an equivocal term

Whoever the 'great man' might be, his correct intuition was focused on the attibution to space of a phenomenal status. But this idea, according to Kant, could be, and had been historically understood in two different ways: a misleading one, which had been so far the common one, endorsed by 'monadists', and the correct one (and Kantian), attributed also to the 'great man' himself :

> [a] This proposition was taken to be asserting that space appears to us, though it is otherwise a thing, or relation of things, but that the mathematician considers it only as it appears. [b] Instead, it should been have understood as saying that space is in no way a property that attaches in itself to anything at all outside our senses. It is, rather, only the subjective form of our sensibility (MAN, AA 4: 507).[15]

As a consequence of assumption [a],

> Because of this misunderstanding people went on thinking of space as a property also attaching to things outside our faculty of representation, but such that the mathematician thinks of it only in accordance with common concepts, that is, *confusedly* (for it is thus that one commonly explicates appearance). Accordingly, the thesis of infinite divisibility – a property demonstrated with mathematical evidence, starting from distinct notions – has been attributed to allegedly 'confused' concepts (MAN, AA 4: 507).[16]

In this way, the mistaken ontological evalutation of space and of its 'phenomenal' nature turns out to be tightly bound to the fundamental error of the Leibnizian-Woffian school in the field of the theory of knoweldge, already denounced as a crucial element in the amphiboly mistake: that is to say, the view of sense knowledge as a kind of 'confused' version of the intellectual one, instead of as the product of a wholly different source.

The battle of interpretations, therefore, concerns the way of understanding the 'phenomenality' of space. Kant is eager to clarify a crucial point: the 'monadists' invoked phenomenality, on which also his own solution relied – but evidently, in a quite different sense.

Kant's words ("is thus that one *commonly* explicates appearance") seem to echo a precision Wolff had been eager to make, when qualifying extended things as 'phenomena'. In his *Cosmologia generalis*, he explained that he used 'phenomenon' in the 'common' sense of what is an object of sense perception, *that is to say* is perceived confusedly. And this – Wolff continued – in order to accurately distinguish this technical, metaphysically neutral sense of 'phenomenon', from the view of post-Cartesian idealism, challenging the reality of extended things:

> We have put this proposition in order to show in which sense one could, and even should admit that extension and continuity are phenomena, and to avoid the suspicion of idealism; given that idealists take 'phenomenon' in a quite different sense, as that which only seems to exist, while not having any reality outside our mind. And idealists make this mistake … because they do not explain this term in a distinct way, or they give it a meaning which is far from the commonly received one (Wolff, CG, § 226).[17]

Interestingly enough, Wolff observes that precisely those who ignore the 'phenomenal' (in his "correct" sense) character of extension, promoting it to the status of substance (Cartesians are clearly meant), expose themselves to the victorious challenge of idealism, because of the difficulties of thinking of the composition of continuum.

Monadology: good and bad

The final step of *Remark* 2 leads back view (a) to a bad interpretation of Leibnizian monadology, while reading Leibniz's original intuition, instead, in sense (b):

> The ground for this aberration lies in a poorly understood monadology, [a theory] which has nothing at all to do with the explanation of natural appearances, but is rather an intrinsically correct Platonic concept of the world, devised by Leibniz, insofar as it is considered, not at all as object of

> the senses, but as thing in itself, and is merely an object of the understanding, which, however, does indeed underlie the appearances of the senses (MAN, AA 4: 507).[18]

The concept of an intelligible world in Plato's style, sharply distinguished from the sensible one, was a leading idea for Kant; it had been positively used by him in the 1770 *Dissertation*, and now is used to interpret Leibniz's world of monads.[19] Emphasis is laid, above all, on the neat division of the two plans: monads on one hand and phenomena on the other. Leibniz would have essentially endorsed this distinction, and the related irreducibility of space to the underlying metaphysical framework of simple substances.

According to Kant, in fact, the order of coexistence of Leibnizian monads would not represent the true nature of space, but only an intelligible order somehow corresponding (in no better specified way), at the monadic level, to the spatial framework for phenomena. In this way, the illusory escape of monadists rejected in the note to the *Second Antinomy* – I mean, their reliance on the alleged ontological priority of simple substances over space, within the framework of a relational theory[20] – is prevented. And this, despite the fact that in the *Amphiboly* Kant had attributed to Leibniz exactly such a view.

> Therefore, Leibniz's idea, so far as I comprehend it, was not to explicate space trhough the order of simple beings next to one another, but was rather to set this order alongside space as corresponding to it, but as belonging to a merely intelligible world (unknown to us) (MAN, AA4: 508).[21]

Moreover, Leibniz would have interpreted the distinction in the sense of two ways of thinking of a world, hence taking the phenomenal nature of space in sense [b] above. Thus, ultimately, he would have anticipitated Kant's own solution, pointing to the role of space as a subjective form of our experience:

> Thus he asserts nothing but what has been shown elsewhere: namely, that space, together with the matter of which is the form, does not contain the world of things in themselves, but only their appearance, and is itself only the form of our outer sensible intuition (MAN, AA 4: 508).[22]

It is worth comparing our *Remark* with the later characterization of Leibniz's monadology in the final pages of Kant's polemical essay against Eberhard. This conclusion of *On a discovery* is the text where the 'Kantian' image of Leibniz is most emphasized – this time, certainly, also for tactical and polemical grounds:

> *It is really believable that Leibniz, the great mathematician, held that bodies are composed of monads (and hence space composed of simple parts)?* He did not mean the physical world, but its substrate, the intelligible world, which is unknown to us. This lies merely in the Idea of reason, and in it we must certainly represent to ourselves everything we think as a composite substance as composed of simple substances … He infers nothing from this, however, concerning sensible beings. He wishes these latters to be considered as relative to a special mode of intuition, of which we are only capable in regard to knowledge which is possible for us […] (ÜE, AA 8: 248).[23]

It is easy to see, how all motives we have found in the MAN are taken again: the

opposition of the 'great mathematician' Leibniz to the nonsense of physical monadology (by the way, a rhetorical turn of phrase which strongly echoes that of Kästner in his *Preface*); his alleged endorsement of a Platonic view, where an intelligible framework is accurately distinguished from the sensible one; the validity of the monadological inference at the level of things in themselves, and the causal-explanatory gap between the two levels; finally, the reference of the distinction to our cognitive faculties.

The attribution of such a view to Leibniz, however, cannot help to appear strained: even if one could grant him the distinction, and the phenomenal character of bodies in space, it looks difficult to deny the foundational and explicative value he claimed for his monads with respect to the related phenomena. Apparently, the expressive connection, or the "well-foundedness" of phnomena, is Leibniz's central insight which gets lost in Kant's reading. Nor seems the ideality of space stated by Leibniz in the Clarke correspondence to be the same as that which is proper of Kantian subjective space.

How could this 'charitable' (and annexing) reading of Leibniz seem plausible to Kant, or could be made plausible by him? First of all: why was he interested in putting forward this interpretation, and in detaching Leibniz from his commonly received image?

2. Reshaping Leibniz's Portrait

Behind physical monadology: Monads versus Atoms

First of all, we can wonder about what could in principle attract Kant's attention on the discrepancy between Leibniz's original doctrine and his allegedly authorized heirs. A first clue was offered by Wolff's admission of his distancing from the master with his physical interpretation of monadology, at the expense of Leibniz's characterization of monads as representative centres.[24]

Now, the *Remark* to the Thesis of the *Second Antinomy* in the *Critique of pure reason* shows that Kant was well aware of this orignary deviation of Wolff and was eager to distinguish the consequent standard usage of monads made by contemporary 'monadists' within the cosmological field (a usage for which he would prefer the label of 'atomism') from the proper (Leibnizian) sense of 'monad', which should be rooted, instead, wholly on the ground of 'apperception' (i.e., self-knowledge), hence of the philosophy of mind.[25] Here and only here, and not in the problem of the composition of matter, one can find, according to Kant, the bedrock intuition – admittedly illusory – lying behind the philosophical quest for simplicity.[26]

Interestingly enough, if we come back to the text of the *Amphiboly* bearing all this in mind, we realize that Kant also there was careful in presenting the core of the monadological view according to the original Leibnizian intuition: thus, he emphasized the mind-like character of monads, given that their internal predicates cannot but be representative states. And his speculative reconstruction of Leibniz's monadology was based on the intrinsic/

extrinisic dialectic, without reference to the problem of the constitution of material substance. More precisely, Kant envisaged also the physicalist interpretation of monadology, but only as a kind of derived or subordinated specification of the more general concept, applied to substances in general: "Thus Leibniz made of all substances, which he represented to himself as noumena – *and even of the constitutive elements of matter* - … some simple subjects, endowed with representative force - in a word, some monads".[27]

In the context of the *Amphiboly*, of course, emphasis was laid on Leibniz's mistaken claim of knowing things in themselves. But the comment to the *Second antinomy* has shown us what, in the original Leibnizian approach to monadology, was still appreciable for Kant in his critical period: I mean, its detachment from physical issues and its essential autonomy with respect to the cosmological problem.

A 'Reflexion' on Leibniz

Also Kant's own development on this topic, fom the precritical period until the MAN, is marked exactly by his abandonment of physical monadology, with its core idea of taking monads as the basic building blocks of bodies, or corporeal susbstances. His critical reflection, from the antinomy chapter to the MAN, ends up with dissolving this view, in all its versions – his own earlier dynamical one included, as we have seen in *Proposition* 4 of his *Dynamics*.

In Kant's *Reflexionen* on the topic of composition and simplicity, during the preparatory years before the *Critique*, one can follow the emergence of this train of thought, guided by the irreducibility of the phenomenal level to the metaphysical one – a basic intuition already stated in the *Dissertation* of 1770, but further worked out with the deepening of the critical standpoint.[28] A major role in this process – decisive for his mature theory of space and time and its application to the antinomy problems - was played by the reflection on the contrasting mereological properties of ideal wholes on one hand, that are logically prior to their parts, and actual wholes on the other, whose parts are prior to them: in Kant's terminology, 'analytic' and 'synthetic' wholes, respectively. This contrast was explained by the irreducibility of the respective sources of knowledge and confirmed, in its turn, this irreducibility, hence the impossibility of blurring the logic appropriate to things in themselves and that appropriate to phenomena. From this perspective Kant commented, in his *Reflexionen*, the sections of Baumgarten's *Metaphysics* devoted to the simple-composite polarity, and began to disentangle the mixing of the two levels presupposed by the standard monadological approach.

Interestingly enough, in the context of one of these *Reflections* one can find an explicit reference to Leibniz's thought about phenomena. The passage is worth quoting at lenght:

> *Leibniz's sentence, according to which bodies are phenomena, does not tell anymore than that the idea of body is an idea of sense, whose underlying intellectual substratum is unknown to us*; that is to say, it is an idea which does not express anything but a notion arising from the relationship of some unknown substances with the sensitive way of knowing. If this notion is taken as if it were intellectual, then we say that it is a substantial phenomenon [*phaenomenon substantiatum*]. If one abstains from this, however, then bodies, taken as phenomena, are not made of simple elements, that is to say if one divides according to the concept of space the division has no end. True enough, if this is taken

> according to intellectual knowdledge, then it is made up of monads. *But this assumption does not determine any consequence, that is to say it cannot work as a principle of empirical knowledge*. It is simply required that the connection of the soul with bodies is different not objectively, but only according to the form of its knowledge, from its connection with simple substances in general … Space, however, is the formal element in phenomena; if, instead, it is taken as the true way of conceving the connection among substances, then it must be said to be an intellectual phenomenon, and in this case it is put beyond the scope of sense knowledge.
>
> If sense knowledge, while not changing its species, is extended to infinity, it remains sensitive; accordingly, we can never find empirically that bodies are built up simple elements; therefore *monads are useless in physics, and also in metaphysics their usage is only negative*, in order to avoid that, by taking phenomena for the true of objects, the axioms of sense knowledge become, as it were, intellectual (Refl 4500, AA 17: 574-575).[29]

Given the nature of this text – a scattered remark, with no wider context – it is difficult to say, whether and to which extent Kant is attributing to Leibniz himself some of these ideas, or – more probably - is simply developing his critical considerations, starting from Leibniz's thesis about the phenonemenal nature of bodies. Anyway, the fact that it develops his reflection starting precisely from there is very interesting for our concern.

Kant suggests here a kind of 'minimalist' interpretation of Leibniz's view of bodies as phenomena, which turns out to be compatible with his own theory of space as the form of sense knowledge: as a matter of fact, we are faced here with the reading that will be decidedly attributed to to the author of *Monadology* himself by the later *Remark* of the MAN.

Admittedly, Kant is well aware that this is not the only possible interpretation – maybe not that of Leibniz himself: his phenomena can be taken as if they were substantial things, hence as the object of intellectual knowledge. And this, clearly enough, from Kant's point of view, opens the road to the amphiboly, or worse to the misunderstandings of physical monadology; while the other reading points to a clear-cut distinction between metaphysics and physics.

We have already seen Kant stressing, in the *Critique*, the objective divergence between Leibniz's mind-like monads and the Wolffian approach of physical monadology. Combining this with the other relevant clue offered by the *Reflexion* above, one might conclude that the seeds for an attempt at systematically distinguishing Leibniz from his allegedly legitimate heirs were already on place. But this makes the question the more urgent: why did Kant in 1786 decide to make this distinction explicit, and even to attribute to Leibniz the prefiguration of his own view?

A possible 'Kantian' Leibniz? Some textual hints for a critical reassessment

At this point, one can hardly avoid wondering, which *direct* knoweledge did Kant actually have of Leibniz, over and above what had been filtered through the German *Schulmetaphysik* in which his philosophical training had took place? More specifically: given that in 1786 he had already worked out his fundamental critical reading of Leibniz's philosophy, can we explain his reassessment in the MAN through a reading of some Leibnizian texts which he had previously

ignored, or neglected?

Here we are faced with a fact: surprising as it may be, Kantian scholars make us sure that we not have any precise information available about Kant's reading of Leibniz's texts. We know well of some of them he certainly read, e. g. the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence; for some others, we have no clear indication; in general we are not able to date any reading.

In this condition, it turns out very difficult to individuate any plausible textual basis for Kant's apparent change of judgment in the MAN. What we can do, is to consider all Leibnizian texts edited at the time of the composition of the MAN, hence in principle accessible to Kant: fundamentally, besides obviously those which appeared already during Leibniz's life – the *Theodicy* and all writings published in the periodicals - the Clarke correspondence quoted above, the *Monadology* and the other pieces to be found in some collections: the one edited by Des Maizeaux (1720), the important German edition by Raspe (1765), which revealed to the learned public the *New Essays*, and the Dutens edition (1768), by then the largest one of Leibniz's works. It is easy to see, how all these works were in principle accessible already before Kant's critical turn. No further textual discoveries or editions came out in the following years; but we cannot exclude, of course, that between the composition of the *Critique* (hence, also of the *Amphiboly*, wich should represent, according to Kant's scholarship, one of the oldest layers of the work) and that of the MAN, Kant came across some previously unnoticed Leibnizian texts. Anyway, all that would be barely conjectural.

In this situation, our question has to be reformulated in this way: is there, in the set of Leibizian writings in principle accessible to Kant, some text which could have justified, if not inspired, his new assessment in the MAN? I wish to stress that I am not making here an issue of factual sources, but I wish only to consider which texts could have objectively provided a basis for Kant's interpretation, without entering the (apparently undecidable) question of his actual reading of any of them. Still, this search distinguishes itself from a quite general theoretical comparison with Leibniz's thought, insofar as it intentionally confines itself within the scope of the texts historically available in 1786.

Dan Garber, who tried to make, instead, a general objective comparison, concluded that it makes few sense to wonder whether Kant's "charitable" interpetation of monadology was correct, insofar as Leibniz did not have, for his own part, any firm view on the topic; as far as the relationship of monads with bodies is concerned, many different layers cross together in his thought, without maybe never finding a final decision[30] – although at Kant's time the very limited availability of Leibniz's texts and the hegemony of the standard reading, coming essentially from the *Monadology* and its Wolffian reception, could obscure this situation.

Now, although the scope of my verification is much more limited than Garber's, insofar as I do not consider the mass of Leibniz's writings unpublished at the end of the eighteenth century, still also in the relatively small group of texts available at that time one could have detected the trace of different trains of thought, some of which potentially alternative to the standard 'Wolffian' interpretation. In what follows, I wish to present a selected sample of texts which could have offered to Kant some powerful hint to a 'fresh look' to Leibniz's heritage,

beyond the filter of Wolffian tradition and potentially more in tune with his own intuitions.

Consider, first of all, some passages from Leibniz's writings related to the discussion with Pierre Bayle on the 'new system' and on pre-established harmony. These texts could have attracted the attention of a reader like Kant, given that pre-established harmony had been intensively discussed in his philosohical background, and was still a historical model well present in his reflection. Moreover Leibniz, in his *Remarks* on Bayle, chiefly devoted to the article *Rorarius* in the second edition of Bayle's *Dictionary*, takes briefly into account also another famous article devoted to Zeno's paradoxes. Bear in mind that Bayle's strategy in this article aimed at dissolving the reality of Cartesian extension, by relying on the apories of continuum. Wolff probably had in mind exactly this background, when he warned that rejecting the phenomenality of extension in the only acceptable sense amounted to being committed to the 'bad' sense of phenomenality, implying the loss of reality for extension: in a word, being committed to idealism.

On the contrary, Leibniz advances here, to escape from Bayle's aporia, a sense of 'phenomenon' different from the 'standard' one envisaged by Wolff, and closer to that which was relevant in the discussion about post-Cartesian 'idealism':

> what is real in extension and motion consists only of the ground of order and of the succession of phenomena and percepions according to a rule. Academics ans Skpetics on one hand, as well as those who tried to contrast them on the other, seem embarrassed chiefly because they looked, in the sensible things outside us, for some greater reality than that which is proper of well regulated phenomena (Dutens II, 78-79).[31]

A present-day reader knows that this is not an isolated idea, but the expression of a train of thought worked out by Leibniz in many contexts: I mean, a kind of decidedly phenomenistic approach, according to which the only sense of reality open to us has to be found in the coherence of our perceptions, or in the possibility of connecting them according to the spatiotemporal order and some lawlike patterns. It hardly needs to be emphasized, how much this kind of approach can be held to anticipate some Kantian intuitions - although Kant himself could ignore almost all of these texts, maybe except for some suggestive hint, like this one.

Leibniz then goes on to consider the nature of space and time, as typical examples of ideal continua:

> I acknowledge that time, extension, motion, and the continuum in general, as we understand them in mathematics, are only ideal things, that is, they express possibilities, just as do numbers … But to speak more accurately, extension is the order of possible coexistence, just as time is the order of possibilities that are inconsistent but nevertheless have a connection… But space and time taken together constitute the order of possibilities of our entire universe, so that these orders – space and time, that is – relate not only to what actually is but also to anything that could be put in its place, just as numbers are indifferent to the things which can be enumerated. This inclusion of the possible within the existent makes a continuity which is uniform and indifferent to every division. It is true that perfectly uniform change, such as the mathematical idea of motion, is never found in nature any more than than are actual figures which possess in full force the properties which we learn in geometry … Yet the actual phenomena of nature are arranged, and must be, in such a way that nothing happens which violates the law of continuity, which I introduced into philosophy

> … or any of the other most exact rules of mathematics. On the contrary, things can be rendered intelligible only by these rules […] (Loemker, 583).[32]

We find here the same definition of space as order of coexistence that will occur in the discussion with Clarke; but here it is inserted in a context which illustrates better the sense of the 'ideality' Leibniz attributes to it. Far from implying a dependence of space and time on things, Leibniz presents them as 'orders' of possibilities, which impose to the created things the conditions for their existence and intelligibility.

Nor seem these mathematical notions to be associated here to confused perceptions; on the contrary, their heuristic and explanatory power is contrasted to the limits of our perception. Instead of talking about confusion, rather Leibniz connects his view of space and time as 'ideal' notions with his general view of mathematical concepts as useful 'fictions', worked out within his discussion on the ontological status of infinitesimals:

> Although mathematical thinking is ideal … this does not diminish its utility, beacuse actual things cannot escape its rules. In fact, *we can say that the reality of phenomena, which distinguishes them from dreams, consists in this fact. However, mathematicians do not need all these metaphysical discussions, nor need they embarrass themselves about the real existence of points, indivisibles, infinitesimals, and infinites in any rigorous sense*" (Loemker 583-4).[33]

These lines connect, again, the role played by space, time and mathematical concepts with the peculiar sense of the reality of phenomena, which already emerged in a preceding quotation. Also the will of preserving mathematics from metaphysical discussions is suggestive.[34] Remember how a difficulty for the attribution to Leibniz himself – but also to a 'Leibnizian' like Kästner – of the view of Kant's 'great man' was the characterization of the latter as a defender of mathematical knowledge against metaphysical worries and concerns: what seemed, at first sight, more proper to the Newtonian adversaries of Leibnizian philosophy. As a matter of fact, Leibniz's vindication of the merely phenomenal status of mathematical extension had been commonly read by his heirs (and their adversaries) as a way of diminishing its ontological value, on behalf of monadological metaphysics. But here we have a text where Leibniz, the great mathematician, explicitly vindicates the autonomy of mathematics *and its philosophical relevance*, and we can see how it was objectively possible to think seriously of him, the father of monadology, as being engaged in defending the rights of mathematical knowledge on the issue of infinite division against philosophical obejctions, like the classical Zenonian ones related to the 'labyrinth' of continuum.

If Kant could have known the detail of Leibniz's solution of the continuum apories, he would have apprehended that it was based on a neat distinction of the level of mathematical continuum from that of actual things; and this distinction, in its turn, was based on a mereological analysis close to that which played a major role in Kant's own reflection on space and time, his mature view about them and its application to the antinomy problems. I am thinking to Leibniz's contrast between ideal wholes that are logically prior to their parts on one hand, and actual wholes, whose parts are prior to them: in Kant's terminology, 'analytical' and

'synthetical' wholes, respectively.

As a matter of fact, some texts where Leibniz made this distinction explicit had been edited by the time of Kant. Even if the de Volder correspondence, or some text from the Foucher correspondence – where this topic emerges in the clearest way – were still unpublished, we should not forget, in fact, that the Dutens edition included a significant number (thirty) of letters to Des Bosses. Consider this passage from the letter of July, 31, 1709:

> […] Space is something continuous, but ideal, whereas mass is discrete, indeed an actual multitude, or a being of aggregation, but one from infinite unities. In actual things, simples are prior to aggregates; in ideal things, the whole is prior to the part. *Neglect of this consideration has produced the labyrinth of the continuum* […] (LR, 141).[35]

Once again, we have no independent objective element to adjucate the possibility that Kant was acquainted with the des Bosses correspondence. As is well known, it involved some exoteric and theologically-minded metaphysical issues, like that of the *vinculum substantiale*, presumably very far from Kant's interests; still, beside this metaphysical hypothesis – and, more interestingly, in neat alternative to it – the exchange presented, especially in its latest stage, some of the most relevant developments of the phenomenist line of thought that already popped up in the discussion on the new system and elsewhere. Thus, in the letter of June 16, 1712:

> I regard the explanation of all phenomena solely through the perceptions of monads agreeing among themselves, with corporeal substance excluded, to be useful for a fundamental investigation of things. In this way of explaining things, space becomes the order of coexisting phenomena, as time is the order of successive phenomena […] (LR, 255).[36]

Moreover, Leibniz in the same letter is crystal-clear in excluding monads themselves from space, and in emphasizing that they are not ingredients, but conditions of phenomena:

> there is no absolute or spatial nearness or distance between monads. To say that they are crodwed together in a point or disseminated in space is to employ certain fictions of our mind when we willingly seek to imagine things that can only be understood (ibidem).[37]

Finally, he repeats, once again, that only in this way one can escape from the 'labyrinth' of continuum:

> No extension or composition of the continuum is involved in this account either, and all the problems about points disappear. As I tried to say somewhere in my Theodicy, the difficulties concerning the composition of the continuum should warn us that we need to conceive things very differently" (ibidem).[38]

In these letters Leibniz contrasts this type of view with the hypothesis of a more robust ontological status for aggregata, or corporeal substances. The resulting contrast between mere phenomena on one hand, and *phaenomena substantiata* on the other, objectively recalls the alternative envisaged in Kant's own reflection, and in his interpretation of Leibniz' '*sententia*'

about bodies and phenomena. On this point, Kant – differently from Leibniz - has certainly decided against the substantializing of phenomena, by embracing the pposite reduction of (material) substance to the status of phenomenon ("*substantia phaenomenon*").

Kant should have been somehow aware of the plurality of alternative suggestions potentially present in Leibniz's texts, before and beyond their scholastic systematizing. In any event, our sketch of a possible way through some texts which already had come to light during the century after Leibniz's death shows that Kant's sympathetic (and self-assimilating) reading of Leibniz could have found some good textual basis in the writings of the founder of monadology.

Note: a forced polarity

As we have seen, the 'good' interpretation of monadology envisaged by Kant is crucially committed to a neat dichotomy between the metaphysical level of monads and the phenomenal one of bodies. In Kant's view, the physical world is detached from its metaphysical ground and entirely delivered to the phenomenal level. Mathematical idealities, like space, are the inner tissue of phenomena. In Leibniz, however, one could detect – besides some texts apparently endorsing a kindred view – a more complex layering: that is to say, the acknowledgment of an intermediate, properly 'physical' level between the metaphysical groundfloor on one hand and mathematical idealities on the other. From the mereological point of view, a third type of whole is recognized: physical wholes are *actually* infinitely divided.

But this means that Leibniz – the great mathematician – while being well aware of the need of avoiding the apories of the continuum, would have not subscribed to Kant's argument against real infinite divisibility, as it appeared in the *Remark* of the MAN. According to Leibniz, in fact, Kant's objection, based on the impossibility of achieving an infinite totality, does fail. In his view, the giveness of an infinite multiplicity is not prevented by the impossibility of considering it as a whole; and the apories of infinite number are neutralized by simply denying that such a number does exist.

Still, Kant does not consider (maybe, does not know) these subtle aspects of Leibniz's thought, which he could have hardly appreciated. If he had known them, he would have probably taken all this as a further proof of the coexistence in Leibniz's thought of several contrasting trains of thought on the matter, included those which could give occasion to the profoundly mistaken 'physical' reading of his monadology.

Between amphiboly and apology: a lost Platonic paradise

A question is still open: if Kants reassessment of Leibniz's stance was dictated by serious theoretical appreciation – and all the more, if we were even to concede that he actually drew some elements from a closer reading of some Leibnizian text - why is there no trace of anything of the sort in the second edition of the *Critique*, where the *Amphiboly* is reproposed without the smallest change?

Once again, of course, one might look for an answer by appealing to tactical motives, that is to say to the opportunity of presenting his own philosophy as a radical alternative to an older one. Moreover, the familiarity of public with the *Schulmetaphysik* as the authorized version of Leibniz's philosophy would have discouraged the recourse to subtle distinctions, where it was worth sketching a schematic but also pregnant contrast between two philosophical approaches.

Despite appearances, however, Kant's judgements can be acknowledged as globally coherent also from a strictly philosophical point of view. Let me reconsider: in the MAN he had emphasized how Leibniz's stance could (and should) be accurately distinguished from the physical monadology of the Wolffian tradition: his monads could not be held as the elements of corporeal substances.

The view criticized in the *Amphiboly* was already not identified with that mistaken doctrine attribuable, rather, to the Wolffian reading: a view which turned out to be wholly incoherent. On the contrary, the core of the *Amphiboly* view laid exactly in the construction of a purely intellectual world: something perfectly consistent in itself, even necessary according to the logic of pure understanding, but not to be taken as a real knowledge of our world.

Now, in the MAN this view of an intellectual world had been presented as the central move for a correct reading of monadology. But then, how to conciliate the persistent negative evaluation of this central element, with the seemingly positive one it received in the MAN? [39]

An answer seems to be immediately to hand: the amphiboly denounced the blurring of plans, whose distinction was the decisive aspect in the postive interpretation of monadology. But this blurring, in its turn, depended on a crucial mistake in Leibniz's theory of knowledge.

Now, this alleged Leibnizian mistake was one that was held by Kant to persist also within the most 'charitable' reading of Leibniz; even together with its aspect potentially most approaching to his own view, namely the reduction of space and its phenomenal order to some structural features of our way of perceiving. According to Kant, in fact, Leibniz's admitedly subjective view of space was still open to a fatal interpretative ambiguity, insofar as it could be read in the sense of the doctrine of sensibility as a 'confused' version of intellectual knowledge .

Consider the later occurrence of the 'Kantian' reading of Leibniz in *On a Discovery*. After praising the aspects of the monadological intuition quoted above, Kant points out – admittedly, in a slightly oblique way - to a problem:

> *We cannot, therefore, be disturbed by his explanation of sensibility as a confused mode of representation, but rather must set in its place another one which is more in accordance with his purpose*. Otherwise his system will contradict itself. The acceptance of this error as a deliberate and wise precaution … can hardly be regarded as a contribution to the glory of the master (ÜE, AA 8: 248-249).[40]

In the preceding discussion in *On a Discovery*, in fact, Kant always assumed that his 'Leibnizian' adversaries – and in this case, apparently, Leibniz himself - endorsed this fundamentally mistaken view of sensibility, hence they considered phenomenal knowledge as a kind of confused perception of a real, intelligible multiplicity. By the way: ironically enough,

while Kant was striving to credit Leibniz with some of his own views which the latter would have hardly subscribed to, he insisted in seeing the main obstacle to their full agreement in a theory – that of the 'confused' nature of sense perception – whose attribution to Leibniz himself is at best controversial, if not totally misleading.[41] Still, in this case Kant saw a real continuity between Leibniz and his Wolffian followers. A text like Kästner's *Preface* to the Raspe edition, for instance, could confirm this reading insofar as - while rejecting the 'physical' interpretation of monadology [42] - it professed that view of sensibility.

At the same time, Kästner's way of presenting the topic of confused perception (by the way, a term which he does not use) could support a reading which capable of distinguishing it from the view attacked by Kant. Kästenr, in fact, does insist on the leap between the appearance of extension and its real basis in simple beings: in his Leibniz-minded metaphor, remember, the perception of each single star is not a part of the resultung confused appearance, but only its objective basis.

Let this be as it may, the conclusion of Kant's last passage is important: he is well aware that Leibniz's "system", as such, cannot be assimilated to his own, if not at the price of freeing it from the compresence of some elements which are objectively contradictory.[43]

But the inadequacy of historical Leibniz's stance has another aspect. One should not think, indeed, that the 'Platonic' world envisaged by Leibniz, even once accurately distinguished from the phenomenal world, was a metaphysical possibility viable to Kant. As observed above, in Kant's reading Leibniz would have arrived, at best – that is to say, after being cleaned up from his inadequate view of sensibility - at the stance illustrated by the 1770 *Dissertation*.[44] But of course, this was no longer Kant's critical stance. Thus, the egological approach to the simple referred to in the Antinomy was for him certainly more defensible and consistent than the cosmological approach from the composition of matter; but ultimately it was not able to provide any true metaphysical knowledge, as the criticism developed in the *Paralogism* chapter shows.

In any event, Kant could well think of having pointed to some Leibnizian motives and ideas which hinted at, or prefigured some of his own solutions, but were still intertwined in Leibniz with other contrasting ideas, and located in a globally pre-critical context. And in a sense, we can say that this insight was basically right.

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ABSTRACT: In the *Amphiboly* chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* as is well known, Kant launches a devastanting attack against Leibniz's philosophical framework. Some years later, however, in a *Remark* in his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Philosophy*, he suggests a positive appreciation of Leibniz's monadology, by sharply distinguishing it from his Wolffian allegedly heirs and assimilating Leibniz's originary intention to his own view. This re-evaluation will be confirmed in the polemics againt Eberhard, although meanwhile Kant had reproposed his *Amphiboly* without any correction in the second edition of the *Critique.*

This intirguing reassessment of Leibniz's view poses to interpreters several puzzling issues, both conceptual and historical – concerning Kant's intentions, the viability of his 'charitable' reading of Leibniz and his possible textual basis – which I try to clarify in my paper.

KEYWORDS: Kant – Leibniz – Monadology – Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy – Infinite divisibility

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Notes

1 See also Allison 1973.

2 Useful remarks have been made to this passage in the excellent comments and studies devoted to the MAN. See Pollok 2001, pp. 251-273; Friedman 2013, pp. 143-170, and the comments to his translation in CK. A detailed and very valuable study specifically devoted to the problem of Kant's reassesment is Pecere 2013 pp. 7-41. See also Pecere 2007. Although these contributions provide a very good account of the text, I think that the the problems involved are worth some further inquiry. See also, on Kant's reevaluation of Leibniz, more in general, Jauernig 2008.

3 MoPh, AA 1: 473-487. On the *Physical Monadology*, see the classic Adickes 1924; Sarmiento 2005; Malzkorn 1998 (the last considers also the relationship between the early work and the MAN).

4 It is the Academy Prize of 1747. For this debate, see Palaia 1993; Pasini 1994, pp. 107-163.

5 For Euler's writing related to the Academy prize, anonymously published, see *Considérations sur les éléments des corps, dans lequelles on examine la doctrine des monades et l'on déclare la véritable essence des corps*, now in Euler s. III, vol. 2. Euler devoted several other writings to the problems of the nature of space. His most popular attack against monadology is contained in his *Letters to a German Princess*, published some years after Kant's concilitory attempt.

6 "Die Mathematik kann zwar in ihrem inneren Gebrauche in Ansehung der Chicane einer verfehlten Metaphysik ganz gleichgültig sein und in sicherem Besitz ihrer evidenten Behauptungen von der undendlichen Theilbarkeit des Raumes beharren … allein in der Anwendung ihrer Sätze, die vom Raume gelten, an die Substanz, die ihn erfüllt, muß sie sich doch auf Prüfung nach bloßen Begriffen, mithin auf Metaphysik einlassen. … Denn es folgt nicht nothwendig, daß Materie ins Unendliche physisch theilbar sei, wenn sie es gleich in mathematischer Absicht ist … wofern nicht bewiesen werden kann, daß in jedem aller möglichen Theile dieses erfüllten Raumes auch Substanz sei … Also fehlte doch bisher dem mathematischen Beweise noch etwas, ohne welches er auf die Naturwissenschaft keine sichere Anwendung haben konnte, und diesem Mangel ist in obsthendem Lehrsatz abgeholfen worden".

7 "Was nun aber die übrigen Angriffe der Metaphysik auf den nunmehr physischen Lehrsatz der unendlichen Theilbarkeit der Materie betrifft, so muß sie der Mathematiker gänzlich dem Philosophen überlassen, der ohnedem durch diese Einwürfe sich selbst in der Labyrinth begiebt…".

8 The metaphor, however, was not coined by him. When adopting it to qualify the continuum problem, he usually referred to a book of the theologian Libert Fromond. Fromond's book is still quoted in Kästner's *Preface* to the Raspe edition of Leibniz (see below).

9 " Ein großer Mann, der vielleicht mehr als sonst jemand das Ansehen der Mathematik in Deutschland zu erhalten beiträgt, hat mehrmals die metaphysischen Anmaßungen, Lehrsätze der Geometrie von der unendlichen Theilbarkeit des Raums umzustoßen, durch die gegründete Erinnerung abgewiesen: daß der Raum nur zu der Erscheinung äußerer Dinge gehöre; allein ist er nicht vestanden worden".

10 See his essays in Eberhard's magazine: Kästner 1790, and Kant's related comments in AA 20: 410-423. For all this, see Fichant 1997. I was encouraged in taking seriously the hypothesis of Kästner by a hint in a paper by Michel Fichant.

11 "Es ist nicht nötig, sich hie in metaphysische Untersuchungen des Raumes und der Stetigkeit einzulassen. Der Begriff der geometrischen Ausdehnung ist ein abstracter Begriff, welcher richtig bleibt, wie man auch sonst diese Dinge sich vorstellen will. Man muß eine stetige Ausfüllung des Raumes annehmen, sobald man auf die besondere Beschaffenheit der Dinge, welche den Raum ausfüllen, nicht sehen will. Aber gegentheils ist niemand berechtiget, die metaphysischen Begriffe nach den geomterischen zu richten, oder die Theilbarkeit ohne Ende, der physischen Ausdehnung beyzulegen, weil sie der geometrischen zukommt. Bey dieser findet sie statt, weil ihr allegemeiner Begriff der Teilung keine Gränzen setzt. Wo jeder Theil durch nichts als die Grösse und den Ort, von andern unterschieden ist, da kann man aus jedem Theile, Dinge die nicht völlig eben den Ort einnehmen, eben die Größe haben, neue Theile, machen. In der Natur aber finden wir, daß sich die Theile von einander durch mehr Dinge als durch Ort und Grösse unterscheiden, und also könnte hie etwas die Theilung ohne Ende hindern, die in der Geomtrie verstattet ist. Die natürliche Logik, und selbst Beyspiele der Geometrie zeigen, daß Bestimmungen aus einem allgemeinen Begriffe statt finden, die ein besondere nicht zulässt".

12 "Que l'univers réel soit toute autre chose que l'apparent c'est une verité, dont il semble qu'on ne doit plus douter depuis Descartes … La métaphysique de Leibniz m'a toujours paru fondée sur ce principe. Ceux qui lui reprochent une impenetrable la trouveroient très claire pour peu qu'ils voulissent se defaire de certains préjugés assez semblables aux especes intentionelles, que Descartes avait à combattre. Ils soutiennent que la maniere, de laquelle Mr. Leibniz a conçu l'origine de l'etendue ne sauroit s'expliquer. Ils prouvent par des demonstrations geometriques, comment il est absurde de regarder le corps comme une somme de points. Peut on charger de cette absurdité celui, à qui tout le continent de l'Europe doit le alcul de l'infini? … Ce n'est pas le corps que Ms. Leibnitz compose des estres simples, c'est le phénomene de l'etendue, dont il croit rendre raison, en disant que nous nous representons confusement un grand nombre d"etres non-étendus. Le telescope nous decouvre des amas d'etoiles, où l'oeil nu ne voit que des taches lumineuses. Cette tache n'est pas composé des étoiles comme le tout l'est des parties: c'est une apparence, qui s'offre à des yeux trop foibles pour distinguer les étoiles. Voici ce que sont les Elemens de Leibniz. Ceux qui les ont combattus par des raisonnemts geometriques, que Leibniz sans doute savoit faire aussi bien q'eux, n'on-pas pas perdu bien des peines?", in OPLF: *Préface de Mr. Kästner, Professeur des Mathématiques et de la Physique à Goettingue*, p. IV.

13 Kästner 1769. For the exposition of Leibniz's monadology, see, pp. 11-15. Here also, Kästner see as central insight of the monadological doctrine the idea the fundamental contrast between the real world and its appearence to our sense perception.

14 Other identifications which have been advanced seem to match scarcely with Kant's indications: Lambert was an illustrious mathematicians, esteemed by Kant, but he does not profess a phenomenistic theory of space; Ploucquet – whose identification with the 'great man' has been endorsed by Gerlach in a learned paper, and whose vindication of the nature of space, on the occasion of the Academy prize, is actually an interesting one – could hardly satisfy the role Kant gives to the 'great man' in mathematical culture. See B. Gerlach, *Wer war der 'grosse Mann', der die Raumtheorie des transzendentalen Idealismus vorbereitet hat?,* in Kantstudien 89/1 (1998), p. 1-34.

15 "[a]Man nahm diesen Satz so, als ob er sagen sollte: der Raum erscheine uns selbst, sonst sei er eine Sache oder Verhältniss der Sachen an sich selbst, der Mathematiker betrachtet ihn aber nur, wie er erscheint; [b[anstatt daß sie darunter hätten verstehen sollen, der Raum sei gar keine Eigenschaft, die irgend einem Dinge außer unseren Sinnen an sich anhängt, sondern nur die subjective Form unserer Sinnlichkeit…".

16 Bei jener Mißdeutung dachte man sich den Raum immer noch als eine den Dingen auch außer unserer Vorstellungskraft anhängende Beschaffenheit, die sich aber der Mathematiker nur nach gemeinen Begriffen, d. i. verworren, denkt (denn so erklärt man gemeinhin Erscheinung) und schrieb also den mathematischen Lehrsatz von der unendlichen Theilbarkeit der Materie, einen Satz, der die höchste Deutlichkeit in dem Begriffe des Raums voraussetzt, einer verworrenen Vorstellung vom Raume…".

17 "Propositionem hanc ideo apponimus, ut appareat, quo sensu admitti possit, immo debeat, extensionem et continuitatem phaenomena esse, ut ideo in suspicionem Idealismi non incurras, cum Idealistae alio sensu pheanomenon appellent id, quod tantum existere apparet, nihil vero realitatis extra mentem habet: in quem errorem incidunt Idealistae … propterea quod terminum vel non distincte explicant, vel significatum a recepto alienum eidem tribuunt".

18 "Der Grund dieser Verwirrung liegt in einer übelverstandenen Monadologie, die gar nicht zur Erklärung der Naturerscheinungen gehört, sondern eine von Leibnizen ausgeführter, an sich richtiger platonischer Begriff von der Welt ist, so fern sie gar nicht als Gegenstand der sinne, sondern als Ding an sich selbst betrachtet, blos ein Gegenstand des Verstandes ist, der aber doch den Erscheinungen der Sinne zum Grunde liegt".

19 See on this Fichant 2013.

20 See the Remark to the *Second Antinomy*. KrV A 441, 443/B 469, 471: the 'monadists' claim that monads and their dynamical

relations are the conditions of the possibility of space. For Kant, however, the reverse is true, given that we know only phenomena, for which space is the possibility condition.

21 "Daher war Leibnizens Meinung, so viel ich einsehe, den Raum durch die Ordnung einfacher Wesen neben einander zu erklären, sondern ihm vielmehr als correspondirend, aber zu einer blos intelligibeln (für uns unbekannten) Welt gehörig zur Seite zu setzen […]".

22 "… und nichts anders zu behaupten, als was anderwärts gezeigt worden, nämlich daß der Raum sammt der Materie, davon er die Form ist, nicht die Welt von Dingen an sich selbst, sondern nur die Erscheinung derselben enthalte und selbst nur die Form unserer äußern sinnlichen Anschauung sei".

23 "Ist es wohl zu glauben, daß Leibniz, ein so großer Mathematiker! die Körper aus Monaden (hiemit auch den Raum aus einfachen Theilen) habe zusammensetzen wollen? Er meinte nicht die Körperwelt, sondern ihr für uns unerkennbares Substrat, die intelligibele Welt, die blos in der Idee der Vernunft liegt, und worin wir freilich alles, was wir darin als zusammengesetzte Substanz denken, uns als aus einfachen Substanzen besthehend vorstellen müssen … davon er aber nichts auf die Sinnenwesen bezog, die er für auf eine besondere Art Anschauung, deren wir allein um Behuf für uns möglicher Erkenntnisse fähig sind, bezogene Dinge, in der strengsten Bedeutung für blose Erscheinungen … gehalten wissen will".

24 See Wolff, CG, § 243.

25 See KrV, A 442/B 470.

26 See also, for this egological foundation of the idea of simple, the *Remark* to the Antithesis of the *Second Antinomy*, KrV A 441, 443/B 469, 471.

27 See KrV A 266/ B 321-322.

28 Se for instance Refl 41, AA 14: 153; 3789-3791, AA 17: 293-294; 4061-4068, AA 17: 401-403; 4314- 4318, AA 17: 503-505; 4418-4425, AA 17: 539-541; 4498-4520, AA 17: 573-580; 4830-4832, AA 17: 740. I can only hint at these texts here, without making any analysis of them.

29 Sententia Leibnitzii, quod corpora sint phaenomena, nihil aliud offert, quam quod idea corporis sit sensitiva, cuius substratum intellectuale ignoratur h. e. quod non exprimat, nisi conceptum, qui oritur a relatione incognitarum substantiarum ad modum cognoscendi sensitivum. Quod si habetur pro intellectuali, dicitur phaenomenon substantiatum. Si hoc autem evitetur, corpora ut phaenomena non constant simplicibus, h. e. secundum conceptum spatii dividendo divisio est absque termino. Verum intellectualiter conceptum constat monadibus. Sed hec thesis non influit in consequentia, h. e. non est principium cognitionis empiricae. Verum tantum indigitat, nexum animae cum corporibus non esse obiective, sed tantum secundum formam cognoscitivam diversum a nexu animae cum substantiis simplicibus generatim... Spatium autem est phaenomenorum formale; quod si habeatur pro ipsa reali conceptione nexus substantiarum, dicitur phaenomenon intellectuatum, si nempe ulterius quam ad modum cognoscendi sensitivum extenditur. Si cognitio sensitiva extendatur in sua specie in infinitum, tamen manet sensitiva, ut corpora nunquam deprehendentur empirice constare simplicibus; ergo monades in physica nullius sunt usus, et in metaphysica sunt usus negativi, ut caveatur, ne habendo phaenomena pro reali constitutione obiectorum axiomata sensitiva fiant quasi intellectualia.

30 See Garber 2008. Garber is reacting here to Anja Jauernig's essay in the same volume, quoted above (note 5).

31 "… ce qu'il ya de réel dans l'étendue et dans le mouvement ne consiste que dans le fondement de l'ordre et dans la suite reglée des phenomenes et perceptions. Aussi tant les Academiciens et Sceptiques, que ceux qui leur ont voulu répondre, ne semblent s'être embarrassés principalement parce qu'ils cherchaient une plus grande réalité dans les choses sensibles hors de nous, que celle des phenomemes reglés".

32 "Je reconnais que le temps, l'étendue, le mouvement, et le continu en général, de la manière qu'on les prend en Mathématique, ne sont que des choses idéales, c'est-à-dire, qui expriment les possibilités … Mais pour parler plus juste, l'étendue est l'ordre des coexistences possibles, comme le temps est l'ordre des possibilités inconstententes … Mais l'Espace et le Temps pris ensemble font l'ordre des possibilités de tout un Univers, de sorte que ces ordres … quadrent non seulement à ce qui est actuellement, mais encor à ce qui pourrait estre mis à la place … Et cet enveloppement du possible avec l'Existant fait une continuité uniforme et indifferente à toute division. Et quoyque dans la nature il ne se trouve jamais des changemens parfaitement uniformes, tels que demande l'idée que les Mathématiques nous donnent du mouvement, … neantmoins les phenomenes actuels de la nature sont menagés et doivent l'estre de telle sorte, qu'il ne se rencontre jamais rien, où la loy de la continuité … et toutes les autres regles les plus exactes de la Methématique soient violées. Et bien loin de cela, les choses ne sauroient estre rendues intelligibles que par ces règles …" (Dutens; II, 91)

33 "Ainsi quoyque les méditations mathématiques soient idéales, cela ne diminue rien de leur utilité, parce que *les choses actuelles ne sçauroient s'écarter de leur règles; et on peut dire en effet que c'est en cela que consiste la réalité des phenomenes, qui les distingue des songes.* Les mathématiciens cependant n'ont point besoin du tout des discussions métaphysiques, ni de s'embarasser de l'existence réelle des points, indivisibles, infiniment petits…" (Dutens, II, 91-92).

34 This attitude is confirmed, some lines below, by a final comment on the discussions with de l'Hopital about the status of infinitesimals: "I believe that he has no more desire than I to burden geometry with metaphysical problems" ("je crois qu'il ne

voudra pas, non plus que moy, charger la Geometrie des questions métaphysiques", Dutens, II, 92; Loemker, 584).

35 "spatium est continuum quoddam, sed ideale. Massa est discretum, nempe multitudo actualis, seu ens per aggregationem, sed ex unitatibus infinitis; in actualibus, simplicia sunt anteriora aggregatis, in idealibus totum est prius parte. Hujus considerationis neglectus illum continui labyrinthum peperit." (Dutens, II, 287)

36 "Explicationem phaenomenorum omnium per solas Monadum perceptiones inter se conspirantes, seposita substantia corporea, utilem censeo ad fundamentalem rerum inspectionem. Et hoc exponendi modo spatium est ordo coexistentium phaenomenorum …" (Dutens, II, 298)

37 "nec ulla est monadum propinquitas, aut distantia spatialis, vel absoluta, dicereque, esse in puncto conglobatas, aut in spatio disseminatas, est quibusdam fictionibus animi nostri uti, dum imaginari libenter vellemus, quae tantum intelligi possunt" (ibidem)

38 "In hac etiam consideratione nulla occurrit extensio aut compositio continui, et omnes de punctis difficultates evanescunt. Atque hoc est quod dicere volui alicubi in mea Theodicaea, difficultates de compositione continui admonere nos debere, res longe aliter esse concipiendas" (ibidem).

39 Notice, however, that the Platonic interpretation of monadology is not necessarily an element which Kant unqualifiedly approves, even in the MAN; I shall explain this later.

40 "wobei man sich durch seine Erklärung von der Sinnlichkeit als einer verworrenen Vorstellugsart nicht stören lassen, sondern vielmehr eine andere, seiner Absicht angemessenere an deren Stelle setzen muß: weil sonst sein system nich mit sich selbst zusammenstimmt. Diesen Fehler nun für absichtliche, weise Vorsicht desselben aufzunehmen … kann ihnen schwerlich zum Verdienst um die Ehre ihres Meisters angerechnet werden".

41 See on this Fichant 2014.

42 By the way, by using a wording significantly similar to that of Kant in the final pages of ÜE: "Who can think that such a great mathematician …"

43 As is well known, in this context Kant explicitly defends a way of interpreting philosophers through free rational reconstruction, acording to which the interpreter can understand them better tahn themselves did.

44 It is important to stress this point, in order to distance from an interpretation like Langton 1998, which, though excinting, in my opinion does not capture adequately the distance of the critical Kant from a pre-critical metaphysics.

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Between 'perception' and understanding, from Leibniz to Kant

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§ 1. The problem of 'perception'

Much of the discussion of Kant's account of theoretical 'cognition [Erkenntnis]' and 'knowledge [Wissen]' over the past several centuries has (understandably) focused on the nature and significance of his distinction within 'representations [Vorstellungen]' between 'intuitions [Anschauungen]' and 'concepts [Begriffe]', in order to specify their relevant contributions to 'experience [Erfahrung]' and to cognition more broadly. Recently, however, it is becoming more widely recognized that Kant's account of theoretical cognition in general involves a much wider suite of representations than merely intuitions and concepts, and that many of these are involved in essential ways in the constitution of experience in particular. More specifically, closer attention is being paid to the distinctive role played in the constitution of experience by 'the power of imagination [*Einbildungskraft*]', 'apprehension', 'perception [*Wahrnehmung*]', 'consciousness [*Bewußtsein*]', 'images [*Bilder*]', 'schemata', and even 'appearances [Erscheinungen]' themselves as the immediate though undetermined 'objects' of intuition (cf. KrV, B 33) – as all providing their own distinct, if complementary, contributions to experience and cognition, related to but separate from those provided by intuitions and concepts themselves.[1] All of these representations are singled out at key points (some even in the very section headings) in Kant's discussion of cognition in the first *Critique* for the separate contribution that they make in the process of allowing cognition itself to 'arise [*entspringen*]' from the '*unification* [*Vereinigung*]' of intuitions with concepts (cf. B75-6). At the same time, however, these are all representations that Kant *contrasts* both with intuitions and concepts, on the one hand, but also with cognition itself and experience as well, on the other. Rather, these representations

all function as intermediate steps on the 'progression [Stufenleiter]' that transpires within our mind as it moves *from* the receptivity of intuitions by our 'sensibility [Sinnlichkeit]' *to* the cognition of objects through concepts by our 'understanding [Verstand]' (cf. KrV, B 355; B 730; B 376-77).

One likely reason for the relative neglect of Kant's account of these intermediate steps between intuition and cognition through concepts is a persistent worry that Kant can have nothing informative to say about these in-between representations, given the sharpness with which he draws his initial distinction between intuitions and concepts.[2] Famously, against Leibniz, who 'intellectualized [*intellektuierte*] appearances', and also against Locke, who has 'sensibilized [*sensifiziert*]' concepts, Kant insists instead that appearances (along with the intuitions which initially 'give' them to the mind) and concepts each arise from 'two entirely different [*ganz verschiedene*] sources of representation', namely, our understanding and our sensibility (cf. KrV, B 327). The very idea that Kant himself would recognize any sort of representations 'in-between' intuitions and concepts, yet not reducible to either, might seem to threaten the familiar narrative of how Kant means to mark his break with the views of his predecessors. Nevertheless, as there is more than sufficient evidence that Kant himself not only accepts the existence of such intermediate representations but also accords them a crucial role in his account of experience and cognition itself, we must take up the task of articulating a more complex narrative which can account for their distinctness from both intuitions and concepts, while also showing how the overarching position continues to respect the original intuition-concept distinction itself.

This sort of representational irreducibility has been more widely recognized in the case of *experience*, since Kant is quite explicit that experience itself involves both 'the intuition of the senses' and 'a concept of an object' (cf. KrV, B 126). There has been considerable debate, however, over whether Kant takes representations of the *imagination* (images, schemata) to be likewise 'in between' intuitions and concepts, representations which are not identical to either any intuition or concept, but which relate to, or some way involve, intuitions or concepts or both at once.[3] In the case of *perception*, by contrast, its very existence as a representational stage distinct from both intuition and experience has often gone unnoticed.[4]

In previous work, I have provided the beginnings of an analysis of what Kant means by 'perception [*Wahrnehmung*]', drawing both on Kant's own texts, but also on the use of 'Wahrnehmung' in the writings of some of the more influential of his immediate predecessors (Wolff, Baumgarten, Meier, Tetens).[5] The preliminary results of this analysis indicate that 'Wahrnehmung' is almost uniformly used by Kant and his predecessors to pick out the state of becoming *conscious* of a sensory representation already present in the mind, rather than picking out either the sensory representation itself, or any act of judgment about (cognition of) the objects of such representations. In Kant's terms, Wahrnehmung as 'empirical *consciousness*' of sensory representations (cf. KrV, B 207) lies between sensation and intuition as mere sensory '*representation* [Vorstellung]' (cf. KrV, B 33-34), and experience as 'empirical *cognition*' of objects 'through' such consciousness of representations as is afforded in Wahrnehmungen (cf. KrV, B 218).

In the present essay, I want to take up two important further issues that have come to the

fore during these historical-systematic investigations. The first is a growing appreciation of the potential for significant terminological confusion to arise due to the common use of the English term 'perception' to render not only 'Wahrnehmung' but also the earlier Latin 'perceptio' and French 'perception' – as used, for example, in the writings of Descartes and Leibniz. As I will show below, this translation practice becomes problematic because, already arguably with Descartes (cf. § 2) but especially in Leibniz's hands (cf. §3), 'perceptio'/'perception' do not pick out representational states which essentially involve consciousness. Rather, for Descartes and Leibniz, 'perceptio'/'perception' should be associated instead with the first stage of the progression identified above – namely, with mere sensory representation. In fact, as I will also show below (cf. § 4), when Leibniz's French works are translated into German, in the generation before Kant's Critical period, it is precisely these German terms ('Vorstellung', 'Empfindung') that are used to render the French 'perception', *rather than* 'Wahrnehmung'. Strikingly, 'Wahrnehmung' itself is used instead to render Leibniz's French '*ap*perception'. I will then show that this is likewise true of the German renderings of the Latin textbooks written by the Leibnizians (and others) that were especially familiar to Kant himself.

The second important issue that I will aim to address here concerns the nature of the role, if any, that is played, for Kant, by the understanding within 'Wahrnehmung' itself. Elsewhere I have argued in favor of the traditional view, against recent 'intellectualist' and 'conceptualist' interpretations of *intuition*, that, for Kant, the understanding is not already at work in the mere having of an intuition, nor are concepts contained in the content of intuitions.[6] To the extent that authors have discussed 'perception [*Wahrnehmung*]' at all in this regard, it has largely been under the assumption that it is equivalent in sense to 'intuition', and has largely focused on texts expressing Kant's commitment to 'synthesis' being involved in 'perception', which are then taken to be evidence that Kant thinks synthesis is involved in intuition itself. This latter point is then assumed to demonstrate the intellectualist thesis that Kant thinks the *understanding* is involved in intuition (because in perception), on the common assumption that all synthesis is an act of the understanding.

In the examination of Leibniz (§ 3) and the post-Leibnizians (§ 4) especially, then, I will also be concerned to trace out how the understanding's relation to Wahrnehmung (as Leibnizian apperception) is conceived of in the pre-Kantian historical context, to help set the stage for a discussion of Kant's own views on this relation (§ 5). The main conclusions on this front will be in some ways more complicated. On the one hand, it will emerge that the Leibnizian tradition ascribes a pre-apperceptive activity of synthesis (unification) to the *imagination* rather than the understanding. On the other hand, the tradition will also be seen to consistently distinguish this activity of the imagination per se from Wahrnehmung (apperception) proper, taking the latter to require not just the imagination but the *understanding* (intellect) as well. This is because, as apperception, it involves a kind of *self*-consciousness via *reflection*. When we turn to Kant (§ 5), We find that Kant also agrees to the following points: first, the imagination performs its own synthesis or unifying prior to apperception qua consciousness of representations, and hence prior to the understanding; second, Wahrnehmung, by contrast, constitutively includes consciousness and consists in a form of (empirical) apperception; and third, apperception itself is something 'higher' than either sense or imagination. What is also

striking, however, is that compared with this tradition, Kant puts forward a sharper distinction between *apperception* itself and the *understanding*, with the former consisting only in the capacity for the *consciousness* of representations, and the latter being defined as the capacity for *cognition* of objects.

More broadly, I hope the following will help demonstrate that closer consideration of these terminological-conceptual issues will be absolutely crucial to keep in mind if we are to hope to properly understand the developments in early modern German philosophical psychology, and to uncover the points of genuine agreement and disagreement between Kant and his predecessors. In particular, the results of what follows will force us to be more precise in our assessment of the nature of Kant's alleged departure from Leibniz and the Leibnizians. My own conclusion (cf. § 6) will be that there is considerably more overlap than might otherwise have been expected, given familiar narratives about Kant's break with the Leibnizians. In drawing out these parallels, my efforts here in comparative history of cognitive psychology are meant to complement important recent work that has also sought to resist the familiar historical-developmental narrative concerning Kant's break with his predecessors and instead draw Kant much closer to Leibniz on other key questions concerning the *erkenntnistheoretische* foundations of metaphysics, geometry, and the natural sciences – partly in order to help sharpen our appreciation of how much was already in place intellectually with Kant's predecessors, but also in order to help sharpen our sense of where Kant's innovations actually lie.[7]

§ 2. From *perceptio* to the intellect in Descartes

As should already be evident, Kant was not the first to propose a threefold division of the core stages in the development of psychical activity toward cognition. This perspective has a long and rich history, going at least as far back as Aristotle. At the outset of the *Metaphysics*, for example, Aristotle distinguishes (1) a basic level of 'sensation [aesthesis]', which is possessed by all 'living things [*zoa*]', from (2) a second level involving 'memory [*mneme*]' and 'imaginings [*phantasiais*], which is possessed only by some, from (3) a still third level involving 'art [*techne*]' and 'reasoning [*logismos*]', which only those of 'the human genus' possess, and which is responsible for 'experience [*empeiria*]' and ultimately 'science [*episteme*]' (I.1 980a1-981a1). This division is repeated at the end of the *Posterior Analytics*, where the three levels are also associated with stages in a process within the human soul, such that, within us, (1) sensation gives rise to (2) memory when the sensation 'persists', and then frequently repeated memories give rise to (3) experience itself, which is now said to make present 'the universal [*tou kath'olou*] in the soul', as 'the one from the many', and which involves 'thinking [*dianoia*]', which in turn makes possible art and science (cf. II.19 100a1-100b5).

Despite various attempts to escape core aspects of Aristotelianism, the basics of this threefold division persist well into the early modern period, as will be seen especially clearly below when we consider Leibniz's account of the mind. We can, however, see more than partial traces of this even in Descartes. Though he has been widely understood as challenging in particular the Aristotelian account of the psychical life of non-human animals, and though it has

been common to assume that Descartes denies all psychical dimensions to non-human animals (viewing them as mere 'bêtes-machines'), it has recently been argued that Descartes not only retains certain key psychological distinctions from the tradition, but means to ascribe certain lower psychical capacities to animals after all.[8] Whether or not this is so about Descartes' view of animals, what *is* more widely conceded is that, at least for humans, Descartes retains something close to the traditional threefold distinction in his own differentiation between sensation, imagination, and intellection.[9]

To begin to get an orientation toward Descartes' psychology, we can start by considering the cruder twofold psychological distinction that Descartes draws in his 1641 replies to the Sixth set of Objections to his *Meditations*, in order to narrow our focus on what is psychical (pertains to the soul or mind) rather than merely physiological (pertains to the body alone). This itself is important, since the first psychical stage (sensation) is itself seen to (somehow) arise from an earlier physiological stage of affections and impressions upon bodily sense-organs – a stage which, as Descartes notes here, also often goes by the name of 'sensing'. For this reason, Descartes thinks we should more carefully distinguish the following 'grades or degrees [gradus]' within sensing (I have added the lettering for ease of reference):

> [a] The first is limited to the immediate *stimulation of the bodily organs* by external objects; this can consist in nothing but the *motion* of the particles of the organs, and any change of shape and position resulting from this motion. [b] The second grade comprises all the immediate *effects produced in the mind* as a result of its being united with a bodily organ which is affected in this way. Such effects include the *perceptions* of pain, pleasure, thirst, hunger, colors, sound, taste, smell, heat, cold and the like, which arise from the union and as it were the intermingling of mind and body, as explained in the Sixth Meditation. [c] The third grade includes *judgments* about things outside us which we have accustomed to make from our earliest years – judgments which are occasioned by the movements of these bodily organs. (AT VII.436-7; my ital.)

To further clarify, Descartes then provides the following analysis of how these three 'grades' are involved in the sensory experience commonly described as 'seeing a stick':

> [a] [R]ays of light are reflected off the stick and set up certain *movements* in the optic nerve and, via the optic *nerve*, in the *brain*, as I have explained at some length in the Optics. This movement in the brain, which is common to us and the brutes, is the first grade of sensory response. [b] This leads to the second grade, which extends to the mere *perception* of the color and light reflected from the stick; it arises from the fact the *mind* is so intimately conjoined with the body that it is affected by the movements which occur in it. Nothing more than this should be referred to the *sensory faculty*, if we wish to distinguish it carefully from the intellect. [c] But suppose that, as a result of being affected by this sensation of color, I *judge* that a stick, located outside me, is colored; suppose that on the basis of the extension of the color and its boundaries together with its position in relation to the parts of the brain I make a *rational calculation* about the size, shape and distance of the stick: although such reasoning is commonly assigned to the senses (which is why I have here referred it to the third grade of sensing), it is clear that it depends solely on the *intellect*. (AT VII.437-8; my ital.)

On Descartes' picture as it is elaborated here, we need to separate out three distinct 'grades' within what is commonly called 'sensing', and assigning each to a different capacity or power we possess. [a] First, there is the *physiological* grade, consisting in '*movements*' that arise in our *bodily*

organs due to being affected by other moving bodies, movements which then are communicated through our nerves, and ultimately into our brain. [b] Second, there is the *perceptual* grade, consisting in '*perceptions*' that arise as 'effects' in our *mind* due to the mind's being 'affected' by the aforementioned corporeal movements, though this affection operates only on our '*sensory* capacity', without the involvement of our intellect. [c] Finally, there is the *intellectual* grade, consisting in '*judgments*' (and 'rational calculations'), which also arise in our mind (rather than our body), but which are assigned to not to our sensory faculty but instead to our *intellect*.

This same threefold division, finally, can also be found in Descartes' later 1649 treatise, *The Passions of the Soul*:

> Those [perceptions] which we refer to things outside us, namely to the objects of our senses, are caused by these objects (at least when our opinion are not false). For in that case [a] the objects produce certain movements in the organs of the external senses and, by means of the nerves, produce other movements in the brain, which cause [b] the soul to sense them [les sent]. Thus when we see the light of a torch and hear the sound of a bell, the sound and light are two different actions which, simply by [a] producing two different movements in some of our nerves, and through them in our brain, [b] give to the soul two different sentiments [sentimens]. And [c] we refer these to the subjects we suppose to be their cause in such a way that we think we see the torch itself and hear the bell, and not that we sense [sentir] merely the movements coming from them. (AT XI.346).

Here Descartes aligns the 'perceptions' which are the 'effects' produced 'in' the mind with '*sentiments*', i.e., things which are 'in the soul' and distinct from the physical objects responsible for bringing about the bodily movements of the first stage. Descartes also clarifies the immediate object of the sentiments/perceptions: the 'movements coming from' the physical objects, rather than these physical objects themselves. Finally, when we make judgments about things like torches and bells, the process is a mediated or indirect one of our 'referring' these 'sentiments' to outer objects, rather than just apprehending the objects directly.

If this establishes that Descartes embraced the broad distinction within psychical states between [b] mere sensing (having perceptions, sentiments; as opposed to [a] undergoing merely *bodily* affection) and [c] the intellectual activity of judging, what I now want to introduce is evidence that Descartes also embraces a further intermediate level or stage between mere sensation (as a form of perception) and intellection -- on par, at least in broad strokes, with the level Aristotle took to be constituted by memory and *imagination*.

Though, throughout his writings, Descartes regularly distinguishes between 'sensing [sentire]', 'imagining [imaginari]', and 'intellection or understanding [intelligere]' (cf. *Principia* I.9 AT VIII.7; I.32 AT VIII.17), the exact nature of the imagination itself is not specified at length.[10] That imagining is distinct from understanding is clear from Descartes' discussion of the wax example in the 2nd *Meditation* and his discussion of the chiliagon in the 6th *Meditation*. In the 6th *Meditation* Descartes also claims that it is through 'memory [memoria]' that certain mental contents that are first perceived by the senses (such as colors, sounds, tastes, pain) 'reach' the imagination (AT VII.74). This both implies the distinctness of imagining from sensing and also indicates at least partially something of the nature of what is involved in imagination over and above mere sensing: it is something which draws upon memory to supply

itself with previous perceptions as its content.

A bit more on the intermediary role of imagination can be filled in from Descartes' early remarks in the *Rules*. In Rule 8, Descartes distinguishes the intellect from both 'sense [*sensus*]', 'imagination', and 'memory' as three other faculties which are able to help or hinder the intellect in its quest for 'science [*scientia*]' (AT X.398). In Rule 12, Descartes says a bit more about this division – though here Descartes is explicit that, for the most part, what he is here discussing under the heading of imagination and memory are actually parts of the *body* rather than capacities of the soul (cf. AT X.412-14).[11] Even so, this 'corporeal' imagination or 'fantasy [*phantasia*]' here is said to be a place where the 'common sense [*sensus communis*] fashions figures or ideas' and also a place where these ideas and figures can be 'retained', which is what we then call 'memory' (AT X.414). Here the imagination is given a more productive role, insofar as it supplies a new content (e.g., figure, shape) to what had been merely sensed (e.g., color).

Admittedly, Descartes' concern in the more familiar metaphysical works is predominantly with separating out the 'pure' intellect from the senses and the imagination, and demonstrating that genuine cognition can be obtained only through intellection itself. What is more, it is clear that Descartes would not be sympathetic with any Aristotelian-sounding claims that cognition via intellection itself *always* 'arises' from sense or imagination. Nevertheless, in his more physio-psychological works, Descartes does allow that, at least when the intellect means to 'examine' anything that is 'referred to *bodies*', our mind must first 'form' the 'idea' of it 'in the imagination', which is itself a process that gets going (at least paradigmatically) by first 'exhibiting [exhibenda] the thing itself to be represented by the idea in the external senses', as he puts it in the *Rules* (AT X.417; my ital.).[12] This is so, even if, as the 2nd *Meditation* emphasizes, it is ultimately the intellect alone, rather than the imagination, which 'perceives' the real nature of the physical object (e.g. wax) in question.[13]

Before moving on to Leibniz, we can return briefly to the question of Descartes' views on animals. For despite his disagreements with the Aristotelians, Descartes, too, seems to associate the grades of sensing from the Sixth *Replies* with a division among kinds of substances. It is clear from Descartes' physics that he accepts that all *bodies* (all corporeal substance) can communicate motion and hence 'contain' movements, and so (in principle) can undergo the first grade of 'sensory response'. Only beings with *souls* that have a '*sensory* faculty', however, can undergo the second grade, since this consists in the arising of perceptions 'in' a mind. Finally, only minds with both a sensory faculty and an *intellect* can undergo the third grade, since this consists in the arising of judgments (rational calculations) in response to perceptions (sensations).

Now, while it is clear that *human* beings can undergo all three grades of sensing, and while it follows that all *bodies* can undergo the first grade, there has been some disagreement as to whether, for Descartes, there are beings which can undergo merely the first and the second without being able to achieve the third grade (intellection). In fact, the Sixth *Replies* themselves give us at least some reason to think that Descartes would accept that non-human (non-'rational') *animals* ('brutes') are just such beings. To be sure, it is clear from these *Replies* (and elsewhere) that Descartes rejects the idea that brutes are able to *think*: 'the brutes possess

no *thought* whatsoever' (AT VII.426; my ital.). Even so, Descartes does here seem to allow that brutes are able to *have sensations*. This comes out when, in response to the charge that he assumes that the way that 'beasts operate' can be 'explained by means of mechanics without invoking any sensation [*sensus*], life or soul', Descartes insists on clarifying that what he mean to affirm is that such an explanation can go through 'without invoking *thought* [*cogitatio*]' – after which he explicitly acknowledges that 'I accept that the brutes have what is commonly called 'life', and a corporeal *soul* and organic *sensation* [*sensus*]' (AT VII.427; my ital.).[14]

What is especially striking for our purposes, however, is Descartes' willingness to also ascribe a form of *imagination* and *memory* to animals as well – hence, psychical states on the second level of the Aristotelian cognitive-psychological progression. Though this is treated more thoroughly and directly in his physiological-psychological works,[15] even the 2nd *Meditation* itself gives an indication of this. At the conclusion of the discussion of our cognition of the wax, when Descartes considers on which occasion we should be said to have the most 'perfect and evident perceiving of what wax is' (i.e., cognition proper), he again distinguishes our relation to the wax (1) through the 'external senses', (2) through 'what is called the common sense, i.e., the power of imagination', and then (3) finally through the acts of 'distinguishing' and 'judging' (AT VII.32). In again emphasizing, however, that it is only through the final sort of mental activity that we are able 'to cognize [cognoscere]' the wax itself, Descartes here also adds that it is only this third stage which 'is not possible without a *human* mind [humana mente]', remarking about the previous stages, by contrast: 'what of this is an *animal* not able to have' (ibid.)?

§ 3. From *perceptio* to the intellect in Leibniz's psychology

While there is much more to say about Descartes' psychology on these points, the foregoing should suffice to bring out the broadly Aristotelian contours of the Cartesian account of the progression from (1) the initial psychological-perceptual (rather than physiological) stage of mere sensation, through (2) the collection and retention of such representations in the imagination (memory, 'common sense') and the 'fashioning' of 'figures and ideas' out of them, and on to (3) our intellectual recognition of physical objects (such as wax) through judgment and reasoning. What I want to show in the present section is the extent to which Leibniz, too, embraces this sort of threefold progressive model – while at the same time also acknowledging the manner in which Leibniz sees himself as departing from the Cartesians over the possibility that both (1) and (2) could obtain without (3). I will draw mostly upon two of Leibniz's late writings from 1714, the *Principles of Nature and Grace* and the *Monadology*.

In his *Principles of Nature and Grace* (PNG),[16] Leibniz distinguishes between three kinds of simple substances or 'monads': lifes, souls, and minds (cf. PNG § 1). A '*life* [vie]' is a simple substance which is characterized by certain 'internal qualities' and certain 'actions' (cf. PNG § 2). The former are what Leibniz calls '*perceptions*', which consist in 'the representation of the composite, or the external, in what is simple'; the 'actions' of the monad arise from 'appetitions' which are certain 'tendencies to go from one perception to another' and are 'the principles of

change' in the monad (cf. PNG § 2). Leibniz also takes a life to be associated with a body (cf. PNG § 4). In fact, perceptions themselves 'represent' changes in the 'organs' of the associated body; these changes in organs, which result from the organs being 'adjusted', are what Leibniz calls 'impressions' (PNG § 4).

A '*soul* [*ame*]', by contrast, is a life which not only has a body which undergoes impressions, as well as perceptions which represent them, but also has 'perception *accompanied by memory* [memoire]', or 'perception of which there *remains an echo* long enough to make itself heard on occasion' (PNG § 4; my ital.). It is this more complex sort of mental state which Leibniz calls '*sentiment* [*sentiment*]' (ibid.). Leibniz takes *this* sort of mental state, and the soul which is capable of it, to be distinctive of 'animals [*animaux*]'.[17]

Yet though sentiment, and animal souls more generally, therefore involves more complexity than mere perception and 'life' – as it also involves memory – even this further complexity does not yet bring into play anything specifically *intellectual*. More is required, thinks Leibniz, to 'raise' a soul 'to the level of *reason*', at which point it becomes 'something more sublime' and 'is counted among the *minds* [*esprits*]' rather than mere lifes or souls (PNG § 4; my ital.). Leibniz accepts that 'there is a connection [liaison] among the perceptions of animals which bears some *resemblance* to reason', though upon closer inspection he thinks we can see that 'this connection is only founded in the *memory* of facts or effects', and 'not at all in the *cognition* [*connaissance*] of causes' (PNG § 5; my ital.). Beyond mere perception (in life), and the repetition and connection of perceptions in memory (in souls), minds are able to engage in the further act of '*noticing* [remarquer]' these interconnections and 'performing *reflective* acts', such that they are even capable of '*considering* [considerer] what is called 'I" – i.e., 'substance, soul, mind' *itself* (PNG § 5; my ital.).

Leibniz's name for this 'noticing' of perceptions is '*ap*perception': '[I]t is good to distinguish between *perception*, which is the internal state of the monad representing external things, and *apperception*, which is consciousness [conscience], or the cognition [connaissance] of this internal state' (PNG § 4). Leibniz's discussion here implies that only souls which are *minds* can attain this state: apperception is 'something not given to all souls, nor at all times to a given soul' (PNG § 4). It is because they are without these states that mere animals 'are called *beasts* [bêtes]' (PNG § 5).[18]

Now, Leibniz signals that he takes his introduction of the middle stage of sentiment, between mere perception (sensation) and intellection (judgment, reason), and his introduction of the soul as the correlative intermediate type of monad, between mere life and mind, to distinguish his position sharply from the Cartesian doctrine of animality. At least as Leibniz understands it, the Cartesian position 'shocks common opinion' by 'refusing sentiment to beasts', such that the Cartesians 'believe that only *minds* are monads, that there are no *souls* in beasts, still less other principles of *life*' (PNG § 4; my ital.). The cause of this, Leibniz thinks, is that, in their philosophical reflection, Cartesians in general 'disregard' in the human case all of 'the perceptions that we do not apperceive' (PNG § 4), with sentiments forming a special class of these. On their view, rather than seeing animals as enjoying something like a 'prolonged stupor', in which there is a 'great confusion of perceptions', all of which are nevertheless pres-

ent and prolongedly so (even if not themselves 'noticed' or 'apperceived'), the Cartesians see animals as being in a state of 'death', in which 'all perception ceases' (ibid.).

If we now turn to Leibniz's account of human psychology in the *Monadology* (M),[19] we can find the same sorts of distinctions at work, if with a slight change in terminology. Here too we find Leibniz describing monads as possessing both an 'internal *principle*' of change (M § 11) and also a 'diversity' of states in the monad as '*that which changes*' (M § 12). The latter is again associated with '*perception*' as 'the passing state which involves and represents a multitude in the unity' (M § 14). The former 'principle' is again associated with '*appetition*', as 'the action of the internal principle which brings about the change or passage from one perception to another' (M § 15).

In the place of the term 'life', Leibniz here refers to the simplest monads (substances) as mere '*entelechies*' (M § 18). While even these simplest monads possess a kind of 'sufficiency [suffisance; autarkeia]' such that they can be counted as 'automata', what distinguishes them from other kinds of more complex monads, such as *souls* in the proper sense, is that they do not possess any 'sentiment', with sentiment again being singled out as 'something *more* than simple perception' – namely, perception which is 'more distinct and accompanied by memory [memoire]' (M § 19). Here Leibniz also goes on to describe the activity of memory itself as involving the *imagination* (due at least in some cases to 'habit [habitude]') (M § 27), such that both perceptions and even sentiments too are reproduced in animal souls: they are 'led to have sentiments similar to those they have had before' (M § 26).

Also as in the PNG, while souls are therefore to be distinguished from mere simple monads by being capable of more complex states involving memory, imagination, and habit, they themselves are again to be distinguished from *minds*, on the basis of their lack of reason (M § 29).[20] Human minds come to have reason itself (and 'the sciences') through our 'cognition [connaissance] of eternal and necessary truths', and this cognition itself also eventually 'raises' us to 'cognition of *ourselves* and of God' (M § 29). This happens through further '*reflective* acts' which 'enable us to think [penser] of that which is called *me* [Moi] and enable us to consider [considerer] that this or that is in *us*' (M § 30).

In both works, then, Leibniz distinguishes (2) an intermediate animal layer of sentiment, lying between (1) mere ('simple') perception and (3) the kind of reflexive consciousness and cognition that is distinctive of rational minds. As with Aristotle and Descartes, Leibniz too singles out the capacities of imagination and memory as what marks off this second layer from the first sensory though still representational layer of mere perception. While Leibniz therefore accepts that only rational minds are capable of (3) the reflective cognition that this or that state is in us, he continues to accept both that there are (1) states which can be 'in' a mind momentarily without being noticed reflectively, but also that (2) states can remain prolongedly present in the mind or even be repeatedly re-presented in the mind without being noticed reflectively. In other words, Leibniz seems to be working with a more generic distinction between (3) apperceived perceptions (perception with '*consciousness* [conscience]' (M § 14)) and (1-2) non-apperceived perceptions. This seems to track a basic distinction between there *being* an internal representational state 'in us' – even one that is in us by having been reproduced in

us out of our memory via imagination due to some habit – and our having a kind of '*consciousness*' ('thinking', 'considering', noticing') of it *as* in us.[21]

When Leibniz again criticizes the Cartesians in the *Monadology*, it is now more directly about their treatment of this more general class of non-apperceived perceptions: because Cartesians 'took no account of the perceptions that we do *not* apperceive', their account of animal life 'failed badly', such that they were led to believe that 'minds alone are monads and that there are no animal souls or other entelechies' (M § 14; my ital.). The Cartesians thereby (allegedly) fail to recognize not only (2) (animal) sentiment but also even (1) mere (simple) perception, neither of which per se (according to Leibniz) are cases of (3) *apperceived* perceptions. The Cartesians (again, allegedly) only allow for there to be perceptions 'in' us when we in fact have the kind of reflective intellectual self-cognition that Leibniz takes to be distinctive only of apperceived perceptions.[22]

Now, while the foregoing establishes Leibniz's recognition of the Aristotelian division among types of psychical substances, and also his embrace of the idea that there is a progression among these substances, what is still to be shown is the parallel progression among psychical acts or states that Leibniz takes to obtain *within* the human mind itself. One such exposition is given in the Preface to Leibniz's *New Essays*; I have added the numbering to help make the progression salient:

> [1] [T]here is at every moment an infinity of *perceptions* in us, though without apperception and without reflection, that is to say, an infinity of alterations in the soul itself which we do not apperceive, because these impressions are either too small or in too great a number or too uniform, such that they have nothing sufficiently distinctive on their own, [2] but when they are combined [jointes] with others, they do not fail to have their effect and to make themselves *felt* [se faire sentir], at least confusedly within the collection. [...] [3] [W]hen we are not alerted, so to speak, to *take up* [prendre garde] some of our own present perceptions, we allow them to pass by without *reflection* and even without being *noticed* [remarquées]. (NE Preface G 5: 46-47; my ital.)

In a well-known 1702 letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte, Leibniz gives more indication as to how the imagination in particular is involved in the second intermediate step of 'joining' or unifying perceptions:

> [S]ince our soul compares the numbers and shapes that are in colors, for example, with the numbers and shapes that are found by touch, there must be an *internal sense* in which the perceptions of these different external senses are found united [reunies]. This is called the *imagination*.... (G 6: 501)

Here Leibniz echoes Descartes by contrasting the work of the imagination with that of 'the external senses': while the latter are what 'make us cognize [nous font connoistre] their particular objects, which are colors, sounds, scents, flavors, and qualities of touch' (G 6: 499), it is only the imagination as 'internal sense' that is able to 'unify' perceptions of particular qualities into more holistic representations by joining together either multiple perceptions from a single sensory modality or even join perceptions together from across several sense-modalities. To do achieve this unification, the imagination makes use of 'notions of *common sense*', such as shape or number, which strictly speaking are not contained in the elementary perceptions themselves (G 6: 501).

This merely sensible unification, however, is distinct from whatever act of the intellect is required to achieve the *cognition* of those objects (things) which are thereby represented through these perceptions. As Leibniz goes on to make clear in this same letter, it is only through 'the understanding [*l'entendement*]' that our soul is able to recognize substances, qualities (properties), causes, effects, actions, and so on, rather than simply have or unify perceptions which represent such objects (G 6: 502). Still, Leibniz claims that the work of the imagination is a necessary stage along the way to cognition via sensory representation, and is also necessary for the latter to be able to be taken up by the understanding in reasoning: 'particular sensible qualities are susceptible of explications and reasonings *only* insofar as they contain [*renferment*] that which is common to objects of several external senses and belong [appartenir] to the internal sense' (G 6: 501).[23]

§ 4. 'Perceptio' as 'Empfindung', 'apperceptio' as 'Wahrnehmung': Leibnizianism in translation

While (again) there is much more to say about Leibniz's own philosophical psychology, along with additional points of overlap and distance from Descartes, enough has been said to draw out a basic, if high-level, continuity in Leibniz concerning the threefold division and progression within human psychology: from (1) merely *sensory* representation ('perception'), to (2) the collection and unification of such representations via memory and *imagination*, to (3) the use of the intellect or *understanding* to 'apperceive' these representations and to judge or cognize objects (substances, things) on the basis of the previous two layers. What we must now turn to is the question of the transmission – and potential transformation – of this perspective from Leibniz to Kant.

One important point of information concerns the decisions made by German intellectuals in the first half of the 18th century as they set out to forge a philosophical lexicon in German that would be best suited to capture the thoughts and concepts expressed by Leibniz in his French writings. These decisions on translation manifest themselves both in the direct translations of Leibniz's writings into German, but also in the emerging practice of providing German glosses (in the margins and the footnotes) to key terms in the Latin philosophy textbooks of the period – something which occurs in several textbooks that were very familiar to Kant himself.[24] I will therefore begin by looking to German translations of Leibniz's own works in the 1720s (§ 4.1), before turning (in § 4.2) to German glosses to the relevant terms which are provided in Latin textbooks written by philosophers influenced by Leibniz and familiar to Kant.

Our focus throughout will be on tracking the German terminology chosen to articulate the Aristotelian threefold progression. To anticipate: two key results from consulting the Leibniz-translations will be the perhaps surprising terminological coordinations, first, between Leibniz's French 'perception' and the German 'Empfindung' (i.e., the German word now commonly translated in English as 'sensation') rather than 'Wahrnehmung' (the German word now commonly translated in English as 'perception'), and then, between 'Wahrnehmung' and Leibniz's French '*ap*perception'. These translational conventions will then be confirmed via consultation of the German glosses in the Latin textbooks.

4.1. Leibniz in translation

Perhaps the single most instructive text in this regard is the 1720 German translation of Leibniz's *Monadology* by Heinrich Köhler, published as *Lehrsätze über die Monadologie* (LM). We will focus our attention on how Köhler renders the key passages in the sections from the *Monadology* discussed in the preceding section, beginning with M §14. In this passage, in which Leibniz first introduces what he calls (in French) 'perception', 'perception' itself is rendered by Köhler as '**Empfindung** oder *Perception*' – that is, first with the German word associated with *sensation* (emphasis is Köhler's), and then by giving Leibniz's original French 'perception', with Köhler signaling typographically that he is here including a foreign word.[25] In fact, Köhler adopts this method of providing Leibniz's words directly, either accompanying his choice of a German equivalent or (often) without any equivalent German given, throughout the rest of his translation. In the following sentence in M § 14, Köhler adopts the same convention, though this time he instead gives a Germanized Latin equivalent of Leibniz's French, writing '*Perceptiones* oder Empfindungen' for Leibniz's 'perceptions' (again signaling typographically that 'Perceptiones' is a foreign word).

What is equally crucial to note about this same second sentence of M § 14 is how Köhler renders the terms Leibniz uses to point up his contrast with the Cartesians on the existence of 'perceptions that one does not apperceive'. For Leibniz's original introduction of 'apperception or consciousness [conscience]' in the earlier first sentence of M § 14, Köhler gives 'Apperception oder **Bewust seyn**', again reproducing 'Apperception' as a foreign word and then giving a German gloss on it, this time the German word associated with being conscious (or consciousness) (LM § 14). In the second sentence of M § 14, however, Köhler now chooses to align Leibniz's 'apperceive' with two German phrases: first 'sich bewusst sein' but then also '*wahrnehmen*' (LM § 14).[26]

Now, as we have already noted above, in other circumstances the latter German word might itself *also* be rendered in English as 'perception', but here this would make a mess of the passage. Not only would rendering both Leibniz's (French) 'perception' and 'apperception' by the single English 'perception' have the effect of completely covering over the crucial conceptual difference that Leibniz means to be tracking with his different French terms, but it would force us to express Leibniz's challenge to the Cartesians as a failure to acknowledge 'perceptions [perceptions] which one does not perceive [aperçoit]'.[27] What is more, as consultation with Adelung's *Wörterbuch* from the period helps to make clear, the use of the term 'Wahrnehmung' in the 18th century is one that expresses *not* just a passive receiving (on the model of a Leibnizian 'perception') but rather a 'taking [*Nehmung*]' in which one is '*aware* [*wahr*-]'.[28]

Similar choices recur through the remainder of Köhler's translation. In M §21, for example, Leibniz's claim that 'when there is a great multitude of *petites perceptions* without any being distinct', the substance in question is 'stupified [étourdi]', gets rendered by Köhler as a claim about what happens when there is 'eine grosse Menge von kleinen Empfindungen' of the relevant sort (LM § 21).[29] Köhler also renders Leibniz's claims in M § 27 about imagination 'coming from [*vient de*]' particularly 'grand' or 'multitudinous' *perceptions*, in terms of the 'Einbildung' being 'awoken [*erwächset*]' by preceding '*Empfindungen*' (LM § 26). Concerning

apperception: in M § 23, Leibniz characterizes 'waking from stupor' as involving the fact that 'one *apperceives* [*s'apperçoit de*] one's *perceptions*'; Köhler renders the latter idea as the fact that one 'wahrnimmet seine Empfindungen und *perceptionen* wiederum' (LM § 22).[30] In M § 8, Leibniz makes the related claim that 'if simple substances did not differ at all in their qualities, there would be no way of *apperceiving* [*s'apperçevoir*] any change in things';[31] this latter phrase, too, is rendered by Köhler as there being no way that one could 'in denen Dingen einige Veränderung *wahrnehmen*' (LM § 8).

What do we find when turn to the stage that Leibniz classifies as intermediate to perception and apperception – namely, the sentiment had by animals through memory and imagination? Interestingly, with respect to M § 19, where Leibniz first introduces the stage of *sentiment*, where Leibniz writes that '*sentiment* is something more than a simple *perception*', here Köhler glosses '*sentiment*' (which he includes and marks as foreign; cf. LM § 25) with '*Gedancke*', or the German word for 'thought'.[32] As far as I can tell, this is the only place where he glosses '*sentiment*' with '*Gedancke*', but it is still worth noting that the idea Leibniz had in mind – concerning a mental state that includes something *more* than mere 'perception/Empfindung' – was something Köhler felt was akin to 'thought' rather than merely a product of the senses.[33]

One final choice that is worth noting concerns Köhler's use of the German word 'Vorstellung', now typically rendered as 'representation'. In relation to M § 14, Köhler associates 'vorstellen' with what every '*perception*' does (cf. LM § 14). This occurs as well in LM § 20: where Leibniz speaks not just of 'perception' but of 'distinct perception [perception distinguée]', here Köhler writes: 'deutliche *perception* oder Vorstellung'.[34]

4.2. German glosses by post-Leibnizians

The foregoing puts into place one important intermediate piece of the puzzle which connects Leibniz's French terminology with Kant's eventual choices of German expressions to name the elements of his own version of the progression from sensory representation toward cognition.[35] What I now want to show is that a closely parallel set of correlations were continued among the next generation of philosophers trained in the so-called 'Leibniz-Wolffian' tradition, when they were faced with the task of rendering their correlative *Latin* expressions into the newly emerging philosophical German.

One important example is the 1757 fourth edition of Alexander Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* (1st 1739), the text on metaphysics that Kant used in his lecture courses. From this fourth edition forward, Baumgarten began including German glosses on the Latin words for certain key concepts in metaphysics. These first steps toward linguistic coordination were then furthered substantially when a partially abridged German translation of the *Metaphysica* was completed by Georg Meier in 1766.

In the opening sections on psychology, Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* claims that 'the foundation [fundus; Grund] of the soul is a 'complex of obscure *perceptiones*' (§ 511). In § 514 Baumgarten then defines a 'total *perceptio*' as the phrase 'the whole of representations [totum

repraesentationum] in the soul'. At this point, Baumgarten glosses 'total *perceptio*' as 'die gantze Vorstellung' (ibid.); he continues this practice in the subsequent sections (cf. §§ 516-517; § 634), though he also uses 'Vorstellung' to gloss 'repraesentatio' in §521. Interestingly, in §534 Baumgarten distinguishes *perceptio* in general from *sensatio* in particular, insofar as a *sensatio* is specifically the 'representation of my present state'. 'Sensatio' itself is here glossed as 'Empfindung' (ibid.). Both of these choices are followed in Meier's 1766 translation (cf. Meier § 378 for 'perceptio' as 'Vorstellung';[36] and Meier § 396 for 'sensationes' as 'Empfindungen').

In the *Metaphysica* Baumgarten himself doesn't (to my knowledge) introduce 'wahrnehmen' as a gloss on any particular act of the soul, though he does offer 'das wahrzunehmende' as a rendering for 'that which is observable [*observabilia*] (*phaenomena*)' (cf. § 425).[37] In his 1761 *Acroasis Logica*, however – which Kant had in his library,[38] and which also continues the practice of providing German glosses on certain key terms – Baumgarten does use 'wahrnehmen', and his use likewise continues the tradition we saw emerging above. After having already aligned 'perceptiones' and 'repraesentationes' both with 'Vorstellungen' (§ 3), Baumgarten then uses 'wahrnehmen' in the German glosses, *not* for mere 'percipere', but rather for '*ap*percipere' and 'esse conscius'. The following Latin phrase from § 15: 'that which we distinguish from something else, we apperceive [appercipimus], we are ourselves conscious of it', is rendered: 'das stellen wir uns vor, das sind wir uns bewußt, das bemerken wir, das nehmen wir wahr' (ibid.).[39] Crucially, apperception itself is associated in Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* with acts of 'attention [attentio; Aufmerksamkeit]' (cf. § 628), which is itself identified as an act of the *intellect* which is directed toward representations of sense and imagination (cf. § 625).

Strikingly, something close to this set of conventions for Latin-German coordination – and the same threefold division between sense, imagination, and intellect – was also followed even by those philosophers who were explicitly critical of various aspects of the Leibniz-Wolffian programme. A particularly important example in this regard comes from Martin Knutzen, one of Kant's more influential teacher. In his 1747 *Logica* (L), Knutzen anticipates the practice of Meier and Baumgarten by providing German-language subject-headings for each of the sections of the *Logica* in the margins. In L §24, Knutzen first aligns 'to sense [*sentire*]' with 'to perceive [*percipere*] with the senses', which occurs 'when we represent [*repraesentamus*] something present to ourselves', such that an 'act of sensing [*actus sentiendi*]' is 'sensation [*sensatio*]'. After dividing sensing into external and internal forms (along roughly Kantian lines), Knutzen then defines 'the faculty of imagining, or imagination' as that which 'is able to reproduce in ourselves images of absent things previously perceived by the senses' (L § 24). In the margins, Knutzen summarizes the contents of this section in German as follows: 'was empfinden, die Empfindung, die Empfindungskraft oder der Sinn und die Einbildungskraft sei'.

In L § 27 Knutzen affirms the now-familiar thesis that the senses (sensations) are the 'foundation [fundamentum]' (in the margin: 'ground [*Grund*]') for the imagination – and then also adds that they are also the 'basis' for 'all our cognition [*cognitio; Erkenntnis*]'. In L § 29 Knutzen then also clarifies another task that the imagination is responsible for: in the course of reproduction or retention of previous sensations, it 'brings forth *connected* representations *together* [*bringet verknüpfte Vorstellungen zusammen hervor*]'.

As with the Leibnizians, it is only *after* introducing both sensing and imagining, and having spelled out their psychological ordering, that Knutzen introduces the 'intellect or understanding [*intellectus*; *Verstand*]' in L § 33. In L § 34 Knutzen begins to enumerate what the understanding adds: it is 'the faculty of attending, reflecting, abstracting, comparing, reasoning, etc.'. Its first act, however, is what Knutzen calls 'simple apprehension [*apprehensio simplex*]',[40] by which Knutzen means 'the act of mind whereby representations of objects of produced by the senses or imagination are contemplated [contemplatur] without affirmation or negation' – with Knutzen here clarifying that the contemplated 'representation itself in the mind is called *perceptio*' (L § 35). Knutzen's marginal German gloss here on 'apprehensio' itself, as this first reflective act of understanding itself (and so, rather than the 'perceptio' toward which such reflection is directed), is: 'wahrnehmen oder bewusst seyn' – i.e., of a piece with what we have seen above.

§ 5. Kant on the place of 'Wahrnehmung' in the progression through the senses, the imagination, and apperception

From the preceding consideration of the tradition in and after Leibniz, we have uncovered a common set of analytical divisions, along with a fairly consistent set of terminological alignments. More specifically, we have found a consistent alignment of 'Wahrnehmung' not with (1) the most elementary stage of *sensation* (Leibnizian 'perception'), nor even with (2) the secondary stage of reproduction and unification of sensations by the *imagination* and memory (Leibnizian 'sentiment'), but rather with (3) a third, higher, 'reflective' stage of becoming 'conscious' or 'aware' of sensation and imagination by the use of our *understanding* (Leibnizian 'apperception').

For readers of Kant, this particular threefold distinction should sound familiar, as it is cast in roughly the same terms (sense, imagination, apperception) that Kant himself uses in the Analytic of Concepts – both in the lead-up to the Transcendental Deduction, and then again throughout the A-Deduction and (though less prominently) in the B-Deduction as well – in order to characterize 'the three subjective sources of cognition' (KrV, A 97). What is more, as I will show below, there continue to be fairly precise parallels in the details of how himself articulates the distinctions between the contributions of these three 'sources' (cf. § 5.1). Seeing these parallels will in turn help make even less surprising the fact that Kant also follows the tradition in his own use of 'Wahrnehmung', associating it not with mere sensation (or intuition), or even imagination per se, but rather with a form of *consciousness* ('apperception') of these representations (cf. § 5.2).

Nevertheless, I will also argue that it is not clear that Kant follows suit with this tradition on all fronts. More specifically, I will argue that Kant goes beyond the post-Leibnizians in more clearly identifying (3) the stage of apperception (consciousness) *per se* as something that does *not* already *involve* the understanding or its concepts, characterizing it rather as something more like (1) sense and (2) imagination – i.e., as something which '*makes possible* even the understanding' (A97; my ital.), without itself already *being* the understanding. I will show that this is what lies behind Kant's distinction between apperception per se and what at various

points he calls 'the *unity* of apperception' (§ 5.3); only the latter, but not the former, should be identified with the understanding – or so I will argue below.

5.1. Sense, imagination, apperception in the Analytic of Concepts

Once we have the traditional threefold progression in mind, several things about Kant's own path in the Analytic of Concepts become slightly less mysterious, since it becomes evident that Kant is proceeding largely on the basis of a traditional conception of the psychological-developmental stages of representationality which are required to achieve the cognition of objects, by leading up to the use of understanding.

Consider, first, Kant's use of this threefold division in the introductory sections to the Analytic. In §10, in the course of specifying the 'clue [*Leitfaden*]' to the discovery of the pure concepts of understanding, Kant makes note of the kind of 'content' that the understanding will have given to it, so as to provide its concepts with 'a matter', and to thereby 'make a cognition out of' this content (KrV, B 102). The first source of this content is one that comes as no surprise to readers of Kant – namely, the 'manifold of sensibility', which Kant here notes has been the subject-matter of the Aesthetic (as the science of sensibility). Yet Kant here also then introduces a further, though less commonly noticed, second source of content or matter, above and beyond mere sensibility – namely, the *imagination*. The addition of something from our imagination is necessary because of the way our understanding ('our thinking') is constituted: it 'requires that this manifold first be gone through [*durchgegangen*], taken up [*aufgenommen*], and combined [*verbunden*] in a certain way, in order to make a cognition out of it' (ibid.). This further activity is supplied by the imagination, in the form of what Kant here calls 'synthesis', as that 'alone' which 'properly collects [*sammelt*] the elements for cognitions and unifies [*vereinigt*] them into a certain content' (KrV, B 103).

Now, though it is common to think (perhaps especially in the B-edition) that Kant assigns all synthesis to the understanding,[41] here Kant says explicitly that 'synthesis in general [überhaupt] is...the mere effect of the power of the *imagination*, a blind though indispensable function of the soul' (KrV, B 103; my ital.). The understanding is not what is responsible for synthesis *as such*, but (as Kant then goes on to say) is instead responsible for a further act: the 'function that pertains to the *understanding*' is 'to *bring* this synthesis *to concepts*' (KrV, B 103; my ital.). What is more, though synthesis by the imagination lies at 'the first origin of our cognition' and so is something 'without which we would have no cognition at all', it is only this subsequent activity of the understanding (of bringing synthesis to concepts) 'by means of which' we are '*first* provided' with 'cognition *in the proper sense* [*in eigentlicher Bedeutung*]' (KrV, B 103; my ital.).

In the following paragraph, we then see Kant explicitly laying out the familiar threefold progression – from sense, to imagination, to understanding; I have added numbering to help make it more salient:

> [1] The first thing that must be given to us...for the cognition of all objects is the *manifold* of... [sensibility]; [2] the *synthesis* of this manifold by means of the power of imagination is the second

> thing, but it still does not yield cognition. [3] The concepts that give this...synthesis *unity*...are the third thing necessary for cognition of an object that comes before us (KrV, B 104)[42]

When Kant returns to this progression toward cognition (viz. experience as empirical cognition) at the outset of the A-Deduction, the terminological parallel with the Leibnizians becomes even more salient:

> There are...three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul) which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experiences, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely, *sense*, *the power of imagination*, and *apperception*. (KrV, A 94; cf. KrV, A 115)

And in this later passage Kant again separates out '*synthesis*' as what 'is grounded [gründet sich]' on the imagination, with this being again distinguished from 'the *unity* of this synthesis', which 'is grounded' on apperception (as understanding) (ibid.).[43]

5.2. Kant's use of 'Wahrnehmung' in the Analytic

Given this fairly direct inheritance from the tradition of the stages of progression toward cognition, it is perhaps less surprising that Kant also closely follows tradition in his technical use of the term 'Wahrnehmung'. For Kant, as for the Leibnizians, 'Wahrnehmung' picks out, not Leibnizian 'perception'/'Empfindung', but rather the higher-level act of *becoming conscious* of such elementary sensory representations. Now, Kant departs slightly from the tradition insofar as he introduces a further layer of analysis in between (1) sensation and (2) imagination – namely, what Kant calls 'intuition [*Anschauung*]', which consists of a manifold of sensations 'ordered' according to a form (cf. KrV, B 34). By being constituted out of sensations ordered according to a form, the resulting intuition itself has not just a single sensory quale as the object it represents, but a whole field of qualia that Kant names an 'appearance [*Erscheinung*]' (cf. KrV, B 33-34). Hence Kant's descriptions of 'Wahrnehmung' likewise depart slightly from the Leibnizians, by referring both to the consciousness of sensation, and of intuition, and of appearances.

In the other relevant respects, however, Kant's account parallels the Leibnizians quite closely. Kant, too, distinguishes Wahrnehmung from the original givenness of sensory contents: 'the first thing that is given to us is appearance, which, if it is combined with *consciousness* [*Bewußtsein*], is called *Wahrnehmung*...' (KrV, A 119-120; my ital.); 'The *consciousness* of an empirical intuition is called *Wahrnehmung*' (ÜE, AA 8: 217; my ital.). Kant also takes Wahrnehmung to depend not just on there being a manifold of sensibility given, but also on there being a synthesis of this manifold by the imagination. In contrast to Knutzen, however, Kant uses 'apprehension' to name this imaginative-synthetic act, rather than reserving it for the first operation of the understanding in contemplating a representation: 'There is thus an active faculty of the synthesis of this manifold in us, which we call imagination, and whose action...I call apprehension' (KrV, A 120). Still, Kant retains the basic idea that an act of imagination is required to 'make possible' the transformation of a merely given sensory

representation that we have 'in' mind into something that is accompanied 'with consciousness' – i.e., into *Wahrnemung*:

> [B]y the *synthesis of apprehension* I understand the placing together [*Zusammensetzung*] of the manifold in an empirical intuition, through which *Wahrnehmung*, i.e., empirical consciousness of it (as appearance) becomes possible. (KrV, B 160)

> If I therefore make, e.g., the empirical intuition of a house into *Wahrnehmung* through apprehension of its manifold.... (KrV, B 162)

Again, note that apprehension by the imagination is not here said to be identical with the 'empirical consciousness' (Wahrnehmung) that it 'makes possible'; rather it is said to be one of its conditions (cf. AA 22: 476; AA 23: 18).

5.3. Apperception vs. the unity of apperception

While the foregoing allows Kant to continue to keep faith with the tradition by assigning *Wahrnehmung* itself, not to the ('blind') imagination, but rather to a still higher capacity for 'consciousness', it is less clear, however, that Kant himself means to assign the act of becoming conscious to the *understanding* per se. As we have seen, for the Leibnizians, Wahrnehmung itself constitutes a kind of self-consciousness or apperception, insofar as it consists in a consciousness of one's own representational states (things 'in' us, parts (predicates) of our minds, etc.). Since the Leibnizians also identified the capacity for recognizing (thinking, considering) of oneself with the intellect (understanding), it was natural for them think of Wahrnehmung itself consists in the 'first', 'simple' act of the intellect.

What is especially striking, then, about Kant's own analysis in the Deduction, in light of this tradition, is Kant's further distinction between (a) the mere *consciousness* of one's state – Wahrnehmung, empirical consciousness, or what he also calls 'empirical apperception', which is made possible by through the imagination's synthesis of apprehension – and (b) the '*unity* of apperception' or 'unity of consciousness', which is something further, and something that is brought about by a representation of the synthesis 'through' the pure *concepts* of *understanding* (KrV, A 119).[44] Keeping track of this distinction is important for our purposes because it is ultimately only 'the *unity* of apperception *in relation to* the synthesis of the imagination' which is said to be 'the *understanding*' – rather than the act of empirical *apperception* per se, let alone the imaginative-synthetic act of *apprehension* which makes (empirical) apperception (Wahrnehmung) itself possible (cf. KrV, A 119; my ital.; cf. AA 23: 18).

By drawing a distinction between consciousness and the conceptual representation of its unity, Kant thereby opens up room for the possibility that, as merely empirical consciousness (of parts, states of oneself, empirical apperception), Wahrnehmung itself does not itself involve any representation through the *concepts* of the *unity* of apperception. It is striking, then, to note that, though he explicitly includes consciousness in his definition of Wahrnehmung, Kant himself does not anywhere (to my knowledge) demand that the consciousness that is constitutive of Wahrneh-

mung be one that includes the representation of the *unity* of this consciousness through *concepts*. Rather, the latter idea is introduced primarily in the context of the transition from Wahrnehmung (empirical consciousness of sensations; cf. KrV, B 207) to *experience* as empirical *cognition* of objects 'though' Wahrnehmungen (cf. KrV, B 218-219).[45] Indeed, at the outset of the Logic, Kant explicitly characterizes the understanding itself, not as the capacity for consciousness of representations, but as the 'capacity for *cognizing* an object by means of [sensory] representations' (KrV, B 74-75).

What, then, is the capacity for Wahrnehmung itself, if it is not the understanding? As far as I can tell, the main possibility that suggest itself is that Wahrnehmung is achieved by the 'capacity' or 'source' that Kant names in the A-deduction simply as *apperception* – rather than the capacity responsible for representing its unity. Indeed, in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Kant explicitly identifies apperception as the 'capacity [Vermögen] for *consciousness*' (MAN, AA 4: 542). Furthermore, the distinction between consciousness and apperception, on the one hand, and the understanding, on the other, is anticipated in Kant's notes from the 1770s. In Reflexion 410, for example, Kant notes that 'consciousness belongs to the higher capacity, but not as a necessary condition to the understanding' (AA 15: 166). To be sure, this would be to introduce a sharp distinction between apperception per se and understanding, which is admittedly not at all a commonplace among readers of Kant, but the foregoing has already suggested the need for this sort of distinction. And note once again that in the A-deduction apperception per se is classified along with sense and imagination as a 'source' that 'makes possible' the understanding (cf. KrV, A 97), rather than being identified with it.

Especially in light of these comments from the lectures, we might also expect Kant to more explicitly broaden the set of psychical states that are available to animals souls which do not possess an understanding, to include not just sensation, intuition, and imagination, but also Wahrnehmung itself as empirical apperception.[46] To my knowledge, in his published writings Kant doesn't ever explicitly ascribe this capacity to animals, but he seems to do just this in the notes from his lectures on logic compiled by Jaesche (cf. Log, AA 9: 64 ff.) as well as in his correspondence.

In his logic notes, Kant again draws the distinction between mere 'representing [*vorstellen*]' and 'representing with consciousness', and again identifies the latter with 'wahrnehmen',[47] before contrasting both of these with 'cognizing'. Strikingly, he also here notes a still further level of psychical activity, this time in between Wahrnehmung (consciousness) and cognition – namely, 'to be acquainted [*kennen*]' with something. What is especially of interest for our purposes, is that he here ascribes the capacity to be acquainted to animals – and hence, by implication, it would seem, *both* the lower capacities for mere representing and for Wahrnehmung, too (Log, AA 9: 65).

To this compare Kant's remarks in a 1789 letter to Herz, describing what would take place 'if, in thought, I make myself into an animal'. Here he suggests that, as a mere animal, the representations in us would not only still 'be combined [*verbunden*] according to empirical laws of association' but that I could still 'be *conscious* [*bewußt*] of each individual representation' (Br, AA 11: 52 ff.) – i.e., I could still enjoy what Kant calls elsewhere 'Wahrnehmung',

and a form of empirical apperception (consciousness of my own state). What would *not* be possible as a mere animal, Kant here suggests, is the *further* consciousness of the 'relation' of an individual representation to 'to the *unity* of representation of their object, by means of the synthetic *unity* of apperception', which Kant here takes to imply that I would not be able to '*cognize*' anything about myself or even about my state (ibid.; my ital.). In other words, I would have empirical apperception without understanding.

§ 6. Conclusion: Leibniz, Kant, and the progression from sensibility to understanding

Though (as with the previous sections) there is much more to be said about Kant's cognitive psychology and its relation to that of his predecessors,[48] I hope the foregoing will suffice to have made an inroad on the following three points about Kant's own views. The first concerns the continuity of Kant's views with his predecessors on the separation of both (1) sensibility and (2) imagination from (3) the understanding. All sides agree not just that (a) there is a primitive layer of representationality in the soul which does not involve the understanding or concepts (mere representation, sensation, 'perceptio'), but also that (b) there is a further intermediate level of representational states from the imagination, 'in between' mere representation by the senses, and cognition by the understanding through concepts, and, finally, (c) that while these intermediate imaginative states involve a kind of unifying (synthesis) of representations, this *too* does not involve the understanding.

The second point concerns the considerable continuity across the period in the use of the term 'Wahrnehmung', as marking a new level of psychical activity over and above both sensory and imaginative representation (Leibnizians: perceptio, imaginatio; Kant: Empfindung, Anschauung, apprehensio). Rather, Wahrnehmung is uniformly understood as involving the *consciousness* of sensory and imaginative representation. The third point concerns difference rather than continuity, on the relation between consciousness (apperception) and understanding. Kant officially expands the *pre*-intellectual reach of the mind so as to now include not just sense and imagination (apprehension), but also a form of empirical consciousness (Wahrnehmung, empirical apperception) of one's representations – with the understanding (pure concepts, cognition) coming into play only afterwards, in the achievement of cognition of objects by the representation through concepts of the 'unity' of such representations in consciousness.[49]

The immediate 'object' of Wahrnehmung is a representation (sensation, appearance), and so something 'subjective', in the sense of being 'in' the mind. Kant thinks Wahrnehmung, as an achievement of mere apperception, must be contrasted with cognition proper (e.g., in experience) as the achievement of the understanding, since only the latter allows us to recognize whatever thing is (objectively) represented by the representation, rather than merely attending to the representation itself.[50]

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ABSTRACT: In previous work I have argued that more care must be taken when discussing Kant's views on 'perception' and 'perceptual experience', in light of Kant's own technical use of 'perception [Wahrnehmung]' to pick out the mental act distinct from both empirical 'intuition [Anschauung]' and 'experience [Erfahrung]', insofar as Wahrnehmung involves *consciousness* of empirical intuition over and above the intuition itself, and insofar as this consciousness of the intuition itself is not yet empirical *cognition* of the object it represents. In the present essay I argue, first, that Kant›s use of ‹Wahrnehmung› is continuous in key respects with how the term is used both among German translators of Leibniz and among the later Leibnizians themselves, insofar as they all also associate ‹Wahrnehmung› with the consciousness or apperception of sensory representation, rather than with the elementary sensory representation itself. I show that this is so, despite the potentially misleading fact that Leibniz and his successors (following Descartes) use the French ‹perception› and Latin ‹perceptio› to refer to the more elementary sensory representation itself. I also demonstrate a continuous commitment to the *imagination* and its synthesis playing a mediating role in between mere sensation and Wahrnehmung (apperception). I then argue, finally, that Kant nevertheless departs from this tradition by decoupling consciousness and apperception per se -- and hence, Wahrnehmung as well -- from acts of *understanding,* precisely insofar as Kant means to distinguish the mental activity required for Wahrnehmung as mere empirical consciousness of representations, from what is required for empirical cognition of objects via concepts.
KEYWORDS: Intuition, Imagination, Perception, Experience, Consciousness, Apperception, Conceptualism, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Psychology

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Notes

1 For perception and apprehension as distinct from intuition and experience, see Tolley 2017 and 2013 along with forthcoming, as well as Tolley manuscript-a and manuscript-b; compare Longuenesse 1998 and Allison 2015. For images and imagination, see Matherne 2015 and 2016; compare Sellars 1978 and even earlier Heidegger 1928. For appearances as distinct from both intuitions and concepts, see Tolley forthcoming. For earlier, similarly broadly psychological approaches to Kant's account of cognition and experience, see Sellars 1968, and Kitcher 1990, Waxman 1991, and Brook 1994.

2 This sort of worry is especially common in relation to Kant's doctrine of schemata, for example, which is supposed to function precisely as a sort of go-between with respect to intuitions and concepts (cf. KrV, B 177 ff.).

3 Compare Matherne 2014, 2015, and 2016, and Stephenson 2015.

4 Cf. Tolley 2017 and Tolley manuscript-a and manuscript-b. For recent failures to acknowledge the importance of the distinction between intuition and perception (which in turn vitiate their arguments for conceptualism about intuition in particular), see Griffith 2011; Land 2011; Gomes 2014. (This is also true of 'empirical consciousness' as a distinct general category of representation from 'empirical cognition'.) This distinction is also neglected in McLear's earlier writings, though more recently he has begun to recognize its significance (and the significance for keeping track of the intuition/perception distinction for adjudicating the debates about Kant's alleged conceptualism); cf. McLear 2014.

5 See Tolley 2017. I first highlighted the importance of recognizing perception as a separate topic, distinct from both intuition and experience, in a series of talks in 2011-2014 (cf. Tolley manuscript-a); first in print in Tolley 2013. Since then, several im-

portant works have begun to incorporate a sensitivity to the distinction, including McLear 2014, Allais 2015, Allison 2015, and Stang 2016.

6 See Tolley 2013 and forthcoming. The terminology of 'intellectualism' and 'conceptualism' is developed in McLear 2015.

7 Among others, see especially Ameriks 2000, Watkins 2005, Wunderlich 2005, De Risi 2007, and Jauernig 2008; compare also Rutherford 2004.

8 For earlier work that cautions against the familiar picture of Descartes as denying all psychical life to animals, see Cottingham 1973; for some criticism, see Hatfield 2008.

9 Compare Clarke 2003.

10 Compare Sepper 2016.

11 Compare Clarke 2003: 47 ff.

12 For more references, see Clarke 2003, 89 ff.

13 Cf. 'something that it seemed I was seeing with my eyes is in fact something I comprehend [*comprehendo*] solely by the faculty of judgment which is in my mind' (AT VII.32).

14 A similar point is made in a 1649 letter to Henry More; cf. AT V.278. For further references, see Cottingham 1973 and Clarke 2003: 74 ff. In Hatfield 2008, Hatfield makes the point that in these passages Descartes might always only be talking again about the first merely corporeal grade of sensing mentioned above. At the very least, these sorts of passages should give some pause to the not-uncommon interpretation of Descartes as always using 'thought [cogitatio]' as a genus-term for *everything* that occurs in a soul – instead of at times as a species-term for only that which is 'in us *in such a way that we are immediately [aware]* of it' (2nd Replies AT VII.160). The possibility considered here is that animals have the second rather than merely the first grade of sensing – i.e., that animals would have representations 'in' their souls (even if merely 'corporeal souls') that represent corporeal motions without being identical to them, even if the animal soul itself was not 'conscious' of these representations – at least seems to be the possibility Descartes floats here: that they would have [b] perception or sensation without it rising to the level of [c] thought and judgment. On this compare Vendler 1971.

15 Clarke 2003, pp. 78-105 gives a variety of textual and systematic arguments that Descartes also accepts that animals have (at least 'corporeal') imagination and memory.

16 Cf. G 6: 598-606.

17 In his *New Essays*, Leibniz claims that 'there is some perception and appetition even in plants' (II.9.11; G 5: 126), though (to my knowledge) he does not ascribe sentiment, memory, or imagination to them, which suggests that they might be cases of mere 'lifes'.

18 As can be gleaned from Jorgensen 2011, there is an ongoing dispute about whether Leibniz means to identify apperception with reflection, or if they can come apart in one or the other direction, such that, e.g., mere souls (animals) might have one but not the other. As I note below, a similar debate arises in relation to Kant's account of apperception (consciousness) below. Compare as well Simmons 2001.

19 Cf. G 6: 607-623.

20 Cf. 'memory provides a kind of sequence [consecution] in souls, which imitates reason, but which must be distinguished from it' (M § 26). Compare as well Leibniz's remarks from the *New Essays*: 'the sequences of beasts are only a shadow of reasoning, that is to say they are only connections of imagination, and only passages from one image to another, because in a new encounter which appears similar to the preceding one, one expects of the new that which previously one has found together with it, as if the things were linked in effect, because their images are so connected in memory' (NE Preface G 5: 44).

21 Leibniz here in fact seems to be distinguishing two layers within acts of mind: first, we have (first-level, determinative) cognition in which certain 'truths' are recognized; then, on the basis of this, the mind 'rises' to a kind of 'reflective' self-cognition as 'cognition of ourselves' and of 'this or that' which is 'in us' as in us. This might be thought to anticipate Kant's distinction between empirical cognition and pure apperception.

22 As noted above, there is considerable debate about whether Leibniz (and others) is right to think that the Cartesians are committed to the nullity of non-apperceived perceptions. This debate itself leads to complications concerning how best to assess the precise extent of Leibniz's in-fact agreement or disagreement with Descartes' psychology; cf. Barth 2011. In any case, it is broadly agreed that Leibniz is much more explicit in his sympathies with what might be called a more 'gradualist' (and hence in some ways more Aristotelian and 'naturalist') account of the differences between non-human and human souls – even if it is not exactly clear how Leibniz's claim that there is a continuity of degrees in the progression of souls is ultimately compatible with the apparent difference in kind that he also means to attribute to souls in possession of an intellect; cf. Jorgensen 2009.

23 A further point worth noticing, in anticipation of our discussion of Kant below, is Leibniz's claim here that it is through this

process of pre-intellectual synthesis (according to the 'common notions' of figure and number) that the imagination furnishes 'the *objects* of the mathematical sciences, i.e. arithmetic and geometry' – even as it is 'only something higher, that the intellect [*intelligence*] alone is able to furnish' which is what enables the mind to achieve the 'perfect *generality of truths* which are found' in these sciences (G 6: 501; my ital.). For more on this function of the imagination for Leibniz in geometry, and an instructive comparison with Kant, see especially De Risi 2007.

24 In fact, there is some reason to believe that it is the post-Leibnizian textbooks which provided Kant with one of his most sustained (if mediated) connections to Leibniz's thought. In addition to the German translations mentioned below (and a Latin translation of the *Monadology* from 1721), Kant would have also had access, at least in principle, to the *Theodicy* (published in 1710) and various essays that were published during Leibniz's lifetime in the *Acta Eruditorum*, along with the few contained in the collection of Leibniz's French and Latin philosophical writings that Raspe published in 1765, which also included the *New Essays*. Strikingly, however, the list of books recorded in Warda as being in Kant's own library does not include a single work by Leibniz, even though Kant does refer to several of Leibniz's works by name; cf. Jauernig 2008, p. 217 n. 21.

25 'Der veränderliche Zustand, welcher eine Vielheit in dem einem oder in dem einfachen in sich fasset und vorstellet, ist nichts anders als dasjenige, welches man die **Empfindung** oder *Perception* nennet' (LM §14; my underlining).

26 Cf. 'Und hierinnen haben die Cartesianer sehr verfehlet, wann sie die *Perceptiones* oder Empfindungen, derer man sich nicht bewust ist und welche man nicht wahrnimmet, vor nichts gehalten haben' (LM § 14; my underlining).

27 Given Köhler's previous choice to associate Leibniz's '*perception*' with '*Empfindung*', were an English rendering of Leibniz's works to be taken directly from Köhler's text, we might well opt for tracking Köhler's version of Leibniz's distinctions by labeling the '*perception/Empfindung*' concept with the English 'sensation' and then *perhaps* using 'perception' to capture the concept associated with '*apperception/Wahrnehmung*'. But notice that this choice would cover over the ap-perceptive dimension included in 'Wahrnehmung' itself (see below).

28 The first definition provided by Adelung of 'wahrnehmen' is '*gewahr* werden', i.e., 'to become aware'; the third is 'to become aware of a previously occurent observation, to remark or note [*nach vorher gegangener Beobachtung gewahr werden, bemerken*]' (cf. Adelung 1786, p. 31). Interestingly, the second definition Adelung gives is 'to sense through the senses [durch die Sinne *empfinden*]', though he notes that this is only for 'wahrnehmen' used 'in a wider sense [in weiterer Bedeutung], though seldomly so used' (ibid). For further evidence from within philosophy (e.g., from Tetens's *Versuch*) which confirms the connection between 'wahr-nehmen' and 'gewahr-werden', see Tolley 2017; compare Wunderlich 2005: 41f.

29 Leibniz's similar claim about '*perceptions*' being present even in 'stupor' in M § 24 is also rendered by Köhler as a claim about 'Empfindungen' (LM § 23). Compare as well the rendering of M § 60's claim about 'degrés des perceptions distinctes' as one about 'Graden der deutlichen Empfindungen oder *Perceptionen*' in LM § 61.

30 For some reason Köhler includes the text of M § 23 within LM § 22, which then shifts the LM section numbers off by one count for the next stretch of the translation; later Köhler makes still other re-carvings. Incidentally, alteration of Leibniz's section-division also occurs in the 1721 Latin translation of the *Monadology* in the *Supplement* to the *Acta eruditorum*.

31 Note that the translation in Ariew and Garber does not mark this use of 'appercevoir' (cf. AG 214).

32 Cf. "das *sentiment* oder der Gedancke etwas mehr als eine blose *perception* ist' (LM § 19; my underlining).

33 Interestingly, Köhler also here adds the phrase 'welche nur alleine die Empfindung haben' to further specify what belongs to entelechies (simple monads, mere 'lifes') – i.e., these are substances 'which have only sensation' – though there is no correlate to this phrase in Leibniz's original French. (These sorts of editorial supplemental glosses can be found (unmarked as such) throughout Köhler's text.)

34 To be sure, Köhler's special use of 'Vorstellung' as a gloss here, instead of the usual 'Empfindung', might be taken to suggest instead that, in his lexicon, 'Vorstellung' is reserved for a stage higher than mere 'perception/Empfindung'; Vorstellung is an Empfindung which is distinct rather than confused. (Compare also the use of 'Vorstellung' in Köhler's rendering of M § 26 in LM § 25.) A related variant to this part of this scheme can be found in Christian Wolff's 1744 German translation of Spinoza's *Ethics*. In the definitions in Part II, where Spinoza defines 'idea' as a 'concept [conceptus] of the mind' rather than as a 'perception [*perceptio*]', Wolff renders the latter as 'Vorstellung (*perceptio*)' (*Sittenlehre* 88).

35 Similar sorts of coordination-schemes for 'perceptio' can also be seen in other relevant translations in the years to follow. For example, throughout the 1723 translation of Descartes' *Passions* into German by Balthasar Heinrich Tilesio, as *Tractat von den Leidenschafften der Seele* (TLS), we find Tilesio rendering Descartes' French '*perception*' also with '*Empfindung*', and doing so directly (i.e., without even taking Köhler's care to also provide the original French). To focus on one important passage we discussed above: where Descartes entitles his section 'on *perceptions* that relate us to objects which are outside of us' (PA I.§23 AT XI.346), Tilesio renders this heading as 'von den Empfindungen, welche wir zu den objectis hinbringen, die ausser uns sind' (TLS I.§ 23). It is interesting as well that in this section Tilesio also renders Descartes 'sentir' and 'sentimens' with 'empfinden' and 'Empfindungen', which suggests that he (not unlike Leibniz) takes Descartes to use these French words as equivalents to '*perception*', rather than something more robust or complex (as Leibniz himself uses '*sentiment*'). (Thanks to Stefan Heßbrüggen-Walter for putting me on to the existence of this early German translation of Descartes.)

36 In Meier's own 1752 *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, the textbook from which Kant lectured on logic most of the years of his career, Meier gives the reverse gloss on 'Vorstellung': 'repraesentatio, perceptio' (§10).

37 'Observables (phenomena)' are here identified with 'that which we are able to cognize [cognoscere] by the senses (confusedly)', and are contrasted with 'corpuscles', which are the 'small bodies which are not observable by us' (§425). In his German edition, Meier renders the phrase '(*phaenomenon, observabile*)' as 'eine Erscheinung, das Wahrzunehmende' (cf. Meier, § 307). Meier also uses 'wahrnehmen' in such a way that it can take 'Empfindungen' as its objects (cf. § 410, § 421).

38 Cf. Warda 1922.

39 It is true that Baumgarten uses 'vorstellen' here too, but note that he adds the self-referring 'uns', so as to signal that he does not mean the mere possession of a representation 'in' me, but rather the relating of the representation 'to' me (in consciousness).

40 In L § 44 Knutzen indicates more directly that *apprehensio simplex* is an *operatio intellectus*.

41 Compare Kitcher 1990: 158f. The most compelling (and most often cited) evidence in favor of ascribing all synthesis to the understanding is to be found in §15 of the B-deduction, where Kant claims that 'all *combination* [*Verbindung*]' is 'an action of the understanding [*Verstandeshandlung*]', and then adds that this action will be 'designated with the universal title *synthesis*' (KrV, B 130). Yet as Kant goes on to note in this same section, the 'combination' he is concerned with is actually more complex than mere synthesis, noting specifically that 'combination is the *representation* of the synthetic *unity* of the manifold' (KrV, B 130; my ital.), which suggests that he is concerned primarily here not with synthesis per se, but rather with the representation of the unity of a synthesis – i.e., with what he has called earlier in the Leitfaden 'bringing synthesis to *concepts*' (see below).

42 I have replaced 'intuition' with 'sensibility here because we have not yet introduced Kant's doctrine of intuition (as itself between sensation and imagination). I have also omitted references in this passage (marked by the ellipses) that indicate Kant here is especially concerned with the 'pure' and 'apriori' versions of these three stages, in line with his more general concern in the Transcendental Analytic with the possibility of pure synthetic apriori cognition in particular. As Kant goes on to note, these three 'capacities' all also have 'an empirical use' (KrV, A 94), in their cooperation to achieve specifically empirical cognition (i.e., experience; cf. KrV, A 115). Our focus here is instead on a more generic or neutral characterization of their differential contribution to cognition per se.

43 Compare Metaphysik Herder (AA 28: 117) for another quite Leibnizian progression, and even an explicit allusion to Leibniz (cf. Ameriks 2000: 245-6). In the A-deduction passage under discussion, Kant here also identifies what he calls a 'synopsis' as what 'is grounded' on sense (KrV, A 94), though he makes it explicit a few pages later that this only refers to the fact that 'sense contains a manifold' in its representation (KrV, A 97), and not because sense itself is capable of effecting a synthesis. Rather, synthesis will take place only by the imagination, and will therefore be something that 'corresponds' to synopsis (ibid.).

44 Cf. the above discussion in the role of concepts in the 'unity' of the synthesis, and the latter unity itself as something achieved when the synthesis is 'brought to concepts'.

45 Along these lines, Kant's analysis of 'judgments of perception [*Wahrnehmungsurteile*]' in the *Prolegomena* might be taken to suggest that *no* 'pure concept of the understanding' is required for Wahrnehmung itself (consciousness of sensations, intuitions, appearances), though such concepts *are* required for experience as the cognition of *objects* 'through' such Wahrnehmungen (cf. Prol, AA 4: 298 ff.). Now, ultimately Kant wants to ground even these representations of the unity of apperception (which are involved in experience as empirical *cognition*) in something further – namely, a further act of what Kant calls '*original* [ursprüngliche] apperception' (cf. KrV, A 94). What exactly this 'original' apperception is is not altogether clear, but it is safe to say that it cannot itself be a case of Wahrnehmung or the empirical apperception (consciousness) of one's *states*. Kant seems to associate it instead with the 'pure' consciousness of 'the *identity* of one's *self* [seiner selbst]' across (or 'in') such states (KrV, A 107-8; my ital.). (Compare Wunderlich 2005: 145f.)

46 Compare Naragon 1990: 8f for references concerning sensation, intuition, and imagination; more recently, compare McLear 2011. As Naragon notes, there are also several places where Kant also assigns to 'apprehension' to animals (cf. Br, AA 11: 345; compare AA 15: 166; AA 15: 958) – which might itself be taken to support the idea that animals can have Wahrnehmung, since apprehension is said to make Wahrnehmung possible. Nevertheless, in one of these places (a draft of a letter from 1792), Kant explicitly denies that the animals in question would have apprehension 'with consciousness'; rather 'apprehensio bruta' is said to be '*without* consciousness' (Br, AA 11: 345; my ital.). This incidentally gives us further reason for distinguishing apprehension from Wahrnehmung. Compare Kant's letter to Beck in 1794, where Kant likewise distinguishes 'the apprehension [*Auffasung*] (apprehensio) of the manifold of the given' from 'the taking up [*Aufnehmung*] in the unity of consciousness of this (apperceptio)' (Br, AA 11: 515).

47 This passage also is striking insofar as it contains the very un-Leibnizian use of 'perceptio' to gloss 'wahrnehmen' itself. This raises the question of how to interpret Kant's own uses of the Latin 'perceptio'. The first thing to note is the near-complete absence of the Latin term '*perceptio*' from Kant's published writings and correspondence. Aside from this passage in Jaesche's edition of Kant's logic notes, there are, in fact (at least to my knowledge), only four places where Kant uses 'perceptio': one in the first *Critique* (KrV, A 320/B 376), one in the *Prolegomena* (Prol, AA 4:300), and then on two pages in the *Anthropology* (Anth, AA 7: 134 n., 138). (This is in stark contrast with the over five hundred occurrences of 'Wahrnehmung' in the published works alone.) Secondly, when we do consider these few scattered cases, we arguably do not find an unambiguous pattern of usage by Kant. In one

of the *Anthropology* passages (cf. Anth, AA 7: 138), Kant seems to follow the tradition by aligning 'perceptio' with 'Vorstellung'; the others can either be read as leaving this kind of alignment open, or (like the Jaesche passage) they might even seem to suggest that Kant does mean to take the un-Leibnizian route of aligning 'perceptio' instead with 'Wahrnehmung' (and hence, apperceptio, etc).

48 Not least about the various other contributions that Kant ascribes to the imagination – including furnishing 'pure images' of the universal forms of our sensible representations (cf. KrV, B 182), which thereby makes possible the science of geometry and number (cf. KrV, B 201-202),which brings Kant close to Leibniz (cf. note above). For a recent more comprehensive overview of Kant's views of the imagination, see especially Matherne 2016.

49 To be sure, at least with respect to Leibniz's own views, this might be better classified as a difference of emphasis, since, as we saw above (cf. § 3), it might simply follow out on something that Leibniz himself might be thought to have anticipated – namely, the distinction between reflective *consciousness* of one's *states* and *cognition* of one's self and other substances as an *objects ;* cf. Wunderlich 2005: 145f. It is less clear, though, that Leibniz would concede that the former might not yet involve the understanding.

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The Priority of Judging: *Kant on Wolff's General Logic*

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One would be forgiven for suspecting that Kant did not think much of Christian Wolff's contributions to logic. Wolff's works on logic are, of course, implicated in Kant's far-ranging verdict that the discipline has not taken a single step forward since Aristotle's time, and Wolff in particular frequently comes up for criticism in Kant's own lectures on the topic. In the Wiener Logik, for example, Kant is reported as referring to Wolff's claim that the content of a concept can be completely analysed as "too dictatorial" and that as a result Wolff's attempts to ground his philosophy on the precise definitions of concepts is "entirely false" (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 917). Given this, it is to say the least surprising that (from the late 1770's onwards[1]) Kant should regularly single out Wolff's general logic in those lectures as "the best one has" (V-Lo/Pölitz, AA 24: 509), "the best that one encounters" (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24:796), or even simply "the best" (V-Lo/Busolt, AA 24: 613; cf. also Log 9: 20).[2] Nor would this seem to be a sort of backhanded compliment, praising Wolff's as only the best *of a bad lot* of modern general logics, since this high estimation is echoed by some of Kant's closest disciples: so, we find unadulterated praise in L. H. Jakob's preface to his *Grundriß der allgemeinen Logik*, where it is claimed "Wolff grasped the idea of a general logic exceedingly well,"[3] a passage that is also approvingly quoted in Jäsche's introduction to his edition of Kant's *Logik*.

While this praise of Wolff is surprising in its own right, it is particularly striking that it is Wolff's *general* or *universal* ("*al*[*l*]*gemeine*"—AA 24: 509) logic that is the specific object of admiration since Wolff himself never characterises (any part of) his treatment of logic as a general as opposed to a particular logic. Moreover, it is not immediately clear what specifically Kant took to be so praiseworthy in Wolff's logic as opposed to, for instance, the texts by Meier which he

regularly used in his lectures, or indeed, any of the other treatments (by Baumgarten, Knutzen, or Lambert for instance) with which he would have been familiar. In this paper, I will take Kant's praise of Wolff's general logic at face value, and attempt to determine both what precisely Kant (and his disciples) understood by Wolff's "general logic" and what specifically they found so praiseworthy about it. As I will show, while Kant took issue with many of the features Wolff himself identified as innovative aspects of his logic, Kant had nothing but praise for Wolff's analysis of the operations of the mind which preceded the analysis of concepts, judgments, and inferences, in the course of which analysis Wolff offers an unmistakable anticipation of what is arguably *the* key claim underlying the relevance of general logic to transcendental logic in the metaphysical deduction. The following will be divided into four sections. In the first, I will outline some of the distinctive features of Wolff's logic, particularly his use of the Leibnizian classification of concepts, his discussion of definitions, and his defense of Aristotelian syllogistics. In the second section, I will argue that none of these innovations on Wolff's part could have served as the basis of Kant's praise inasmuch as Kant takes issue with Wolff with respect to each of them. In the third section, I will present Wolff's novel analysis of the three operations of the mind with which he opens his later logic presentation and show that Kant endorses this analysis. In the fourth and final section I will argue that the reason why Wolff's presentation earns Kant's praise is that Wolff's discussion constitutes an important and influential step towards Kant's contention that the act of judging is primary among the operations of the mind.

1. Wolff's "General Logic"

Wolff published two major works devoted to logic, first the *Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit* (the *Deutsche Logik*) of 1713 and then the multi-volume Latin *Philosophia rationalis, sive Logica* of 1728), though discussions of issues relating to logic can be found throughout his works, including his texts devoted to mathematics, ontology, and psychology. However, aside from a passing reference to "allgemeine Logick" in the AN, by which Wolff appears to intend the same thing as "gemeine [i.e., common] Logick,"[4] Wolff does not characterize his logic as a general logic, though the distinction had been employed by logicians whose work would no doubt have been familiar to him.[5] Instead, Wolff employs a broad distinction between the "theoretical" and "practical" parts of logic, a distinction he adopts on the basis of the presentation of his student L. P. Thümmig published after the DL.[6] With respect to what is treated with the theoretical part of logic, Wolff indicates broadly that it will contain the "rules of logic" as opposed to the practical part which will consider the "manifold uses of the rules" (Wolff, AN § 55). In terms of its specific topics, Wolff indicates that, in light of Thümmig's introduction of the distinction, he would retrospectively group the first four chapters of DL under the theoretical part of logic, which would be to say that it includes the treatments of concepts, words, propositions (*Sätze*), and inferences (Wolff, AN § 55). In the LL, Wolff conscientiously characterizes the first part of logic as the theoretical part, though the division of topics is amended somewhat. So, Wolff now treats words in the course of his broader account of concepts (rather than devoting a chapter to the topic in its own right), and in place of propositions Wolff now considers judgments. The

most conspicuous difference from the structure of the DL consists in the addition of an initial section concerning the principles of logic (*De logicae principiis*), which contains a presentation of principles that logic takes from psychology and ontology.[7] So, the first chapter of this section (Wolff, LL §§ 30-58) concerns the three operations of the mind, which makes use of principles (such as the division of the faculties of the mind) that are only demonstrated later in empirical and rational psychology, and the second chapter (Wolff, LL §§ 59-76) considers our general knowledge of being in terms of essentialia, attributes, and modes. These discussions no doubt already inform the presentation in DL—the Aristotelian distinction between three operations of the mind underlies Wolff's division of the subject matter of logic into concepts, propositions, and inferences,[8] and DL also includes a brief consideration of essence (cf. Wolff, DL c. 2, § 48)—but nonetheless they do not receive as much or as detailed attention there as in LL.

It is likely that it is the theoretical part of Wolff's logic that Kant identifies as his general logic. While neither Baumgarten nor Meier identify their logic (or parts thereof) as a general logic, Martin Knutzen makes use of the general/special distinction in his *Elementa philosophiae rationalis*,[9] incorporating both what Wolff had identified as the theoretical and practical parts into his general logic.[10] Kant could have borrowed the distinction between general and particular logic from Knutzen's *Elementa*; however, Kant rejects the admission of a practical part into general logic (cf. Log, AA 9: 17-18). This would accordingly only leave the theoretical part of Wolff's logic as a candidate for what Kant identifies as Wolff's general logic, and assuming that it is to this that Kant and his followers are referring, we can consider what in Wolff's treatment might serve to distinguish it from other available treatments. Here, Wolff himself (unsurprisingly) offers some assistance as he provides a discussion of his logic (as it was presented in the DL) in the *Ausführliche Nachricht* that is intended to highlight precisely what he takes to be his most original contributions on the topic. For present purposes, we might focus on three features mentioned by Wolff: his adoption and amendment of Leibniz's classification of concepts, his account of definitions as that which the analysis of concepts aims at, and his defense of the syllogism.

Beginning with Wolff's treatment of concepts, in AN he indicates that he thought Leibniz's discussion of the obscurity, clarity, distinctness, etc., of notions represented a considerable improvement over that of Descartes, which never accounted precisely for these differences in concepts, and accordingly Wolff incorporated it into his logic while adapting it to his specific uses (Wolff, AN § 58).[11] In the DL, Wolff makes explicit that these classifications apply uniformly to concepts, where Leibniz appeared to apply them to notions, ideas, and knowledge, and in the LL they are identified as the "formal differentia [*differentia formalis*]" of concepts. Wolff also amends Leibniz's classification somewhat, adding his own distinction between complete and incomplete concepts (*ausführlicher/unausführlicher Begriff*; *notio completa/incompleta*) to follow on the division into distinct/indistinct, but also offering a detailed discussion of the adequacy (*Vollständigkeit*/*adaequatio*) of a concept which Leibniz had introduced into the Cartesian classification and a feature of concepts which Wolff thought was a particularly helpful addition (Wolff, AN § 58). For Leibniz, a concept is adequate when "everything that enters into a distinct notion is, again, distinctly known, or when analysis has been carried to completion."[12] In Wolff's hands, the adequacy of a concept also consists in the distinctness of

its marks (Wolff, DL c. 2, § 16; LL § 95), though because these marks are themselves concepts, which in turn have marks that can likewise be known distinctly, Wolff contends that adequacy admits of various degrees, where the first degree of adequacy involves the distinctness of the marks of the concepts, the second degree the distinctness of the marks of the marks, and so on (Wolff, DL c. 2, § 17; LL § 96).

A second distinctive feature of Wolff's logic, as identified by Wolff, is his emphasis on the importance of definitions. In AN, Wolff notes that the aim of his discussion of concepts, and his focus on clearly delimiting the criteria of their distinctness, completeness, and adequacy, is for the sake of providing definitions: "Since distinct and complete concepts supply the definitions, and adequate concepts [supply] their connection with one another" (Wolff, AN § 62). Wolff distinguishes nominal definition (*Wort-Erklärung*, *definitio nominalis*) from real definition (*Sach-Erklärung*, *definitio realis*), where the former suffices to distinguish the defined thing from all other things whereas the latter shows the defined thing is possible by accounting for how it comes to be (Wolff, DL c. 2, § 41; LL § 191).[13] This account of nominal definition brings it in line with what Wolff calls the *completeness* of concepts in particular, given that a concept is complete when the marks suffice for recognizing the object of the concept and distinguishing it from others (Wolff, DL c. 2, § 15; LL § 192). That Wolff should thus make room in his classification of concepts for nominal definitions in this way signals his departure from Tschirnhaus who, according to Wolff "offers such praise in his *Medicina Mentis* for real definitions and gives them priority to nominal definitions" (Wolff, AN § 62).[14] Instead, Wolff emphasizes the utility of nominal definitions, not only for the purposes of ordinary life but also in the sciences (DL c. 2, §45), and he contends that they can provide the basis for formulating real definitions. So, Wolff claims that given a nominal definition, we should seek distinct concepts of each of the marks enumerated in the definition (Wolff, DL c. 2, § 54). This results in an adequate concept of the thing defined, but insofar as we additionally consider these marks, and compare them with one another and with other cognition we have, we are able to determine in many cases whether and how the defined thing is possible and might come to be, which process accordingly results in a real definition.

A final innovative feature of Wolff's logic concerns his defense of the utility of the syllogism, though here what is innovative is not so much any specific doctrine Wolff defends but rather merely the fact that Wolff should assign such importance to syllogistics in contrast to a number of modern logicians who dismissed the utility of the syllogism, particularly as a medium of invention.[15] Indeed, as is well known, Wolff himself had previously shared this low opinion of syllogistic reasoning,[16] a position he changed as a result of Leibniz's intervention near the outset of their correspondence.[17] Having subsequently defended the indispensability of syllogisms in mathematical proofs in the *Anfangsgründe* of 1710,[18] Wolff turns to the subject in his logic textbooks, with a comparatively streamlined presentation in his DL and a much-expanded discussion in the LL. In both cases, Wolff endorses many features of the Aristotelian doctrine, including the analysis of the principles governing syllogisms and the reducibility of all syllogistic figures to the first.[19] So, Wolff identifies the *dictum de omni et nullo*, in accordance with which anything that is asserted (or denied) of an entire genus or species is likewise asserted (or denied) of all genera and species which fall under it, as that (dual) principle on

which all syllogisms are based (Wolff, LL § 353; DL c. 4, § 10). It is on account of the fact that the *dictum de omni* and *dictim de nullo* can themselves be reduced to syllogisms of the first figure that Wolff identifies it as the most natural figure (Wolff, LL § 380; DL c. 4, § 14), and because the valid syllogistic forms of the first figure suffice to prove conclusions of all four categorical forms, he identifies it as the perfect syllogistic figure (Wolff, LL §§ 378, 401), and proceeds to reduce the other three syllogistic figures to it.[20] Indeed, and surprisingly, Wolff goes further than this to argue that even hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms can be reduced to categorical syllogisms of the first figure. Hypothetical syllogisms are reducible to the first figure given that the hypothetical proposition that serves as the major of the syllogism is equivalent to a universal affirmative categorical proposition provided that the same subject occurs in both antecedent and consequent (Wolff, DL c. 4, § 18; LL §§ 412-13, § 415); and disjunctive syllogisms are reducible given that Wolff takes the disjunctive proposition that serves as the major as providing alternate predications of the same subject (which is the only form of disjunctive proposition Wolff considers; see LL § 417, § 420 and DL c. 4, § 19).[21] Having considered these three features of Wolff's theoretical logic that he himself identified as distinctive, we can now turn to Kant's reception of Wolff's logic and determine whether Wolff might have earned Kant's late praise as a result of them.

2. Kant's Reception of Wolff's Logic

Kant himself never adopted Wolff's DL or LL for use in his own lectures, though Kant did make use of Wolff's *Der Anfangsgründe aller mathematischen Wissenschaften, Erster Theil*, which contains a "Kurzer Unterricht" that amounts to a condensed presentation of Wolff's logic, for his lectures on mathematics. Even so, the texts he did use for most if not all of his logic lectures—Meier's *Vernunftlehre* and the *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*[22]—were starkly influenced by Wolff; Kant himself frequently identifies the continuity between Baumgarten's "concentration" of the Wolffian logic and Meier's expansion of it (Log, AA 9: 21; cf. also V-Lo/Pölitz, AA 24: 509, V-Lo/Wiener 24: 796). It is Wolff's logic, however, that is singled out for praise, and part of what evidently recommended it to Kant was that it avoided the wide array of deficiencies and defects that afflicted other modern alternatives. Leibniz, for instance, is identified along with Wolff as worthy of note (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 796), particularly for his account of concepts (V-Lo/Dohna, AA24: 701), and even as having (along with Wolff) set modern logic "*in Gang*" (Log, AA 9: 21), and yet Leibniz obviously did not write a logic (V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 701). Kant identifies as deficient Malebranche's *Recherche de la vérité* and (in spite of early praise) Locke's *Essay* (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 37, V-Lo/Philippi, AA 24: 338) given that the former amounts more to a metaphysics than a logic (V-Lo/Busolt, AA 24: 613), the latter considers the origin of (presumably metaphysical) concepts which is not a proper topic of logic (V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 701, Log, AA 9: 21), and both do not distinguish the consideration of the form of the understanding from that of its content (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 796, V-Lo/Pölitz, AA 24: 509). Lambert's *Neues Organon* is likewise frequently praised (V-Lo/Philippi, AA 24:338, V-Lo/Pölitz, AA 24:509, V-Lo/Busolt, AA 24: 613), though it was presumably limited in its usefulness as a text in general (pure) logic by its avowed aim of disclosing the rules of

scientific discovery (cf. KrV, A53/B77), and J. P. Reusch's and Knutzen's treatments are mentioned but not credited with much originality (cf. V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 796, V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 701, Log, AA 9: 21). Finally, Crusius' logic is also frequently mentioned, and while Kant at one point praises it as providing nourishment for the understanding (V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 701), he more frequently criticises it as obscure (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 37), as adulterating logic with metaphysical and theological principles (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 37, V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 796), and as failing to offer a proper account of truth (Log, AA 9: 21).

In these, rather general, respects, Wolff's logic would appear to be preferable to those of his contemporaries, and this likely contributes to Kant's high estimation of it. Significantly, however, Kant targets for criticism the very claims that Wolff had identified as the distinctive features of his logic, and his reasons for doing so reveal fundamental differences between the two accounts of logic. So, as already noted, Kant approves of Leibniz's classification of concepts, and likewise incorporates it into his own discussion, yet Kant takes issue with a number of Wolff's amendments to that classification. Most famously, it is Wolff who comes in for criticism for his identification of clarity with the consciousness of a representation (and consequently obscurity with unconsciousness),[23] given that some degree of consciousness must be met with in obscure representations for them to even qualify as obscurely-had (V-Lo/Philippi, AA 24: 409, KrV, B414-415n). Moreover, Kant accepts a number of important supplementations made to Wolff's version of the classification, by Baumgarten and Meier, such as the distinction between intensive and extensive clarity (cf. V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 138). Most importantly, however, Kant objects to Wolff's account of the adequacy of concepts in terms of the distinctness of their marks. In his frequent discussions of Wolff's treatment, Kant objects that taking the adequacy of a concept to consist in the distinctness of its marks is "precarious [*schwankenden*]" (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 848), given that in order to make the marks of a concept distinct, we must enumerate the marks of those marks, which would in turn require the enumeration of the marks of those marks, and so on (V-Lo/Pölitz, AA 24: 540), where the concept is not rendered adequate until this process is complete (V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 731); yet there is no guarantee that this process must always come to an end (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 917, V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 138). As a result, Kant supplies his own definition of adequacy, where a concept is adequate when the marks "contain no more and no less than what precisely constitutes the concept" (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 913; cf. also V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 114, V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 848, V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 731), or alternatively that it consists in the "completeness" and "precision" of the cognition of the marks of the concept (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 138, 264, V-Lo/Pölitz, AA 24: 540, V-Lo/Wiener 24: 913). And while Kant ultimately retains Wolff's notion of adequacy, in the form of the distinctness of a concept's "subordinated" rather than "co-ordinated" marks, he strictly limits its applicability to pure concepts of reason and arbitrary concepts and so not to empirical concepts (Log, AA 9: 62-63).

Regarding Wolff's account of definitions, Kant is rather less receptive as he takes issue with much of Wolff's treatment. So, while Kant makes use of the distinction between nominal and real definitions, and even adopts Wolff's characterizations of each, he only regards real definitions as "actual" definitions as he takes nominal definitions to be mere clarifications of the name of a thing which disclose nothing essential about it (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 919), and as such these are more properly identified as descriptions (*Beschreibungen*) rather than definitions

(Log §106). In stark contrast with Wolff's defense of the utility of nominal definitions, Kant claims that they are "wholly dispensable" (V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 757), and that they are "not needed unless a misunderstanding of terms is at issue" (V-Lo/Busolt, AA 24: 658). Kant also differs from Wolff with respect to the sorts of concepts for which we might offer real definitions and, in the case of those that we can provide them for, what constitutes their real definition. Kant allows that all concepts except empirical concepts permit of real definitions (Log, AA 9: 143-144), presumably due to the fact that a definition of such a concept cannot on its own suffice to prove the (real) possibility of something corresponding to it. Moreover, with respect to mathematical concepts, which Kant like Wolff identifies as "made concepts [*conceptus factitii*]" (specifically, made through arbitrary combination of marks[24]), Kant contends that Wolff does not recognize that the real definition of such concepts must include the rule for constructing it and so amount to a "genetic definition" of the concept (Log 9, AA: 144, § 106 n. 3). Instead, the real definitions Wolff supplies, such as for the concept of circle, require a further inference to exhibit how the concept comes about.[25] In addition to these specific concerns with Wolff's account of definitions, Kant frequently draws attention to the harmfulness of Wolff's excessive emphasis on the importance of definitions for philosophy in general (cf. for instance V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 188-189, V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 917-918).

As concerns the importance of the syllogism in logic, it would seem that Kant is rather more positive in his evaluation of Wolff's contribution.[26] So, not only is Wolff's appropriation of the Aristotelian analysis of the principles of syllogistic reasoning taken up by Kant at one point (for instance at DfS, AA 2: 49) but Wolff's decisive emphasis on the first figure, particularly in the DL (cf. Wolff, AN § 65 [201]), is a likely inspiration for Kant's discussion in *False Subtlety*. There are, nonetheless, important differences between the two treatments, such as that Kant attempts to further reduce the *dictum de omni et nullo* to more fundamental principles governing syllogistic inference (cf. DfS, AA 2: 49).[27] More importantly, Kant criticizes Wolff's privileging of the first figure as both not going far enough and going too far. Regarding the former, Kant as opposed to Wolff does not defend the *reducibility* of the syllogistic figures to the first, but rather contends that they deploy hidden premises and for that reason are not to be regarded as syllogisms properly speaking. Moreover, in contrast with his presentation in DL, Wolff's later treatment of syllogisms in LL considers the second and third figures in detail and even allows that they admit of a limited usefulness (Wolff, LL §401); for his part, Kant, dismisses the syllogistic figures outside of the first as not merely useless but also as "false" (DfS, AA 2: 55-56), at least to the extent that they are (wrongly) taken as "simple" forms of syllogistic inference, as Wolff seems to do.[28] While Wolff thus does not go far enough in his discussion of the alternative figures of categorical syllogisms, Kant claims that he goes too far in maintaining the reducibility of *all forms of syllogisms* including hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms (which he groups under "composite" as opposed to "simple" or categorical syllogisms—§403) to categorical syllogisms of the first figure. Kant rejects any such attempt, however, given that he takes categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms (much like categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive propositions) to express distinct functions of reason and accordingly, the latter cannot universally be reduced to the former (Log, AA 9: 120-121).

That Kant should thus object to the very doctrines that Wolff identified as the most in-

novative features of his logic makes it difficult to see why he would have identified the logic of his distinguished predecessor as the best we have. Indeed, Kant's worries about Wolff's account of the adequacy of concepts, his treatment of real and nominal definitions, and his defense of the syllogism can all be traced back to deeper concerns with Wolff's thought. So, Kant's concerns about Wolff's views on conceptual adequacy have their ground ultimately in his rejection of the Leibnizian-Wolffian emphasis on *analysis* as the sole means by which concepts are to be clarified and definitions offered (Log, AA 9: 63), whereas his objections to Wolff's discussion of definitions as well as his defense of syllogistics likely find their source in Kant's rejection of Wolff's efforts to introduce the mathematical method into philosophy (cf. V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 272, 269). In seeking for the ground of Kant's approval of Wolff's logic, then, we might wonder whether it was some other aspect of Wolff's discussion in his treatment of concepts, judgments, and inferences that served to set his logic apart from others; it might be wondered for instance whether Wolff succeeded in providing more than a merely nominal definition of truth in his logic by providing "the general and certain criterion of the truth of any cognition" (KrV, A 58/B 82). As a matter of fact, I doubt that Kant would give Wolff credit for addressing this deficiency of traditional logic, though this cannot be discussed in detail here.[29] Instead, I would like to turn to a separate discussion within the theoretical part of Wolff's logic, one that does not concern the different objects of logical investigation (concepts, judgments, and syllogisms), but that rather considers the different activities on the part of the subject that have these distinct products as their effects, namely, the three operations of the mind which are considered in the opening section of Wolff's theoretical logic.

3. Wolff and Kant on the Three Operations of the Mind

Above, I considered the innovations Wolff introduces within the traditional division of the topics of logic, namely, concepts, judgments, and inferences. However, and in addition to the features listed above, Wolff trumpets his reintroduction of the Aristotelian analysis of the operations of the mind—an analysis that grounds the division of logic into discussions of concepts, judgments, and inferences—as something that distinguishes his treatment from those of his modern contemporaries. Aristotelian thinkers supposed that some such consideration of the various operations of the mind underlies Aristotle's own treatment in the *Categories*, *De Interpretatione*, and the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, and they identified three distinct acts or operations of the intellect, namely the acts of apprehending concepts (*simplex apprehensio*), judging (*judicium*), and inferring (*ratiocinium*); this is for instance made explicit in St. Thomas' Preface to his *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics*:

> The parts of logic must therefore correspond to the different acts of reason, of which there are three. The first two belong to reason insofar as it is a kind of intellect. The first of these is the understanding of indivisible or simple things, the act by which we conceive what a thing is. [...] The second act of the intellect is the composition or division of things that are understood, the act in which truth or falsity is found. [...] The third act is proper to reason itself; it is the act by which we proceed from one thing to another, so as to arrive at a knowledge of the unknown from the known.[30]

Wolff notes, however, that as Scholastic logic fell out of favour with many modern philosophers this traditional division of the topics of logic was discarded.[31] In spite of the fact that perhaps the most famous treatment of logic in the early modern period—the so-called *Port-Royal Logic*—employed this division and assigned at least a structural significance to it,[32] many influential logics particularly within the Cartesian tradition departed from this convention or even dispensed with it entirely. For instance, Johannes Clauberg retained the tripartite division but amended it so that clear and distinct perception, judgment, and memory were the three underlying acts.[33] Tschirnhaus, by contrast, abandons the use of this division of the intellect as a framework for his logic, and offers a division of operations that appears to take Descartes' own division of the faculties as its point of departure.[34]

As concerns Wolff's appropriation of this division, the analysis of the three operations of the intellect appears to take on a more prominent and important role in Wolff's logic from the DL to the LL. In the DL, the distinction between conceiving, judging, and reasoning clearly structures Wolff's presentation in the first four chapters (with no distinct mental activity connected with the use of words), and Wolff treats of these activities briefly at the outset of each chapter. Wolff's account of the operation of the mind in acquiring concepts, corresponding to Scholastic *apprehensio simplex*, begins with sensation (*empfinden*), where Wolff claims that we sense something "when we are conscious of it as present to us" (Wolff, DL c. 1, § 1). We gain a concept then, or "a given representation of something in our thoughts" (Wolff, DL c. 1, § 4), from sensation insofar as we represent that which we are conscious of by means of sensation as outside of us (Wolff, DL c. 1, § 5).[35] The second operation of the mind is judging (*urtheilen*), which Wolff characterizes as that act through which "we think that something does or does not pertain to something" (Wolff, DL c. 3, § 1). The second operation of the mind yields propositions (*Sätze*), but clearly presupposes the first operation insofar as through it "we connect two concepts with one another, or separate them from one another" (Wolff, DL c. 3, § 2). Reasoning, which constitutes the third operation of the mind likewise presupposes the previous two (and, in DL, presupposes the use of words) inasmuch as the paradigm instance of inference for Wolff takes place when we have a universal concept that is combined with a certain name, and from the occurrence of a state of affairs whose marks accord with the definition of the concept, we infer the applicability of the name to that state of affairs (Wolff, DL c. 4, § 1).

The account of the three operations of the mind seems to take on increasing importance in Wolff's subsequent works in logic. So while this account is largely behind-the-scenes in the DL, Wolff makes its role in driving his division of the subject explicit in AN, and also supplements his discussion with a defense of the completeness of the division of the mind's operation into these three (and only these three) faculties.[36] As Wolff points out, we can do nothing more with respect to things than either merely representing them or judging regarding them, and thus our cognition must consist in either concepts or judgments; however, when judging regarding things, we assign to things either those properties which we directly perceive of them or properties which we take to pertain to them by means of a further judgment, in which latter case, we infer that the property belongs to them (Wolff, AN §§ 56, 182). Accordingly, in order to account for all of our cognition we only need these three distinct operations: "Either we merely represent something to ourselves, and leave it at that, or we judge regarding it,

either by means of mere concepts or by means of inferences [*Vernunfft-Schlüsse*]" (Wolff, AN §§ 56, 182-183). Significantly, the *tres operationes mentis* are given an even more prominent place, and much more detailed treatment in Wolff's Latin logic where, as was noted above, the entire first chapter of the first section of the theoretical part of logic is devoted to it.[37] Wolff's discussion incorporates many of the features of his previous treatments as he identifies *simplex apprehensio*, or the act of attention to an object present to the senses or imagination through which we acquire notions of those objects (Wolff, LL §§ 33-35), judgment (*judicium*—§40), and reasoning (*discursus*—§50) as the three operations of the mind; rehearses his argument for the completeness of this division (Wolff, LL § 52); and reaffirms the order of these operations in cognition (Wolff, LL § 53).

Following Wolff, a number of subsequent works in logic by German thinkers likewise emphasized the importance of the analysis of the(se) three operations of the mind for logic. In his condensed presentation of Wolffian logic, Thümmig identifies his discussion of the entire theoretical part of logic as concerning the "*tribus mentis operationibus*,"[38] whereas Reusch offers an account of the operations and faculties of the mind in cognition as part of a "propaedeumatic treatise" to his logic.[39] Significantly, Knutzen identifies the consideration of the faculty of cognition and its three operations as the first part of his general logic.[40] Notably, there is no independent consideration of the three operations of the mind (although the analysis continues to play a structuring role) in Baumgarten's *Acroasis logica* of 1725, which follows Wolff's presentation in the DL, nor in Meier's *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*. Most importantly, and in stark contrast with his reception of the other features of Wolff's logic, Kant fully endorses the consideration of the three operations of the intellect. As a matter of fact, throughout his notes and lectures on logic Kant makes frequent and approving mention of the "ancient division" (Refl 1705, AA16: 88); as the Busolt logic notes read, "the *operationes mentis* were already correctly divided by the ancients, namely: *apprehensio simplex*[,] that is, a concept[,] judgment, and reason" (V-Lo/Busolt, AA 24: 653). Kant even appears to indicate the *absence* of such a consideration in Meier's presentation, writing "*tres operationes mentis*" in his own copy of the *Auszug* at the outset of Meier's treatment of concepts (Refl 2829, AA 16: 533; cf. Meier, *Auszug* §249).[41]

It might, therefore, be conjectured that Kant's praise of Wolff's general logic as "the best we have" has something to do specifically with the latter's decided and distinctive emphasis on the importance of the analysis of the operations of the mind as a part of general logic and a prologue to the treatment of concepts, judgments, and inferences.[42] Indeed, that Kant regarded such a division of the operations of the mind as foundational for the structure of general logic is undeniable, as Kant makes clear in the KrV:

> General logic is constructed on a plan that corresponds quite precisely with the division of the higher faculties of cognition. These are: *understanding*, *the power of judgment*, and *reason*. In its analytic that doctrine accordingly deals with *concepts*, *judgments*, and *inferences*. (KrV, A 130/B 169)

Even so, it is not immediately clear that Wolff should be credited with having brought this ancient division to Kant's attention. There seems to be, for one, an important difference between Kant and Wolff regarding the operation of the intellect that yields concepts as its ef-

fect: so, where Kant takes this to be the understanding, presumably in the narrow sense (i.e., as the faculty of concepts),[43] Wolff as we have seen takes the lower faculties, including sensation and imagination to be involved in the generation of concepts. Moreover, and quite consistent with this difference, Kant never credits Wolff with re-introducing this distinction; so not only does he consistently refer to it as the "ancient" division, but in the student notes for one of his logic lectures Kant even appears to deny that Wolff employed this division in his logic:

> The rational concept [*Vernunftbegriff*] arises from a syllogism.[44] [...] Thus, one can only infer to a *notam remotam* from a *notam mediam* by means of a syllogism. Therefore, before one treats of syllogisms, one should first discuss the three *operationen* of thought. That was Aristotle's method—very strict. –It was Wolff who broke with it. (V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 763)

These points notwithstanding, I will show in the next and final section, that there is compelling evidence to suggest that Wolff's analysis of the diverse operations of the mind in particular was taken into account by Kant and that it did in fact prove to be of decisive importance for his own general (and transcendental) logic.

4. Kant and Wolff on the Priority of Judging

Kant clearly departs from the antecedent tradition in excluding any contribution of the lower faculties of cognition from his general logic, and it is not obvious what role is played for Kant by the operation of *simplex apprehensio* when it comes to the formation of concepts.[45] Even so, Kant appears to draw on another, relatively overlooked feature of Wolff's discussion of the three operations. After arguing that simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning are the (only) three operations of the mind in LL § 52, and re-affirming the correctness of their ordering in LL § 53, Wolff turns to a consideration of universal notions (*notiones universales*) and accounting for how these are formed. Wolff's treatment of this topic at this comparatively late juncture in the discussion of the three operations (but *before* the discussion of concepts, judgments, and syllogisms) highlights an important feature of his earlier discussion of simple apprehension, namely, that the notions that we acquire by means of such apprehension are *individual notions* or, equivalently, *ideas* (Wolff, LL § 34) which in retrospect is just what we would expect in light of the involvement of sensation which yields representations of individual things (Wolff, LL § 57). Accordingly, in § 55 Wolff turns to accounting for how universal notions (which is to say *concepts* in Kant's sense), are formed, and he argues that this is only possible through the activities of judging and reasoning. The passage begins as follows:

> *It is not possible to form universal notions without the second and third operations of the mind.* Since a universal notion comprehends things which are common to the notions of many individuals or of many species (§ 54), it cannot be formed unless you have distinguished that which is contained in the notion of the things from the things themselves, and you have determined whether these continually belong to them or if they are subject to changes (Wolff, LL § 55).

Taking judgment first, Wolff's claim would appear to be that in order to form a universal

notion we must first distinguish between the individual things and the mark that is being attributed to them. Taking a previous example of a triangle that we intuit, Wolff explains that we discern three angles in the triangle which in turn we distinguish from it in taking the triangle to *have* three angles (Wolff, LL § 39 n.). Given that judgment, for Wolff, involves either attributing to or removing from a thing some mark that is distinct from it (Wolff, LL § 39; cf. also DM §§ 286-287), he contends that an act of judgment is required for distinguishing the mark from the thing it pertains to; as he puts it after the previous quote, "To the extent, then, that you recognize which [notions] agree with things, which ones cannot always agree, to that extent you judge" (Wolff, LL § 55). With respect to the involvement of the third operation, Wolff writes:

> moreover, it must be determined through reasoning whether that which we observe to be in a thing [*quod rei inesse observamus*] always belong to these same things, or whether it can truly exist apart from it, [and] since these [actions] cannot be referred to intuitive judgments, so they must pertain to discursive judgments which are elicited by means of reasoning (Wolff, LL § 55)

Here, Wolff appears to contend that in order to form a universal concept, the mark that has been distinguished from the individuals ('having three angles' in the previous example) must further be recognized as an essential feature of the individuals of which it is predicated; thus, the universal notion 'triangle' is formed inasmuch as we recognize that having three angles is not merely a feature of the triangles we intuit but is in addition a characteristic feature or mark of triangles as such.[46] As Wolff explains, this additional step goes beyond an intuitive judgment (*judicium intuitivum*) or *Grund-Urtheile* (Wolff, DL c. 5, § 2; LL § 51), which involves the direct intuition of some feature as belonging to some thing, but also requires a discursive judgment (*judicium discursivum*) or *Nach-Urtheile* (Wolff, DL c. 5, § 2; LL c. 5, § 2), in accordance with which the feature is judged to always belong to that thing (inasmuch as it presupposes the further general claim, for instance, that *all triangles have three angles*—Wolff, LL § 51n.; cf. DM §§ 336-337). Judgments of the latter sort are "elicited by reasoning" insofar as they involve attributing a further mark of the predicate of the subject (Wolff LL § 51 n.).

In spite of abandoning Wolff's treatment of singular representations in his own general logic, Kant seems to have made good use of Wolff's (widely overlooked[47]) discussion of the role of judging and reasoning in the formation of universal concepts. Indeed, that Kant is working out of the framework of Wolff's original discussion is evident, for instance, in the "Concluding Reflection" of *False Subtlety*. There, Kant begins by arguing that the paradigmatic products of the understanding, namely, distinct and adequate concepts, involve judgment and reasoning, respectively. Concerning the former, Kant's argument for the involvement of judgment proceeds along recognizably Wolffian lines:

> *Firstly*, then I would say: a *distinct* concept is only possible by means of a *judgment*, while a *complete* concept is only possible by means of a syllogism. A distinct concept demands, namely, that I should clearly recognize something as a characteristic mark of a thing; but this is a judgment. In order to have a distinct concept of body, I clearly represent to myself impenetrability as a characteristic mark of it. (DfS, AA 2: 58)

Kant argues that a distinct concept involves a judgment inasmuch as such a concept involves the clear representation of its marks which requires that we recognize some feature as a mark of that concept.[48] This is, of course, the same basis on which Wolff argues that universal concepts involve the second and third operations of the mind, and while Kant departs from Wolff's presentation on a number of points, even these departures are consistent with Wolffian doctrines. So, while Wolff contends that the operation of judgment *and reason* is required for universal concepts, we have seen that reason's activity is itself modelled by Wolff in terms of judgment. More substantively, Kant's focus on *distinct* concepts (rather than *universal* concepts as such) is justified given that, for Wolff, a universal concept the marks of which we are clearly conscious of as belonging to it will qualify as distinct (cf. Wolff, DM § 206), and the universal concepts which result from the operations of judgment and reasoning are distinct since in the process of their formation we also gain a clear conception of (at least some of) their constitutive marks.[49] Kant does offer an important revision of Wolff's account of the operation of reason, as what Wolff had identified as the contribution of reason (the recognition of the feature as an unchanging mark of the concept) is straightforwardly identified by Kant as the contribution of judgment. Instead, Kant takes the operation of reason to figure in adequate (*vollständige*) concepts since such concepts involve the recognition of some mark as a *mediate* characteristic mark of something, and so as belonging to something in virtue of being a "characteristic mark of a characteristic mark of a thing" (DfS, AA 2: 47).[50] In any case, as a result of these considerations, Kant diagnoses a widespread mistake with the order in which topics are treated in traditional (general) logic, namely, that "it discusses distinct and adequate concepts *before* it discusses judgments and syllogisms, although the former are only possible in virtue of the latter" (DfS, AA 2: 59—my emphasis).

In spite of the (to my mind) undeniable resemblances between the treatment in *False Subtlety* and Wolff's argument in LL § 55, Kant does not specifically mention his esteemed predecessor's views on the role of judging in this regard, nor indeed does he explicitly exempt Wolff from the mistake he diagnoses with traditional logics. However, in related (albeit unpublished) later discussions, Kant makes explicit Wolff's involvement on this score. In the Busolt student notes to Kant's lectures on logic, for instance, we find Kant emphasizing the consistency of his doctrine of the priority of judgment with Wolff's conception of the understanding, as the faculty of distinct cognition, and Kant seems also to credit Wolff with having recognized that (distinct) concepts involve an act of judging:

> All actions of the understanding go back to judgments, and every object that we cognize, every concept is, as it were, a predicate of a possible judgment; so one can define the understanding, which one had previously defined as the capacity of concepts, as the capacity of judgment [*Vermögen der Urtheile*] or of rules: for, the understanding is the source of rules, [and] because every judgment is a rule [and] every rule a judgment; for example, All men are mortal, as soon as I see a man, this proposition is like a rule for me: this man must also be mortal. This definition of the understanding agrees with that given by Wolff, namely, that the understanding is a capacity of distinct representations: for the logical distinctness of representations only comes about through judgment. Accordingly, [one] should discuss distinct representations among judgments [*bei den Urtheilen*], because a distinct concept already presupposes a judgment. (V-Lo/Busolt [1789/90], AA 24: 662-663)

Significantly, in another passage, found in the Philippi student notes, we find Kant unfavourably comparing Meier's treatment of distinctness to that of Wolff:

> In the following sections, the author discusses distinctness. Why did he reserve this [discussion] for this point and why did he not introduce it immediately in the 10th section according to the example of Wolff? He [i.e., *Wolff*—CD] has perfectly good cause [for this]. No distinctness comes about without judgment: therefore, the treatment of judgment must precede. (V-Lo/Philippi [1772], AA 24: 409)

Kant is evidently referring to Meier's discussion of distinct cognition in the Fifth Section of the *Auszug* (§ 135 ff.) entitled "Of the Clarity of Learned Cognition" and which contains Meier's initial treatment of concepts. Here, Kant faults Meier for failing to treat distinctness only after the discussion of judgment, which in Meier's text occupied the Ninth Section ("Of Learned Judgments"), which would mean that distinctness would more appropriately be discussed at the outset of the Tenth Section ("Of Learned Inferences"). Kant's comparison with Wolff is, at first blush, peculiar since Wolff himself likewise discusses distinctness in the context of his treatment of concepts in both DL (c. 1, §13) and LL (§88), and so *before* his full-dress account of judgment. Yet, in light of the foregoing, it should be clear that what Kant is referring to here is not Wolff's consideration of the various forms of *judgments*, but rather his initial investigation into the operations of the mind, which investigation we can now see Kant was clearly aware amounts to an argument for the priority of judging among the operations of the understanding in the formation of concepts.

This is to say, then, that Wolff is to be credited with having avoided the mistake of treating concepts, judgments, and inferences before conducting an analysis of the various operations of the mind since, crucially, Wolff (and apparently Wolff alone[51]) recognized the priority of the act of judging, at least concerning the formation of (universal) concepts. Wolff's importance for Kant on this score is not, however, limited to disclosing a role for judgment in the formation of distinct concepts since Kant's discussion in *False Subtlety* amounts to Kant's first (published) defense of the thesis that "the higher faculty of cognition rests absolutely and simply on the capacity to judge" (DfS, AA 2: 59). So, with respect to the understanding (taken narrowly), its actions can be traced back to judging given that this activity has been shown to be indispensable for the formation of distinct concepts and where Kant takes the understanding in the Wolffian sense, namely, as the faculty of distinct representation (cf. Wolff, DM § 277, PE § 275). Moreover, Kant contends that reason, as evidenced in its production of adequate concepts, is not at bottom a different faculty from judgment since the difference only concerns whether some feature is recognized as an immediate or a mediate characteristic mark which, in either case, amounts to a judgment.[52] While, as mentioned, this latter point amounts to a departure from Wolff's account of reason (which he took to be involved in the formation of universal or distinct concepts), it is nonetheless arguably in the spirit of the close connection Wolff draws between judgment and reasoning, as was already suggested by his characterization of the products of the latter in terms of judgments.[53] Of course, Kant goes further than Wolff given that Wolff does not contend that what is, for him, the first operation of the mind (*apprehensio simplex*) involves judging,[54] yet this does not detract from the relevance of Wolff's discussion of the operations of the mind for Kant's eventual identification of the understand-

ing, in all of its actions, as a faculty of judging.

Ultimately, then, it is Wolff's incorporation of his distinctive analysis of the operations of the mind within his "general" logic that sets his treatment off from those of his predecessors and successors and which earns the high praise of Kant and his disciples. Indeed, Wolff's importance for Kant in this regard is difficult to over-estimate. More than serving a merely structural importance for Kant, the investigation into the operations of the mind plays an essential role in general *and* transcendental logic given that the tracing back of all of the understanding's actions to the capacity to judge is what serves as the clue for Kant's discovery and complete exhibition of the categories at the basis of the unprecedented enterprise of transcendental logic. It is, then, just insofar as Wolff lays the groundwork for the discovery of the priority of judging that he is, rightly, credited by Jakob with having "grasped the idea of a general logic exceedingly well" since the initial but arguably most importance service that general logic can render to transcendental logic consists precisely in disclosing the priority of the second operation of the mind. Moreover, Wolff's importance on this score also offers a possible explanation for his surpassing of Locke when it comes to Kant's estimation of the most important contributors to general logic. While Locke, at least according to some, likewise recognized the importance of conducting an analysis of the operations of the mind for the aims of logic,[55] and thus earned Kant's early praise (at V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 37 and V-Lo/Philippi, AA 24: 338), it is likely that Wolff's account of the *tres operationes mentis*, and his trailblazing discussion of the priority of judgment which has no correlate in Locke, gained relevance for Kant once he had framed the idea of a transcendental logic, and that this is why, in Kant's mature evaluation, the *allgemeine Logik* of Wolff is the best we have.[56]

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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I consider the basis for Kant's frequent praise of Wolff's general logic as "the best we have." I argue that while Kant took issue with a number of distinctive aspects of Wolff's logic, particularly his account of the adequacy of concepts, the utility of nominal definitions, and his syllogistics, Wolff's novel analysis of the three operations of the mind (*tres operationes mentis*) was highly esteemed by Kant. As I argue, what Kant likely found worthy of praise was Wolff's account of the formation of general concepts, in the course of which he anticipates Kant's argument for the priority of the understanding's activity of judging which provides the central thesis (and *Leitfaden*) of the Transcendental Analytic.
KEYWORDS: Christian Wolff, Immanuel Kant, history of logic, general logic, judgment.

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Notes

1 As has been noted by for instance Brandt 1991, p. 110, in the Blomberg and Philippi logic notes Kant is effusive in his praise of Locke's logic; thus, in V-Lo/Blomberg Kant is recorded as claiming that "[a]mong critical philosophers, Locke deserves priority" and that "Locke's *de intellectu humano* is the ground of all true *logica*" (AA 24: 37), and in V-Lo/Philippi that "Locke took the most essential step in paving the way for the understanding" (AA 24: 338). Below, I will offer an explanation as to why Wolff is given apparent priority to Locke in Kant's lectures on logic in the Critical period.

2 For additional praise of Wolff's logic on Kant's part, see V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 37, V-Lo/Philippi, AA 24: 335.

3 Jakob 1788, Vorrede iv.

4 So, Wolff writes: "I found that, with respect to all this, universal [*allgemeine*] logic differentiated between individuals, species, and genera [...], and this distinction was necessary and completely sufficient for the sake of judgments and inferences," but, as he proceeds to point out, "I also noted at once that the common [gemeine] logic did not explain this difference with sufficient distinctness" (Wolff, AN § 59), which suggests that "allgemeine" and "gemeine" logic would refer to the same discipline, namely, to the traditional treatment of logic as a whole, where no contrast with a "particular" or "special" logic would be intended.

5 Among these are Joachim Jungius' *Logica Hamburgensis* and Jacopo Zabarella's *Opera Logica* (for references to both of these sources, see Tolley 2012, p. 427 n. 24.

6 Thümmig 1725-1726; cf. "Institutiones Logicae." For Wolff's acknowledgment of Thümmig's contribution in this regard, see

AN § 55. See also Pozzo 1988, p. 172.

7 On this see Wolff, LL § 59 and § 2 (note), as well as DP §§ 89-91.

8 This is confirmed in AN §56 where Wolff defends his appropriation of the Aristotelian tradition on this score. More on this below.

9 Knutzen 1747. See also Tolley 2012, p. 427 n. 24.

10 See Knutzen 1747, Praefatio: "*Methodum* quod attinet: *Logicam universalem*, quam alii theoreticam minus congrue appellant, eum in modum pertractaui, vt *a) theoriam* intellectus & *trium mentis operationum* indolem, variasque earum species explicarem, s. subiectum Logicae enuclearem; *b)* tum de *fine* s.veritate, & tandem *c)* de *regulis* hunc finem obtinendi s. de praxi, ac directionem trium mentis operationum agerem."

11 For Descartes' discussion, see *Principles* I, §45 (AT VIIIA.22/CSM I 207). On the importance of Leibniz's treatment on Wolff's logic, see H. W. Arndt's introduction to DL, p. 19-20, as well as RP II, c. 2, §27 and Wolff's Preface to the first edition of DL: (p. 109 of *Gesammelte Werke* edition).

12 Leibniz, AG 24.

13 See also Wolff, KU §§ 3-4.

14 See, for instance, Tschirnhaus 1695 (reprinted with a foreword by W. Risse, 1964), pp. 67-68.

15 For Wolff's discussion of the contrast between Scholastic and modern logicians on this score, see RP, c. 1 (*de lectionibus logicae*), §§ 5-8.

16 See AN §65: "Today however one has acquired a great prejudice against this doctrine, one to which I myself gave way in my younger years." For Wolff's discussion of his early rejection of the syllogism, see Wuttke 1841, reprinted, with a preface by Hans Werner Arndt, 1980, pp. 134-137.

17 For this see Arndt's intro to DL, p.19-20. See also Leibniz's letter to Wolff of 21 Feb. 1705: "Quod ad Corollaria tua attinet, non ausim absolute dicere, syllogismum non esse medium inveniendi veritatem" (BLW 18).

18 See Wolff, KU §§ 45-46.

19 For a detailed presentation of what follows, see Vanzo, forthcoming, in Gili-Sgarbi (eds.).

20 On this, see Vanzo, pp. 8-9.

21 For more on Wolff's position on this see Anderson 2015, p. 124.

22 Meier 1752 and 1752b (the latter is reprinted in AA 16: 1-872).

23 See, for instance, Wolff, DM § 203: "When our thoughts are clear, then we say it is light, or bright, in our soul."

24 See, for instance, Kant's discussion in Log 9:141 (§102 and note) and V-Lo/Dohna 24: 757. For Wolff's views on this, see DL c. 2, §30.

25 See V-Lo/Pölitz 24: 573 and V-Lo/Wiener 24:919. For more on Kant's criticism of Wolff on this score, see Heis 2014, pp. 612-613.

26 Thus Rescher 1966, p. 37 (quoted in Vanzo, p. 2 n. 12).

27 See Vanzo, pp. 14-15.

28 On this see M. Wolff 2010, pp. 359-371.

29 Wolff considers this topic in the chapter "*de veritatis criterio*" in the practical part of his LL (cf. §§505-48); however, that Kant ultimately judges Wolff's efforts to offer more than a merely nominal definition a failure (inasmuch as Wolff lacked the idea of a transcendental logic that would be required for such a criterion) has recently been argued by Rosenkoetter 2009.

30 Aquinas 2008, Book I, 4, p. 1. For references to other Medieval discussions of this topic, see Pozzo 1988, pp. 6-12.

31 "The three operations of the understanding, or *tres mentis operationes*, are the ground of ancient Aristotelian logic, as the Schoolmen treated it. Many of the moderns have dismissed this way of treating logic" (AN §56).

32 Thus, Arnauld and Nicole 1996 p. 23 write: logic "consists in the reflections that have been made on the four principal operations of the mind: conceiving, judging, reasoning, and ordering".

33 Clauberg 1658, pars prima, cap. II, §16.

34 See Tschirnhaus 1695 [1964] p. 80. One might also consult James Buickerood 1985, for a survey of some non-facultative logics

in the seventeenth century (see especially 172 and 172 n. 11); and Knutzen 1747 §45, pp. 61-62.

35 See also AN §56, 183: "Because, however, one cannot judge concerning something which one does not represent insofar as one does not simply want to repeat those judgments that one has heard concerning it, so the mere representation of things (*simplex rerum apprehensio*) or the doctrine of concepts (*de notionibus*) is the first thing that must be treated."

36 On this see also M. Wolff 1995, pp. 191 and 191 n. 299. Wolff also indicates that he made a beginning of accounting for the three operations of the intellect in DM §286; see AzDM §93.

37 See also Pozzo 1988, p. 25.

38 Thümmig 1725-1726, p. 4.

39 Resuch 1734, p. 1; cf. also §29

40 *Elementa philosophiae rationalis sue logicae*, p. 51. See also Knutzen's Preface: "1) *Logicam universalem*, quam alii theoreticam minus congrue appellant, eum in modum pertractaui, ut *a*) *theoriam* intellectus & *trium mentis operationum* indolem, variasque earum species explicarem, s. subiectum Logicae enuclearem." As M. Wolff notes, Knutzen also supplies an argument for the completeness of this division of the operations of the intellect; cf. *Elementa* §44 and M. Wolff 1995, p. 191 n. 299.

41 Meier is similarly faulted in V-Lo/Pölitz, AA 24: 565: "Thus far we have talked about cognition according to its various sorts, now the author divides cognitions into their elements which would have been sensible had it have happened earlier. 1) The first perfection, the author says, is when a cognition becomes a representation and concept. 2) when concepts are combined and judgments thus arise, 3) when judgments are combined and inferences arise. The ancients say: *quot sunt mentis operationes*? *tres, apprehensio simplex, judicium, et ratiocinium*".

42 That this analysis is the basis for Kant's praise of Wolff is also suggested, for instance, by Brandt 1991, p. 110 and M. Wolff 1995, p. 191.

43 This is consistent with Kant's interpolation of '*conceptus*' after '*simplex apprehensio*' at V-Lo/Busolt, AA 24:653 (quoted above). See also Refl 1713, AA 16: 90: "Logic: merely a formal part of philosophy. Logic treats of cognition, but not as intuition, rather of thought, not according to matter but form. *apprehensio simplex, iudicium*".

44 Here, '*Vernunftbegriff*' evidently refers to what Wolff had called an adequate concept; see, for instance V-Lo/Dohna 24: 762: "The representation that is general through the consciousness of it as a mark is a clear concept. The consciousness of a universal representation (*repraesentatio communis*) is therefore not merely called a concept but rather a clear concept. The concept that is clear by means of a judgment is called a distinct concept, and a concept that is distinct by means of an inference [*Vernunftschluß*] is called a rational concept [*Vernunftbegriff*] (according to Wolff an adequate [*vollständiger*] concept." For more on this point, see the next section.

45 On at least one occasion, Kant seems to identify the role of *simplex apprehensio* with the consciousness involved in the possession of a clear concept; see for instance V-Lo/Dohna: "Clear concept, through consciousness of generality. 2. distinct concept, not through mere *apprehensio*, but rather – *judicium*" (AA 24: 762-763).

46 See Wolff's presentation of related points in DL c. 1, § 13 and DM § 336.

47 Within the secondary literature, Wolff's discussion in LL §55 of the role of judging in concept formation only receives mention (as far as I am aware) in Risse 1970, p. 590 n. 342.

48 Cf. DfS, AA 2: 59: "The distinctness of a concept does not consist in the fact that that which is a characteristic mark of the thing is clearly represented, but rather in the fact that it is recognized as a characteristic mark of the thing".

49 Thus, in DL c. 1, §13 and DM § 336, Wolff frames his accounts in terms of "*deutlichen Begriffe*".

50 I take it that this earlier discussion is what Kant refers to in the "Concluding Section" when he writes "It is easy to show that an adequate concept is only possible by means of a syllogism; one needs only to look at the first numbered section of this treatise" (DfS, AA 2: 58).

51 To my knowledge, none of Wolff's disciples take up his account of the role of judging in the formation of universal concepts. So, it is not found in Thümmig's presentation in the *Institutiones* (though this is not surprising since it predates the clearer formulation of this argument in LL), nor is it to be found in the comparable discussions in Reusch 1734, §28 ff.; pp. 17 ff.) or in Knutzen 1747, §§33 ff.).

52 Thus, Kant writes, "for the capacity which immediately recognizes something as a characteristic mark of a thing, and which represents another characteristic mark as contained in the first characteristic mark, and which thus thinks the thing by means of a remote characteristic mark, is in all these cases exactly the same" (DfS, AA 2: 59).

53 See Wolff, DL, c. 5, § 2 (where Wolff distinguishes the products of these activities in terms of *Grund-* and *Nach-Urtheile*) and LL § 51 (where Wolff makes use of the distinction between *judicia intuitiva* and *discursiva*, referenced above).

54 Martin Lenz has pointed out to me that Martinus Smiglecius suggests at one point that *simplex apprehensio* might involve judgment (without committing to the claim that it does); see Smiglecius 1617, disp. 3, q. 1, 100.

55 For Locke's awareness and (implicit) use of the classical tripartite distinction between the operations, see Buickerood 1985, especially pp. 165-167; and Hill-Lagerlund 2012, pp. 18-19.

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Ens imaginarium: *Kant e Wolff*[1]

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No final da "Analítica transcendental", Kant apresenta uma subdivisão do conceito de "nada", cujo terceiro lugar fica ocupado pelo *ens imaginarium*, definido como "intuição vazia, sem objeto" (KrV A 292/B 348, trad. p. 274), e colocado em relação com o espaço e o tempo puros. O significado do *ens imaginarium* foi também recentemente objeto de controvérsias, principalmente relacionadas com a interpretação da "Estética transcendental".[2] Em contrapartida, pouca atenção tem sido dada à origem desta expressão: alguns autores mencionam fontes escolásticas e protomodernas,[3] mas pouco tem sido feito, seja para reconstruir as teorias pré-kantianas do *ens imaginarium*, seja para avaliar a atitude de Kant no que diz respeito a elas. Além disso, o debate centrou-se principalmente sobre a mencionada passagem da primeira Crítica, deixando quase sempre na sombra as não raras ocorrências da mesma expressão em outros textos de Kant. Por isto, buscarei mostrar que o conhecimento das fontes é essencial para compreender-se corretamente a tese kantiana acerca dos entes imaginários, bem como para tornar as declarações da primeira *Crítica* coerentes com o que Kant escreve em outros lugares. Defenderei, por um lado, que, para Kant (como para as doutrinas tradicionais), é apenas a maneira como nós pensamos o espaço e o tempo que os torna entes imaginários. Por outro lado, mostrarei que a recuperação kantiana do conceito tradicional de *ens imaginarium* é acompanhada de uma rejeição da maneira pela qual este conceito foi definido por Wolff; e isto porque, do ponto de vista da "Estética transcendental", as teses wolffianas sobre o papel da imaginação na representação do espaço e do tempo tornaram-se inaceitáveis.

1. Imaginário versus real

Amplamente atestada na escolástica espanhola e alemã, a discussão sobre a natureza imaginária do espaço e do tempo volta a ser destaque no início do século XVIII com a publicação da correspondência entre Leibniz e Clarke. Ao longo da controvérsia, Leibniz tenta várias vezes desqualificar a concepção newtoniana de espaço e tempo, acusando-a de introduzir

entes imaginários como espaço e tempo absolutos ou de atribuir realidade a coisas que só podem ser imaginárias. Espaço e tempo, diz Leibniz, "são coisas verdadeiras, mas ideais como os números" e "como todos os entes relativos".[4] A idealidade do espaço implica a inexistência do espaço vazio, pois o espaço não pode ter nenhuma realidade absoluta, independente da existência de objetos extensos; o espaço vazio é algo "imaginário". Em que sentido deve ser compreendido este adjetivo? Leibniz refere-se ao uso escolástico da expressão "espaços imaginários", que designava os espaços extramundanos, e aplica esta qualificação para o espaço vazio em geral, observando que os argumentos contra a realidade dos primeiros valem também contra o segundo.[5] Como Clarke bem compreende,[6] Leibniz utiliza "imaginário" em oposição a "real": o espaço concebido como realidade absoluta é uma quimera, uma ficção.[7] A este espaço imaginário, de ficção, Leibniz opõe o espaço devidamente concebido como uma ordem, ou seja, uma realidade ideal: esta é uma "coisa verdadeira" no sentido que os possíveis são verdadeiros.

Contra Newton, Robert Greene argumenta também que o espaço e o tempo absoluto são apenas abstrações da mente: não coisas reais, mas "criaturas da imaginação" – um ponto que, não surpreendentemente, será muito destacado por Wolff em sua recensão da obra de Greene.[8]

Neste período, os autores da tradição escolástica tendem a classificar como imaginário tudo o que tenha a ver com abstrações e ficções matemáticas, e que, embora não seja um mero nada, não tem uma realidade extramental. Assim o faz Daniel Strahler na sua censura da metafísica de Wolff, afirmando que representamos o espaço se imaginarmos que os entes atuais não existem: o espaço é, portanto, um "*Ens rationis* e *mere imaginarium*, que não tem Réalité para fora de nossos pensamentos".[9] Deste modo, há entidades a serem caracterizadas como "imaginárias", e seu estatuto ontológico é identificado com o dos entes de razão, cujo ser consiste apenas em ser pensados.

Para o Wolffiano Jakob Friedrich Müller, a expressão "ser imaginário" parece um expediente insatisfatório de Strahler para manter a "velha quimera do espaço absoluto", mesmo depois de admitir que o espaço é uma ficção.[10]

Müller alega igualmente que se Strahler conta entre os entes também o que é puramente imaginário, então ele deve ter uma definição de entidade mais ampla da de Wolff.[11] Em outras palavras: não há espaço na ontologia de Wolff para entidades de consistência duvidosa como os entes imaginários. Müller estava errado: a expressão *ens imaginarium* reapareceria alguns anos mais tarde, exatamente nas obras latinas de Wolff, mas agora utilizada num sentido técnico, e portanto parcialmente ressemantizada em comparação com os usos anteriores.

2. Um substituto da realidade: as noções imaginárias de Wolff

Wolff define o *ens imaginarium* como "o que é exibido por uma noção imaginária",[12] ou seja, uma noção "pela qual, dada alguma semelhança, simula-se o que não é, para que possamos tornar presente, como que diante dos olhos, através uma imagem, o que não se apresenta diante deles".[13] As noções imaginárias são uma ajuda cognitiva, permitindo-nos formar uma representação visual (e, portanto, um conhecimento intuitivo) de coisas que, por si sós, não são

objeto dos sentidos. Mas o que significa "simular o que não é"? E qual o papel desempenhado pela semelhança neste processo fictício?

Um exemplo significativo de noção imaginária é a ideia de memória como um receptáculo de ideias. Essa concepção da memória, sedimentada também na linguagem coloquial (por exemplo: em frases metafóricas como "manter na memória" etc.[14]), baseia-se na semelhança entre a atividade memorativa e o gesto de extrair de um recipiente coisas que foram aí colocadas. Nesta comparação, as ideias memorizadas correspondem às coisas guardadas, e a reprodução das primeiras corresponde ao ato de extrair as segundas. "Por causa desta semelhança – escreve Wolff –, simulamos, portanto, aquilo que não é, ou seja, uma espécie de receptáculo em que são colocadas as ideias adquiridas".[15] Não há, pois, nenhum armazenamento de ideias; visualizar a memória desta maneira significa "simular o que não é". O armazenamento de ideias, portanto, é um *ens imaginarium*, que a noção imaginária exibe. Contudo, esta simulação não é totalmente infundada, porque inspirada numa semelhança real entre o que a imagem realmente é (um receptáculo) e o que se quer representar por ela (uma faculdade mental).

Além das realidades espirituais,[16] mesmo as entidades abstratas podem ser exibidas "sub imagine".[17] Uma das tarefas da ontologia é mostrar "como comumente formam-se as noções imaginárias das coisas absstratas"[18]. A matemática, o reino das abstrações, é, naturalmente, o âmbito próprio para a aplicação das noções e das entidades imaginárias, que, portanto, desempenham uma importante função cognitiva e heurística: de fato, a discussão completa deles pertenceria à *ars inveniendi.*[19] O uso heurístico destas noções é baseado na possibilidade de substituir o verdadeiro objeto da investigação científica com o seu "suplente" imaginário,[20] de modo a ser possível estudar mais facilmente as propriedades do primeiro: "com a noção imaginária é colocado um ente substituto do verdadeiro, e que pode ser tomado em lugar dele para investigar e demonstrar a verdade".[21]

Wolff, contudo, adverte que o processo simulatório deve ser consciente e supervisionado, de forma que a mudança entre o real e o imaginário não se torne enganadora. A noção de memória como um receptáculo de ideias pode levar-nos a crer que o conteúdo mental seja como objetos que podemos reapreender à vontade, em aberta violação das leis psicológicas.[22] Em outras palavras, conceber a memória como um armazenamento pode sugerir inferências impróprias das propriedades do armazenamento para as propriedades da memória. O erro está em transgredir os limites de validade da ficção, estendendo indevidamente a semelhança entre o ente imaginário e o ente real, até identificá-los. O imaginário pode ser assumido como o substituto do real por meio da semelhança entre os dois, e apenas dentro dos limites dessa semelhança. Trata-se de uma regra metodológica que podemos formular do seguinte modo: se o ente S é semelhante ao ente R no que diz respeito à propriedade P, que ambos possuem, é permitido atribuir a R, segundo a sua semelhança com S, apenas as propriedades de S que nós deduzamos a partir da propriedade P.

Em contrapartida, demais propriedades que descubramos pertencer a S, mas cuja posse não seja derivável da posse de P, não podem ser atribuídas a R (a não ser, é claro, que haja alguma razão independente para tal atribuição). Assim, se concebermos a linha reta como um fio esticado de um extremo ao outro, devemos atribuir à linha apenas aqueles predicados do fio,

que resultam da consideração do comprimento dele.[23] Isso explica porque a matemática pode beneficiar-se da referência ao imaginário: ela considera apenas as quantidades, e "para determinar a quantidade ou a grandeza das coisas são suficientes noções imaginárias".[24] Pelo contrário, estas não são de nenhuma utilidade quando se trata de conhecer as qualidades das coisas, de modo que são estéreis na metafísica, e, em geral, na filosofia.

Vamos agora às noções de tempo e espaço. Segundo Wolff, o tempo, como ordem, "dá-se" se e somente se existem coisas que se sucedem; não obstante, ele permanece distinto das próprias coisas, podendo mesmo ser concebido "em abstrato", como ordem de sucessão entre possíveis não existentes.[25] Por esta razão, o tempo é normalmente pensado como algo subsistente para além das coisas existentes, acreditando-se que ele continuaria a fluir mesmo se nada existisse.[26]

Além disso, nós temos a tendência para pensar o tempo a partir de uma métrica: para medir diferentes durações, dividimos o tempo em partes semelhantes, e, portanto, concebêmo-lo como um todo que contém as existências sucessivas de coisas. Deste modo, a noção real do tempo é "reduzida" à noção imaginária,[27] que representa o tempo como "um ente composto de partes sucessivas contínuas não intrinsecamente diferentes, distinguido das coisas sucessivas, e junto ao qual elas coexistem".[28]

A imagem que corresponde à noção imaginária, e que nos permite visualizar o tempo, é a de uma "linha gerada a partir do fluxo contínuo de um ponto"; essa, com efeito, oferece-nos uma representação do tempo imaginário, ou seja, do tempo concebido "como um ente composto de partes sucessivas, que flui contínua e uniformemente",[29] e que pode ser considerado como distinto das coisas que se sucedem umas às outras. A linha representa a totalidade composta por partes contínuas, e o *punctum fluens* designa o único instante temporal presente.[30] Por isso, os matemáticos representam o tempo por uma linha reta:[31] não se trata de uma ficção arbitrária, mas sim de um procedimento justificado pela semelhança entre o ente real e o ente imaginário assumido como seu substituto. Na noção imaginária de um ente "não há nada a que não corresponda algo verdadeiro"; e assim é possivel utilizar esta noção como noção substituta da real:[32] portanto, "através da noção imaginária o tempo é corretamente representado pela linha reta gerada a partir do fluxo contínuo de um ponto".[33]

Devemos ter porém em mente que, apesar desta "correspondência" com o verdadeiro, cada noção imaginária "tem em si algo de fictício, que vem da imaginação";[34] portanto, é preciso evitar a confusão com a noção real, pois, caso contrário, haveria o risco de acreditar que o tempo fosse "um ente real existente fora das coisas que se sucedem".[35] A questão é que o tempo imaginário abrange somente o aspecto quantitativo da duração das coisas existentes: podemos então valer-nos da noção imaginária, em vez de da noção real, apenas quando o único aspecto relevante seja a quantidade do tempo, isto é, quando queremos medir a duração de uma coisa comparando-a com a duração de uma outra coisa. Para os matemáticos, que lidam com o tempo apenas com o propósito de medição, o conceito imaginário é, portanto, suficiente, porque permite-lhes determinar facilmente a quantidade da duração e as relações entre os diferentes durações. Pelo contrário, isso é totalmente inadequado para os fins daqueles que, lidando com metafísica, ocupam-se com questões ontológicas (o que é o tempo?) ou psicológico-racionais (como surge na alma a noção confusa de tempo?).[36]

Mesmo o espaço sendo considerado "em abstrato" como a mera possibilidade de coexistência de várias coisas, esse espaço abstrato (possível) difere do espaço concreto (atual), pois deve ser concebido como algo uniforme e continuamente extenso.[37] Este é o fundamento que justifica a noção imaginária do espaço: "Até que se conceba o espaço imaginário como algo extenso, uniforme e contínuo, não se atribui a ele nada a que não corresponda algo verdadeiro. Portanto, a noção de espaço imaginário pode ser substituída pela noção verdadeira apenas quando se deva levar em conta a grandeza das coisas extensas, ou seja, quando as grandezas dos corpos tenham de ser comparadas".[38] Esse espaço imaginário permite estabelecer uma métrica, então é útil para os matemáticos, que medem o tamanho e o movimento dos corpos.

Os limites de validade deste conceito são ao contrário transgredidos se o espaço for concebido como "um ente real existente fora das coisas simultâneas",[39] uma espécie de receptáculo sem corpo, que recebe todos os corpos.[40] Desta forma, o espaço, antes concebido "em abstrato", é agora concebido como uma entidade existente juntamente com os corpos, e que tem características opostas às da matéria: indivisibilidade, imobilidade e penetrabilidade. Estas são também uma parte da noção imaginária de espaço, que nos apresenta o espaço exatamente como "um continuo extenso e uniforme, indivisível e imóvel, penetrável pelas coisas existentes".[41] Tal como esclarecido pela *Psychologia rationalis*, esta representação do espaço depende dos limites do nosso sistema perceptivo, parecendo-nos perceber realmente algo extenso e indivisível, distinto das coisas materiais singulares, e, portanto, penetrável.[42] O erro está em tomar essa percepção confusa por uma ideia distinta e, portanto, em inferir a partir dela as outras propriedades do espaço, tornando-o um ente infinito e eterno – atributos que prenunciam a deificação do espaço operada por Henry More, Joseph Raphson, Newton e Clarke.[43]

Mesmo tendo uma natureza ficcional, o ente imaginário wolffiano difere do ente fictício.[44] O *ens fictum* é algo impossível, que nós acreditamos possa existir, por não percebermos a contradição no conceito dele:[45] são fictícias as quimeras formadas pela fantasia, mas também as forças e as qualidades ocultas introduzidas pelos escolásticos e pelos newtonianos. O ente imaginário, ao contrário, não é caracterizado por uma "repugnância" à existência ou pela nossa suposição errônea sobre a sua possibilidade, mas pelo fato de não existir tal como nós o concebemos: "Assim, o espaço, tal como concebido pelo povo, [...] é um ente imaginário, e de fato não existe tal como acreditamos que ele exista e tal qual nos parece que o observamos".[46] Distinguir o imaginário do fictício serve a Wolff para destacar o diferente valor epistêmico e heurístico dos dois tipos de entes: o ente imaginário é caracterizado por uma relação de semelhança com o ente real, dentro dos limites da qual é permitido tomar o primeiro como representante do segundo – o que, porém, não pode ser feito com os entes fictícios.

3. O ente imaginário de Kant

A maneira como Kant retoma o conceito de *ens imaginarium* é parte da complexa operação que ele faz entre as duas tradicionais concepções rivais de espaço e tempo: a de Newton e a de Leibniz. Por um lado, Kant concorda com a crítica de Leibniz ao realismo newtoniano: quem considera espaço e tempo como realidades subsistentes tem "de assumir dois não entes,

subsistentes por si mesmos, eternos e infinitos (o espaço e o tempo), que existem (sem que exista contudo algo real) apenas para englobar em si todo o real" (KrV A 39/B 56, trad. p. 85, alterada). Por outro lado, a posição de Leibniz é qualificada como realismo objetivo, e, portanto, rejeitada (Cf. KrV A 26/B 42, A 32-3/B 49, e MSI, AA 2: 400).

São vários os textos que mostram Kant ter presente a expressão "ente imaginário" no sentido antirrealista tradicional.[47] Assim, na "Dissertação de 1770", após ter negado que o tempo fosse "*algo objectivo e real*", Kant compara o tempo "considerado em si mesmo e absolutamente", o qual é um "ser imaginário", com o tempo concebido como condição das representações sensíveis, que, ao contrário, é um "conceito totalmente verdadeiro" (MSI, AA 2: 400-401, trad. pp. 54-56). Aqui, o estatuto de "ente imaginário" é utilizado para expresar o que o tempo não é: esta definição se aplica ao tempo concebido como algo que existe independentemente do sujeito, como uma substância, ou um acidente ou uma relacão. Em suma, seja o tempo dos leibnizianos, seja o dos newtonianos, em ambos ele é um ente imaginário.

Numa anotação de 1774, à primeira vista desconcertante, lê-se que o espaço absoluto não é um ente imaginário.[48] Mas consideremos o contexto: Kant está explicando que o espaço não é um objeto de intuição, mas a própria intuição, e que, portanto, como intuição pura, é algo real ("etwas wirkliches"), mesmo que simplesmente ideal ("nicht reale, sondern ideale"), porque existe só na alma, e não fora de nós. A razão pela qual o espaço não é "*nada de imaginado*" é que "ele é a única condição real [*wirkliche*] da representação de coisas externas reais" (Refl. 4673, AA 17: 639).

Desta forma, o passo acorda-se com o que a "Dissertação de 1770" diz sobre o tempo: se devidamente entendidos como condições formais da representação, tendo uma realidade ideal e subjetiva, espaço e tempo são entes não imaginários; eles se tornam entes imaginários somente se nós assumimos que eles existem fora do sujeito, como objetos que poderíamos intuir.

Na primeira *Crítica*, lemos que o espaço puro e o tempo puro são, sim, "algo como formas de intuir", mas "não são eles próprios objetos que sejam intuídos (*ens imaginarium*)" (KrV A 291/B 347, trad. p. 274). Aqui parece que o conceito de ente imaginário serve para determinar o estatuto ontológico do espaço e do tempo, quer dizer, para establecer o que o tempo e o espaço *são*, como formas puras da intuição.[49] Mas esta impressão é enganosa: de fato, não é decerto porque "eles são algo" (isto é, as formas da intuição) que espaço e tempo são mencionados na "Tábua do Nada". Assim, considerados como formas da intuição, espaço e tempo não seriam entes imaginários, devendo, então, aparecer numa "Tábua do Algo". Eles enquadram-se na divisão do nada só se esvaziados de todo o conteúdo perceptual. Mesmo aqui, então, Kant está comparando o algo que espaço e tempo realmente são, com o nada que eles são se considerados em si mesmos, como se fossem entes reais.[50]

Esta interpretação encontra apoio numa *Reflexion* que data de entre 1778 e 1789. Para distinguí-lo do não-ente, da pura negação, Kant caracteriza o ente imaginário do seguinte modo: "Mera forma, sem realidade (pensada como coisa em si), é *ens imaginarium*. Espaço".[51] Aqui é significativa a clarificação: a forma pura, sem conteúdo perceptual, é um ente imaginário, se "pensada como coisa em si". A clarificação coloca o texto em consonância com a tese da

"Dissertação de 1770", segundo a qual o tempo. "considerado em si mesmo e absolutamente", é um ser imaginário. O fato que espaço e tempo sejam entes imaginários depende essencialmente de como nós os concebemos:[52] se os pensarmos como coisas em si, introduziremos entidades imaginárias em nossa ontologia, e assim consideraremos o nada como se fosse algo.

Mas a "Tábua do Nada" da primeira *Crítica* não contém a clarificação mencionada.[53] Mesmo assim, é difícil defender que Kant, então, teria abandonado esta solução. Numa *Reflexion* posterior, lemos que a idealidade do espaço e do tempo pode ser deduzida do fato que "o espaço nada contém em si que pudesse ser em si a representação de uma coisa ou da relação (de diferentes [coisas]) das mesmas umas com as outras; considerado como uma tal determinação, como *ens imaginarium*, ele é um *non ens*" (Refl 6316 (1790-1791), AA 18: 622).

O espaço, em si, não oferece qualquer conteúdo representativo que nos permita objetivá-lo: é uma forma vazia, real não como forma das coisas em si, mas apenas como forma da nossa representação das coisas. A forma-espaço em que intuímos os objetos externos não pode ser uma determinação desses objetos, porque se nós concebermos o espaço desta forma, em nada mais pensaremos do que em um ente imaginário; logo, um não-ente, um nada. A idealidade do espaço e do tempo significa que eles são reais como condições de representação, mas imaginários se tentarmos concebê-los como conteúdo de uma representação.

O conceito de ente imaginário serve assim a Kant para expressar o lado negativo, por assim dizer, da idealidade do espaço e do tempo, ou seja, o fato que espaço e tempo nada são, senão formas de nossa intuição. Nesse sentido, o uso kantiano mantém uma evidente relação com o uso tradicional do termo "imaginário" para descrever algo que não tem nenhuma realidade fora de nosso pensamento. Mas Wolff já codificara a expressão "ente imaginário" como um termo técnico, atribuindo-lhe um significado mais específico do que o tradicionalmente associado a ele.[54] Nesse sentido, qual a posição de Kant no que diz respeito à concepção wolffiana do ente imaginário?

4. Kant e a heurística wolffiana

Vimos que, na terminologia de Wolff, o estatuto do "imaginário" refere-se à formação de uma imagem, e, portanto, a uma intervenção da imaginação no processo cognitivo: não sendo capaz de representar visualmente uma entidade imaterial ou abstrata, imaginamos algo que se assemelhe a ela.

Em seu Streitschrift contra Eberhard (1790), Kant nega explicitamente que espaço e tempo sejam entes imaginários neste sentido. Para remover os paradoxos da composição do contínuo, Eberhard tinha reproposto a distinção wolffiana entre o espaço-tempo concreto e o espaço-tempo abstrato.[55] Kant rejeita esta solução: "[...] não se pode buscar uma solução no fato que o tempo e o espaço concretos não seriam submetidos ao que a matemática demonstra a propósito de seu espaço (e tempo) abstrato como ente imaginário [*als einem Wesen der Einbildung*]" (ÜE, AA 8: 202).[56] O ente imaginário aqui em questão é o de Wolff:[57] o espaço e o tempo abstratos que os matemáticos representam como grandezas contínuas, uniformes e

mensuráveis. Do ponto de vista kantiano, isso é inaceitável, por razões bem conhecidas: se a matemática tivesse realmente como objeto noções abstratas da experiência, não poderia construir juízos sintéticos *a priori*. Portanto, a única maneira de remover o paradoxo seria admitir que "espaço e tempo são meros entes de razão [*Gedankendinge*] e entes imaginários [*Wesen der Einbildungskraft*], não como forjados [*gedichtet*] por esta última, mas sim como ela tem de colocá-los a fundamento de todas suas composições e ficções [*Dichtungen*], porque são a forma essencial de nossa sensibilidade" (ÜE, AA 8: 202-203).

Ao contrário dos textos considerados antes, a passagem em questão afirma que as formas de intuição são entes imaginários; mas ela o faz de forma peculiar, sem contradizer os argumentos anteriores. Com isso, em que sentido espaço e tempo são "entes da imaginação"? Não como seus produtos, diz Kant, pois, caso sim, espaço e tempo seriam meras ficções, o que não explicaria o fato de os objetos dos sentidos sempre estarem em conformidade com eles. Em vez disso, espaço e tempo pertencem à imaginação, na medida que não podemos imaginar um objeto que não tenha dimensões espaço-temporais: como formas a priori, espaço e tempo enformam todas as nossas representações, sejam de objetos reais, sejam de objetos inexistentes. O significado da precisão é claro: admitir que espaço e tempo sejam entidades imaginárias significa desistir de considerá-los como coisas reais, que existem fora de nós, mas não significa colocá-los em pé de igualdade com as ficções construídas por nossa imaginação. O propósito da precisão é igualmente claro: em oposição a Eberhard, Kant pretende salientar a diferença entre a sua concepção do ente imaginário e aquela empregada pela escola wolffiana. Embora, como vimos, Wolff distinga cuidadosamente o ente imaginário do ente fictício, Kant parece dar pouca importância a esta parte da teoria de Wolff: a seu ver, o ente imaginário wolffiano ainda mantém o estatuto de um produto, de uma ficção, não podendo, portanto, fornecer uma caracterização adequada do *a priori* espaço-temporal. As formas *a priori* da intuição são algo dado originalmente, e não o resultado de uma ficção ou abstração.

Em apoio a esta leitura, pode-se mencionar um passo da "Estética transcendental", no qual as posições de Leibniz e Wolff são acusadas de ignorar a aprioridade dos conceitos de espaço e tempo, reduzindo-os a produtos da imaginação. Aqueles que, em alternativa à visão newtoniana, consideram o espaço e o tempo como relações abstraídas da experiência, desistem com isso da possibilidade de fundar a priori a certeza matemática, "e os conceitos *a priori* de espaço e tempo, segundo essa opinião, são meras criações da imaginação [*Geschöpfe der Einbildungskraft*], cuja fonte tem de ser buscada na experiência, de onde a imaginação abstraiu as relações para criar algo que de fato contém o universal das mesmas, mas que não pode existir sem as restrições que a natureza ligou a elas" (KrV, A 40/B 57, trad. p. 85).[58]

As "criações da imaginação" aqui mencionadas são claramente entes imaginários no sentido wolffiano: entidades que a imaginação produz para representar na forma de uma imagem as relações abstratas derivadas da observação dos fenômenos. Se Leibniz e Wolff acusaram Newton de considerar reais o espaço e o tempo imaginários, Kant, por sua vez, acusa os dois primeiros de objetivar espaço e tempo, considerando-os como relativos às coisas em si. Nesse sentido, o erro de Leibniz e Wolff teria sido o de reduzir a componente *a priori* das representações espaço-temporais a um produto da imaginação.

Mais de um passo da "Estética transcendental" parece aludir à teoria wolffiana. Após ter apresentado a sua concepção do tempo como forma do sentido interno, Kant considera a representação linear do tempo: "E, justamente porque essa intuição interna não fornece nenhuma figura [*Gestalt*], nós procuramos suprir esta falta por meio de analogias e representamos a sequência do tempo por meio de uma linha que prossegue ao infinito e na qual o diverso constitui uma série de apenas uma dimensão" (KrV A 33/B 50, trad. p. 81).[59] Portanto, mesmo para Kant, a linha deixa uma imagem do tempo, que em si não é representável, em virtude de "analogias" (Wolff teria dito "semelhanças") subsistentes entre as duas coisas.

Além disso, acrescenta Kant, "inferimos das propriedades desta linha todas as propriedades do tempo, exceto uma: que as partes da primeira são sempre simultâneas, ao passo que as do último vêm sempre umas após as outras" (KrV A 33/B 50, trad. p. 81, alterada). Esse é o método de inferência desenvolvido por Wolff: nós temos razão em atribuir ao ente real as propriedades do ente imaginário, mas apenas sob a condição de que estas tenham sido derivadas das propriedades comuns às duas entidades.

Contudo, essa concessão ao wolffianismo é só aparente. Com efeito, exatamente por ela, Kant pretende derivar um argumento dissimuladamente anti-wolffiano: "Com isso também fica claro que a própria representação do tempo é uma intuição, pois todas as suas relações se deixam exprimir em uma intuição externa" (KrV A 33/B 50, trad. p. 81). Em outras palavras, se o tempo fosse uma representação do entendimento (o conceito universal de ordem, de acordo com o que Wolff defende), entre esta representação e a representação intuitiva da linha não haveria semelhanças suficientes para expressar, através da imagem, todas as relações temporais.

Qualquer que seja o valor deste argumento, é claro que isso pressupõe a ruptura kantiana entre sensibilidade e entendimento, ou seja, entre intuições e conceitos: no âmbito da tópica transcendental kantiana não há mais lugar para a função mediadora que a epistemologia wolffiana tinha atribuído às noções imaginárias. De um ponto de vista geral, o que está em falta na visão de Kant é a função heurística e "produtiva" do ente imaginário, ou o que, exatamente, é a contribuição original do discurso de Wolff.

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ABSTRACT: The present article clarifies Kant's use of the expression *ens imaginarium* by confronting this use, on the one hand, with the traditional (which is still present in Leibniz), and, on the other hand, with Wolff's use. After considering the revival of the debate on the distinction between "imaginary" and "real" after the publication of the correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke (§ 1), the article illustrates Wolff's transformation of the traditional concept of *ens imaginarium*, a transformation carried out through the theory of imaginary notions (§ 2). Contrary to the fictitious *ens*, Wolff's *ens imaginarium* can work as a surrogate of the real *ens*, and thus play a heuristic function. In Kant, however, the expression *ens imaginarium* keeps the more traditional sense of "not real": space and time are imaginary beings if we conceive them as contents of the representation, rather than as pure forms of it (§ 3). Thereby, Kant aims to oppose precisely the changes introduced by Wolff, which he considers incompatible with the a priori character of the concepts of space and time (§ 4).
KEYWORDS: Imagination, Nothing, Space, Time, Kant, Wolff

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Notas

1 Este artigo foi inicialmente publicado, em italiano, em *Kant und die Aufklärung*. Akten der Kant-Tagung in Sulmona, 24-28. März 2010. Hildesheim: Olms, 2010; p. 315-328. O autor agradece a Gualtiero Lorini e a Alberto Vanzo pelos comentários e sugestões.

2 Veja-se a discussão entre Longuenesse 1993, p. 302-304 e p. 348-349; 1998, p. 79-91, trad. ingl. in Id. 2005, p. 64-80, e Fichant 1997, p. 20-48.

3 Cf. Kobusch 1987, p. 380-382 (o autor atém-se em particular a Fonseca e a Suárez).

4 *Correspondance Leibniz-Clarke*, editada por Robinet 1957, p. 42 e 100.

5 Cf. Ivi., p. 85 e 136.

6 Cf. Ivi., p. 69.

7 Cf. Ivi., p. 89 e 181.

8 Greene 1727, p. 40-41, 43, 47. Com respeito à recensão wolffiana, cf. *Acta Eruditorum*, Junho 1729, p. 244-245. Na *Ontologia*, Wolff menciona Greene por ter reconhecido que o espaço é somente um "ens notionale", como o tempo e o número, mas julga que ele seja demasiado rigoroso na medida que ele nem sequer na matemática admite a noção imaginária de espaço (Ont § 611).

9 Strähler 1999 (1723), p. 28. O autor, ao contrário, defende, contra Wolff, a realidade do vazio: cf. ivi., p. 30.

10 Müller 1726, p. 55-57.

11 Ibid. Em seguida Müller tornou-se contra Wolff: veja-se Müller 1731.

12 Wolff, Ont, § 141.

13 Wolff, Ont, § 110.

14 Cf. Wolff, PE, §§ 178 e 188.

15 Wolff, PE, § 177.

16 Para mais um exemplo, cf. Wolff, PR § 82 n.

17 Ch. Wolff, Ont, § 111 n.

18 Wolff, Ont, § 110 n.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Wolff, Ont, § 141 n. Portanto, não me parece que "imaginarius" em Wolff tenha uma "conotação exclusivamente negativa", como defendido por Pimpinella 1988, p. 382.

22 Wolff, PE, § 177 n.

23 Wolff, Ont, § 111 n.

24 Wolff, De differentia, p. 385-479. Sobre este escrito, que tem um grande interesse epistemológico, cf. Marcolungo 2004, p. 341-347.

25 Wolff, Ont, §§ 574-576.

26 Wolff, Ont, § 576 n.

27 Wolff, Ont, § 577.

28 Wolff, Ont, § 581. É a ideia do tempo como um "receptáculo de sucessivos" (Thümmig 1725-1726 (1982), vol. I, § 52).

29 Wolff, De differentia, § 9.

30 Wolff, Ont, § 582.

31 Wolff, Ont, § 586; De differentia, § 9.

32 Wolff, Ont, § 581 n.

33 Wolff, Ont, § 582.

34 Wolff, Anmerkungen Metaphysik, § 26.

35 Wolff, Ont, § 581 n.

36 Cf. Wolff, Ont, §§ 581 n. e 586; De differentia, § 9.

37 Wolff, Ont, §§ 591-594 e 598.

38 Wolff, Ont, § 599 n. Cf. Wolff, LL, § 937 n.

39 Wolff, Ont, § 599 n.

40 Wolff, Ont, §§ 599 e 611.

41 Wolff, Ont, § 599.

42 Cf. Wollf, PR, § 106.

43 Cf. Wolff, Ont, § 599 n.; De differentia, § 7.

44 Cf. Wolff, Ont, § 141 n.

45 Wolff, Ont, § 140.

46 Wolff, Ont, § 141 n.

47 Note-se que em *Metaphysik* L_2 a expressão "ens imaginarium" é empregada para indicar, de forma genérica, o que em outros lugares Kant chama "ens rationis": cf. V-Met-L2/Pölitz, AA 28: 543-544, 555. E na Refl 5724 (1783-1784) "ens imaginarium" indica uma de duas espécies de "ens rationis" (Refl 5724, AA 18: 336). Por razões de espaço, não vou me debruçar sobre tal uso, que considero um pouco destoante.

48 Refl. 4673, AA 17: 639: o espaço absoluto "ist [kein] nichts eingebildetes (*ens imaginarium*) ". "Eingebildet" para traduzir "imaginarius" encontra-se também em Lambert 1764, vol. I, p. 481. Os conceitos de espaço e tempo, se claros, mas não distintos, são considerados como "*eingebildete Begriffe*, Ideae imaginariae".

49 Estão orientadas desta maneira as leituras de Vollrath 1970, p. 57, e de Organte 2003, p. 67-87.

50 Para interpretar de forma consistente estas diferentes formulações de Kant, devemos assumir que a intuição desprovida de qualquer objeto, mencionada na *Crítica*, coincida, em certa medida, com o tempo "considerado em si mesmo e absolutamente" da "Dissertação de 1770". Isto não implica, em minha opinião, dificuldades insuperáveis: conforme a mesma controvérsia entre leibnizianos e newtonianos, admitir a existência de espaços e tempos vazios significa reconhecer implicitamente ao espaço e ao tempo uma realidade em si, e, portanto, concebê-los como objetos que podem existir mesmo na ausência de outros objetos. Contra essa tentação, Kant adverte que, considerados desta forma, espaço e tempo são apenas entes imaginários.

51 Refl. 5577, AA 18: 238: "Bloße Form ohne realitaet (als Ding an sich gedacht) ist *ens imaginarium*. Raum". A expressão entre parênteses é uma adição contemporânea à *Reflexion*.

52 Mesmo autores da área wolffiana caracterizaram o ente imaginário de uma maneira semelhante: cfr. Darjes 1743, p. 163 (há um ente imaginário se, por alguma semelhança, "nós representamos como um ente o que não é um ente"); e Böhm 1753 (1998), § 77 ("no próprio ente não há nada pelo que ele seja chamado imaginário; a distinção depende da forma como é representado").

53 É preciso salientar que a conclusão nem sequer se encontra nas Refl. 5552 (possivelmente 1778-1783; AA 18: 219) e 5725 (1785-1788; AA 18: 336).

54 Este uso técnico foi imediatamente incorporado pelos manuais da escola wolffiana. A exposição de J. P. Reusch parece-me particularmente clara e fiel: Reusch 1735 (1990), §§ 19, 26, 143, 145-146, 153, 155-156.

55 Eberhard 1789, vol. I, p. 169-172.

56 Cf. Kant 1994, p. 79.

57 Este ponto não foi bem apreendido por Longuenesse 2005, p. 75, que, então, interpreta a passagem como se Kant afirmasse que o espaço abstrato da matemática é um ente imaginário.

58 Kant não menciona expressamente Leibniz nem Wolff, mas a identificação de ambos não é difícil.

59 Cf. KrV B 154, B156, B 292.

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Kant entre harmonia pré-estabelecida e influxo físico

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A abordagem de Kant das diferentes teorias da causalidade que se confrontam no debate científico e filosófico de sua época é caracterizada, por um lado, pela referência a suas fontes mais diretas e, por outro lado, pela tendência à elaboração de uma perspectiva original, que não é totalmente redutível a estas mesmas fontes. Neste contexto, um dos primeiros pontos focais é representado pela referência a Leibniz, muitas vezes mediada por autores como Wolff e Baumgarten, o que, a propósito, leva o próprio Kant a por vezes acreditar esteja posicionando-se contra as teorias de Leibniz, ao passo que, na realidade, ele está, por exemplo, atacando uma tese de Wolff ou de um discípulo de Wolff. Isto acontece com menor frequência no que diz respeito a Baumgarten, que em muitos aspectos é um leibniziano mais ortodoxo do que Wolff.

Uma outra linha de interpretação tende a salientar o emprego, por parte parte de Kant, das posições de Crusius como um meio para contrastar o formalismo wolffiano. Contudo, mesmo que o desacordo de Kant com Crusius seja em geral mais oculto e implícito, ele é muitas vezes agudo e determina, também, o surgimento de posições autônomas e originais no pensamento de Kant. O ponto de partida e o constante pressuposto na análise deste panorama é o que o próprio Kant (falando de ontologia) definiu como o "vestíbulo da metafísica" (cf. FM, AA 20: 260). Neste caso, o vestíbulo é o texto através do qual Kant enfrenta a tradição metafísica, ou seja, a *Metaphysica* de Baumgarten, que Kant emprega durante toda a sua carreira acadêmica como manual para suas lições de metafísica. É por isto que vamos começar a partir deste texto.

Para Baumgarten, *ratio* [*Grund*] significa "fundamento" de um ente [*ens*],[1] e está ligado a este ente por um *nexus*, que tem de ser entendido num sentido metafísico mais amplo. O "princípio" é o que contém o fundamento de uma outra coisa, e pode ser princípio "de ser" [*essendi*], "de vir-a-ser" [*fiendi*] ou "do conhecer" [*cognoscendi*],[2] enquanto a "força" [*vis*] caracteriza o nexo interno através do qual os acidentes aderem à essência da substância na medida que ela é o "fundamento suficiente" deles.[3] No que diz respeito à adesão à essência dos "modos", e mais ainda das "relações", precisamos de mais uma determinação, ou seja, de um fundamento que é uma "causa", não uma "força", e que coincida com o "princípio da existência" (a ser entendida como "vir-a-ser").[4] Este princípio é o fundamento do "complemento de essência ou da possibilidade interna"[5] de uma coisa. Entre os significados do conceito de "causa" expressos por Baumgarten, Kant adota desde os *Pensamentos sobre a verdadeira avaliação das forças vivas* o de "causa eficiente" [*causa realitatis per actionem*].[6] Contudo, enquanto Kant adota este conceito, a fim de explicar o "influxo físico" entre as substâncias, Baumgarten é um adepto da "harmonia pré-estabelecida". Por conseguinte, para Kant, também e sobretudo, a ação da força tem um valor de causalidade, pelo fato de poder exercer-se por uma substância sobre a outra, enquanto Baumgarten reduz a relação entre as substâncias a uma força que é apenas interna a qualquer substância.[7] A harmonia pré-estabelecida pressupõe uma teoria monadista da substância, que é atacada por Kant na terceira seção da *Nova dilucidatio*, através da exposição de dois princípios que devem ser deduzidos a partir do princípio da razão suficiente. O primeiro é o "princípio da sucessão" [*principium successionis*]: "Nenhuma mudança pode acontecer às substâncias, a não ser na medida que estão conexas com outras, cuja dependência recíproca determina a mútua mudança de estado" (PND, AA 1: 410). Aqui, o principal objetivo polêmico de Kant é Wolff, segundo o qual "uma substância simples está sujeita a mudanças constantes em virtude de um princípio interno de atividade" (PND, AA 1: 411).[8] Kant considera aqui a teoria de Wolff insustentável por vários motivos. Em primeiro lugar, uma mudança exige novos fundamentos que devem necessariamente derivar do exterior, mas no presente caso isto não pode acontecer porque as determinações internas que já aderem à substância estão "postas por fundamentos internos, com exclusão do oposto" (PND, AA 1: 410). Ademais, as mudanças das determinações internas da substância não podem derivar de uma mudança em seus fundamentos, porque estes, por definição, são imutáveis, assim como as determinações são simultâneas a eles. Com isto, na medida que as determinações essenciais são imutáveis, elas não podem ser a fonte das alterações internas da substância. Os wolffianos – diz Kant – "criaram uma definição de força a tal ponto arbitrária que significa aquilo que contém o fundamento das mudanças, quando deveria antes dizer o que contém o fundamento das determinações" (PND, AA 1: 411). Isto se refere aos *Pensamentos*, texto em que a força foi definida como a expressão mais autêntica da causalidade, e seu caráter peculiar foi representado pelo conceito de "atividade", que caracteriza também o princípio de mudança wolffiano.[9] Então, o passo seguinte consiste em entender em direção a que tende a atividade da força, o que exige investigar um pouco mais o conceito de causalidade.

Wolff, Baumgarten e Meier partilham um conceito geral de causa como um fundamento cujo âmbito é basicamente lógico. Pois este fundamento é uma expressão do princípio da razão suficiente, que por sua vez vem do princípio lógico da não-contradição, donde se poder concluir que também este fundamento tem um valor lógico.[10] Portanto, mesmo a necessidade que

caracteriza a derivação do causado em relação à causa deve ser lógica. Pois a posição da causa é simultânea à da consequência [um princípio aceito até mesmo por Kant]; as determinações decorrentes dos fundamentos essenciais da substância são simultâneas a esses fundamentos essenciais, tanto do ponto de vista lógico quanto do ontológico, ou seja, elas são imutáveis como os seus fundamentos.[11]

O objetivo das observações de Kant é exatamente o de explicar a transição do plano lógico ao ontológico, mas, para este efeito, a teoria da causalidade de Wolff é claramente insuficiente. De fato, para Kant no conceito wolffiano de substância faltam as relações intra-substanciais, e, portanto, este conceito de causalidade não pode ser considerado *real*. Pelo contrário, isto é expressado por uma mera correspondência lógica e ideal entre causa e causado. Portanto, a ação da força só pode ser exercida sobre as determinações internas da substância, e a alteração é reduzida a uma sucessão de determinações internas que precisam de um outro princípio interno para tornar-se reais. Este modelo contradiz o conceito de uma essência fundamentada em determinações cujo contrário foi logicamente excluído. Assim, para Kant nada existe no interior da substância que possa produzir a mudança. Esta deve necessariamente vir do exterior, por meio de uma força expressada por uma causalidade real.

Na terceira seção da *Nova dilucidatio*, Kant adota uma perspectiva complementar no que respeita às duas primeiras seções. De fato, enquanto nas duas primeiras seções Kant visa analisar o princípio da razão suficiente e demonstrar a sua validade, aqui, por meio da limitação da validade deste à realidade contingente, Kant pode definir a modalidade de determinação das substâncias contingentes como uma interação causal mútua. Em outras palavras, as alterações das relações externas da substância são a causa das suas alterações internas, porque as primeiras contêm o "fundamento de existência" [*ratio existentiae*] das segundas. Deste modo, pelo "princípio da sucessão", Kant explica como a remoção do predicado oposto ao que pertence ao sujeito é possível mesmo quando esta remoção fica *atual*, ou seja, naqueles casos em que esta remoção vai além dos limites da lógica formal. Devendo esta remoção ser efetuada por uma causa externa, isto requer que as substâncias encontrem-se numa relação mútua e real.[12] Neste sentido, a adesão de Kant a esta forma de influxo físico responde à necessidade de preencher a carência da lógica formal, na medida que ela pretende fornecer uma explicação completa da realidade contingente.

De fato, com base no seu princípio de sucessão, Kant reivindica a possibilidade de "derrubar totalmente a harmonia pré-estabelecida de Leibniz" (PND, AA 01: 412). Mas, mesmo no que diz respeito à relação entre fundamento e determinação, que Kant discute nessas linhas, as suas críticas não afetam realmente a concepção leibniziana autêntica. Suas críticas são ao contrário dirigidas contra a versão wolffiana desta relação.[13] A objeção de Kant repousa sobre o fato que, uma vez posto um fundamento essencial interno à substância, uma determinação correspondente é, por sua vez, imediata e imutavelmente colocada. Portanto, uma mudança interna pura não é admitida. Contudo, Leibniz, de forma diferente de ambos, Wolff e Kant, rejeita a contemporaneidade entre a posição do fundamento e a da determinação correspondente. Isto permite a Leibniz explicar a mudança em termos de causas derivadas, não em termos de causas primeiras.[14] Não obstante, a explicação da mudança em termos de causas

primeiras, ou pelo menos de fundamentos essenciais, é um objetivo perseguido tanto por Wolff quanto por Kant, embora através de diferentes estratégias. É por isto que o "idealismo" de Leibniz ainda é insatisfatório para os propósitos de Kant, mesmo que o princípio kantiano de sucessão não enfraqueça substancialmente a própria posição de Leibniz.

Pelo princípio da sucessão, Kant parece reivindicar que a realidade sensível consista, em última análise, de pontos físicos primitivos dotados de forças físicas, que gerem interações causais. Contudo, desde que estas forças não sejam expostas a mudanças, elas igualmente não podem ser identificadas com as forças particulares, que nós podemos observar na nossa experiência sensível. Elas, ao contrário, parecem já coincidir com as forças atrativas e repulsivas de que Kant tratará na *Monadologia physica*.[15] Neste texto, Kant descreve as mônadas, cuja simplicidade, de forma diferente dos *atomi naturae* de Wolff, bem como das mônadas leibnizianas e baumgartianas, não as impede de ser compostas por partes. De fato, para Kant a simplicidade das mônadas físicas consiste no fato que suas eventuais partes não podem ser separadas umas das outras, e uma tal definição de simplicidade não se encontra em qualquer outro autor do tempo de Kant.[16] No entanto, após ter colocado este elemento de originalidade, pelo menos programática, o desenvolvimento da *Monadologia physica* não explica como a propriedade de "ser composta de partes, que não podem ser separadas umas das outras", realiza-se efetivamente na substância simples. Assim, ao fim e ao cabo, a simplicidade das mônades físicas em Kant coincide ainda com a definição de simplicidade em Wolff como "ausência de partes".[17]

O segundo princípio introduzido por Kant na terceira seção da *Nova dilucidatio*, ou seja, o princípio de coexistência, é, na verdade, pressuposto pelo princípio da sucessão:

> As substâncias finitas não estão, somente por sua existência, em relação umas com as outras, nem estão ligadas entre si por qualquer interação, exceto na medida que o princípio comum da sua existência, ou seja, o entendimento divino, as mantém em um estado de harmonia em suas relações recíprocas (PND, AA 1: 412-413).

Kant ilustra aqui as modalidades do nexo causal entre as substâncias, necessário para que uma mudança aconteça no interior de uma substância singular. A limitação desta análise às substâncias contingentes é expressa pela referência às substâncias "finitas". Além disso, é importante notar que a insuficiência da mera existência de substâncias singulares para a determinação de suas relações mútuas parece colocar a posição de Kant perto da doutrina da harmonia pré-estabelecida. Na verdade, se Kant não afirmasse ter já descartado esta teoria na exposição do princípio da sucessão, passagens como a seguinte poderiam ser interpretadas como totalmente consistentes com a posição de Leibniz e Baumgarten:

> Por conseguinte, na medida que cada uma das substâncias tem existência independente das outras, não ocorre nenhum nexo mútuo das mesmas, nem acontece nas <substâncias> finitas ser causas de outras substâncias e, no entanto, pois todas as coisas no universo se encontram coligadas por um nexo recíproco <mútuo>, tem de admitir-se que esta relação depende da comunhão da causa, ou seja, de Deus, princípio geral dos existentes (PND, AA 1: 413).

O ponto sobre o qual Kant não concorda com Leibniz e Baumgarten é a natureza real, e não simplesmente ideal, da relação entre as substâncias, uma relação que se baseia na dependência comum das substâncias do esquema do entendimento divino.[18] Contudo, a verdadeira natureza desta relação foi já indicada na explicação do princípio de sucessão; portanto, a crítica de Kant é principalmente focada na insuficiência da existência das substâncias para a determinação das suas relações mútuas. Por esta razão, o objetivo das críticas de Kant tem que ser identificado com Crusius. De fato, embora Crusius admita a natureza real das relações entre as substâncias, ele afirma que só Deus pode criar substâncias, cuja existência coloca-as *ipso facto* numa relação real.[19] Pelo contrário, Kant afirma que as substâncias poderiam também ser criadas (com todos os seus fundamentos internos) sem ter nenhuma relação mútua. Neste caso, as relações seriam adicionadas posteriormente e de forma independente dos fundamentos internos. Pois a mera existência das substâncias não implica necessariamente a sua interação [*commercium*] mútua, pois ela nem sequer pode dar razão das determinações decorrentes desta interação; portanto, "é óbvio que, se se supõe que existem mais substâncias, disso não se determina ao mesmo tempo o lugar, a posição e o espaço que é constituído por estas relações de muitas maneiras" (PND, AA 1: 414). Deste modo, o espaço ocupado [*eingenommen*] ou preenchido [*erfüllt*] pelas substâncias começa agora a desempenhar um papel significativo na determinação da interação causal entre elas.

1. A natureza do espaço como problema-chave na determinação das relações inter-substanciais

Como afirma Kant na *Nova dilucidatio*, no ponto "5" da "Aplicação" do princípio de coexistência, o conceito de espaço deriva das substâncias corpóreas, das quais ele manifesta as relações sensíveis, cujo fundamento metafísico é constituído pela dependência destas substâncias em relação à causalidade divina. Aqui, Kant menciona uma "*notio spatii*" que fica reduzida às "ações implicadas das substâncias com as quais sempre necessariamente a reação tem de estar junta" (PND, AA 01: 415). Deste modo, embora Kant admita, com Leibniz, a natureza derivada do espaço, ele não conclui, como Wolff, que o espaço é meramente subjetivo. Em vez disso, em conformidade com Newton, ele atribui ao espaço uma realidade que o torna um elemento essencial nas relações entre os corpos. De fato, a rejeição da tese newtoniana do primado ontológico do espaço sobre as substâncias físicas não impede Kant de argumentar que o fenômeno externo da relação universal entre os corpos "chama-se atração, a qual, como resulta da mera copresença, chega a qualquer distância, e é a atração newtoniana, ou a gravitação universal" (PND, AA 01: 415).

Aqui, mais uma vez, a força expressa a essência mais autêntica da causalidade. De fato, quando Kant critica as teorias da harmonia preestabelecida e do ocasionalismo, ele volta ao significado da causalidade eficiente, cujo pressuposto é a dependência comum das substâncias em relação a Deus como sua causa criadora:

Com o mesmo direito pode-se assumir que as mudanças externas podem ser produzidas desta maneira por causas eficientes, e também que as mudanças que ocorrem dentro da substância

são atribuídas a uma força interna da substância, embora a eficácia natural desta, tal como aquele fundamento das relações externas, dependa da divina sustentação (PND, AA 1: 415).

Contudo, é surpreendente que nestas últimas linhas da *Nova dilucidatio* Kant até pareça rejeitar a teoria do influxo físico, que até este ponto defendera, seja por seus pressupostos, seja pela exclusão de possíveis alternativas a ele:

Quaisquer que sejam as determinações e as mudanças que se encontrem em qualquer [substância], elas sempre se referem, na verdade, ao que é externo, mas o influxo físico, no verdadeiro sentido do termo, tem de ser excluído, e há uma *harmonia universal* das coisas (PND, AA 1: 415).

Mas Kant está aqui a simplesmente rejeitar uma versão esboçada do influxo físico na qual se pode reconhecer não só a teoria de Crusius, mas também a de Knutzen.[20] Nos *Pensamentos*, Kant tinha de fato mencionado sarcasticamente um "agudo escritor" [*scharfsinniger Schriftsteller*] que foi o principal defensor do influxo físico.[21] Nesta referência, alguns estudiosos têm com razão reconhecido Knutzen.[22] O pressuposto básico de Knutzen é que a força do próprio movimento que caracteriza a mônada leibniziana implica a força de mover outras coisas.[23] Isto seria também demonstrado pela impenetrabilidade.[24] Assim, Knutzen enfrenta as duas objeções tradicionais contra o influxo físico, e afirma que este último não implica a migração de acidentes de uma substância a outra, mas apenas uma alteração na substância submetida à ação de outra. Além disto, e por meio de uma referência leibniziana, Knutzen rejeita a crítica relativa à conservação da vis viva no mundo, e afirma que esta não é válida para a interação corpo-alma. De fato, Leibniz deduz esta lei do princípio da inércia, que, para Knutzen, não pode ser válido para a alma.[25]

Porém, Kant não parece convencido por estas soluções propostas por Knutzen, mesmo elas sendo sofisticadas. Na verdade, ele acredita que a teoria de Knutzen não pode evitar a mera migração de acidentes de uma substância a outra. Mais ainda: na teoria de Knutzen, nenhuma dependência comum das substâncias de Deus é exigida para explicar a possibilidade das suas interações mútuas, o que não permite alcançar a "harmonia universal das coisas" [*rerum harmonia universalis*] (PND AA 1: 415).

Como já mecionado relativamente à *Monadologia physica*, a tentativa de fundamentar o influxo físico de uma maneira inovadora está intrinsecamente ligada a uma nova fundação da teoria da substância simples. Apesar da adesão geral de Kant a uma teoria wolffiana da substância simples neste período, alguns elementos leibnizianos e baumgartianos ainda permanecem. Com efeito, quando, no final da *Nova dilucidatio*, Kant tenta fundamentar a relação entre as substâncias por meio de conceitos newtonianos, ele está ainda a refinar o conceito de "força ativa", que é basicamente leibniziano. Para ultrapassar esta posição, que o impede de abraçar a perspetiva newtoniana, Kant tem de questionar a teoria segundo a qual qualquer atividade da substância pode ser reduzida a uma das suas propriedades intrínsecas. A partir da versão kantiana do influxo físico, uma resposta possível é implicitamente detectável no final da proposição "7" da *Monadologia physica*. Aqui, Kant defende que as propriedades relacionais da substância precisam das propriedades intrínsecas às quais elas são referidas, da mesma maneira

como os acidentes precisam de uma substância.[26] Ao mesmo tempo, vale lembrar o que Kant tinha afirmado acerca do princípio da sucessão na *Nova dilucidatio*, ou seja, que as alterações dentro da substância dependem das alterações das suas relações, que, de acordo com o princípio da coexistência, comprendem igualmente "lugar, posição e espaço" (Cf. PND AA 01: 414). A partir de todos estes elementos, pode-se argumentar que qualquer substância contingente, que, como tal, esteja exposta a mudanças, determina a sua própria posição no espaço em virtude de uma pluralidade de relações com as outras substâncias. Estas relações são estabelecidas através das forças de impenetrabilidade e atração.

Não é coincidência que, desde as Lições de Metafísica do início da década de 1760, quando enumera os primeiros conceitos da metafísica, Kant enumere, ao lado dos conceitos que "quase não podem ser reduzidos em absoluto" – como "representação", "contiguidade" e "sucessão" –, também enumere "espaço" e "tempo", que, de forma diferente, "podem ser reduzidos apenas parcialmente" (V-Met/Herder AA 28: 155-158).[27] Isto atesta que, apesar de neste período Kant ainda conceber o espaço como um conceito de relação, este conceito já fica caracterizado como objetivo. Kant, assim como Baumgarten, coloca o espaço entre os conceitos básicos da metafísica. Na variedade do universo, afirma Kant, todas as coisas têm sua própria posição [*Lage*], e o espaço parece estar dividido pelas coisas colocadas nele. Dentro do espaço é possível individuar lugares [*Orte*] que coincidam com pontos, nomeadamente entidades sem partes. Portanto, nenhum ponto no espaço "ocupa" um lugar. Não obstante, pois podemos afirmar por experiência direta que no espaço há algumas posições, nós devemos ao mesmo tempo admitir a existência de determinações (mutuamente) externas [äußere Bestimmungen] que correspondam às substâncias. Por conseguinte, onde não há nenhuma substância, não há também espaço nenhum. Assim, através dos conceitos de *Ort* e *Lage* Kant deriva uma *notio prima* de espaço como um conceito relativo exigido pelas substâncias.[28]

Nos escritos publicados no final dos anos 1750 e nos anos 1760, esta concepção de espaço é particularmente relevante. Na *Nova concepção do movimento e do repouso*, bem como no *Ensaio para introduzir o conceito de grandezas negativas em filosofia*, por exemplo, este conceito encontra-se colocado numa discussão mais ampla sobre o método da metafísica. Mesmo no texto em que tal discussão alcança o seu pico, ou seja, os *Sonhos de um visionário explicados por sonhos* da *metafísica*, a continuidade argumentativa com os problemas tratados na *Nova dilucidatio* e na *Monadologia physica* é claramente detectável. Com efeito, nos *Sonhos* Kant admite a existência de substâncias materiais simples e tenta delinear por analogia com elas as características de eventuais substâncias espirituais simples.[29] Ao fazer isto, ele está claramente a integrar a perspectiva da *Monadologia physica*. Nos *Sonhos* ele argumenta que, embora a presença no espaço das substâncias espirituais seja mediada pela área da sua atividade, esta presença não é um "preenchimento". Em seguida, Kant lembra algumas características da concepção relacional do espaço, que tinha sido esclarecida na *Aplicação* do princípio de coexistência e desenvolvida nas lições do início dos anos 1760.[30]

De qualquer forma, serão necessários mais dois anos para Kant alcançar um progresso essencial, embora não definitivo, na elaboração de sua versão peculiar do influxo físico: isto acontecerá com o escrito *Acerca do primeiro fundamento da diferença das regiões do espaço* (1768).

Neste trabalho Kant adere de fato à concepção newtoniana do espaço absoluto, e reconhece uma realidade particular do espaço, cuja natureza merece ser mais bem investigada.[31]

2. *Influxus originarius* e *influxus derivativus*

Antes de analisar o escrito de 1768, é preciso considerar uma reflexão que vem logo depois (entre 1769 e 1770), em que Kant especifica que quando se fala de "influxo" é sempre preciso admitir a possibilidade de uma influência direta de uma substância sobre a outra, já que, "originalmente, uma substância não pode afetar uma outra substância, porque as substâncias não recebem [a ação] uma da outra, a não ser que se afirme que as substâncias recebem [a ação] uma da outra na medida que a recepção [de tal ação] é ao mesmo tempo uma ação" (Refl 4217, 1769-1770, AA 17: 461). Aqui, Kant ainda adere à tese de Baumgarten, segundo a qual até mesmo o receber uma ação por parte de uma substância só pode ser representado por esta mesma substância sob a forma de uma ação própria, cujo conteúdo expresse essa recepção.[32] Com base nesta posição, Kant divide o influxo físico em original [*originarius*] e derivado [*derivativus*], e afirma que: "O primeiro ocorre se o fundamento formal [*ratio formalis*] é interno [*domestica*] às substâncias; o segundo, se esse fundamento é externo [*peregrina*]". O primeiro caso representa a influência que as substâncias poderiam exercer umas sobre as outras, apenas em virtude de sua existência, e coincide com o modelo de Knutzen, parcialmente com o de Crusius, ambos rejeitados por Kant.

Na medida que este fundamento assume um valor causal, ou seja, os seus efeitos vão além dos limites das relações internas entre a substância e os seus acidentes,[33] isto é uma "causa externa ao mundo" e coincide com um "ser extra-mundano [*ens extramundanum*]". Kant conclui que "[a] interação [*commercium*] das substâncias no mundo é realizada por meio do influxo derivado, ou seja, é uma interação natural resultante de uma dependência comum" (Refl 4217, 1769-1770, AA 17: 461). Trata-se aqui basicamente do princípio já introduzido por Kant na *Nova dilucidatio*, segundo o qual a interação entre as substâncias é baseada na sua dependência comum da mesma causa criadora. Aqui, este princípio alude explicitamente ao conceito de "totalidade" [*Universitas*], que será tematizado na "Dissertação de 1770". A reflexão de fato termina com a seguinte declaração: "A natureza do universo, como tal (pois toda a natureza é a natureza de todas as substâncias), consiste no conjunto e na completude [*completudo*] (por esta razão é dita totalidade [*universitas*] das coisas)" (Refl 4217, 1769-1770, AA 17: 461). Assim, embora a realidade do influxo físico entre as substâncias, que se baseia na dependência das substâncias em relação a uma causa comum, seja para Kant preferível à interação ideal proposta pela harmonia pré-estabelecida e pelo ocasionalismo, esta solução ainda depende inteiramente de um pressuposto fundamental suprassensível, a saber, a causalidade divina.

No entanto, Kant em 1768 já tinha individuado o conceito-chave para a fundação da sua versão do influxo físico, ou seja, o espaço absoluto como uma condição da intuição sensível. Pode-se então perguntar o que ainda impede Kant, quase dois anos depois deste texto, de empregar este conceito de espaço, a fim de integrar a sua versão do influxo físico. Com efeito, por meio deste conceito ele teria podido explicar como a interação mútua entre as

substâncias realiza-se *concretamente*. Contudo, há um problema que afeta o próprio conceito de espaço, e em relação ao qual, na transição do escrito de 1768 para a "Dissertação de 1770", Kant introduz uma "correção" decisiva. Na verdade, se nós analisarmos a definição de espaço fornecida na "Dissertação de 1770", detectamos o desaparecimento de um dos predicados que caraterizavam o espaço em 1768: em 1770, não há mais referência à "realidade" do espaço (e do tempo). Já no final do escrito de 1768 Kant tinha admitido que este predicado do espaço, embora seja intuitivo no que diga respeito ao sentido interno, cria dificuldades quando se quer apreendê-lo por meio das ideias da razão.[34] Na "Dissertação de 1770", em vez de "*conceptus spatii*" e "*idea temporis*", Kant associa espaço e tempo por meio da definição de "*intuitus purus*".[35] Diferentemente do que ocorria em 1768, Kant defende agora que, existindo o espaço antes das substâncias cuja interação é tornada possivel por ele, a "realidade" da sua função não pode ser empiricamente estabelecida, mas, ao contrário, deve estar enraizada no entendimento. Assim, entre 1768 e 1770 o espaço mantém o seu caráter absoluto, no contexto de uma adesão geral ao modelo newtoniano, mas sua realidade peculiar é afirmada no sentido subjetivo e transcendentalmente ideal, que o caracterizará também na *Critica da razão pura*. Esta transição ocorre exatamente no período da Reflexion 4217, e, portanto, pode-se de forma legítima supor que, neste fragmento, Kant não tinha ainda desenvolvido o conceito de espaço como uma forma subjetiva da intuição dos fenômenos.[36]

Na "Dissertação de 1770" esta concepção de espaço tem consequências imediatas sobre a correção do influxo físico, que é um dos objetivos de Kant. De fato, no "§ 22" Kant afirma que a interação primitiva entre as substâncias, na medida que "decorrente da própria subsistência daquelas, fundada numa causa comum", dá lugar a uma harmonia "*geralmente estabelecida*", enquanto a harmonia, "que tem lugar apenas na medida em que os estados individuais de qualquer substância se adaptam ao estado de outra", é uma "*harmonia singularmente estabelecida*". O comércio decorrente da primeira espécie de harmonia é "real e físico", enquanto que o decorrente da segunda é "ideal e *por simpatia*" (MSI, AA 2: 409, trad. p. 68). Kant acrescenta que uma "influência física (corrigida)" representa a forma mais geral das relações entre as substâncias no mundo. Ele afirma que esse comércio é sempre e inevitavelmente "*estabelecido externamente*", mesmo no caso em que este seja "individualmente conciliado com os estados das mesmas" (MSI, AA 2: 409, trad. p. 68), o que seria o caso da harmonia pré-estabelecida e do ocasionalismo.

Porém, a distinção fundamental entre o influxo físico e as duas teorias alternativas, distinção que determina a realidade do primeiro, depende mais uma vez do nexo que estabeleça as substâncias do mundo como dependentes de uma única causa criadora:

> Se, por conseguinte, mediante a sustentação de todas as substâncias por um só, a *conjunção* de todas as coisas que constituem uma unidade for *necessária*, então o comércio universal entre as substâncias será realizado através da *influência física* e o mundo será um todo real, de outro modo, o comércio será realizado *por simpatia* (isto é, por harmonia, sem que haja um verdadeiro comércio) e o mundo não será mais do que um todo ideal. Quando a mim, a primeira tese, ainda que não demonstrada, está sobejamente provada também por outras razões. (MSI, AA 2: 409, trad. p. 69)

Além disso, embora no *Scholium* o espaço seja definido como a "condição universal e necessária conhecida sensitivamente da presença simultânea de todas as coisas", ele é também definido como "OMNIPRESENÇA ENQUANTO FENÓMENO". "(Pois a causa do universo – diz de fato Kant – não está presente a todas e a cada uma por estar nos lugares destas, mas, ao contrário, há lugares, relações possíveis entre as substâncias, por ela estar intimamente presente a todas)" (MSI, AA 2: 410, trad. p. 69). Assim, nós podemos defender que a correção do influxo físico que Kant menciona no "§ 22" da "Dissertação de 1770" não consiste apenas no esclarecimento da dependência das substâncias de uma causa criadora comum, mas também em conceber o espaço como uma forma subjetiva da intuição, uma ideia que em 1768 ainda não estava presente.

Por um lado, a correção da teoria do influxo físico esboçada na *Nova dilucidatio* é aqui efetivamente realizada, na medida que Kant não só evita a mera migração dos acidentes de uma substância a outra, mas consegue também conceber a interação entre as substâncias através das condições das suas relações sensíveis. Por outro lado, Kant ainda representa aqui um dos princípios do mundo sensível, nomeadamente o espaço, como dependente do princípio formal do mundo inteligível, a saber, a causa criadora. Contudo, em 1770 essa dicotomia é totalmente colocada dentro da dimensão do sujeito cognoscente.

3. O espaço como forma de onipresença de Deus

A partir de 1771 Kant aprofunda o modelo de 1770, na medida que ele retoma a justaposição entre os termos "original" e "derivado" e emprega este conjunto de termos não só para o conceito de "influxo", mas também para o de "interação". Numa Reflexion de 1771, Kant de fato especifica que um influxo original de uma substância sobre uma outra só pode ser admitido sem nenhuma "substância-mediadora", de modo que este influxo originário pertence "apenas à *substantia sustentatrix*". Da mesma forma, no caso de uma interação de um "influxo mútuo", nenhuma substância mundana poderia ter, no que diz respeito a uma outra substância, a mesma relação causal original que o autor da totalidade do mundo tem em relação a esta totalidade das substâncias mundanas. Por conseguinte: "Nenhuma interação de substâncias [...] é original, cada uma delas é derivada, na medida que é sustentada por outra coisa" (Refl 4438, AA 17: 546). Numa Reflexion de 1776-1778, Kant acrescenta que "[o] influxo físico é naturalmente original ou derivado; este último é racional" (Refl 5422, AA 18: 178).

Vale a pena notar aqui que o influxo derivado é definido como racional porque Kant, perto da virada crítica, sente a necessidade de uma compreensão da totalidade que seja fundada em uma representação conceitual própria do sujeito, uma representação que, portanto, pressuponha as formas da intuição sensível. Já em algumas Reflexionen desta época Kant tinha esboçado o princípio – em seguida formalizado na *Crítica da razão pura* – segundo o qual "[a]s condições a priori de uma experiência possível em geral são, ao mesmo tempo, condições de possibilidade dos objetos da experiência" (KrV A 111, trad. p. 160).[37] Este princípio ilustra bem a nova perspectiva de que Kant considera o problema. Na *Crítica da razão pura* ele já não fala mais de um mundo, mas da natureza, que poderia ser tanto *materialiter spectata*, como "conjunto completo de todos

os fenômenos [*Erscheinungen*]", ou *formaliter spectata*, na medida que "todos os fenômenos [*Erscheinungen*] da natureza têm de estar sob as categorias no que diz respeito à sua ligação". Além disso, ele não fala mais de "substâncias", mas de "fenômenos", concebidos como "representações de coisas que existem sem que se tenha qualquer conhecimento daquilo que elas poderiam ser em si mesmas" (KrV B 163-165, trad. p. 147-148).[38] Este ultrapassamento do dualismo entre o mundo sensível e o inteligível, tal como fora concebido na "Dissertação de 1770", também permite a Kant superar a objeção clássica contra o influxo físico da alma no corpo. Com efeito, ele pode demonstrar que o pretenso dualismo qualitativo entre corpo e alma é, na verdade, fictício. Dado que nós não podemos conhecer as coisas como elas sejam em si, não faz sentido pretender conhecer a essência da substância simples, sequer reivindicar a heterogeneidade entre a substância material e a *res cogitans*.[39] Ambos os termos desta comparação deveriam ser considerados no mesmo nível, a saber, o da representação da realidade fornecida pelo sujeito transcendental com base na sua experiência.

Esta perspectiva já pode ser reconhecida tanto nas Reflexionen como nas "Lições de Metafísica" do fim da década de 1770. Aqui, Kant divide a interação derivada em "influxo hiperfísico [*influxus hyperphysicus*]", que abrange harmonia pré-estabelecida e occasionalismo, e "influxo físico", que "se refere às leis da natureza" (V-Met-L1/Pölitz, AA 28: 213).[40] Estas leis da natureza correspondem ao sistema conjunto de categorias e intuições puras a priori, que permite conceber a natureza como um todo. De fato, depois de ter estabelecido que a "conexão" [*Verknüpfung*] entre Deus e o mundo é uma "conexão de derivação" [*Verbindung der Ableitung*] – o que significa que Deus não está enredado nas determinações mútuas entre as partes do mundo[41] –, ele acrescenta que o espaço, como um fenômeno, "é a conexão infinita das substâncias, umas com as outras" (V-Met-L1/Pölitz, AA 28: 214). Vê-se claramente que a linguagem de Kant nas Lições é mais acadêmica do que nas obras impressas, e esta é provavelmente a razão pela qual ele ainda fala aqui de "substância". No entanto, a abordagem crítica é já claramente reconhecível quando Kant afirma que, se nós imaginarmos sensivelmente a conexão entre as substâncias – uma conexão cuja consideração puramente intelectual limita-se à sua fundação na causa criadora divina –, então o espaço é "a mais alta condição de possibilidade da conexão" (V-Met-L1/Pölitz, AA 28: 214). Portanto, o espaço é reconhecido como uma das condições de possibilidade que permitem à imaginação operar a síntese transcendental pela qual o sujeito pode representar a natureza como um totalidade "de acordo com as leis gerais".[42]

Em seu último curso sobre metafísica, em meados da década de 1790, Kant afirma que a definição newtoniana de espaço como o *Organon* da onipresença de Deus é errada, porque "o espaço não é nada em si mesmo; e não pode ser pensado como algo em si realmente existente através da conexão das coisas" (V-Met-K3 E/Arnoldt AA 29: 1007).[43] A harmonia entre substâncias, ou seja, a relação acima mencionada "de acordo com as leis gerais", só pode ser realizada como harmonia *in commercio*, isto é, através do influxo físico, e não como harmonia *absque commercio*, a saber, como um dos possíveis modos do influxo hiperfísico.[44] A realidade específica do espaço, que Kant já tinha discernido entre 1768 e 1770, pode agora ser alcançada através da sua integração com as leis gerais do entendimento humano.

Desde a *Nova dilucidatio* Kant visava utilizar a dinâmica newtoniana a fim de explicar

a maneira pela qual o vínculo mais original entre as substâncias pudesse ser representado pelo entendimento humano. Para alcançar este resultado, não foi suficiente para Kant atribuir ao espaço uma realidade ontologicamente anterior à realidade das substâncias, porque esta atribuição teria colocado o espaço no nível numenal da causalidade divina, da qual, ao contrário, o espaço deve ser a expressão inteligível. A relação específica entre o espaço e a onipresença divina, que Kant tinha percebido desde suas lições do início dos anos 1760 – quando ele tinha definido o espaço como "o primeiro ato da onipresença divina" (V-Met/Herder, AA 28: 103; Nach. Met. Herder, AA 28: 888) –, é esclarecida perto da virada crítica, quando Kant define o espaço como *um* fenômeno da onipresença divina.[45]

Contudo, é só nas suas lições mais tardias que Kant consegue deduzir, a partir da determinação transcendental do espaço, a sua definição como "condição *formal*" da representação da natureza como um *totum reale*. Aqui, Kant alcança a passagem que foi prefigurada na *Crítica da razão pura*. Com efeito, o espaço não é mais concebido como uma mera condição da natureza *materialiter spectata*, ou seja, como uma condição da mera presença simultânea de todos os fenômenos, mas, ao contrário, torna-se "a forma da onipresença divina", na medida que esta última "é expressada na forma de um fenômeno; e por meio dessa onipresença de Deus todas as substâncias estão em harmonia" (V-Met-K3 E/Arnoldt, 29: 1008).[46] Pois o espaço expressa na realidade fenomênica apenas a forma da onipresença divina; mas essa forma é ao mesmo tempo definida como um *fenômeno* desta onipresença *tout court*, o que significa que a determinaçao formal da onipresença divina fornecida pelo espaço diz também respeito à matéria desta onipresença. Portanto, todos os fenômenos que constituem a realidade fenomênica podem estar em harmonia através do espaço.

Poder-se-ia perguntar como esta harmonia pode ser concretamente realizada, na medida que ela deve expressar a totalidade *real* da natureza. Mas, aqui, Kant conclui que a nossa razão não pode ver além.[47]

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ABSTRACT: The present essay aims to provide an overview on Kant's dealing with the main theories of causality which were proposed and discussed in his time. The goal is to show that, since the pre-critical period, he has never simply accepted the theories of causality that he could find in second-scholastic sources, but has always tried to develop an original position. Starting from a general acceptance of the theory of the "physical influx", Kant tries to amend this theory, as it had been roughly provided by Knutzen and Crusius. This emendation is carried out through elements coming from the Leibnitian tradition. However, in this field Kant never totally embraces the Wolffian, as well as the Baumgartenian model. The paper tries also to shed light on the way in which the critical conception of space allows Kant to fulfill his original theory of causality as an amended version of the physical influx.
KEYWORDS: Physical Influx; Occasionalism; Pre-established Harmony; Causality; Space

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Notas

1 Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, § 14.

2 Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, § 311.

3 Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, § 197.

4 Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, § 307.

5 Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, § 55.

6 Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, § 319.

7 Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, §§ 449 ss. Cf.: e.g. GSK, AA 01: 18.

8 De qualquer forma, na *Cosmologia generalis* (§209) Wolff admite que podemos explicar todas as mudanças que ocorrem num elemento singular através das mudanças que ocorrem num outro.

9 Cf. supra GSK, AA 01: 18.

10 Cf. Wolff, Ont, §§ 866-881.

11 Cf. Wolff, DM, §§ 32, 42.

12 Sobre este ponto cf.: Reuscher 1977, p. 28

13 Este aspeito é bem salientado por Kaehler 1985, p. 406-408.

14 Veja-se, em particular: Leibniz, *Système nouveau* (1960-1961), p. 477-487. Sobre este assunto: Watkins 2005, p. 125.

15 Cf. Watkins 2005, p. 129.

16 See: Wolff, CG, §§ 186-188; Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, §§ 224, 230. Sobre este ponto veja-se Sarmiento 2005, p. 5.

17 Pozzo e Oberhausen argumentam que o wolffianismo de Kant nestes anos sobre temas relacionados à filosofia da natureza não é surpreendente, porque ambos, Leibniz e Newton, são ensinados neste período em Königsberg através de manuais wolffianos. Cf. Pozzo-Oberhausen 2002, p. 354.

18 Sobre o esquema do entendimento divino como fundamento das relações entre as substâncias, uma fonte significativa de Kant é Ploucquet 1753, §§ 200-202.

19 Cf. Crusius 1745 [1964], §327.

20 Cf. Knutzen 1735, 1745.

21 GSK, AA 1: 21.

22 Cf. Kuehn 2001, p. 93.

23 Knutzen 1735, § 28.

24 Knutzen 1735, § 29.

25 Knutzen 1735, § 53.

26 Cf. MonPh, AA 1: 482.

27 Cf. igualmente Refl 3716 (1762-1763), AA 17: 257.

28 Veja-se NLBR, AA 2: 23-24 e V-Met/Herder, AA 28: 29.

29 Veja-se TG, AA 2: 323.

30 Veja-se TG, AA 2: 323-324.

31 Veja-se GUGR, AA 2: 378.

32 Veja-se Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, § 463, e V-Met/Herder AA 28: AA 28: 51-53.

33 Cf.: Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, §§ 459 e ss.

34 Cf. GUGR, AA 2: 383.

35 Cf. MSI, AA 2: 398-404.

36 Cf.: Refl 3950, AA 17: 362; 4077, AA 17: 405-406; 4078, AA 17: 406; 4086, AA 17: 409-410. Todas estes Reflexionen são do 1769.

37 Vejam-se também Refl 4757 and 4758 (1775-1777), AA 27: 703-708.

38 Para os diferentes sentidos em que Kant fala de "mundo" e "natureza", cf. KrV, A 418-419/B 446-447. Cf. também Afeissa

2009 p. 161-165.

39 Cf. KrV, A 389-396.

40 Cf. também Refl 5428 (1776-1778): AA 18: 179.

41 V V-Met-L1/Pölitz, AA 28: 212.

42 Cf. V-Met-L1/Pölitz, AA 28: 214 e V-Met/Mron, AA 29: 868.

43 Neste contexto, Kant retoma a definição de espaço como um "símbolo" desta onipresença. Esta definição já estava presente na Refl 4208 (1769-1770), AA 17: 456.

44 Cf. V-Met-K3 E/Arnoldt AA 29: 1008. Cf. também V-Met/Dohna, 28: 665; V-Met-K2/Heinze, AA 28: 758.

45 Cf. V-Met-L1/Pölitz, AA 28: 347; Met Mron, AA 29: 866.

46 Cf. também V-Met-K2/Heinze, AA 28: 732.

47 V-Met-K3 E/Arnoldt, 29: 1008.

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Kant and Leibniz on Negative Magnitudes

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The essay entitled *An Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy* has often (although not always) been interpreted as the sudden eruption of Hume-inspired doubts in the middle of Kant's otherwise rationalist projects, and as heralding the view of metaphysics later expressed in *Dreams of a Spirit-seer*.[1] For this reason nearly all the attention given to this work is focused on Kant's final and quite brief General Remark, which constitutes less than one-tenth of the essay. The real heart of the text, however, lies elsewhere, and once this becomes clear it also becomes evident that Hume is really irrelevant to the entire issue. Indeed, what strikes many readers as reminiscent of Hume in the General Remark is nearly a paraphrase of a few passages from Crusius's famous *Dissertatio philosophica de usu et limitibus principii rationis determinantis* (1743), and the general tendency of the whole is not essentially different from what is seen in Kant's earlier *New Elucidation*. The truth of the matter – or so I will argue in this paper – is that in this essay Kant actually approaches closer to the original ideas of Leibniz than at any other moment in his career, even closer than did Wolff or his followers. Moreover, I argue that in doing so Kant raises precisely the kinds of difficulties with the Wolffian position on the principle of sufficient reason that, I suspect, Leibniz himself would have raised.

In the first two sections, I will begin by explaining Kant's concept of a negative magnitude and the distinction Leibniz draws between necessary and contingent truths. On this basis, I will argue in section three that not only can Leibniz easily accommodate Kant's concept of a negative magnitude, but that Kant himself was motivated to develop this concept by metaphysical concerns close to those at the basis of Leibniz's earlier account of contingent truths. Finally, in sections four and five I will use this background to provide a comprehensive interpretation of *Negative Magnitudes,* its relation to Kant's earlier writings of the 1750s, and what this tells us about the relation between metaphysics and epistemology during this period in his intellectual development.

I

As in his other writings of the period, Kant begins the present essay with the careful explanation of a series of specific instances of reasoning or "tentative experiments," in this case regarding what he calls "real opposition" (NG, AA 02:189).[2] Kant then proceeds to draw from these experiments very general rules that appear to govern the use of certain concepts. His specifically stated aim in this essay is to attempt to introduce the mathematical concept of negative magnitudes into philosophy. Of course, this must not be understood as an attempt to extract an originally mathematical concept and to apply it in philosophy. It must rather be understood as an attempt, by means of mathematical examples, to abstract a specifically *philosophical* concept, one which has, despite its origin, tended to be overlooked by philosophers themselves. But this is not a task that can be carried out all at once, because one must be able to show that the abstracted principle actually has a real application within the wider domain of philosophy. For this reason, the essay itself proceeds progressively, starting in the first section with the mathematical instances of negative magnitudes and moving in the second section to examples from the metaphysical foundations of natural science, psychology, moral philosophy and finally natural science. It is only after this progressive induction that Kant hazards to present a few universal principles which he believes can be shown not only to be applicable to all these domains, but indeed to even constitute the higher-order principles of the real grounds in them.

What then is a negative magnitude? Kant introduces this concept by first drawing a distinction between what he calls logical and real opposition. Logical opposition occurs when two things logically contradict one another; real opposition occurs when two things are not contradictory, and so can both be predicated of one and the same subject, but still cancel out one another's effects when so predicated. Now, the point of *Negative Magnitudes* is entirely missed if one thinks Kant is here treating of the incompossibility of two realities, and thus that he is arguing, *contra* Baumgarten and the other Leibnizians, that it is possible that "two positive determinations exclude each other."[3] The opposition Kant has in mind is one in which two realities actually existing in one and the same thing either partially or entirely cancel one another's *effects*. Accordingly, Kant defines opposition in general to be where "one thing cancels that which is *posited* by the other." (NG, AA 02:171). Real opposition or real repugnancy is therefore "based upon the relation of the two predicates of the same thing to each other," and:

> That which is affirmed by the one is not negated by the other, for that is impossible. It is rather the case that both predicates, A and B, are affirmative. However, since the consequences of the two, *each construed as existing on its own*, would be *a* and *b*, it follows that, if the two predicates A and B, *construed as existing together*, neither consequence *a* nor consequence *b* is to be found in the subject; the consequence of the two predicates A and B, construed as existing together, is therefore zero. (NG, AA 02:173; emphasis added)

Kant's understanding of real opposition as expressed in this passage rests on a counterfactual analysis, and amounts to the following:

1) If A but not B is a predicate of substance S, then A posits *a* in S.

2) If B but not A is a predicate of substance S, then B posits *b* in S.

3) But if A and B are both predicates of substance S, then neither *a* nor *b* is posited in S.

Clearly A and B cannot be logical opposites, nor can they be logical grounds of their consequences, *a* and *b*. The former is not possible because the same thing must be able to have both predicates, and if they are contradictory opposites then the substance S will be something impossible. More interestingly, *a* and *b* cannot be logical consequences of A and B respectively *either*, because then the existence of A in S would necessarily entail the positing of *a* in S, and the same for B and *b*. In this case it would be impossible for A and B to be posted in S without *a* and *b* also being so posited, as we read in reflection 3719:

> If the real consequence were contained in the real ground and posited through it by means of the rule of identity, then it would always be found with latter at the same time. All change is therefore only possible through real relation of ground to its consequence, and the logical grounds are therefore distinguished from real grounds not through the limits of my knowledge, but rather in themselves. (Refl 3719, AA 17:266)

If there is real opposition, i.e. a case where two predicates cancel out one another's effects through being both posited in one and the same substance, then A and B must be the grounds of their consequences in S in a way that is not based upon the principle of identity or contradiction. It follows therefore that A and B are not logical, but rather "real grounds" of their effects, taken both separately and in conjunction. This, indeed, is precisely how the concept of real opposition is tied to the concept of real grounds: For real opposition to even be possible, the opposing grounds posited in a thing must be real and not logical grounds of their consequences, taken both individually and in conjunction. Still, it should be noted that *a* and *b* nevertheless are *logically* opposed in the case described, because they are negative magnitudes of one another. In an example similar to Kant's, if a ship is driven by the west wind 4 miles and is driven by the east wind 3 miles, it is surely a logical contradiction for it to be both 4 miles west and 3 miles east of its original position. But this logical contradiction is not the reason why both do not exist together in the subject. The grounds A and B here are really opposed; their natural consequences *a* and *b* are logically opposed (because they are different magnitudes of the same quantity which are to be predicated of one and the same thing); the result however is something else altogether, namely the mathematical difference between the quantities *a* and *b*.

II

Kant is quite clear in *Negative Magnitudes* that he thinks the philosophical concept in question has been almost entirely neglected by philosophers. But not only this; it also seems evident that he chooses to focus on this concept because it provides a forceful illustration of his own distinction between real and logical grounds, and by extension, of the distinction between logical and material principles in metaphysics. And since these twin distinctions, on Kant's view, are his own original discovery and contradict the doctrines of both Wolff and Baugmarten (and one would expect also Leibniz), it follows that his likely intention in the essay is to prove the

insufficiency of their views by demonstrating that they cannot account for a real and prevalent phenomenon.

That Wolff and Baumgarten would have difficulty in explaining negative magnitudes seems quite plausible. Both claim to prove the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) based on the principle of contradiction, which would make it difficult, if not impossible, to articulate a consistent distinction between logical and real grounds. That they would also overlook the importance of this concept, is also not very hard to imagine, since its primary examples lie in the field of physics, and neither was a particularly masterful physicist. But what about Leibniz? Although he perhaps flirted with proving the PSR by reference to the principle of contradiction, he nevertheless articulated a quite robust distinction between logical (absolutely necessary) and contingent truths and pioneered the foundations of early modern physics. Indeed, his writings abound in attempts to work out a physical dynamics based precisely on the PSR and the distinction between absolutely necessary and contingent truths.

I believe the following passage in particular shows Leibniz reflecting on the concept of negative magnitudes and its relation to the PSR:

> 12. *There can therefore be many contrary conatuses in the same body at the same time.* …
>
> 22. If conatuses that cannot be compounded are unequal, they are subtracted from each other, the direction of the stronger being conserved … For two conatuses can be subtracted from each other, since the less is equal to the part of the greater, and hence, as long as a resolution of the problem is found in a part of either conatus, there is no reason for choosing a third solution.
>
> 23. If two conatuses that cannot be compounded are equal, the directions of both will be destroyed, or a third will be chosen intermediate between the two, the velocity of conatus being conserved. This is, so to speak, the peak of rationality in motion, since the problem is solved not merely by a crude subtraction of equals but also by the choice of a more fitting third possibility, and so by a kind of remarkable but necessary wisdom, such as is not easily shown in the whole of geometry or phoronomy. … But this principle, along with No. 20, depends on the noblest of all, namely:
>
> 24. That *there is nothing without a reason.* The consequences of this principle are that as little as possible should be changed, that the mean is to be chosen between contraries, that whatever is added to one thing need not be subtracted from another, and many other things that are important in civil science as well. (Leibniz 1956, p. 221-222)

In this passage, Leibniz asserts that there can be grounds of contrary motions (i.e. opposed conatuses) in one and the same body and that the combination of these conatuses is not merely a logical repugnance. Rather, he says, their combination constitutes a "problem" that is "solved … by the choice of a more fitting third possibility" governed ultimately by the PSR. So even if Leibniz does not provide here the kind of detailed analysis we find in Kant's essay, there seems to be every reason for believing that he could have done so. The implication, then, is that Kant's distinction between logical and real grounds might not be so different from the theory of Leibniz as he himself believed.

But to get a better understanding of why Leibniz should be able to account for negative magnitudes, it will be helpful to recall the main features of his theory of truth. Its bedrock, so to say, lies in what has been called the *in esse* principle. As Leibniz writes in *First Truths*,

> The predicate or consequent therefore always inheres in the subject or antecedent. And as Aristotle, too, observed the nature of truth in general or the connection between the terms of a proposition consists in this fact. In identities this connection and the inclusion of the predicate in the subject are explicit; in all other propositions they are implied and must be revealed through the analysis of concepts, which constitutes a demonstration a priori. (Leibniz 1956, p. 412)

And again in correspondence with Antoine Arnauld in 1686 Leibniz writes,

> It is that always, in every true affirmative proposition, whether necessary or contingent, universal or particular, the notion of the predicate is in some way included in that of the subject. *Praedicatum inest subjecto*; otherwise I do not know what truth is. (Leibniz 1956, p. 517)

This principle is in fact so powerful that on several occasions Leibniz claims that both of his great principles, namely the principle of contradiction and principle of sufficient reason are mere corollaries of it (see, e.g., Leibniz 1956, pp. 411-417).

Now although all true propositions must be capable of being analyzed (at least in principle) in such a way that the inclusion of the predicate in the subject can be shown, Leibniz nevertheless holds that there are two kinds of truths. The first kind of truths is what he refers to as those that are absolutely necessary. These are governed by the principle of contradiction or identity, and their essential characteristic consists in being reducible to an explicit identity in a *finite* number of steps by means of simple logical analysis. The second kind of truths is what he refers to as contingent truths, as matters of fact, or, at other times, as morally necessary. Of course, in such truths the predicate must also be contained in the subject, but in this case the relevant proposition can *never* be reduced to an explicit identity, even with an infinity of successive steps. Rather, what occurs in this analysis is that the more we analyze the subject term, and the more we include its other independent properties, the more we will find it most fitting for the proposition to be true. But no matter how far this analysis is taken there can never be an explicit identity, because ultimately the inclusion of the predicate in the subject depends upon the free decree of God through which he creates only what is best. As Leibniz explains,

> In contingent truths, however, though the predicate inheres in the subject, we can never demonstrate this, nor can the proposition ever be reduced to an equation or an identity, but the analysis proceeds to infinity, only God being able to see, not the end of the analysis indeed, since there is no end, but the nexus of the terms or the inclusion of the predicate in the subject, since he sees everything which is in the series. Indeed, this truth itself arises in part from his intellect and in part from his will and so expresses his infinite perfection and the harmony of the entire series of things, each in its own particular way. ("On Freedom," Leibniz 1965, pp. 407-408)

This will be clearer if we consider the logical form of such analysis, which I will refer to as "Leibnizian analysis":

> For any contingent truth A ≈ P (i.e., "A is contingently P"), where A – P is the compliment of P in A, P is the unique concept that when added to A – P will make as perfect

as possible.

To understand this principle properly, we must recognize the underlying complexity of Leibniz's position. Despite what this principle might seem to imply, Leibniz is no voluntarist. Contingent truths are not true, on his view, because God has willed them. Rather, considered *sub ratione possibilitatis,* predicate P is included with other predicates to compose A in some possible world in which God has also decreed by will a general order in which the existence of a being with this concept is most suitable. So the combination of P with other predicates to make up A already depends, not upon a divine decree, but upon some specific divine decree seen *sub ratione possibilitatis* (see in particular: Leibniz 1965, p. 507-20). The truth in question is therefore purely hypothetical in nature: If God decrees a certain set of laws and things, then an A, which is P, will be among them. Now since God has in fact created the best possible world, if there is an A which is contingently P in it, then this is because A is most suitable to exist given this decree. Furthermore, since in such a world each complete being or monad perfectly reflects the world of which it is a part, Leibniz is able to draw the conclusion that assuming as given all the other predicates of A, if P is in actual fact combined with these, this is because the inclusion of P will render the collection the most perfect possible. This is the real foundation for why the analysis of A alone, combined of course with the decree to create only the best possible, is sufficient to provide the reason for the inclusion of P in A.

It is this analysis that provides the sufficient reason for A ≈ P, and the principle of sufficient reason in this case would be just the statement that for every contingent truth, the conditions in the formula above are always satisfied. The key feature of this analysis is, of course, the concept of perfection, which Leibniz always insists is measured by the balance of simplicity amid variety. This concept of perfection is the measure of convergence, which ultimately determines that, given the entire compliment of P in A, only the addition of the single predicate P can render the greatest possible increase in perfection. Furthermore, it is precisely the uniqueness of this P in being the single "remaining" element that must be added to reach a maximum of possible perfection that is the reason for the inherence of P in A.[4] Of course, something further is still required in order to guarantee that such a P will in fact be found combined with the concept A – P in the actual world, and this is the principle that God actually wills the best possible world.

This Leibnizian analysis is clearly teleological in two respects. First, it holds that the ground of the inherence of certain properties within a thing, and to this extent its very *being*, lies in a decree of the divine will (albeit viewed *sub ratione possibilitatis*). Secondly, in the case of actual things the decree in question is that of the best world possible, which means that actual things are not only constituted in view of a plan, but indeed a plan that is "good" or is the "best." What a thing is, in other words, is internally constituted according to a design, and in regard to what exists, this design is a principle of perfection.

The most common kind of example Leibniz provides of this principle at work is that of the complete concepts of existing monads. As is well known, Leibniz holds that all created monads contain within their essences and from all eternity every fact that can ever be true of them. Yet

every fact regarding an actual monad he deems to be merely contingently true. To use Leibniz's favorite example, every fact about Caesar inheres in his essence, or is included in his concept, but that he crossed the Rubicon is only a continent truth (see Leibniz 1989, pp. 44-45). Yet, the more we examine the life of Caesar, and the world in which he lived (which in Leibniz's view results in the same thing because the monad perfectly reflects its world), the more we will become convinced that given the infinity of other facts about him, and the infinity of possibilities as to what he might do at that very moment, his crossing of the Rubicon was the best possible thing (according to the balance of order and variety) for him to have done at that moment. And, in the end, it is true of him, because although neither we nor God can carry out this analysis completely (it has no end), the divine being can nevertheless see that it converges uniquely on this fact and selects for creation the Caesar of which it is true for this very reason.

Now, in the cases of complete concepts, Leibniz is quick to admit that no human being can ever deduce the truth of a contingent fact with complete certainty. Hence, in most cases we must know a contingent truth only through experience (Leibniz 1965, p. 408). However, there are other cases where he says such truths can be known by reason, and in particular by applying the PSR. To illustrate how the analysis in such a case can be both infinite and yet also possible for the human mind to grasp, Leibniz writes

> Assume the case that nature were obliged in general to construct a triangle and that for this purpose only the perimeter or the sum of the sides were given, and nothing else; then nature would construct an equilateral triangle. This example shows the difference between architectonic and geometric determinations. Geometric determinations introduce an absolute necessity, the contrary of which implies a contradiction, but architectonic determinations introduce only a necessity of choice whose contrary means imperfection – a little like the saying in jurisprudence: *Quae contra bonos mores sunt, ea nec facere nos posse credendum est.* (Leibniz 1956, p. 787)

There are, as before, an infinity of possibilities for how a triangle of a specific perimeter can be constructed, and surely the human mind cannot run through them all consecutively. But we also need not consider each of them to see which nature will construct, because it is clear that *relative to these conditions* all such triangles are equally suitable, and there will be just as much reason for making, for instance, one side longer than the other two as there will be for making it shorter. Thus there will be no reason for choosing any irregularly shaped triangle at all, and the only possible triangle left is the one that is unique in the fact that it is the most regular or determinate, having all sides of equal length so that there are no differences that are not accounted for by some reason (see especially Leibniz 1956, pp. 782-783).

This is in fact the essential structure of most, if not all, of Leibniz's examples of teleology in regard to natural laws: The actual laws of nature are precisely those in respect to which the substitution of any other possible law would give rise to possibilities, or "twins," between which there could be no ground of choosing one rather than another. The one that is best and is therefore chosen is hence that alone which is unique. Notably, unlike in the case of a complete concept, it is not the properties of the thing that are infinite, and thus preclude a complete analysis, but rather the number of possible predicates from among which a single one must be selected. Such arguments rely on two peculiarities of Leibniz's thought, namely, that all else being equal,

determination is a perfection, and that there is no determination without a sufficient reason. In this case particularly, all other determinations are excluded by the latter, while the creation of the world in which there is not an equally perfect alternative is justified by the former.

III

We can now see that it is possible for Leibniz to defend the concept of a negative magnitude because the inclusion of a contingent predicate in an actual thing is determined precisely by the sum of all other predicates in the remaining concept of a thing along with the extra principle of perfection. Thus, it is perfectly possible for Leibniz to formulate an analogue to Kant's counter-factual analysis above as follows:

1. Assume the existence of the complete notion N in the divine intellect in a state of possibility, and that it has contingent properties A and B. Also assume that:
   a. The divine analysis of N-A yields A, and this is morally, not logically, necessary.
   b. The divine analysis of N-B yields B, and this is morally, not logically, necessary.

Note: Here N-A = "the set of all properties in the complete notion of N excluding A." This set of properties N-A is not complete and so does not describe the complete notion of any possible thing. It is merely a hypothetical set of properties upon which God exercises his analysis. Hence, if we exclude A from N, then we also exclude *all the consequence that would follow in N as a result of A's being in it*, according to both morally and logically necessary connections.

2. Now assume also that:
   a. The analysis of N-B reveals that property *a* follows A in N-B with moral necessity.
   b. The analysis of N-A reveals that property *b* follows B in N-A with moral necessity.
   c. Analysis of N reveals that property *e,* but neither *a* nor *b*, follows both properties A and B in N with moral necessity. So in this case neither *a* nor *b* occur in N at all, and they can very likely be logically opposed as well.

Note: None of this implies a contradiction of any kind, since none of the connections here are based on the law of contradiction; they all have recourse to God's wisdom in composing the best series. One need also not worry about the fact that in truth the complete notion of N is determined in the divine understanding and already contains property *e*; for the divine wisdom itself in conceiving N, according to Leibniz, actually takes into account these other possibilities just as has our analysis. Thus such counter-factual possibilities are really possible *in themselves* and are taken into account in Leibnizian analysis.

3. It follows that B (or a logical consequence of B) is the reason for A's not resulting in *a* in N, and that A (or a logical consequence of A) is the reason for B's not being followed by *b* in N. Thus A and B are opposed in that they cancel one another's effects, and the result of their addition is actually *e*.

4. Finally, to understand the kind of numerical cancellation Kant speaks about, we would have to add some machinery to our Leibnizian model, namely, a persistent state S in N, which has a numerical magnitude. We would then say the analysis of N-B shows that A is followed by a change in state S from S1 to S2; analysis of N-A shows B is followed by a change in state S from S1 to S3; and the analysis of N shows that after A and B, N is in state S4, which has a magnitude equal to the numerical value S2 – S3.

If this is correct, then although he could hardly have been aware of it himself, Kant's position in *Negative Magnitudes* is in fact strikingly similar to Leibniz's on a number of points. First, unlike Wolff, both Kant and Leibniz hold it as possible for two predicates belonging to one and the same thing to cancel out each other's effects without being logically contradictory. Secondly, they are both able to maintain this for the same reason, namely, because they defend the existence of a kind of non-logical grounding, where the properties of a being do provide a reason, but not a logically sufficient reason, for the positing of an effect. Thirdly, Kant seems to have arrived at this position for reasons close to those adduced by Leibniz. For his view that we can have no purely logical or rational insight into the laws by means of which possibilities combine to produce their effects is a direct consequence of his idea – articulated both in the *New Elucidation* (PND, AA 01:413-414) and the *Only Possible Argument* (BDG, AA 02:85-100) – that all reality, even in its essential determinations and relations, is materially dependent upon the plan of the divine wisdom. In other words, because the constitution of all possibility is not limited to concepts of essences whose determinations are governed by the principle of contradiction alone, it follows that since the principle of contradiction constitutes our sole principle for *a priori* insight, there is simply no way for us to have such insight into the real constitution of things through reason alone. Thus, although the actuality of real opposition is not derivable from the ground of all reality, its possibility is at least thereby guaranteed. The aim of Kant's essay is then to show that real opposition is a universally occurring fact given to us through several different realms of actual experience.

The main difference between Kant and Leibniz on this issue would seem to lie in Kant's rejection of our capacity for insight into any such connections through reason alone. But even here the matter is not so clear. Of course, it must be granted that Kant believes there are a great number of grounding relations into which we cannot have insight; this is one of the chief contentions of *Negative Magnitudes*. But on both sides of the comparison, it is hard to find a clear and hard reason for disagreement. Even in a text like *Tentamen Anagogicum*, Leibniz indicates

that reflecting on final causes through reason is more a guide to discovery and a test for theories than it is a strictly deductive source of knowledge. As for Kant, despite differences I have pointed to elsewhere (see Fugate 2014b), he clearly believes real grounds to be subject not only to general rules of order, but indeed to rules that exhibit the greatest teleological unity, among which are those very laws of nature that so attracted Leibniz's attention. In *The Only Possible Argument,* for instance, Kant writes:

> Since a will always presupposes the internal possibility of the thing itself, it follows that the ground of possibility, that is to say, the essence of God, will be in the highest harmony with his own will. The reason for this is not that God is the ground of the internal possibility in virtue of his own will. The reason rather is this: the same infinite nature is related to the essences of things as their ground; at the same time it also has the relation of highest desire for the greatest consequences which are thereby given, and the latter can only be fruitful if the former are presupposed. Accordingly, the possibilities of things themselves, which are given through the divine nature, harmonise with his desire. Goodness and perfection, however, consist in this harmony. And since goodness and perfection harmonise in one single principle, it follows that unity, harmony and order are themselves to be found in the possibilities of things. (BDG, AA 2:91-92)

And a bit later, after pointing to the properties of space and the laws governing matter as examples of harmony, Kant remarks,

> *Maupertuis* … proved that even the most universal laws of matter in general – whether it be at rest or in motion, whether in elastic or in non-elastic bodies, whether in the attraction of light in refraction or in its repulsion in reflection – are subject to one dominant rule, according to which the greatest possible economy of action is always observed. This discovery enables us to subsume the effects produced by matter … under a universal formula which expresses a relation to appropriateness, beauty and harmony. (BDG, AA 2:98-99)

It is notable in this regard, that Maupertuis "proof" referred to here by Kant is not based upon experience, at least not in any pedestrian sense (see Fugate 2014a, pp. 88-97). So in at least one text written about the same time as *Negative Magnitudes,* Kant appears to be committed, like Leibniz, to the view that we can gain knowledge not only of real grounds in experience, but even of broader teleological laws that govern such grounds collectively.

To see that Kant maintains this view also in *Negative Magnitudes* itself, let us look more closely at his characterization of real opposition and the conclusions he draws from it. The first point he stresses in section one of the essay is the fundamental, but also general rule that "real repugnancy only occurs where there are two things, as *positive grounds*, and where one of them cancels the consequence of the other" (NG, AA 02:176). The issue here, in other words, is the opposition of two realities, or positive determinations. They must therefore exist in the same subject, stand in no logical opposition and negate one another's effects. The second point is the rule that "wherever there is a positive ground and the consequence is nonetheless zero then there is real opposition" (NG, AA 02:177). This, interestingly enough, is a rule for the inference of the existence of a real ground from the non-existence of a real effect. It is thus a *universal* principle governing the relation of grounds and consequences, causes and effects, and at least a partial expression of a principle of determining ground, or sufficient reason. Indeed,

after extending the concept of real opposition, and thus also of real grounds, to the whole of philosophy, Kant returns to and expands upon this principle. "I accordingly maintain," Kant informs us,

> that *every passing-away is a negative coming-to-be*. In other words, for something positive which exists to be cancelled, it is just as necessary that there should be a true real ground *as it is necessary that a true real ground should exist in order to bring it into existence* when it does not already exist. (NG, AA 2:190; emphasis added)

From this it is fairly evident that Kant means to maintain a rather robust form of the Principle of Determining Ground (much like the PSR), just as he had earlier in the *New Elucidation*. He argues elsewhere in the essay, for instance, that although we are not always aware of the grounds in our souls that cause a change in our thoughts, we can be certain of the existence of their real grounds from their passing-away; for this passing-away requires an opposing ground to cancel the original activity (NG, AA 2:191). Admittedly, it is not clear whether this principle is in fact drawn from the "tentative experiments" in the same way as the general concept of real opposition is, and thus is meant to be established by analogy and induction, or whether it has an entirely different, rational foundation, which Kant does not mention. But we will examine this point more closely in our analysis of the third section of *Negative Magnitudes* below.

IV

If looked at with an unbiased eye, the general structure of the work leaves no doubt that the third section is really the heart of *Negative Magnitudes*. The first section, as we have just seen, presents a basic outline of the concept of real opposition by reference to mathematics, while the second section merely runs through a series of analogical examples in various philosophical domains. As interesting as Kant's brief explanation of these latter are – in the longest example he even proposes various experimental arrangements for verifying an attractive negative principle of heat – the main conclusions are left to section three. In this section he first returns to and illustrates the principle of ground mentioned above in section one. "Suppose," Kant argues,

> that a is posited, then only $a - a = 0$. In other words, only in so far as an equal but opposed real ground is combined with the ground of a is it possible for a to be cancelled. Physical nature everywhere offers examples of this principle. A movement never stops, either completely or in part, unless a motive force which is equal to the force which would have been able to generate the lost movement is combined with it in a relation of opposition. But also our inner experience of the cancellation of representations and desires which have become real in virtue of the activity of the soul completely agrees with this. In order to banish and eliminate a sorrowful thought a genuine effort, and commonly a large one, is required. And that this is so is something which we experience very distinctly within ourselves. (NG, AA 02:190)

This surely is nothing other than a negative formulation of the Principle of Determin-

ing Ground articulated in the *New Elucidation*. In that essay Kant formulated it in the terms "Nothing that exists contingently can be without a ground which determines its existence antecedently" (AA 01:396). Now, as Kant has made clear, the state 0 here is not a mere absence, but something positive, an actual deprivation relative to the grounds which, in the absence of opposing grounds, would necessarily produce *a*. Thus, 0 is something positive which has arisen in the very passing away of *a* (it is in this sense that "every passing-away is a negative coming-to-be"). Since every passing-away is the coming-to-be of a real privation (and not a mere lack), Kant's principle therefore has as a corollary the proposition that every such coming-to-be requires a prior real ground by means of which what was opposed to its coming-to-be is itself opposed. The key differences between the two formulations lie in three separate points:

First, the Principle of Determining Ground in *Negative Magnitudes* applies not to contingent things in general, which includes for instance created substances, but more specifically to changes in the states of substances. In this respect, much of Kant's argumentation here is more reminiscent of his derivation of the Principle of Succession from the Principle of Determining Ground in the *New Elucidation*.

Secondly, here Kant formulates the principle not in terms of the coming-to-be, but in terms of the passing-away of something. The two are nevertheless clearly equivalent as I just argued. Kant also signals his recognition of this fact in the quote earlier, where he says that this principle is just as certain as that "it is necessary that a true real ground should exist in order to bring it into existence when it does not already exist." Why then this new formulation? I think this can be traced to Kant's concern to avoid a crucial mistake which he emphasizes in several passages, namely the confusion of what is a merely lack with a real privation. As Kant explains, a lack requires merely a logical ground, because it is nothing more than the result of a certain absence of any ground within the essence of a thing, whereas a true privation requires a real ground, indeed it requires at least two real grounds which cancel each other's effects. Now, if the principle is formulated in accordance with the *New Elucidation*, it tells us that every contingent being, and so every contingent *reality*, requires a prior ground. But Kant also holds that we can have no insight into the inner natures of things other than through their empirical effects. Thus, the only way in which it is possible for us to know that something is a contingent reality is to see it either come-to-be or pass-away, and, more specifically, the only way to know that an absence of a certain determination is a privation or rests upon a reality is by observing the passing-away of a previously existent state. This new formulation has the benefit therefore of more closely fitting the principle to the proper conditions under which we are capable of using it.

Another way to see the same point is to ask how the principle of the *New Elucidation* could be used in practice. It tells us that every contingent being has a prior determining cause of its existence. But how do I know that something is a contingent being in the first place, if not from the fact that I observe its coming-to-be? I surely cannot cognize by any rational means that from its determining ground it will arise or has arisen from such a ground, because causality in Kant's view is an irresolvable fundamental concept or relation. But if I observe the passing-away of the opposite of something, then I can be sure that what arises in this way is a contingent being, and according to this principle it must have a prior ground by which its op-

posite was canceled. Kant's concern for the manner in which we become aware of the existence of a cause-effect relationship is recorded in reflection 3845:

> There is the question: what do we know first. Do we know first, that something is an effect, and so has a cause, or that something is a cause and therefore has an effect. The former. That something is an effect, or is something that occurs, is posited by reason only *per aliud*; we know only *a posteriori* this *nexum*. If we knew the cause beforehand, then the *nexus* would be known *a priori*. (Refl 3845, AA 17:310)

Kant's reformulation of the Principle of Determining Ground is thus the result, I believe, of his deepened concern for formulating his principles in a way that is consistent with his own views on the manner in which knowledge – as a result of these same principles – must be understood as possible.

Thirdly and finally, this new formulation is supported, not by *a priori* arguments as in the *New Elucidation*, but rather by *a posteriori* analogies, those "tentative experiments" mentioned above. Thus in one case Kant is hesitant to make use of the concept of real opposition when speaking of God, because, he says, the "foundation of these concepts can only be found within ourselves" (NG, AA 02:200). Neverhtheless, in regard to the domains within which he adduces examples of real opposition, Kant does not hesitate to conclude to their universal applicability.

In many other respects, however, Kant's treatment of this version of the Principle of Determining Ground clearly harkens back to the *New Elucidation*. First, as there, Kant here claims that this principle applies equally to both physical and spiritual occurrences. As he explains:

> If one considers the grounds which form the foundation of the rule which we have just introduced, the following point will be instantly noticed: in what concerns the cancellation of an existing something, there can be no difference between accidents of mental natures and the effects of operative forces in the physical world. (NG, AA 02:191)

Secondly, in the *New Elucidation* Kant argued that a corollary of the Principle of Determining Ground is that the "quantity of absolute reality in the world does not change naturally, neither increasing nor decreasing" (PND, AA 01:407). In this earlier work, Kant also explained that the reality in the world can actually increase, and indeed is always increasing, but that this is only a relative increase because the production of one reality always results in the production of an opposing reality of the same magnitude. Thus, if the "calculation is performed by subtracting from each other the motions which strive in different directions," then the total change will be zero since "these motions will, of course, in virtue of the fact that they are opposed to each other, somehow eventually cancel each other out" (PND, AA 01:407). Nearly a decade later in *Negative Magnitudes*, Kant draws two very similar corollaries from his new Principle of Determining Ground, namely:

> In all natural changes which occur in the world, the sum of that which is positive is neither increased nor diminished, provide that the sum is calculated by adding together positings which agree with each other (not opposed to each other) and subtracting from each other positings which are really opposed to each other. (NG, AA 2:194)

> All the real grounds of the universe, if one adds those together which agree with each other and subtracts from one another those which are opposed to each other, yields a result which is equal to zero. (NG, AA 2:197)

These two "extremely important" propositions, along with their elucidations, make up nearly the entire body of the central third part of *Negative Magnitudes*. We are forced to conclude therefore that it is these towards which Kant's efforts are chiefly directed in the essay as a whole. Notably, just as Kant regards his new Principle of Determining Ground as applicable to both physical and spiritual beings, so also he points out that these two corollaries extend to both realms. They are thus to be understood as universal metaphysical principles, and not merely as rules of physics.[5]

But what precisely is their importance? The first thing to note is that they are propositions concerning the totality of created reality. The former provides a fundamental *distributive* principle of the *form* of the realities produced in the natural world, namely that they are always produced in equal and opposing pairs. The latter provides a fundamental *collective* principle of the *form* of all such production of realities, that their absolute magnitude is always constant, indeed equal to zero. The formality of these principles, however, is not of the kind found in the principles of contradiction and identity, because it concerns not the form of judgments, but rather the systematic form of material truths themselves. Together these two principles accordingly provide the most general form of the dynamics through which the created world both physically and spiritually develops towards perfection. They form the foundation for the very type of dynamic theory of the unfolding of creation which Kant so admired in Pope's *Essay on Man* and attempted to produce himself in the *Universal Natural History of the Heavens*.

Some have suggested, however, that Kant's admission in this essay that evil is something real in fact marks a change in his views from the 1750s.[6] But this rests on a misinterpretation of Kant's previous position, which in fact does not differ from the one voiced here. For just as the essential unity and perfection of the physical world is completely compatible with the existence of the opposing forces of attraction and repulsion, so also the essential unity and perfection of the moral world is completely compatible in Kant's view with the existence of the opposing moral forces of virtue and vice, good and evil. Indeed, more than being simply compatible, Kant would ideally like to show that it is precisely *through* the laws governing the interactions of these opposing forces that the world is propelled forward and manifests the essential *dynamic* harmony and perfection the possibility of which God implanted in the essences of things at the very moment of their creation. As Kant writes here in *Negative Magnitudes*,

> The perfection of the world in general very much consist in this conflict of real opposed grounds, just as the material part of the world is, in the most obvious fashion, maintained in a regular course simply by means of the conflict of forces, and it is always a serious mistake to conflate the sum of reality with the magnitude of perfection. (NG, AA 02:198)

Again emulating Pope, the young Kant regards evil as truly opposed to the good in particular things, but nevertheless as possessing a merely relative reality. Within the world the

production of every good requires the production of an opposing evil, just as the production of an evil requires the production of an opposing good. The balance is always such that they cancel one another out. Here Kant explains that the sum of such reality, when calculated in the right way, is precisely equal to zero because the world by itself is not capable of containing, let alone *producing*, any reality that has not been given to it by God. Since the original reality of the world forms the ground of the possibility of all later things, this means that this original state of the world contains all the reality that will ever belong to the world (when calculated in the right manner). Still, as Kant now argues in *Negative Magnitudes*, although the sum-total of the reality of the world taken by itself is thus precisely equal to zero, when the world is considered relative to its ground the sum is positive, because God and the world do not oppose one another. Put differently, the creation of the world is certainly the production of a degree of reality that was not there before, since it does not give rise to a corresponding opposite, or negative quantity of reality.

In a note to the third section, Kant is careful to point out that these principles do not deny that the sum of reality or perfection can increase naturally in the world. Quite to the contrary, Kant thinks that both are constantly increasing as physical and spiritual realities unfold. The explanation for this is that the opposed forces which are often produced by means of natural change are both positive realities, and thus although they are opposites of one another, and so cancel out in the whole, they nevertheless increase or add to the realities within the world. Similarly, the perfections which consist in the harmony, regularity and purposive connection within the whole are, in a certain sense, the same as that which lies within its original essence, but in another sense they increase throughout all change. If Kant's position in this respect is the same as he held previously, then, like Pope, he thinks that everything is perfect considered in itself, but that a thing is only truly considered in itself when it is considered with a view to the inner law by means of which it is driven by conflicting forces to harmonize and unite with the whole (see, e.g. Refl 3703-3705, AA 17:229-239). Here in *Negative Magnitudes* Kant has reduced that seeming paradox to perfect clarity: According to these dual principles all reality and perfection is already contained in the first ground of all things, and in the further development of the world throughout all space and all time nothing new ever arises relative to this original ground. However, the infinite wealth of the reality and perfection contained in this original seed, as it were, can never cease in displaying and giving rise to new *particular* realities, perfections and purposive arrangements throughout all creation. Through this dynamic unfolding by means of opposing forces, this original and universal reality and perfection *particularizes itself* and in doing so becomes visibly reflected in the infinite purposiveness and variety among created things.

I now come to the final General Remark, which has received so much attention from commentators. Kant's essential point in this remark is that real opposition, and so also the concept of real ground, is fundamentally distinct from what he has called a logical ground. But here he for the first time draws the necessary conclusion that, since the entire higher faculty of thought consists in judging by virtue of the principles of identity and contradiction alone (as was argued in *False Subtlety*), and since the connection of real grounds with their consequences is not governed by this principle, it follows that it is simply impossible for us to have insight into such connections *a priori.* Of course, Kant thinks that these connections are both

objective and necessary, and that we can have cognition of them *a posteriori*. Crucially, he also clearly thinks that they can be captured in concepts. What he is in fact claiming, therefore, is the following:

1) Assume concept A, which is composed of a series of concepts x_1, x_2, x_3, etc., and also assume that one and only one of these partial concepts, say x_i within A, is a ground of the positing (or cancelling) of consequences of kind B.
2) Now, from the analysis concept A - x_i alone, it does not follow by either identity or contradiction, or by any series of syllogisms no matter how long, that the concept x_i should be included in it and thus that A is a ground of the positing (or cancelling) of consequences of kind B.

Put still another way:

1) Assume as much as you like concerning two things A and B, making sure to leave out only that A is the real ground of the positing (or cancelling) of B or something in B (something, however, that we know to be true from experience).
2) In no wise can it be rationally proven (by identity or contradiction, or syllogism) that A stands in such a relation or possible relation to B or something in B.

Kant himself is not quite so clear as this schema, but a close reading of the General Remark, I believe, leaves little room for doubt that this is his basic idea. Kant's central concern throughout *Negative Magnitudes*, and later in the *Inquiry*, is to show how metaphysical concepts *first originate* within the mind. His contention that real grounds cannot be explained by the principles of identity or contradiction therefore means essentially that there are no resources by which to rationally (i.e. by contradiction, identity, or syllogism) extract from the concept we have of something that it will be the ground of something else, *before* we have discovered this *a posteriori* in experience. Of course, *after* such experience we can add this newly discovered truth to the concept of the thing in question. Moreover, once we add to the concept we had before, such as A - x_i above, that it is the ground of things of kind B, then it follows by merely formal principles that A - x_i (i.e. the concept we had before the experience) + x_i (i.e. the concept of the discovered connection between A - x_i and B) = A, which posits (or cancels) B as a real ground. But here the truth of such real positing or cancelling does not genetically arise from the truth of the formal principles, but rather these principles only govern the form of the judgments in which our material knowledge is expressed.

Since, as far as I am aware, the formulation above goes beyond and departs in many ways from any other interpretation of Kant's argument in the General Remark, I should provide at least some direct textual justification for it. First, Kant accepts that if the concept of one thing is

contained in the concept of the other, then the one really does follow by the principle of identity from the other. Indeed, he even admits that the concept of a consequence is contained in the general concept of a ground in this way. As for real grounds, Kant says explicitly "this relation belongs, presumably, to my true concepts, but the manner of the relating can in no wise be judged" (NG, AA 2:202). To illustrate this conception of a real ground, Kant gives the example of God, which is something, positing the world, which Kant stresses "is *something completely different*" (NG, AA 02:202). So from the analysis of the concept of God alone one will never find within his concept "posits the world." However, immediately after stating this Kant goes on to explain:

> If I already regard something as a cause of something else, or if I attach the concept of force to it, then I am already thinking of the cause as containing the relation of the real ground to its consequence, and then it is easy to understand that the consequence is posited in accordance with the rule of identity. For example, the existence of the world can be understood with complete distinctness in terms of the omnipotent will of God. But here 'power' signifies something in God, in virtue of which other things are posited. But this word already designates the relation of a real ground to its consequence; but it is this relation which I wish to have explained. (NG, AA 02:203)

It is clear from this that the real issue is not that concepts are limited in their grasp of the world, but rather that our concepts and the manner in which they are first constituted by our minds does not allow us to have rational insight into the real essences of things. The concept of A in the formula above might be called a "real concept" in the sense that it is that complete reality contained in an object A; it would be A insofar as it is comprehended in all its real connections with the rest of the universe in the divine intellect. However, our minds are only able to approach such real concepts through experience, and for precisely the reason that we cannot have insight into real connections and real grounds according to the process of analysis.

What our analysis allows us to do, rather, is to resolve our ideas until we reach fundamental concepts of real grounds, which from this point must be adopted as true based upon *a posteriori* evidence. Thus the most basic data of all our concepts will consist in the atomic or unresolvable concepts of real grounds. As Kant concludes,

> the relation of a real ground to something, which is either posited or cancelled by it, cannot be expressed in a judgment; it can only be expressed in a concept. That concept can probably be reduced by means of analysis to simple concepts of real grounds, albeit in such a fashion that in the end all our cognitions of this relation reduce to simple, unanalysable concepts of real grounds, the relation of which to their consequences cannot be rendered distinct at all. (NG, AA 02:204)

V

From all of this it is easy to see that Kant is by no means claiming in the General Remark to *Negative Magnitudes* that logic is merely subjective,[7] or that real relations somehow cannot be captured in concepts, and thus are brute empirical facts. As is clear from the *Only Possible Argument*, he is in fact fully willing to accept Leibnizian complete concepts in the divine intellect (BDG, AA 02:75). The mood in this essay is therefore not in principle anti-rationalist, as some have suggested, although it is certainly opposed to any rationalism that would seek to reduce all conceptual connections to identity and contradiction. As we have seen, Kant's

thinking is in fact closest to that of Leibniz who holds that the complete concepts of things are constituted by two essentially different kinds of connections, namely those which follow by contradiction and those which follow by divine analysis. That Kant has not radically departed from his position in the 1750s, and has not indeed departed from a broadly metaphysical standpoint, should also be clear from the fact that in this same essay, as we saw, he defends a universally formulated Principle of Determining Ground along with those corollaries which give form to the total reality contained in the created world.

One key feature of Kant's understanding of conceptual analysis, as I have interpreted it in the formula provided in the previous section, is that it is counterfactual in structure. Kant's argument is thus not that real relations cannot be captured conceptually, or even that they are not governed by the principle of contradiction, but rather that *if* we were unable to add such determination to our concepts *a posteriori*, *then* there would be no *a priori* ground connecting them by the principle of identity or contradiction either. However, once we have established such a real connection, then it follows that connection of the two are also governed by the principle of identity or contradiction. Kant is, in other words, trying to show how experience itself is *essential* to the genesis of our concepts of real essences, and so also to metaphysics.

This should remind us of Kant's formulation of the Principle of Coexistence in the *New Elucidation*, which was also structured counterfactually. To recall the point, Kant argues there that if God did not sustain all things according to a common schema of relations, then it would be impossible to comprehend the real interaction of substances from their mere existence (see esp. PND, AA 01:414). But since God has established their essences in accordance with just such a schema, nothing over and above the real essences established in this way is necessary to bring about a community of substances (PND, AA 01:415; cf. BDG, AA 02:103). Now the two points, I would argue, are perfectly parallel. Just as Kant argues in the earlier text that we cannot conceive real relations between substances through their mere existence as substances (i.e. apart from such a ground), so in *Negative Magnitudes* Kant is arguing that we cannot conceive real relations by virtue of the principle which allows us only to draw out the non-relational components of the concept of a thing.

The recognition of this parallel in terms of both the content and form of Kant's arguments in the two works is extremely important because it offers a reply to Adickes rejection of the relation between these two texts when it was suggested by Höffding back in 1894.[8] Adickes argues that the distinction between logical and real grounds is not actually similar to the case of substances and their real relations in the *New Elucidation* because Kant there holds that, since the real relations of substances do in fact have a foundation in the divine schema, their causal connections are really contained within their essences, and thus causal connection as such is perfectly understandable. But if my interpretation is correct, then this reply by Adickes fails to recognize that Kant is not denying the general intelligibility of causality in *Negative Magnitudes* any more than he is in the *New Elucidation*. What Kant is denying in both is rather the reducibility of real relations to properties that can be understood as belonging to the *relata* prior to or apart from such a relation. In both cases, we can only ascribe such real relations to the essences of things (or to their concepts), if we already presuppose that they stand in such a relation. But the only ground we can possibly have for this is

empirical, for we are only acquainted with real possibility insofar as it is *given* to us.

Equally, I believe Adickes is wrong to conclude from the fact that real relations are established in the *New Elucidation* as inhering in the essences of the *relata*, that they are therefore perfectly understandable. This only stands if whatever is contained in the essence inheres in it by virtue of the principle of identity or contradiction alone. But Kant's originality, much as Leibniz's, lies in recognizing that there are *two different kinds of connections* by means of which properties can inhere in a real essence, namely by identity or by agreement with the divine plan. To see this one need only ask the questions: Does Kant think it belongs to the complete essence or concept of a thing that it has certain fundamental powers, and does he think that such powers make their consequences necessary? There can be no doubt about the first, for as he writes, "who can deny that in the representation which the Supreme Being has of them [i.e. things generally speaking] there is not a single determination missing?" (BDG, AA 02:72). As for the second, Kant writes in reflection 3757: "That, the positing of which in a necessary manner (according to universal laws) is bound to the positing of something else is called its ground" (Refl 3757, AA 17:285). This means that the distinction between logical and real grounds is either merely an epistemological distinction, i.e. one stemming from the limitation of our minds, or else it must reflect a distinction in the manner of inherence of a determination in the essence, as I suggested. But as Kant writes in reflection 3719 "logical grounds are therefore distinguished from real grounds not through the limits of my knowledge, but rather in themselves" (Refl 3719, AA 17:266). To be precise, then, the correct order is not that logical and real grounds are distinct because of the limits of our faculty of reasoning, but rather that our faculty of reasoning is limited because of the distinction that exists *in nexu reali* between logical and real grounds, and this latter has its foundation in the nature of God. As Kant writes in reflection 3706, "where the combination of a predicate with a thing is not arbitrary (*willkührlich*), but rather is bound by the essence of the thing itself, then the predicate does not belong to the thing, because we think the former as in the latter, but rather it is necessary to think it as in the latter, for the reason that the predicate belongs to the thing in itself" (Refl 3706, AA 17:241). This also evidently means that the methodology of the *Inquiry* rests in fact on metaphysical rather than epistemological foundations, and it suggests, again, that Kant's position at this time may not be so radically different from that of Leibniz.

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ABSTRACT: This essay argues that Kant's standpoint in the essay Negative Magnitudes is not essentially different from that of Leibniz. Rather, if seen in the context of Kant's views on the nature of the divine being and its grounding relation to the essences of created things in the same period, it becomes clear that Kant here comes closer to Leibniz's original views than did Wolff or his followers. On this basis, the essay argues that the prevailing view of Negative Magnitudes as marking a turn from rationalism to empiricism is mistaken. Moreover, the article shows and analyses some significant elements of continuity of Kant's Essay on the *Negative Magnitudes* with both the *New Elucidation* and the *Only Possible Argument*.
KEYWORDS: Negative magnitudes, Contradiction, Principle of sufficient reason, Necessary/contingent Truths.

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Notes

1 In the older tradition see Paulsen 1966, p. 83-4, and more recently Watkins 2005, p. 160-170 and Longuenesse 2005, p. 130. Of course, the opposite opinion is also well represented by the likes of Wundt, Adickes, Henrich, et al.

2 When available, translations are taken from The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood.

3 This mistake is made in Paulsen 1966, p. 83.

4 If the analysis has no end, then what sense is there in speaking of a remaining element that "completes" the series? The difficulty here is merely verbal. Leibniz understands this process as one of approximation on analogy with the concept of a limit in differential calculus. According to this concept, a series can be infinite and unending, and yet contain every but a single completing element that is, nevertheless, uniquely determined by the series itself. E.g.,

$$\lim_{x\to\infty} \frac{2x^2}{x^2+1} = 2.$$

5 See the Introduction to the Cambridge translation in *Theoretical Philosophy 1775-1770*, lxxviii.

6 See the Introduction to the Cambridge translation in *Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770*, lxii.

7 See Schönfeld 2000, p. 232.

8 See the issue of *Kant-Studien* from 1895, esp. p. 74-5. I only became aware of Höffding's essay after formulating my own interpretation. I have been unable to obtain a copy of it, so my knowledge of his interpretation rests entirely on Adickes comments.

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What Leibniz missed – *or Kant misread*?
Kant's critique of Leibnizian metaphysics in light of two recent interpretations

Andree Hahmann

Kant famously criticizes Leibniz for his apparent neglect to observe the difference between two sources of cognition: understanding and intuition. This is the reason that Leibniz supposedly intellectualized the phenomena by identifying them with things in themselves. In Kantian terms, Leibniz fell prey to an amphiboly of concepts which, in the case of his understanding of substance, has led him to assume monads—that is to say, ideal unities which exist in a state of pre-established harmony; for this is the only possible form of community between ideal substances. Distinct versions of this argument can be found in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, notably in the notoriously difficult passage entitled "On the amphiboly of concepts of reflections", and in some later writings, such as the Kantian reply to the self-declared Leibnizian Johann August Eberhard (*On a Discovery whereby any New Critique of Pure Reason is to be made Superfluous by an Older One,* from 1790) or the late fragment *What Real Progress has Metaphysics made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?* (originally from 1793, but published post mortem in 1804).[1]

As is well known, Leibniz' conception of monad lies at the heart of his metaphysics. Hence, it is hardly surprising that Kant's understanding and critique of this conception attracted vast scholarly attention. The question has been asked, for instance, whether his critique is justified and what his own positive account is. Further, it is questionable how far Kant's critical philosophy—and in particular his conception of substance—relates to Leibniz. The last two questions especially have given rise to some original contributions to Kant scholarship in the last years. To name but two, Rae Langton put forward a novel understanding of the relation-

ship between things in themselves and appearances against the backdrop of the Kantian critique of Leibniz, and Eric Watkins addressed Kant's concept of causality in light of the debate surrounding Leibniz' theory of pre-established harmony.[2] Common to both, however, is not only the emphasis they put on Kant's early so-called pre-critical works, in which he engaged mainly with problems created by Leibnizian metaphysics, but their tendency to minimize the differences between this pre-critical work and the later mature writings.

In this paper, I want to reassess Kant's understanding of Leibniz in light of these two interpretations. I will argue that even though both Langton and Watkins correctly emphasize the importance of Leibnizian metaphysics for a proper understanding of Kant's own critical project, they nevertheless fail to take seriously enough the crucial differences between Kant's pre-critical and critical philosophy, and especially the new and extraordinary role attributed to transcendental aesthetics for cognition in general but in particular with respect to the rejection of Leibnizian metaphysics. Thus, only against this background can Kant's critical reading of Leibniz become clear to the fullest extent.

The paper is divided into three sections. The first part shall address Langton's view on the intrinsic properties of substance and things in themselves. We shall see that Langton, contrary to most interpreters, noticed the special importance of Kant's isolationist conception of substance. The second section explores in more detail the actual relationship between Kant's pre-critical and critical philosophy with respect to the Leibnizian distinction between inner and outer determinations of substance. In the third part, we will draw attention to the community of substances and discuss Watkins' influential interpretation of the Third Analogy of Experience.

1. Inner and outer

In her reconstruction of what she takes to be Kant's path to transcendental idealism—or, in her terms, Kantian humility—Langton proceeds, somewhat surprisingly for many readers, from Kant's critical assessment of Leibniz found in the amphiboly section of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The upshot of her overall thesis is that because, for Kant, knowledge essentially depends on sensibility (with which many contemporary philosophers would basically agree, as Langton observes[3]), which again is receptive (that is to say, needs to be affected), we can eventually gain knowledge only of the external relational properties of things. However, since Kant holds, at the same time, that the intrinsic nature of these things is causally not efficacious and thus cannot affect the perceiver, we must remain ignorant about the essential intrinsic properties of things. From this results then the well-known Kantian claim that we are necessarily ignorant of things in themselves.

The advantage of Langton's approach quickly becomes apparent if one considers its consequences for the notorious debate on the relationship between things in themselves and appearances. From her perspective, the distinction can now be broken down to two classes of properties of the very same thing. These are, on the one hand, internal properties (or what things are in themselves), and, on the other, external or relational properties (which Langton

identifies with appearances). So understood, Langton can possibly manage to steer a middle way between the two conflicting opinions about the nature of the thing in itself. Note that, according to the traditional view, the thing in itself and appearance must be taken as two distinct entities belonging to two different worlds. Proponents of the second, so-called two perspective or two aspect interpretation, maintain that it is the same things considered under two distinct aspects or from two different perspectives—namely, first, as the thing is experienced in space and in time, and, second, in abstraction from these forms of intuition and thus considered in itself. This approach has been developed and advanced by Gerold Prauss and Henry Allison. Their intention was, at least in part, to present an anti-metaphysical reading of this important Kantian distinction.[4] Against this backdrop, another novelty of Langton's interpretation comes to the fore, namely her attempt to establish a more metaphysical (or ontological) understanding of Kant's critical project in the wake of early twentieth century German interpreters such as Heinz Heimsoeth.[5]

Closely related, however, is a second benefit of Langton's interpretation. As has been indicated above, Langton places Kant at the heart of an ongoing debate concerning the nature of intrinsic and extrinsic properties in contemporary analytic philosophy.[6] It has been noted that Kant's view on substance and its attributes bears some resemblance to claims found in contemporary positions. We shall later see that it is especially this last point that created much confusion among Kant scholars about the proper understanding of the Kantian distinction between internal and external properties.

This in a nutshell is what most readers take from Langton's interpretation.[7] But, as I want to point out in the following, there is more to it, for she noticed some essential features of Kant's critique of Leibniz which escaped most commentators so far. Let us therefore look at her argument again, but this time from a different perspective by taking the historical context (used also by Langton to support her theses) more seriously.

To begin, in her presentation of the Kantian argument, Langton primarily concentrates on two correlated claims found in the amphiboly section of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. According to the first, every relation needs something which is related that is itself not a relation.[8] The second claim further determines this bearer of relations and—this is especially important—reaches back to Kant's pre-critical understanding of substance. Langton observes that Kant at one point in his philosophical development endorsed what one could call an isolationist notion of substance, according to which true substances exist in isolation from each other.[9] In some way, this conception seems to follow from the traditional definition of substance according to which substance must be understood as something which can be conceived of only as a subject, but never as a predicate.[10] Langton then notes that this understanding of substance finds one expression in the idea that a true substance cannot consist of parts "for something that has parts depends on its parts for its existence".[11] This is indeed the reason why Leibniz and most of his successors, including Kant, endorsed the claim that spatially extended bodies cannot count as real substances. As Langton explains in some detail, corporeal bodies are instead taken as phenomenal substances. The idea is expressed in the well-known and often found argument that composite bodies presuppose the existence of simple elements and, further, that only the

simple can be regarded as a real substance.[12] On the other hand, this simple entity must have some internal properties, for, as Langton again clearly sees, provided they are substances, they must not be completely dissolvable into external relations.[13] However, Langton then merely concentrates on the apparent problem of reducibility of external to internal properties. In her view, the main difference between Kant and Leibniz exists in the fact that, for Kant, contrary to Leibniz, relational properties cannot be reduced to internal ones. Consequently, causal relations cannot simply supervene upon internal properties. This idea originally emerged in an early stage of Kant's philosophical development and Langton traces it back at least to the *Nova dilucidatio*.[14] Accordingly, if we are affected by things, it happens in virtue of their external relations. However, the inner must remain unknown due to the irreducibility of external to internal relations. From this perspective, it rightly follows, given that objective knowledge presupposes sensual receptivity, that human knowledge is limited by the experience of external relations, whereas the inner of things necessarily remains unknown. Thus human knowledge is basically a knowledge of relations, and these relations are the ways in which humans are affected by things.[15] This is then what Langton calls epistemic humility, and she infers from this interpretation her main theses: things in themselves are the internal properties of substances, whereas the phenomena must be conceived of as relational, external properties.[16]

So far so good; however, Langton overlooks one of her own points, which is why her approach fails in the end. It has been said that Langton explains in her presentation of the Leibnizian position that simple substances must have some inner properties. She says:[17] "Monads must have some qualities, otherwise they would not even be beings." Then she observes that given it is a simple substance (which alone can count as a substance for Leibniz, because composite bodies rely on their parts and thus cannot exist independently as required by the concept of substance) and, moreover, that it must have some inner properties (which is also required by its self-subsisting nature as substance), then these inner properties must be ideal by nature.[18] Langton could have supported this claim with numerous well-known passages from Leibniz,[19] and this is exactly the reason why Leibniz' theory of monads in the end amounts to some form of idealism. Moreover, Leibniz' philosophic followers were well aware both of the argument that led Leibniz to this conclusion and the idealistic consequences that are essentially related to it. It is therefore not surprising that Leibniz' most famous student, Christian Wolff, explicitly wanted to leave open the question concerning the nature of the inner determination of simple substances,[20] for he knew that this determines the very nature of substance itself and thus could eventually lead to idealism. That his hesitation was not well grounded, however, was equally clear to his critics, such as Christian August Crusius, who sharply pointed to the problem he found in Wolff's account:

> The Freyherr von Wolf, who does not adopt the imaginative force in the elements, but which, on the other hand, assumes the Leibnizian elements without figure and size, and ascribes to them only one force and effort to change their state, sets an undetermined concept with negation of all possible determinations, whose existence is therefore not possible, but which holds a contradiction in itself [...]. For there is no other force conceivable except one that is a force to think or to desire or to move, and therein exist the possible determinations of the change of the state of a substance. Now he does not want to attribute the two first types to the elements. The latter, however, is not possible in them, because they cannot be moved by having no sides [...]. What remains?[21]

Crusius thus clearly reveals in his criticism the vulnerability of Wolff's notion of substance; moreover, his critique shows the importance attributed to the question of how to conceive of the nature of these inner determinations of substance. It is therefore puzzling that modern commentators in their discussion of Kant's critique of the Leibnizian position for the most part ignore this argumentative context;[22] and it is even more puzzling, if one takes into account that Kant, in the very same context, points to this special Leibnizian conclusion.[23]

Hence, one must not only assume, as Langton points out, that in cognition through mere concepts alone something must be given that is itself not a relation in order to account for being a substance—that is to say, a self-subsisting entity—but, moreover, provided that these simple substances must have some purely internal properties, it also follows that these internal or inner determinations must be *ideal* by their very nature. And it is this last feature that is the real problem for Kant in his critique of Leibniz, for exactly here lies the amphiboly Kant sees in Leibniz, since the latter determined the inner of his substance with respect to the inner sense and thus made them ideal in the end. Hence, what Leibniz did not see was that the inner properties of substance, in order to really provide a ground that is itself not a mere relation, cannot be understood in analogy to the inner sense. For the latter, according to Kant, equally depends on a subjective form of intuition, namely time. As such, it does not therefore provide any privileged epistemic access to something which could be really substantial in the sense of an independent entity.[24] Leibniz therefore failed on his own terms, for his concept of substance was either too optimistic to be applicable to human understanding, or not adequately modelled regarding the natural receptivity of *finite* human beings.[25]

From this follows—in the light of Langton's interpretation of the Kantian critique—that she was right, on the one hand, to assume that Leibniz failed from Kant's perspective to provide a coherent application of his concept of substance; however, on the other hand, at the same time she did not take seriously enough Kant's attempt at modifying the concept of substance so that it can find its place in a *critically revised* analytic of understanding, which is in his view the first step to what he later calls practical metaphysics.[26] Against this background, the overall critical project, in which also the amphiboly section must be placed, becomes much more important than Langton's somewhat abbreviated presentation suggests in this respect. Unsurprisingly, this is one point that many of her critical readers found puzzling with her interpretation and finally took as a starting point for their criticism of Langton's approach.[27] Thus, not a few considered her usage of the concept of substance to refer to things in themselves highly problematic, even though Langton is basically right to contrast phenomenal substances with the pure concept of substance, since the latter appears to demand an isolationist understanding of substance provided that cognition through concepts alone is possible. However, Kant plainly rejects the possibility of cognition through mere concepts and with it noumena in a positive sense.[28] To identify things in themselves with real substances is therefore more than a mere sloppiness in words. It is highly problematic for the following three reasons.

Firstly, Langton completely ignores the crucial differences Kant sees between phaenomena and noumena, as set out in the corresponding section in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. There

it says that the latter allow only a critical limitation of the sphere of possible cognition. As has been said, Kant instead rejects the possibility of determining any so-called transcendental object through pure concepts alone. In Langton's view, however, noumena indeed correspond to things in themselves.

Secondly, and closely related to this, Langton apparently allows positive statements about things in themselves. In her opinion, these substances must have internal determinations, and even though we admittedly remain ignorant of the nature of these inner properties, it follows from her explanation that the inner must be conceived of as the bearer of external relations. Moreover, this ascribes some form of ontological priority to the inner of substance. Kant, however, not only refuses to call things in themselves substances, but he keeps complete silence about their status as objects altogether. In the end, we have to admit that we are ignorant as to whether or not there exists more than one thing in itself. In short, nothing can be attributed to things in themselves, but in particular no internal properties, even if one admits that we are ultimately ignorant of the nature of these properties.[29] Kant, in contrast, famously exclaims that it is not even necessary to consider these inner properties, which he calls in his remark on the amphiboly "eine bloße Grille".[30]

Thirdly, in order to call things in themselves substances (or even objects), it is absolutely necessary to apply the categories of pure understanding. However, as is well known, the very same categories must be schematized first to determine objects. On this condition, however, pure concepts can in principle not be applied to things in themselves, which is why any speculative knowledge about these so-called things is impossible.[31]

Let us briefly review the results of this section. We have explored so far that the relationship Kant sees between inner and outer determinations essentially relates to inner and outer sense, and thus cannot be considered independently of Kant's transcendental aesthetics. This explains why one of Langton's major advantages—namely, its relevance to contemporary debate—turns out to be one of its biggest problems: contemporary distinctions between external and internal properties are unable to explain the problems Kant sees with Leibniz' account, but most notably his rejection of the Leibnizian concept of substance as an ideal monad. It is therefore not surprising that modern commentators ask why Kant thinks that internal properties should be causally inefficacious and why he did not conceive of the inner as some sort of causal disposition, analogous to positions found in contemporary debate.[32] Against the background of the post-Leibnizian discussion, however, it becomes apparent that, for Kant, purely inner determinations of a simple substance can only be conceived of as ideal: if one takes the inner to consist of mental presentations, it in fact makes no sense to assume that there is some immediate influence on other ideal substances.

However, so far it remains open what the modified Kantian concept of substance amounts to and how it relates to the pre-critical features Langton mentioned. We shall therefore address these issues in more detail in the following section.

2. The pre-critical and critical Kant

As has been said, Langton assumes that the critical Kant adopted many features of his pre-critical conception of substance. First, notice that the *Critique of Pure Reason* entails the idea of substance as an ultimate subject of predication. Thus it reads: "[…] substance would signify nothing more than a something that can be thought of as a subject (without being a predicate of something else)" (A147/B186). This definition, which actually reaches back to Aristotle, can also be found prominently in Leibniz and Kant's pre-critical works.[33] We have seen that the notion of an entity that can exist in complete isolation or independently is closely related to this definition of substance. Moreover, taken as such, a substance must comprise some purely internal properties. Kant shares this understanding of substance with many modern philosophers, but in particular Leibniz and Wolff. It is plain for them that in order to serve as an independent, last substrate of predication, the entity must be simple, meaning that it must be without parts (for what is not simple can furthermore be divided into parts on which it depends and thus cannot account as a last independent element). This thought is famously found in Leibniz' *Monadology* and was then endorsed by most of the eighteenth century rationalist philosophers. However, two related claims held by these philosophers apparently disagree with one another and created some serious problems, for how can a substance be simple and, at the same time, furnish the basis for the perceivable objects in space? The latter are as such spatially extended and thus cannot be constituted from something which is simple in the strict sense, for either it consists of something that is itself spatially extended or it does not. If it does, then these parts cannot be simple, since what is spatially extended can further be divided, at least geometrically; and if it does not consist of spatially extended parts, one has to wonder how something that is itself not spatially extended can in sum produce spatially extended bodies. Take, for example, points that do not occupy space: how is it possible to construct a plane out of spatially not extended points? Moreover, how do these spatially not extended entities differ from each other? Both problems are dealt with by Leibniz in his distinction between things in themselves and appearances. Accordingly, perceivable objects are mere phenomena, whereas real substances can only be grasped through understanding, since they are real unities and as such not extended. In addition, we have seen that these simple substances must have some inner properties which provide their distinctive characteristics. Leibniz explicitly stresses that these inner properties can only be ideal in essence. In his view, they must exist in some sort of mental activity, which is why he also calls the monads equipped with apperception spirits.[34] This is roughly the description that most of Leibniz' successors in the eighteenth century, including Kant, found in his *Monadology* and Wolff, too, set out in his own metaphysics. It is therefore not surprising that the debate among Leibniz' followers focused primarily on these two interrelated issues—the inner and outer of substance—for the former decides on the status of substance as an ideal monad or real entity and the latter addresses the question of the community of these substances.

Kant's early work forms no exception in this respect. He too was concerned with these problems and furnished distinct answers to them, which do not agree with each other in all cases and over time. However, one must note that Kant was still in the process of developing

his own view on these questions, and thus did not necessarily hold a coherent conception throughout his whole so-called pre-critical period. To name but one example: in his first writing, the *Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces,* Kant fiercely proclaims the victory of the theory of physical influence over pre-established harmony, only to reject the theory of physical influence a view years later as completely untenable, at least in its unqualified sense. Instead, he presented in his writings from the 1750s—and in his inaugural dissertation from 1770—a much more carefully worked out theory and highlighted some serious problems related to the ordinary conception of physical influence. Be this as it may, it is important to note in the texts that Langton mainly considers, the *Nova dilucidatio* and the *Monadologia physica*, that Kant in many aspects agreed with the above outlined Leibnizian concept of substance. He holds, for example, that true substance must be simple in order to account for composition,[35] even though in his *Monadologia physica* he points to the external efficacy of these simple substances in order to explain the construction of physical bodies.[36] Nevertheless, its essential inner determinations are still not in space, which is why they must be ideal for Kant, too.[37] We have seen that Kant found this conclusion equally in Leibniz and Crusius, and he endorsed the idea not only in the works from the 1750s but also in his later polemical work *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* from 1766, and even in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and other critical works.[38] In all these places, Kant emphasizes that the ideality of inner determinations follows from the very concept of substance itself, for only through these ideal internal determinations can something be provided which accounts for the self-subsisting character of a substance.

However, as is well known, something decisive changed between the inaugural dissertation from 1770 and the *First Critique* from 1781. Kant is from then on confident that cognition through concepts alone is impossible; instead, the understanding must always be applied to intuition in order to furnish cognition. This clearly involves a much stronger emphasis on intuition and finally leads to a substantial increase in the status of intuition for cognition in general. And even if transcendental aesthetics makes up only a small part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, commentators rightly stress its exceptional importance for the book as a whole.[39] It is therefore appropriate when commentators emphasize in their critical assessment of Langton's position that this part in particular proves to be essential for many other aspects of the work, but especially for Kant's understanding of things in themselves and substances. This is true for two reasons: first of all, it follows with respect to things in themselves that if everything that is given within space and time depends on the subject due to her forms of intuition, it would be impossible to find anything in both space and time independent of the very subjective forms of intuition. Thus all empirical objects must be counted among the appearances. On the other hand, however, it equally follows that things in themselves cannot be in space or time. Furthermore, the antinomies in the second part of the *First Critique* rule out that anything spatially or temporally determined can be *at the same time* a thing in itself, for this would result in the well-known problems, such as the above mentioned composition of extended objects from simple substances.[40] Together, then, these two parts—the transcendental aesthetics and the dialectic—provide the framework for *any attempt* at reconstructing Kantian things in themselves. This is all well documented in secondary literature and need not be further elaborated here.

Not so well documented, however, are the consequences of this critical turn for Kant's understanding of substance. In what follows, I want to draw attention to these consequences for they will prove to be highly relevant to Langton's account and, as we shall then see, Watkins' understanding of the Third Analogy of Experience. First it must be admitted that Langton is in a way right to stress that substance and the thing in itself share some decisive features. Accordingly, it is true that the pure concept of substance, which demands a last unity with a self-subsisting existence, cannot be applied to appearances. This is why there is no such substance found among those appearances. The reason for this is in part the same as to why things in themselves are excluded from experience, for appearances as such are determined by the subjective forms of intuition, namely space and time. But one must notice that eventually Kant's understanding of things in themselves and substances decisively breaks apart. We have seen above that pure concepts of understanding taken on their own cannot cognize anything. For this reason, it is impossible to know if there is anything in the world to which the pure concept of substance can be applied. Hence, it is not by chance that Leibniz modelled his concept of substance with respect to the inner form of intuition, for as Kant points out in the amphiboly section, the ideal course of imagination is the only thing possible that a subject can conceive of as purely internal. However, against the backdrop of the Kantian aesthetics, it becomes manifest that the mental activity Leibniz identified with the inner of substance equally depends on a subjective form of intuition—even though it is an inner form—and thus cannot furnish any special insight into the real nature of what the thing is by itself. From this perspective, Leibniz' mistake finally consists in the fact that he attributes a special cognitive power to inner intuition which it does not have for Kant,[41] for even in inner intuition, we are merely receptive and thus only deal with what is given to us through the inner sense.

However, from a Kantian point of view, the Leibnizian mistake goes even further, for not only did Leibniz not see that the inner does not provide a special cognitive power, but in addition he did not even realize that in order to apply the pure concept of substance to inner intuition one has to find something permanent within inner sense. This is, then, Leibniz' ultimate flaw, because the permanent can only be found in external experience. In the end, the only thing that could really account for this substance, according to Kant, is matter.[42]

But let me sharpen the issue a little bit more. Once we know that, due to the finite nature of human understanding, pure concepts must be applied to intuition in order to give knowledge,[43] we must find something that is both formal and intuitive. This characterization already resembles Kant's definition of a transcendental schema.[44] The schemata are therefore needed in order to apply the pure concepts to intuitions, which means for the concept of substance that it need to be temporalized in order to be applicable to spatial appearances. The special temporal characteristic for Kant which allows the application of the pure concept of substance is thus permanence, which shares both features demanded: on the one hand, the formal rule of time determination and, on the other, intuition. Nevertheless, one has to notice that the objects to which it is applied still depend on subjective forms of intuition, so we do not deal with substances in the originally demanded sense of the pure concept—that is to say, an entity that has a self-standing subsistence. Instead, substance for Kant is merely a *substantia phenomenon*, or matter, as he exclaims in the very same amphiboly chapter.[45] Therefore to call

things in themselves substances, as Langton does, not only disregards Kant's conception of things in themselves, but moreover leads his whole criticism of the Leibnizian concept of substance ad absurdum. That this is highly problematic will become even more apparent when one takes the advantages of Kant's new conception of substance into account. Let us therefore turn to a special problem with which Kant was also concerned in his pre-critical philosophy and that Watkins chiefly addressed in his novel approach to the Kantian conception of causality.

3. The community of substances

We have already noted that the question of the external determinations of substances dominated the debate among post-Leibnizian philosophers. We saw that Wolff in some sense fundamentally broke with Leibnizian idealism due to his serious reservations regarding Leibniz' understanding of the inner nature of substance. Contrary to Leibniz, he was unwilling to exclude entirely that at least physical elements (or those substances grounding physical bodies) could have a different type of force as compared to spiritual substances or, in other words, souls. Clearly, some form of dualism results from rejecting the Leibnizian claim that inner determinations can only be conceived of as mental activity. Moreover, it follows that Wolff did not wholeheartedly agree with Leibniz about the special form of the community of substances; and, despite the fact that he took pre-established harmony to be the most likely form of substantial community, he refrained from categorically embracing this theory.[46] Although it must be admitted that all in all the two thinkers did not differ so much from each other in their final views,[47] it is nevertheless crucial to see that in terms of the question of the nature of the inner and outer determinations of substance, Wolff's reservations gave rise to intense debate among his successors and provided intense opportunity for them to engage critically with the opinions of both their predecessors. One of these critics, Martin Knutzen, became particularly attentive to the problem of outer determinations and the possible community of substances. Knutzen was Kant's philosophical teacher in Königsberg, and he is today best known for his contribution to the debate between proponents of pre-established harmony and the theory of influxus physicus, where he sided with the latter and argued for some form of physical influence between substances.[48] As Watkins conclusively pointed out in his study on Kant's conception of causality,[49] Knutzen's approach to these issues had a decisive impact on Kant's own development, which was deeply influenced by this debate. Accordingly, Watkins' conclusive thesis is that Kant's understanding of causality must be regarded against this particular historical background. Consequently, it is not so much Hume and the Humean event-event model of causality Kant is concerned with in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Instead, he furnishes an alternative to the Humean model which leans on the rationalist idea of causal activity of substances.[50]

In the following I do not want to discuss this thesis in detail. Others have pointed to the problems of Watkins' exclusive understanding of causality in terms of substance causality.[51] What concerns us more is Watkins' application of Kant's pre-critical work to argue for this specific model of causality he sees effective in the Third Analogy of Experience, for as it turns out his approach is burdened with fairly similar problems to Langton's work. Both neglect some crucial aspects of transcendental idealism in their understanding of the Kantian argument,

seduced by some similarities they find between Kant's pre-critical discussion of topics related to Leibnizian metaphysics and his critical approach to the same issues. This time, however, it is not so much Kant's concept of the inner nature of substance that proves to be relevant, but the question concerning the outer relation of substances—that is, their causal interaction.[52] It is again in the *Nova dilucidatio* that we find Kant's most detailed, pre-critical discussion of the notion of causality. Even though Kant grounds his principles with reference to the causal activity of God, as Watkins rightly notes, he also insists on some form of influence between substances. Kant thus constructs a theory of the universal causal nexus of substances based on the claim that the Leibnizian account of pre-established harmony can neither explain change occurring within substances nor furnish a coherent account of how one substance can be causally connected with the change occurring in another substance.[53]

Watkins now assumes that the theoretical focus of the *Nova dilucidatio* represents a crucial element of continuity throughout the later development of Kant's metaphysics. He highlights exactly this element in his examination of Kant's critical metaphysics, and with respect to this backdrop, he provides an interpretation of the Second and Third Analogies of Experience in the *First Critique*. With regard to Kant's relationship to Leibniz, what interests us most here is Watkins' interpretation of the Third Analogy. One merit of his approach is that he emphasizes the importance of the long neglected Third Analogy of Experience for an adequate understanding of the Kantian notion of causality in general.[54] However, his presentation is troubled by his attempt to reduce the important differences between Kant's critical and pre-critical position regarding the community of substances. Thus Watkins contends, for instance, that the Third Analogy's account of how one substance can be causally connected with change occurring in another substance is in essential respects identical to that of Kant's pre-critical work. Similarly to Langton, Watkins understands Kant's critical conception of substance analogously to his pre-critical and, in many respects, still mainly Leibnizian account of substance. As a result, one must see that even though he picks out some important characteristics of Kant's conception of causality and its fundamental link to substance, Watkins' neglect of the critical turn in Kant's thinking—and, in particular, the importance of the transcendental aesthetic—raises some serious problems in his approach.

In the remainder of this section, I want to elaborate one problem I see. Of central importance to Watkins' interpretation of the Third Analogy is the assumption he ascribes to Kant that a substance cannot determine its own place in time. Without delving into the problematic reading of the Kantian argument that stands behind this assumption, we are more interested in Watkins' way of tackling this problem, for in order to find an answer to this question, Watkins turns to the *Nova dilucidatio*, since he assumes that Kant took from there the view that a substance cannot act on itself and thus needs to stand in causal relationship with other substances.[55] There Watkins discovers two possible justifications for the alleged Kantian claim that a substance cannot determine its own place in time.[56] What appears to be crucial in the *Nova dilucidatio* for establishing the necessity of mutual interaction is that a reciprocal change has implications for the intrinsic determination of both substances. Watkins admits at this point that there are problems with the intrinsic determinations in Kant's later critical work, and that one cannot simply import this view into the later text.[57] However, despite his reservations, he

holds on to the idea that each substance must be understood as a condition, and thus as a cause, of determinations in the other substance, because he assumes against the backdrop of Kant's pre-critical conception of substance that substances cannot produce a change in their own inner determinations and, since substances cannot causally determine their own inner states, it follows that they ought to stand in mutual interaction in order to allow for change.[58]

It is first of all striking that Watkins himself notices that the argument presented does not take account of the special structure of space. For this reason, he finds it puzzling that Kant himself restricts the argument explicitly to spatial substance.[59] Instead, he asserts that the whole argument bears on the conception of ground that Kant supposedly adopted from his pre-critical period, and that this conception provides an "indispensable help in ascertaining Kant's argument in the Third Analogy".[60] However, by sticking to the pre-critical understanding of ground and his dismissal of the role Kant attributes to the nature of space in the overall argument of the Third Analogy, Watkins ignores what is in fact new and crucial to the Third Analogy. To illustrate my point, I want to consider an important passage that directly refers to this problem and that Watkins does not consider in his discussion. It stems from the "General note on the System of Principles". I will quote it in full here, as we will see it does not only refer to Watkins but is also closely related to Langton's reading and can thus not be overestimated in grasping the proper relationship between Kant's critical and pre-critical understanding of inner and outer. It reads as follows:

> Finally, the possibility of the category of **community** is not to be comprehended at all through mere reason, and thus it is not possible to have insight into the objective reality of this concept without intuition, and indeed outer intuition in space. For how could one conceive the possibility that if several substances exist, the existence of the one can follow reciprocally from the existence of the other (as an effect), and thus as that because there is something in the former, there must on that account also be something in the other that cannot be understood from the existence of the latter alone? For this is requisite for community, but is not even comprehensible among things each of which is entirely isolated from the other others through its subsistence. Hence Leibniz, who ascribed a community to the substances of the world only as conceived by the understanding alone, needed a divinity for mediation; for from their existence alone this community rightly seemed to him incomprehensible. But we can readily grasp the possibility of community (of substances as appearances) if we represent them in space, thus in outer intuition. For this already contains in itself *a priori* formal outer relations as conditions of the possibility of the real (in effect and countereffect, thus in community). (KrV, B292-293)[61]

Notice first that Kant, mostly in agreement with Langton, reemphasizes what one could call Kant's isolationist conception of substance. Accordingly, substance as such—that is, insofar as its pure concept is concerned—only refers to a self-sufficient and isolated being. Consequently, a possible community of thus understood substances must necessarily remain problematic due to their own nature, since a real community for Kant presupposes causal interaction which is actually excluded through the concept of substance itself. This explains, from Kant's perspective, Leibniz' attempt to solve the problem by means of divine intervention that is a pre-established harmony. Needless to say, however, neither here nor elsewhere does Kant mention that he himself put forward a fairly similar view, namely in the *Nova dilucidatio* and even his later inaugural dissertation.[62] This neglect becomes relevant if one takes into account

that Watkins' interpretation relies heavily on this, as we now know, failed attempt to explain substantial community. This alone makes it in fact impossible to explain the Third Analogy with reference to these earlier works.

Secondly, and most importantly, Kant implicitly points to the crucial difference between his critical and pre-critical philosophy: the transcendental aesthetics and the necessary application of the pure concept in its schematized form to sensibility. Due to the transcendental schemata, the forms of intuition gain significant importance for the application of the pure concepts. Thus the nature of space and time must be taken into account if one considers the application of the pure concepts both of substance and community. As it turns out now, these forms of intuition not only exclude absolutely inner determinations, but, in addition, space as such already contains formal outer relations. Hence, there is no problem, insofar as it concerns substances in appearance, to conceive of a causal community between those substances. To put it differently, what seemed to be impossible to solve with respect to the pure concept of substance alone—namely, to establish a real community between those substances, since this was excluded by the isolationist understanding of substance—now poses no threat, because the only substances Kant allows are those determined by the schematized concept of substance and these are substances in appearance. However, these substances are in space and, moreover, essentially shaped through spatial determinations; and, as becomes apparent now, this is not at all a problem for Kant, because there are no real substances in Langton's sense to be found in space and this, in the end, furnishes a completely novel approach to the question concerning both the inner and outer of substance. To quote again the passage from the amphiboly, the absolutely inner turns out to be "a mere fancy" now, since there is nothing absolutely inner in space and time,[63] whereas the outer determinations have lost their problematic character, because space "already contains in itself *a priori* formal outer relations as conditions of the possibility of the real (in effect and counter-effect, thus in community)".

4. Conclusion

Admittedly, it is a great merit in the work of both Langton and Watkins to call attention to the importance of the Leibnizian tradition in which Kant's thought stands and from which his philosophical development emerged. Langton considers this relationship mainly with respect to Kant's understanding of the thing in itself and substance, or, in Kantian terms, the question of the inner nature of substance, whereas Watkins concentrates on the causality of substance. However, both eventually appear to have fallen prey to a similar mistake—namely, not taking seriously enough Kant's critical turn, and in particular the essential role he attributes to the transcendental aesthetics. This means for Langton that she uncritically identified things in themselves with Kant's pre-critical view on inner determinations of substance, while Watkins, on the other hand, imported Kant's pre-critical understanding of ground into the *First Critique*, notably the Second and Third Analogy.

I agree with both that a proper understanding of Kant's critical conceptions and his employed terminology requires a thorough understanding of his relation to Leibniz. If one

takes seriously how Kant understands the Leibnizian project, attention is quickly drawn to the Kantian distinction between inner and outer, as it is presented in the amphiboly section of the *First Critique*. For this reason, I agree with Langton that the amphiboly section really throws some important light on Kant's own critical project and how it is based on eighteenth century debate; but, at the same time, one must be very careful not to overestimate the role played by Kant's pre-critical works in understanding central Kantian conceptions of his critical philosophy, such as thing in itself or substance. Instead, it is absolutely necessary to take seriously the so-called critical turn with all its implications, and in particular the transcendental aesthetics. Regarding the proper interpretation of the amphiboly section, however, we can now see that it is in fact absolutely essential to understand this passage within its historical context—that is to say, both in light of Kant's own pre-critical work and the eighteenth century debate concerning the nature of substance and substantial community. Only from this perspective does it become fully apparent how Kant indeed argues against Leibniz' ambitious project and thus implicitly for some form of humility. However, as it now turns out, this critique does not so much concern the nature of the inner of the things, but the nature of human understanding itself. Thus it becomes apparent not only that Leibniz took appearances for things in themselves because he confused sensual and intellectual cognition, but that this eventually results from not considering that human understanding is essentially finite and this includes the impossibility of sharing in divine understanding, at least with respect to theoretical reasoning. This is, then, also the reason why Leibniz takes our mental activity to provide an example of some infinite or absolute determination which is required to meet the demand set forth by the pure concept of substance and provide an example of an absolutely inner determination of substance. For Kant, in contrast, any form of *speculative* insight into the inner nature of self-subsisting things (that is to say, substances as required by the pure concepts or noumena in the positive sense) remains impossible, since both inner and outer experience are essentially shaped by subjective forms of intuition. That this whole Kantian project, however—and thus also the critique of Leibniz—can become manifest in its fullest extent only within the context of eighteenth century philosophy is what most current commentators of Kant's critical philosophy have missed. Langton and Watkins, however, seem to have misread the nature and extent of this influence.

5. Literature

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ABSTRACT: This paper is devoted to the Kantian critique of Leibnizian metaphysics provided in the so-called amphiboly chapter of Kant's *Critique of pure Reason*. Contrary to two recent interpretations, the paper stresses the special role of the transcendental aesthetics for a proper understanding of Kant's critique of his predecessors. The paper is divided into three sections. First, the it addresses Langton's view on the intrinsic properties of substance and things in themselves. Second, the relationship between Kant's pre-critical and critical philosophy is discussed. The third section draws attention to the community of substances and discusses Watkins' influential interpretation of the Third Analogy of Experience.
KEYWORDS: Kant, Leibniz, metaphysics, amphiboly, substance, monad, thing in itself, Third Analogy of Experience

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Notes

1 KrV, A260-289/B316-346; ÜE, AA08: 247-251; FM, AA20: 281-285. On the development of Kant's view, see Ameriks (1992, 255-272).

2 See Langton 1998, and Watkins 2005.

3 Langton 1998, p. 3: "The premise which is supposed to lead us to humility [namely receptivity; A. H.] is true, or widely accepted to be true. If Kant is right, then many philosophers are closer than they think to the Kantian conclusion that we have no knowledge of things as they are in themselves".

4 Prauss 1974; Allison 1983. Breitenbach 2004 found an important further development with Gerd Buchdahl's approach. However, a general problem of this interpretation remains, since it cannot do justice to the resolution of the Third Antinomy and hence explain the possibility of transcendental freedom simply by abstracting from the fact that the same subject is temporally determined, or to put it in Van Cleves' words (1999, 8): "How is it possible for the properties of anything to vary according to how it is considered? As I sit typing these words, I have shoes on my feet. But consider me apart from my shoes: so considered, am I barefoot? I am inclined to say no; consider me how you will, I am not barefoot." Rosefeldt 2007, p. 165 and Irvin 1984, p. 38 argue similarly. For an intensive discussion of the problems related to the two-aspect interpretation, see Hahmann 2010.

5 Even though Langton refers to Heimsoeth (see, in particular, 1998, p. 29 ff.), one could equally name Max Wundt or Martin Heidegger. Watkins 2005, pp. 200 ff. argues along similar lines.

6 Esfeld 2001, p. 401 points, for instance, to Frank Jackson who supposedly holds an opinion on epistemic humility which resembles the view Langton ascribes to Kant.

7 See, for example, Esfeld 2001; Breitenbach 2004; Walker 2001; Allais 2006.

8 Langton 1998, p. 33. She refers to Kant, KrV, A265/B321; A274/B330.

9 Langton 1998, p. 104: "As in Kant's other works, the conception of a true substance is of something that is capable of existing 'cut off from every external connection and left by itself in isolation'." For Kantian examples of this thought, see KrV, B 292-293; PND, AA01:413.3-6; MSI, AA02:390.18-24; 407.23-27; 408.13-19.

10 Langton 1998, pp. 18 ff.

11 Langton 1998, p. 74.

12 Leibniz, *Monadology*, § 1; Wolff, DM § 76; Ont § 686; Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 234: "Omnis substantia monas est, §. 233, 230, ens compositum strictius dictum non est monas, §. 225. Ergo phaenomenon substantiatum, §. 193, 201." It has often been noted that Kant's expression 'substantia phaenomenon' (see, for example, KrV, A 183/B 227; A 265/B 321; A 441/B 469) is a modified version of Baumgarten's phaenomenon substantiatum which refers to corporeal and thus appearing substances.

13 Langton 1998, pp. 18-20; 205.

14 Langton 1998, pp. 4; 104-123. See also Kant, PND, AA01: 410.18-414.8. Langton later comes back to this point and reemphasizes it in her defense against Allais (2006, 176).

15 Langton 1998, p. 23.

16 See, for example, Langton 1998, p. 20: "Things in themselves are substances that have intrinsic properties; phenomena are relational properties of substances."

17 Langton 1998, p. 75 refers to Gerhardt (7: 236) taken from Ariew and Garber 1989, p. 119.

18 Langton 1998, p. 75: "If a substance is the kind of thing that can exist on its own, if it can exist and be lonely, then it must have properties compatible with loneliness, intrinsic properties. The stakes as to what can count as an intrinsic property have now been raised so high that no physical property can count as an intrinsic property. The conclusion Leibniz draws is, as Kant says, that since the properties cannot be physical, they must in some sense be mental".

19 Leibniz, *Monadology*, §§ 8; 9; 14; 17: "Aussi n'y a-t-il que cela qu'on puisse trouver dans la substance simple, c'est-à-dire, les perceptions et leurs changements. C'est en cela seul aussi que peuvent consister toutes les Actions internes des substances simples."; *Discours de Métaphysique*, §9.

20 Wolff, *Anmerkung Metaphysik* § 215: "Allein dessen ungeachtet habe ich mich doch noch nicht determiniren können, ihm [Leibniz; A.H.] in der Lehre von den Monadibus Beyfall zu geben. Ich erkenne freylich wohl, vermöge dessen, was ich von den allgemeinen Eigenschafften auf eine demonstrativische Art ausgeführet, daß die einfachen Dinge überhaupt, und also auch die Elemente eine Krafft haben müssen [...] allein ich sehe noch keine Nothwendigkeit, warum alle einfache Dinge einerley Art der Krafft haben sollen, und vermuthe vielmehr, es müsse in den Elementen der cörperlichen Dinge eine Krafft anzutreffen seyn, daraus sich die Krafft der Cörper, die sie nebst derselben Veränderung in der Bewegung zeigen, auf eine verständliche Weise herleiten lässet." The remark refers to *Metaphysik* § 598: „Was eigentlich dieses ist, so durch die Würkungen der einfachen

Dinge hervorgebracht wird, wollen wir zur weiterer Untersuchung ausgesetzt seyn lassen. Der Herr von Leibnitz stehet in den Gedancken, daß in einem einfachen Dinge die gantze Welt vorgestellet werde: wodurch sich begreiflich erklären lässet, wie ein jedes von dem andern unterschieden seyn kan und sich auf eine besondere Art auf die gantze Welt beziehen […]. Allein ich trage noch Bedencken diese anzunehmen." See also Wolff, *Anmerkung Metaphysik* § 216: "Da ich nun dem Herrn von Leibnitz darinnen nicht beypflichte, daß diese Krafft undeutliche, ja dunckele Vorstellungen der Welt hervorbringet; so kan ich auch seiner Erklärung der allgemeinen Harmonie nicht beypflichten." The differences between Wolff and Leibniz concerning the theory of monads were also noted by Ameriks 1992, pp. 256-257.

21 Crusius, *Physik* §72: "Der Freyherr von Wolf, welcher sich auf die vorstellende Kraft in den Elementen nicht einläßt, übrigens aber die leibnizischen Elemente, ohne Figur und Größe, annimmt, und ihnen nur eine Kraft und Bestrebung ihren Zustand zu verändern beyleget, setzet hiemit einen undeterminirten Begriff mit Verneinung aller möglichen Determinationen, dessen Existenz daher nicht möglich ist, sondern einen Widerspruch in sich hält […]. Denn es lässet sich keine andere Kraft denken, als eine solche, welche eine Kraft zu denken, oder zu wollen, oder zur Bewegung ist: und darinnen bestehen eben die möglichen Determinationen von der Veränderung des Zustandes einer Substanz. Nun will er die beiden erstern Arten, den Elementen nicht zuschreiben. Die letzte aber ist in ihnen nicht möglich, weil sie nicht bewegt werden können, indem sie keine Seiten haben […]. Was bleibt also übrig?"

22 So, for instance, Pereboom 1991, p. 68, who supposes that Leibniz derived his model of substance "from the conception of intellectual mastery"), even though he emphasized a little bit earlier (p. 52) that most of what Kant knows about Leibniz was passed on to him by Wolff and Baumgarten. It is therefore not surprising when Pereboom assumes: "Kant believes that the intellectual attractiveness of the Cartesian picture of the mind, a mind whose nature consists in intrinsic feature alone, motivates Leibniz to take it as the model for all substances." Instead, we have seen that Kant knew very well what had led Leibniz to the assumption that the inner of a simple substance can only be conceived of as a mental activity. Similarly, Willaschek supposes that Kant "unterscheidet […] hier allerdings nicht klar zwischen dem Inneren im *räumlichen* Sinn, im Sinn der *subjektiven* Privatheit von Vorstellungen und im Sinn *begrifflichen* Enthaltenseins" (1998, 348-349). A notable exception is Ameriks 1992.

23 KrV, A265-266/B321-322: "As object of the pure understanding […] every substance must have inner determinations and forces that pertain to its inner reality. Yet what can I think of as inner accidents except for those which my inner sense offers me? - namely that which is either itself **thinking** or which is analogous to one."; A330/274: "But that which is inner in their state cannot consist in place, shape, contact, or motion (which determinations are all outer relations), and we can therefore attribute to the substance no other inner state than that through which we internally determine our sense itself, namely **the state of representations.**"; A283/B339-4; see also ÜE, AA08: 248; FM, AA20: 285.

24 Schelling (*Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie*, 61; 84) later puts the problem in different terms. Accordingly, one must not mix up intellectual intuition and inner sense. Only the former provides insight into the nature of the absolute or, in Leibnizian terms, what is really substantial, whereas the latter never reveals something that is not conditioned by the subjective forms of cognition. For the same reason, the distinction between the thing in itself and appearance can also be understood as a distinction between two forms of considering the same thing insofar as they are considered by intuitive understanding—that is to say, an infinite mind—on the one hand, and by a finite human understanding which essentially relies on what is given through sensibility, on the other. Accordingly, Kant assumes that "He [Leibniz] also seems, with Plato, to attribute to the human mind an original, though by now dim, intellectual intuition of these super-sensible beings" ÜE, AA08: 248.

25 That Kant really had this notion of inner and outer in mind—and not, as Langton takes it, outer in the sense of external to substance and inner with respect to this substance—becomes even more apparent if one also considers the Kantian distinction between the hyper sensible substrate in us and external to us, for the understanding of substance plays no role in this context, merely the difference between inner and outer sense. See *KU*, AA05: 196; 474.

26 For Kant's project of a practical metaphysics see Hahmann and Ludwig 2016.

27 See, for example, Bird 2000 or Breitenbach 2004.

28 KrV, A235-260/B294-315; FM, AA20: 283; ÜE, AA08: 201.

29 A similar objection was already raised by Breitenbach 2004, pp. 141 ff.

30 KrV, A277/B333: "Yet the absolutely internal in matter, according to pure understanding, is a mere fancy, for it is nowhere an object for the pure understanding; the transcendental object, however, which might be the ground of this appearance that we call matter, is a mere something, about which we would not understand what it is even if someone could tell us".

31 Heidegger (*Die Frage nach dem Ding*, pp. 29 ff.), in his interpretation of transcendental idealism, clearly saw that one cannot call things in themselves objects (let alone substances), since objects are merely objects with respect to human understanding. For this reason, he spoke of 'Entstand' in order to designate the fact that those things are thought of independently of human understanding. Schelling argued very similarly in his discussion of Kant.

32 Allais 2006, p. 160.

33 Aristotle, *Categoriae*, 2a.11-13; Kant, FM, AA20: 330.5-6; Refl. 3829, AA17: 305; Refl. 5856, AA18: 370.20-22. See Longue-

nesse 1998, pp. 325-333 and Hahmann 2009 for Aristotle's influence on the Kantian conception of substance. For the following discussion of the eighteenth century debate, see in particular Hahmann 2009, pp. 11-77.

34 Leibniz, *Monadology*, §§ 29; 72; 84-88.

35 Kant, MoPh, AA01: 477.5-17; *Refl* 4066, AA17: 402.13-24.

36 Kant, MoPh, AA01: 480.1-13; 481.8.

37 Kant, MoPh, AA01: 481.29-30: "Sed internae non sunt in spatio, propterea quia sunt internae."

38 Kant, TG, AA02: 328.22-33; KrV, A265-266 / B321-322.

39 See, for instance, Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (pp. 29-30), who points to KrV, A19/B33.

40 For the special role of the antinomies, but in particular the second as indirect proof for transcendental idealism, see Ameriks 1992, pp. 260-261.

41 See again ÜE, AA08: 248.

42 KrV, A185/B228; A627/B655.

43 Kaehler 1981, p. 417 in my view, correctly notes that the crucial difference between Leibniz and Kant exists in the fact that human understanding is in principle finite for Kant and thus depends on what is given. From this perspective, Leibniz fails to realize that even inner intuition does not share in divine infinite understanding, which is why one cannot attribute a special cognitive power to it.

44 KrV, A138-139/B177-178.

45 KrV, A265/B321.

46 See Wolff, *Anmerkung Metaphysik,* § 216: "Daß eine allgemeine Harmonie der Dinge sey, ist daraus klar, weil der Zustand eines jeden einfachen Dinges sich alle Augenblicke nach dem Zustande der übrigen richtet. Worinnen sie aber eigentlich bestehet, kan ich noch nicht sagen, weil ich den inneren Zustand der Elementen und die in ihnen würkende Krafft noch nicht determiniret habe. Da ich nun dem Herrn von Leibnitz darinnen nicht beypflichte, daß diese Kraft undeutliche, ja dunckele Vorstellungen der Welt hervorbringet; so kan ich auch seiner Erklärung der allgemeinen Harmonie nicht beypflichten." For Wolff's own conception of community of substances, see DM §§ 556-557; also *Anmerkungen Metaphysik*, §§ 174, 176.

47 Sarmiento 2005, however, particularly stresses the differences between the two thinkers. In my opinion, Sarmiento goes too far in his interpretation, because even if there are tendencies to reject Leibniz in Wolff, he remains vague and unclear in many respects and avoids it to comment clearly on decisive aspects of Leibniz' theory. Nevertheless, his indecision and inconsistency certainly had a significant impact on discussion in the following decades.

48 See Wundt 1964, p. 209.

49 Watkins 2005.

50 Watkins 2005, p. 362. Cassam 2008, p. 331 observes that Watkins' major argument to rule out the event-event model of causality relies on the incompatibility of this model with the Third Analogy of Experience, because the Humean model does not allow for mutual interaction.

51 See, for example, Henning 2011; Cassam 2008.

52 Henning 2011, p. 369 objects that Watkins neglects the difference between the discussion of the so-called soul-body relationship and causal interaction in general. However, that this objection is not well grounded can be seen, for example, in the fact that Kant himself exclaims (FM, AA20: 283): "His [Leibniz'] system of pre-established harmony, though the aim of it was really to explain the association of mind and body, had therefore to be first directed, in general, to explaining the possibility of communion among different substances, whereby they constitute a whole; and there was really no way to avoid dealing with this, since substances, by their very concept, if nothing else is added to this, must be represented as perfectly isolated." Notice that Kant here again emphasizes the necessary isolation of substances considered by mere concepts alone.

53 Kant, PND, AA01: 412.36-416.4.

54 Watkins 2005, pp. 217-218.

55 Watkins 2005, p. 229: "Another continuity, much less apparent to those who have focused almost exclusively on the Second Analogy, is Kant's assumption that a substance cannot act on itself so as to change itself or to determine its place in time, an assumption Kant makes most clearly in the Nova dilucidatio's principle of succession." See also ibid., 231: "For just as was the case for the pre-Critical Kant, the Critical Kant thinks that a substance can cause a change of determinate state in another only insofar as it contains a ground that determines the successive states of the other substance".

56 Watkins 2005, p. 223.

57 Watkins 2005, p. 225.

58 Watkins 2005, p. 226.

59 Watkins 2005, p. 226: "While the fact that Kant restricts the scope of his conclusion to spatial substances is, prima facie, peculiar insofar as the arguments he presents do not explicitly invoke space in any of their premises […]".

60 Watkins 2005, p. 227.

61 Kant presents the same thought in other places that are concerned with the problem of community of substances. See FM, AA20: 284; MM, AA29: 868; V-Met-K3E/Arnoldt, AA29: 1007-1008. These last passages are discussed by Ameriks 1992, pp. 267-271. However, Ameriks too does not fully appreciate the role Kant attributes to space in order to solve the problem of community of substances.

62 Kant, PND, AA01: 412.36-416.4; MSI, AA 02: 390.18-24; 407.16-27.

63 For different reasons: there is nothing absolutely inner in space since everything can be dissolved into external—that is, outer—relations, and there is nothing absolutely inner in time since the inner sense too only provides us with conditioned and hence no absolute knowledge.

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A dinâmica do passado e do futuro

Ulysses Pinheiro

> "Kant [....] reduz o inconsciente ao esquecido, longe de encontrar nele o sentido, oculto mas dinâmico, do passado e do futuro".
>
> Yvon Belaval, *Leibniz. De l'Âge Classique aux Lumières*.[1]

No Livro II, capítulo 6, §§39-45 de seu *Ensaio sobre o entendimento humano*, Locke compara as ideias de espécies artificiais (como relógios, navios, sapatos) às ideias de modos mistos (como a traição), opondo ambas às ideias de espécies naturais; segundo ele, essas últimas, ao visarem substâncias extra mentais, seriam mais obscuras e confusas do que as duas primeiras, as quais, justamente por serem ideias de realidades forjadas pelo arbítrio e pelo intelecto humanos, esgotam sua realidade em convenções e práticas inteiramente evidentes para o autor de sua fabricação. Esse trecho ilumina a passagem do capítulo 27, na qual Locke afirma que "pessoa" é um "termo forense" – *i.e.*, uma realidade que é construída por necessidades ligadas a nossa vida prática. Um dos principais comentadores de Locke no século XVIII, Edmund Law, cujo texto *A Defense of Mr. Locke's Opinion concerning Personal Identity* fez parte de várias edições da obra de Locke a partir de 1777, propunha uma interpretação similar a essa; segundo Law, "A personalidade [é] apenas uma criação da sociedade, [...] necessária para o benefício mútuo [dos homens]; *i.e.*, um mero termo forense"; "Trata-se de uma distinção artificial, ainda assim fundada na natureza, mas não na natureza integral do homem".[2] É essa interpretação ciceroniana de pessoa como sendo uma qualidade, uma personagem, de seres inteligentes que desempenha um papel fundamental na teoria lockiana da moral (ao menos tal como ela é formulada no *Ensaio*): só através dela é possível mostrar que

um agente capaz de ser imputado moral e juridicamente por suas ações tem acesso a suas próprias intenções e decisões de modo claro e distinto. Além de considerar as ações humanas como modos mistos capazes de integrar uma ciência dedutiva da moralidade, Locke tem de pressupor o acesso das pessoas a sua essência própria para que a moral possa ter fundamentos certos, pois só através desse acesso as *intenções* das ações podem ser determinadas. Se isso for correto, a teoria de Locke poderia ser caracterizada como envolvendo, ao mesmo tempo, elementos convencionais e tipos naturais com relação à determinação da natureza das pessoas. Tipos naturais, porque o conceito de pessoa, embora pessoas não sejam seres substanciais, envolve necessariamente atos de pensamento de substâncias (as quais, quer sejam elas espirituais ou materiais, são seres vivos pertencentes ao mundo natural), apreendidos reflexivamente. Elementos convencionais, porque há um interesse em nós mesmos que explica por que queremos nos ver como pessoas, interesse que só pode ser realizado por meio de uma atitude com relação a nosso próprio "eu" mediada por convenções (na medida mesma em que faz parte da natureza humana estabelecer convenções e leis que, ao *regular*, *constituem* sua vida prática).

Se o elemento convencionalista na concepção lockiana de identidade pessoal diz respeito tanto à definição da natureza das pessoas quanto aos critérios de identidade pessoal, os elementos naturalistas, ao serem acompanhados por considerações antirrealistas acerca do passado, incidem primariamente sobre a aplicação desses critérios. Ou seja, a abordagem acerca da natureza das pessoas, a partir desse último aspecto, é, à primeira vista, predominantemente epistêmica, mais do que ontológica. Entretanto, essa primeira impressão não se confirma inteiramente, pois, como a própria definição de pessoa envolve termos epistêmicos,[3] isto é, é feita em termos de memória, tal distinção entre o nível epistêmico e o nível ontológico não é absoluta; além disso, como o antirrealismo é uma tese eminentemente semântica (embora seja baseada em considerações epistêmicas sobre o modo de acesso à verdade das proposições), novamente aqui temos uma junção de vários níveis de investigação. Há, entretanto, ao menos uma diferença relevante entre essa forma de abordagem naturalista e o elemento convencionalista da definição de pessoa; trata-se do fato de a primeira não envolver nenhum aspecto voluntário: a memória é independente de nossa vontade, e nós não decidimos sobre o que nos lembramos.[4] Nesse momento, Locke se posiciona contra o senso comum de sua (de nossa?) época, o qual tende a entender a memória como um conhecimento direto, não-inferencial, de eventos passados, de tal forma que ela implicaria a ligação dos valores de verdade de juízos contendo verbos no passado, no presente e no futuro, formulados em diferentes momentos do tempo. Segundo essa concepção usual, a posição mais intuitiva a ser adotada com relação ao conhecimento e ao significado de proposições sobre o passado, envolvendo o testemunho da memória, é uma teoria realista. De fato, que a memória seja uma fonte confiável de conhecimentos parece implicar a tese de que o conhecimento que ela transmite depende da possibilidade de, no passado, termos tido outros acessos à verdade das proposições baseadas nela. Isso significaria que o sentido de proposições sobre o passado não se esgota nos meios presentes e futuros de verificar sua verdade, o que seria a tese propriamente antirrealista.[5] Ou seja, parece que temos de ter um acesso *ao sentido* de proposições sobre o passado independentemente de qualquer meio de verificar sua verdade, justamente porque a existência de conexões dos valores de verdade de proposições enunciadas em diferentes tempos verbais parece ser pressuposta pela compreensão

de tais proposições. O antirrealista, aparentemente, teria de admitir que uma mesma proposição, que hoje, com as evidências disponíveis, é afirmada como verdadeira, pode ser, amanhã, considerada como não-verdadeira, devido à eventual destruição de todas as evidências para ela. Com relação a esse problema, o antirrealista poderia dizer que não há discrepâncias entre os diversos valores de verdade de uma mesma proposição ao longo do tempo, uma vez que o que importa é o momento atual, aqui e agora, quando os juízos são feitos: neste momento, *agora*, todos os juízos que são considerados como verdadeiros mantêm perfeitamente a conexão entre seus valores de verdade. No entanto, diria o realista, o que impediria que recolocássemos o mesmo problema, mas relativo aos vários momentos da enunciação de certos juízos formulados em vários tempos verbais, incluindo o passado? Se fosse assim, no momento em que os juízos são feitos, a conexão entre seus valores de verdade se manteria, mas, a cada momento diferente da enunciação desses mesmos juízos, tais valores poderiam se alterar de forma incomensurável. Isso implicaria afirmar que um mesmo juízo poderia ser considerado ora como verdadeiro e ora como falso (sem que essa mudança possa ser atribuída a um eventual erro de avaliação).

Locke não parece recuar diante de tais consequências aparentemente desastrosas. No já mencionado capítulo 27 do Livro II *Ensaio*, ele se pergunta se é possível haver transferência de uma mesma consciência através de várias substâncias imateriais, preservando a identidade pessoal ao longo dessas transformações. Sua resposta seria negativa, diz ele, se pela expressão "a mesma consciência" se entendesse a mesma ação individual; como, porém, ela significa, nesse contexto, "apenas a representação presente de uma ação passada", por que não seria possível que uma mesma substância imaterial se representasse como tendo feito uma certa ação que de fato nunca fez, como nos sonhos? As ações são entidades passageiras, que não duram tempo suficiente para surgir uma questão sobre sua identidade ao longo da duração, e tudo de que dispomos são de evidências presentes dadas por ideias que aparecem como ideias de memória. Todas as experiências a que tenho acesso desse modo são *minhas* experiências, e elas são *todas* as minhas experiências: não há nada que possa ser atribuído a mim, como uma mesma pessoa, além delas. Ou seja, experiências simultâneas pertencem à mesma pessoa se e somente se uma é a consciência reflexiva da outra.[6] Isso, segundo ele, mostraria que a identidade pessoal não depende da continuidade da mesma substância individual. Radicalizando a posição de Locke, Hume, em seu *Tratado da natureza humana*, desenvolve essas reflexões lockianas sobre as relações entre consciência e tempo, mostrando como a ideia mesma de duração é constituída,[7] e quais são os critérios para distinguirmos ideias da imaginação de ideias da memória. Essas últimas seriam percepções intermediárias, em seu grau de força e vividez, entre impressões e ideias da imaginação, se encontrando, porém, mas perto das primeiras.[8] A função da memória seria a de preservar a mesma ordem e posição das impressões originais; entretanto, como não podemos "comparar" nossas ideias da memória com as impressões que presumivelmente lhes deram origem, *toda* a distinção entre ficções da imaginação e ideias da memória é dada pelos graus de força e vividez, o que nos leva a concluir que é *porque* uma ideia é mais forte e vívida do que as demais que *suponho* que ela preserva a mesma ordem e posição das impressões originais.[9]

Tanto no caso de Hume quanto no de Locke, o que parece servir como razão para adotar uma certa reserva (e, no caso de Hume, um ceticismo) com relação a proposições sobre o passado é uma inspiração que poderíamos chamar de "justificacionista"[10] com relação ao significa-

do, constitutiva do empirismo. Para Hume, o ceticismo sobre o passado implica diretamente um ceticismo sobre a ideia mesma de identidade transtemporal – e poderíamos suspeitar que, partindo-se da aceitação do justificacionismo, o mesmo vale para todas as teorias psicológicas da identidade pessoal – tal como a de Locke –, as quais se veriam comprometidas com uma solução cética ou puramente convencionalista para o problema da identidade (não se trata, aqui, de identificar diretamente o justificacionismo as ceticismo, embora haja conexões entre eles: a própria expressão "antirrealismo" se encarrega de mostrar tal conexão[11]).

Nas passagens em que ele comenta diretamente as teses de Locke sobre a natureza das pessoas e os critérios de identidade pessoal, espelhando o capítulo 27 do Livro II do *Ensaio* em seus *Novos ensaios sobre o entendimento humano*, Leibniz aparentemente defende teses diametralmente opostas às de Locke e (*avant la lettre*) de Hume: contra o convencionalismo e a tese sobre a irrealidade do passado, Leibniz avança, à primeira vista, uma posição realista nesses dois níveis.[12] Comecemos abordando o segundo nível, isto é, a questão da memória e do tempo. Afirmar que Leibniz defende uma concepção realista com relação ao significado de proposições sobre o passado, baseadas na memória, não é contrário ao reconhecimento do caráter ideal das relações espaciais e temporais que caracteriza sua teoria, pelo menos a partir de um certo momento sua obra.[13] Como se sabe, para o Leibniz da maturidade, o espaço e o tempo não são realidades subsistentes em si mesmas, objetivamente, mas são entidades "ideais", no sentido em que são relações puramente mentais.[14] No entanto, o tipo de realismo que ele defende com relação ao passado não diz respeito a esse caráter ideal do tempo, mas sim a proposições que, tendo por objeto realidades mentais, não esgotam seu significado na posse (atual ou possível) de evidências de sua verdade.

Há, porém, um outro tipo de consideração que parece nos levar a duvidar da atribuição a Leibniz de uma posição realista sobre o passado, ainda que o realismo em questão seja tomado nesse sentido mais restrito. De fato, se por "realismo" entendermos a tese segundo a qual há uma distinção entre o que uma proposição diz e o que a verifica,[15] e se entendermos por "realismo sobre o passado" a tese segundo a qual o passado possui, no presente, um tipo qualquer de existência, ainda que não tão "real" quanto a realidade do presente,[16] constatamos que Leibniz parece defender uma curiosa tese intermediária entre realismo e antirrealismo a respeito do passado. Como ocorre frequentemente em sua obra, Leibniz procura aqui se esquivar das oposições aparentemente exclusivas, buscando uma terceira via. No presente caso, essa via alternativa será construída a partir de uma reformulação do conceito clássico de percepção.

No Prefácio dos *Novos ensaios*, ele chama nossa atenção para a importância que a noção de "pequenas percepções insensíveis" desempenhará nas observações críticas que ele fará às teses de Locke. No caso da memória, ele pretende mostrar, usando essa noção, que alguns experimentos mentais relativos à identidade pessoal propostos no *Ensaio* são impossíveis, uma vez que nunca há um esquecimento completo do que se passou. Ou seja, não há, para Leibniz, uma limitação cognitiva (no nível das percepções insensíveis) que elimine de forma irremediável as evidências relativas ao passado e, por mais que cada uma de tais percepções não seja acessível de modo claro à consciência dos indivíduos que as possuem, a consciência obscura e confusa de seu conjunto garante que as proposições sobre o passado em que eles acreditam têm fundamento *in re*.[17] A posição de Leibniz, é, pois, peculiar, uma vez que ela parece aceitar parte da tese de

Locke (aquela que atribui à memória o papel de condição necessária da identidade pessoal, mesmo que seja sob a forma de pequenas percepções insensíveis) e negar outra parte (aquela que exige que tais memórias constituam um conhecimento consciente para a pessoa que elas individuam). Segundo a tese lockiana, o passado deve poder ser objeto de evidências conscientes presentes para poder ser dado como um conteúdo mental. Isto é, Locke não afirma que a condição da identidade pessoal é uma lembrança *atual* do que nos ocorreu, e que só somos idênticos àquilo de que nos recordamos atualmente – isso geraria paradoxos óbvios, tal como o de fazer a identidade de uma pessoa variar ao longo do tempo, dependendo do que ela se recorda em dado instante. Para Leibniz, porém, a exigência de consciência, mesmo que seja apenas a lembrança possível, e não a atual, não é necessária; ainda assim, em um certo sentido, a pessoa que guarda em sua mente todos os traços do passado *sabe* atualmente o que ocorreu no passado – ou seja, o passado sobrevive no presente na mente dos indivíduos.

Mais do que uma mera clausula adicional, que se limitaria a acrescentar a afirmação da existência de percepções inconscientes à tese lockiana sobre a identidade pessoal, a reformulação do conceito tradicional de percepção proposta por Leibniz reconfigura inteiramente os termos do problema do *Ensaio*. De fato, ela responde à estratégia geral dos *Novos ensaios* em relação à obra de Locke, segundo a qual se trata menos de refutar a posição empirista do que de assimilá-la, tal como, no processo de digestão dos animais, a fermentação transforma os alimentos no próprio corpo orgânico do qual faz parte o estômago.[18] Os diversos sistemas filosóficos, segundo um motivo constantemente repetido ao longo dos *Novos ensaios*, são pontos de vista parciais que exprimem, todos eles, alguma verdade, ou uma parte da verdade; a tarefa da filosofia leibniziana é a de traduzir essas parcialidades em um sistema mais abrangente, o que explica, ao menos em parte, o caráter disperso e fragmentário da obra de Leibniz e, em particular, o projeto dialógico dos *Novos ensaios*, desde que se entenda esse último a partir da "assimilação" de Filaleto por Teófilo (o que não deixa de soar como algo antropofágico). Sendo assim, a introdução da noção de pequenas percepções insensíveis servirá para Leibniz como um operador conceitual através do qual não somente ele complementará a teoria da identidade pessoal formulada por Locke, mas, ao invés disso, transformará essa última de tal modo que a adoção do critério da memória passará a implicar, ao contrário do que ocorria no *Ensaio*, a negação de seus elementos antirrealistas e convencionalistas – e, dada a identidade entre ser e perceber envolvida no conceito de pessoa, a afirmação de sua substancialidade. Em outras palavras, uma teoria justificacionista consequente seria indiscernível de uma teoria realista, e a discordância entre elas seria uma falsa questão.

Para bem compreender o modo de funcionamento desse operador conceitual, é preciso, antes, determinar de maneira mais precisa o significado do conceito mesmo de "pequenas percepções insensíveis" [*petites perceptions insensibles*], tal como ele aparece no Prefácio dos *Novos ensaios*, para, em seguida, acompanhar sua aplicação ao longo do texto como um todo. Além de termos de dar conta da disparidade de interpretações distintas entre os comentadores da obra de Leibniz, há um ponto que não foi, até onde eu saiba, suficiente e explicitamente notado pelos comentários,[19] a saber, o fato de que essa expressão designa uma diferença de *graus* – manifestada pela palavra "pequenas" –, e não uma diferença qualitativa entre as percepções "sensíveis" e as "insensíveis". De fato, no referido Prefácio, Leibniz deriva a existência das pequenas

percepções insensíveis da tese anti-lockiana segundo a qual o espírito pensa sempre;[20] a partir dessa premissa, ele afirma que

> há mil marcas que fazem julgar que, a todo momento, há uma infinidade de percepções em nós, mas sem apercepção e sem reflexão, isto é, mudanças na própria alma das quais não nos apercebemos porque essas impressões ou são muito pequenas e em muito grande número ou muito unidas, de modo que elas não possuem nada de bastante distinguível à parte, mas, juntas a outras, não deixam de fazer seu efeito e de se fazer sentir ao menos confusamente em seu conjunto.[21]

Dada a validade do Princípio de Continuidade (segundo o qual não há na natureza uma passagem em "saltos" de um estado a outro), aceito como um dos axiomas dessa obra, devemos concluir que o inconsciente para Leibniz significa um *grau ínfimo* de consciência, ao invés de indicar aquilo que pura e simplesmente está *ausente* da consciência: não há, no caso das pequenas percepções insensíveis, a consciência *clara* (nem, muito menos, *distinta*) de cada uma delas isoladamente, mas apenas uma apreensão *obscura* e *confusa* do seu conjunto. No artigo 24 do *Discurso de metafísica*, Leibniz procura esclarecer o caráter metafórico dessas expressões visuais através da definição precisa de seu significado. As duas primeiras frases desse texto são particularmente relevantes para a atual discussão:

> Quando posso reconhecer uma coisa entre outras, sem poder dizer em que consistem suas diferenças ou propriedades, o conhecimento é *confuso*. Assim conhecemos algumas vezes *claramente*, sem de modo algum duvidar, se um poema ou quadro estão bem ou mal feitos, porque há um *je ne sais quoi* que nos satisfaz ou nos choca. Sendo-me, porém, possível explicar as impressões sentidas, o conhecimento chama-se *distinto*.[22]

O conhecimento claro e confuso é, portanto, aquele que envolve a consciência não-conceitual de uma individualidade ou particularidade – ou seja, é o conhecimento sensível. Da conjunção das duas frases, podemos inferir que o conhecimento obscuro e confuso é um conhecimento sensível que não nos permite "reconhecer uma coisa entre outras" – ou seja, trata-se precisamente da consciência das pequenas percepções insensíveis.

Ora, só pode haver uma consciência confusa do todo se cada uma das partes for, de algum modo, ela mesma, consciente. Portanto, se as pequenas percepções são ditas "insensíveis", é apenas no sentido em que, tomadas isoladamente, nenhuma delas se destaca suficientemente das demais para despertar nossa atenção. Deve-se notar que, no trecho citado, Leibniz pretende oferecer ao leitor uma evidência empírica para sua tese de que a alma pensa sempre, evidência essa acessível indiretamente a sua consciência. Logo antes de apresentar esse argumento empírico, ele havia apelado para os experimentos científicos descritos por Robert Boyle em seu livro *Discourse about absolute rest in bodies*[23]; agora, trata-se de apelar para a experiência consciente dos leitores. As "pequenas percepções insensíveis" se fazem "sentir", escreve Leibniz nesse trecho, "ao menos confusamente em conjunto" – ou seja, cada uma delas é "insensível" (isto é, indistinguível) tomada isoladamente, mas todas elas são "sensíveis" (distinguíveis) tomadas em conjunto.

Tal caracterização das "pequenas percepções insensíveis" coloca em jogo diversos outros conceitos correlacionados, especialmente a diferença entre percepção e apercepção. Esse é um

tema que pede uma abordagem à parte,[24] mas, para a presente discussão, basta assinalar que adotaremos aqui, em linhas gerais, a leitura proposta por Nicholas Rescher, segundo a qual a "apercepção" não deve ser tomada como sinônimo de "consciência", mas antes como sinônimo de "autoconsciência".[25] Segundo Rescher, a distinção leibniziana entre percepção e apercepção seria estritamente paralela à distinção lockiana entre sensação e reflexão – o que explicaria por que Leibniz afirma, no trecho citado, que nós *sentimos* todas as pequenas percepções.[26] Generalizando a tese de Rescher até um ponto que ele mesmo não a levou, podemos concluir que mesmo as pequenas percepções insensíveis são, para Leibniz, não percepções literalmente inconscientes, mas apenas percepções que, por seu grau de distinção, por sua conjunção próxima e por seu número dividem infinitamente a atenção da mente em que elas ocorrem. Ou seja, como já notamos acima, a distinção entre percepções sensíveis e insensíveis é de *grau*, e não de *natureza*; é por isso que, *por princípio*, poderíamos ter acesso a essas percepções que são insensíveis para nós apenas *atualmente*, e não *em si mesmas*, como Leibniz assinala no início do capítulo sobre a percepção dos *Novos ensaios*: "Também temos pequenas percepções nós mesmos [*i.e., além dos animais, os homens também as têm*], das quais não nos apercebemos em nosso estado presente. É verdade que nós poderíamos muito bem nos aperceber delas e delas fazer reflexão, se não fôssemos desviados por sua multiplicidade, que divide nossa mente, ou se elas não fossem apagadas, ou melhor, obscurecidas por percepções maiores".[27] Toda a polêmica de Leibniz contra a crítica ao inatismo proposta por Locke no Livro I de seu *Ensaio* deve ser revista levando-se em consideração essa caracterização do inconsciente leibniziano. Se essa interpretação for correta, ela torna as críticas de Leibniz à tese, proposta por Locke, no Livro I, Capítulo 1 do *Ensaio*, sobre ininteligibilidade de uma modificação não-consciente da mente menos simples do que se poderia pensar inicialmente: tanto quanto para Locke, também para Leibniz o conceito de consciência estaria envolvido no conceito de percepção;[28] ao invés de dissociar os conceitos de ideia e de consciência, ele estaria, na verdade, *ampliando o escopo do conceito de consciência*, o que daria o sentido geral de sua "assimilação digestiva" do empirismo, na medida em que, ao invés de recusar o ponto de partida das percepções conscientes, ele o expandiria até um domínio antes insuspeito pelo próprio empirista. Tal ampliação do conceito de consciência continuaria implicando a tese de que não temos uma consciência distinta dessas percepções tomadas isoladamente, ou seja, de que não temos delas nenhuma percepção clara (nem, muito menos, distinta).

Feitos esses breves esclarecimentos preliminares sobre o conceito de pequenas percepções insensíveis, voltemos à questão da memória. Leibniz identifica como tese central de sua discordância com Locke acerca do conceito de pessoa a afirmação de que a identidade "moral ou pessoal" pressupõe a identidade "real ou metafísica". Essa última pareceria, à primeira vista, envolver a insuficiência da memória como critério de identidade pessoal, substituindo-o por um critério em "terceira pessoa", que levasse em conta o testemunho de outros indivíduos sobre a identidade da pessoa em questão, o que, talvez, repercutisse até mesmo sobre divergências metodológicas, especialmente sobre a relevância de certos experimentos de pensamento. Já notamos, no entanto, que essa primeira impressão é enganosa: ao contrário, é por uma espécie de generalização absoluta do conceito de memória, até o ponto que ele seria aplicado às percepções insensíveis, que a tese da identidade "real ou metafísica" será defendida por ele. Antes de considerar mais atentamente essa resposta, porém, examinemos em que termos é formulada

a crítica de Leibniz à tese lockiana de que a identidade pessoal não pressupõe a continuidade de uma mesma substância pensante. Esse novo exame prévio é necessário porque a posição de Leibniz sobre a tese de Locke é ambígua. De fato, Leibniz ao mesmo tempo procura recusar a tese de que a identidade pessoal não pressupõe a identidade de uma substância e, no entanto, parece aceitar que, em certas circunstâncias, tal pressuposição não é necessária: é logicamente possível que as "consciências" fossem transferidas por Deus de uma alma para outra, mantendo a unidade de uma mesma pessoa ao longo dessas transferências.[29] As razões para se recusar a aceitar o argumento de Locke sobre esse ponto parecem, à primeira vista, demonstrar uma incompreensão dos propósitos dos experimentos de pensamento formulados por esse último – a saber, separar o essencial do acidental nos critérios que usamos normalmente para determinar a identidade pessoal: "isso", diz Leibniz [a saber, supor tal "transferência" de consciências], "seria perturbar a ordem das coisas sem razão e fazer um divórcio entre o aperceptível e a verdade, que se conserva pelas percepções insensíveis".[30] Ora, o objetivo de Locke com seus experimentos de pensamento era justamente o de averiguar até que ponto os critérios que usamos para atribuir identidade às pessoas reais que efetivamente conhecemos (na maioria dos casos, a continuidade de um mesmo corpo humano vivo e, em "primeira pessoa", além do corpo próprio, também a aparente permanência de um mesmo "eu", que seria "aperceptível" internamente por cada um) são necessários, e até que ponto são meramente contingentes, relativos apenas às pessoas que conhecemos neste mundo ou apenas ao estado atual das pessoas que conhecemos. A pergunta metafísica relevante diz respeito ao que as pessoas realmente são, e as diversas hipóteses de Locke são propositadamente formuladas "contra" a ordem natural, i.e., contra o estado contingente do mundo tal como o conhecemos e-ou apercebemos.

Um dos argumentos de Leibniz contra os experimentos de pensamento de Locke que ultrapassa essa aparente incompreensão do propósito com que foram formulados aparece no comentário do § 23, através da contraposição de um experimento aparentemente ainda mais extravagante (uma "suposição muito mais adequada", diz, porém, surpreendentemente, Leibniz): a ideia de uma "Terra gêmea".[31] Segundo esse experimento mental, poderíamos pensar em um globo situado "em outro lugar do universo ou em outro tempo" e que "não difere sensivelmente deste globo da Terra onde habitamos"; poderíamos supor também que "cada um dos homens que o habitam não difere sensivelmente de cada um de nós que lhe corresponde". Haveria assim, ele continua, "ao mesmo tempo mais de cem milhões de pares de pessoas semelhantes, isto é, duas pessoas com as mesmas aparências e consciências; e Deus poderia transferir apenas os espíritos, ou com eles seus corpos, de um globo para o outro sem que eles se apercebessem disso". O desafio de Leibniz a Locke é o seguinte: quer consideremos que houve ou que não houve uma tal transferência entre esses pares semelhantes (ou: sensivelmente idênticos) por intervenção divina, "o que se dirá da pessoa deles ou do *si-mesmo* [*soi*] deles segundo seus autores?". Como podemos entender esse desafio? Qual problema ele coloca para o critério de continuidade psíquica?

Parece que o objetivo do experimento da "Terra gêmea" é o seguinte: Leibniz já havia recusado o critério de identidade pessoal lockiano, formulado em um vocabulário "fenomenológico" de primeira pessoa envolvendo apenas as percepções conscientes (i.e., baseado nos dados mentais disponíveis ao sujeito de experiências conscientes), afirmando que a identidade

das pessoas pode muitas vezes ser melhor estabelecida em terceira pessoa (quer isso seja feito empiricamente – por ex., em casos de amnésia total, poderíamos *ensinar* a alguém que ele foi tal ou tal pessoa[32] –, quer isso seja feito de um ponto de vista metafísico – por ex., usando o conceito de pequenas percepções inconscientes). Mas, admitindo, para efeito de argumentação, na ficção da "Terra gêmea", a premissa de Locke sobre a identidade pessoal, não teríamos como evitar dizer "que essas duas pessoas [....] são uma só e mesma pessoa, o que é, entretanto, um absurdo manifesto". O desafio de Leibniz consiste então em pedir ao lockiano que mostre como evitar que seu critério de identidade pessoal impeça a situação na qual dois são um, o que é evidentemente absurdo quando se está discorrendo sobre a *identidade numérica* de *uma* só e mesma pessoa. Normalmente, os filósofos neo-lockianos tentam evitar objeções do tipo da de Leibniz formulando uma cláusula adicional à condição de continuidade psíquica, a saber: que a série de estados mentais conectados pela memória não contenha nenhuma ramificação. Provavelmente Leibniz encararia essa cláusula adicional como sendo *ad hoc* e arbitrária, não respeitando a "intrinsicalidade" da relação de identidade.

A alternativa de Leibniz para o critério "fenomenológico" de Locke, estritamente ligado às percepções conscientes, é, como vimos, a de fundamentar a consciência nas "pequenas percepções insensíveis": são essas últimas que provam a identidade real, contra a identidade meramente "moral" ligada aos dados da consciência, ou seja, ligada ao que Leibniz denomina de "apercepção". Ou ainda: a apercepção só é possível sobre o pano de fundo de infinitas pequenas percepções insensíveis, as quais exprimem, na mente, a multiplicidade das modificações no corpo, entendido como um todo orgânico composto por uma extensão contínua e infinitamente divisível em ato. A tese de Leibniz implica que um indivíduo não pode não guardar, de alguma forma, mesmo que "inconscientemente" (isto é, de forma minimamente consciente), a memória de experiências e de eventos passados, e que isso é uma condição necessária e suficiente da identidade "real" e fundamento da identidade "moral" – a qual envolve, portanto, o corpo próprio, e explica a validade de critérios em "terceira pessoa" para se reconhecer um indivíduo como o mesmo ao longo do tempo. Ou seja, mesmo a identidade corporal tem sua validade derivada da tese acerca das pequenas percepções insensíveis. Essa tese significa então que a consciência atual não é uma condição necessária da identidade real das pessoas – basta que seja *possível* que o sujeito que tem tais lembranças se recorde dessas experiências e-ou desses eventos passados. Mas, voltando ao texto de Locke, devemos recordar que esse último nunca afirmou que a condição da identidade pessoal é uma lembrança atual do que nos ocorreu, e que só somos idênticos àquilo de que nos recordamos atualmente – isso geraria, como já notamos acima, numerosos paradoxos, tal como o de fazer a identidade de uma pessoa "variar" ao longo do tempo, dependendo do que ela se recorda em dado instante. A discordância com Locke não se dá, portanto, devido à aceitação dessa cláusula mais fraca da "possibilidade" (em oposição à cláusula mais forte da "efetividade"), mas sim devido ao *fundamento* requerido por essa possibilidade: essa última tem de estar fundada em memórias reais, mesmo que sob a forma de "pequenas percepções insensíveis". Se for assim, porém, teremos de admitir que Leibniz aceita o critério lockiano de continuidade psíquica, discordando apenas sobre quais itens deveriam estar conectados dessa forma. De fato, a memória real que fundamenta a identidade moral é dada pelas pequenas percepções insensíveis, mas ela deve estar presente para que seja possível

haver até mesmo a identidade real. Seriam essas percepções insensíveis conectadas entre si de forma "inconsciente" que forneceriam o fundamento para a aparição de memórias aparentes.

Mas então por que a noção de substância pensante continua sendo, para Leibniz, uma condição necessária da identidade real? Por que não seria suficiente uma cadeia de percepções insensíveis? A resposta para essas questões é também o local de onde se pode vislumbrar por que, para Leibniz, a oposição entre realismo e antirrealismo é uma falsa disputa. Como a substância viva é, segundo ele propõe em sua filosofia da maturidade, a unidade no múltiplo de afecções, e como esse múltiplo é composto por um conjunto de elementos infinito em ato, então a substância singular é sempre um indivíduo dotado de infinitas propriedades. A determinação completa envolvida no conceito dos entes concretos só pode ser caracterizada, pois, pela noção de um conjunto infinito de propriedades determinantes. Um dos subconjuntos infinitos desse conjunto infinito é formado pelas pequenas percepções insensíveis; ao invés de caracterizar o "eu" que é o objeto da apercepção como sendo uma *coisa* ao lado de outras coisas percebidas pela mente, Leibniz o caracteriza por sua *função* unificadora. Nelas, as percepções presentes, passadas e futuras convivem em um domínio virtual que não se confunde com o não-ser: o passado é tão real quanto o presente e o futuro.[33] Logo, se o realismo substancial e o realismo sobre o passado são verdadeiros, é porque o conjunto infinito em ato das pequenas percepções insensíveis garante essa continuidade e constitui, sobre o pano de fundo de seus domínios inconscientes, a consciência dos indivíduos. Quando Leibniz afirma, nesse mesmo capítulo 27 do Livro II dos *Novos ensaios*, que a identidade real se prova "por reflexão presente e imediata", constituindo a primeira "verdade de fato", vemos que o acesso introspectivo ao "eu" real se faz sobre a base que nos permite distinguir o "si-mesmo" ("*soi*") da "aparência do si-mesmo", o que nos explica por que a "aparência do si-mesmo, acompanhada da verdade, lhe [i.e., à identidade real] acrescenta a identidade pessoal".

Vimos acima que a recusa da oposição exaustiva entre realismo e antirrealismo na determinação da identidade pessoal leva Leibniz a se posicionar tanto contra o convencionalismo quanto contra a tese sobre a irrealidade do passado. A irrealidade do passado não foi provada como falsa devido à adoção de uma tese anti-justificacionista, mas sim devido à radicalização da tese justificacionista. O convencionalismo, por sua vez, se prova falso pela substancialidade do "eu". O que o "eu" é e o conjunto infinito de suas percepções passadas, presentes e futuras coincidem exatamente. Nessa coincidência, a distinção entre realismo e anti-realismo não faz mais sentido, e as infindáveis polêmicas sobre se o Leibniz da maturidade era mais ou menos realista se perdem nessa compreensão correta de sua posição compatibilista.

Na *Antropologia de um ponto de vista pragmático*, Kant manifesta sua concordância fundamental com Locke – presumivelmente, contra os leibnizianos – ao afirmar que "*Ter representações, e contudo, não ser consciente delas*, nisso parece haver uma contradição, pois, como podemos saber que as temos se delas não somos conscientes? Essa objeção Locke já a fez, que também por isso rejeitou a existência de semelhante espécie de representações". Logo em seguida, porém, essa concordância é matizada por uma ressalva, que retoma quase literalmente as palavras de Leibniz no trecho do *Discurso de metafísica* citado mais acima:

> No entanto, – escreve aí Kant –, podemos ser *mediatamente* conscientes de ter uma representação, mesmo que não sejamos imediatamente conscientes dela. – Tais representações se chamam então

> *obscuras*, as restantes são *claras*, e se sua claridade se estende às representações parciais de um todo delas e à sua ligação, são *representações distintas*.[34]

O exemplo de um homem avistado ao longe, sem que consigamos discriminar clara e distintamente os componentes internos de sua figura (olhos, nariz, boca), nos leva a concluir que somos, de modo mediato – ou seja, *confuso* –, conscientes de cada uma delas, pois a representação do todo é composta pela representação de cada uma de suas partes. Um outro exemplo, o da boa impressão que nos causa uma bela vestimenta, como ilustra Kant na lista de exemplos relevantes para sua *Antropologia* (e não devemos nos esquecer de que Kant dava grande importância à moda e ao bem vestir-se, como nos narra seu biógrafo Manfred Kuehn[35]), contradiz as advertências do entendimento contra a tendência de considerar, a partir dessas percepções confusas, a importância da pessoa que a porta.[36] Esse "*je ne sais quoi*" não deixa de ser uma representação consciente. Se a interpretação proposta acima para o significado que Leibniz atribuía às pequenas percepções insensíveis estiver correta, Kant estaria assim, *malgré lui,* talvez, mais próximo desse último do que de Locke no que se refere ao estatuto das representações conscientes. De fato, como vimos acima, o inconsciente, para Leibniz, não é nada além do que o infimamente consciente. No entanto, ao introduzir em sua caracterização acerca do domínio do insensível a tese de que as pequenas percepções confusas formam um conjunto infinito em ato, e não um conjunto infinito apenas em potência, Leibniz introduz uma marca que constituirá uma diferença *qualitativa* entre sua posição e a de Kant. Porque o conjunto das pequenas percepções é infinito em ato, porque *todo o passado* e *todo o futuro* do mundo estão representados confusamente em cada mônada, então o inconsciente, para Leibniz, ao remeter para a interioridade mais obscura e confusa do sujeito, a identifica com a mais absoluta exterioridade: se a mônada é um "espelho vivo" do universo, se o microcosmo repete o macrocosmo, é porque as afecções infinitas que a modificam são um mapa fiel dos infinitos objetos do mundo. Não é surpreendente, pois, que ele tenha sempre rejeitado a dúvida solipsista de Descartes e afirmado, em seu lugar, a perfeita identidade entre o interno e o externo. O inconsciente é o que, sendo o mais profundamente inscrito em nossas mentes, é, *por isso mesmo*, o que nos conecta mais imediatamente ao mundo externo.

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ABSTRACT: The rejection of an exhaustive opposition between realism and antirealism in the determination of personal identity conduces Leibniz, in his critiques to Locke in the *New Essays*, to criticize both conventionalism and the thesis on the irreality of the past – both of them elements of Locke's theory. Leibniz attacks the thesis on the irreality of the past not because he adopts an anti-justificationist thesis, antitetical to Locke's, but, instead, due to the radicalization of his rival's justificationist thesis. Conventionalism, on its turn, will be proven as false by the fact that the "self" and the infinite set of its past, present and future perceptions perfectly coincide. In the conclusion of this paper, we will see how some passages of Kant's *Anthropology* rend him, contrary to what would initially be supposed , closer to Leibniz than to Locke.
KEYWORDS: Leibniz, consciouness, inconscient, Locke, Kant.

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Notas

1 Belaval 1995, p. 242.

2 O próprio Law parece hesitar na caracterização positiva da categoria a ser aplicada a pessoas: "A palavra pessoa [designa] *um modo misto, ou relação*, e não uma substância" (grifo meu; para essas citações, cf. Law 1823, pp. 184-200).

3 Cf. a definição de pessoa de Locke no *Ensaio*, II, 27, § 9: "um ser pensante inteligente, que tem razão e reflexão e que pode considerar-se a si mesmo como si mesmo, a mesma coisa pensante em diferentes tempos e lugares, o que ele faz apenas através daquela consciência que é inseparável do pensamento e, ao que me parece, lhe é essencial".

4 Ao passo que o conhecimento do futuro, envolvido em grande parte no convencionalismo, na medida em que esse último visa nosso interesse em relação a ações e eventos que são objetos de nossas intenções, depende de nossa vontade. Cf. Dummett 1993, p. 414.

5 Para mais referências sobre o que consideramos aqui como antirrealismo, cf. Dummet 1978, 2004 e cf. Campbell 1997, pp. 162-163.

6 Resta determinar, nesse modelo, o que torna várias experiências do mesmo "nível" (por ex., várias sensações simultâneas) experiências de uma mesma pessoa. Esse é um dos problemas do famoso Apêndice do *Tratado da natureza humana* de Hume.

7 Cf. Hume, *Tratado*, Livro I, Parte II; para o trecho correspondente no *Ensaio* de Locke, cf. Livro II, Cap. 14.

8 Cf. Hume, *Tratado*, Livro I, Parte III, Seção 5: "Das impressões dos sentidos e da memória"; cf. também Seção 4, onde Hume fala de uma "impressão da memória ou dos sentidos".

9 Cf. sobre esse ponto o exemplo de Hume sobre nosso conhecimento do assassinato de César no Senado (e, de um modo geral, sobre o conhecimento de qualquer fato histórico), na Seção 4 do , Livro I, Parte III do *Tratado*. A possibilidade de verificação direta por parte de testemunhas que tiveram a impressão presente da morte de César está na base de todos os juízos confiáveis de memória; mas *nós* não temos mais acesso a tais impressões.

10 Seguindo o vocabulário de Dummett 2004, p. 49. É conveniente lembrar que o próprio Dummett propõe um enfraquecimento do justificacionismo com relação ao passado, não adotando sua versão mais radical. A atribuição de uma inspiração "justificacionista" ou "intuicionista" a Hume pode ela mesma ser questionada, uma vez que, partindo de teses aparentemente comprometidas com tal teoria, Hume muitas vezes parece concluir por uma radicalização cético-naturalista, reduzindo a teoria sobre nosso comportamento mental a uma explicação das *causas* (e não das *razões*) que nos levam a pensar de tal ou tal forma. Não discutirei esse ponto no presente texto.

11 Dummett 1993, p. 421, já notou as consequências destrutivas de uma concepção antirrealista sobre o passado para a atribuição de identidade pessoal.

12 Para algumas considerações acerca do realismo em Leibniz, cf. Adams 1994, pp. 338-340, Cap. 11, Item 3: "Realism".

13 Sobre a evolução dos textos de Leibniz sobre a natureza do tempo, cf. Hartz e Cover 1988; cf. crítica de Adams a esse artigo em Adams 1994, pp. 253-254.

14 Sobre esse ponto, Leibniz concorda em grande medida com Locke sobre o estatuto ontológico das relações.

15 Cf. Dummett 2004, p. 50. Dummett caracteriza o realismo, em outros momentos de sua obra, a partir da aceitação do princípio de bivalência e de uma concepção do significado em termos de condições de verdade.

16 Dummett 2004, p. 52. Para uma posição diametralmente oposta, segundo a qual o passado, enquanto passado, é tão ou mais real do que o presente, cf. Bergson 1984.

17 Cf. Leibniz, *Novos ensaios*, II, 27, § 14 (G V, 222): "Um ser imaterial ou espírito não pode ser despojado de toda percepção de sua existência passada. Ele retém impressões de tudo que lhe aconteceu previamente, e tem até mesmo pressentimentos de tudo que lhe ocorrerá; mas esses sentimentos são o mais das vezes muito pequenos para poder ser distinguidos e para que se possa ter deles apercepção, ainda que eles possam talvez se desenvolver um dia. Essa continuação e ligação de percepções faz alguém ser realmente o mesmo indivíduo, mas as apercepções (i.e., quando nos apercebemos de sentimentos passados) provam além disso uma identidade moral, e fazem aparecer a identidade real". São as percepções insensíveis que garantem a identidade real do "eu", contra a identidade meramente "moral" ligada aos dados da consciência, ou seja, ligada ao que Leibniz denomina de "apercepção" (cf. também Livro II, Cap. 27, § 9). Todos os textos de Leibniz nesse artigo foram traduzidos pelo autor.

18 "[...] uma fermentação moderada e constante se mantém, a qual é alimentada por uma matéria circulatória que aumenta de forma cada vez mais rarificada e que é também aos poucos restaurada..." (Leibniz 2007, p. 160). O texto de Leibniz de onde essa citação foi retirada, intitulado *Corpus hominis et uniuscuiusque animalis machina est quaedam*, foi originalmente escrito entre 1681 e 1682. Para uma análise

das teorias químicas da digestão à época de Leibniz, cf. Smith 2012.

19 Como exemplo de uma certa posição padrão entre os comentadores a esse respeito, cf. o verbete 'Leibniz's Philosophy of Mind' da *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, escrito por um dos maiores especialistas contemporâneos sobre a concepção leibniziana de consciência, M. Kulstad. A certa altura do verbete, Kulstad afirma que "Leibniz's theory of perception involves something very distinctive in an age dominated by Descartes' theory of ideas, the thesis that there are some perceptions of which we are not conscious, the much-discussed *petites* perceptions".

20 Leibniz, Prefácio, G 6: 46: "... sustento que naturalmente uma substância não poderia existir sem ação".

21 Leibniz, G 5: 46-47.

22 AA VI, 4: 1567-1568.

23 Publicado pela primeira vez em 1669 (traduzido para o latim em 1671).

24 Para uma discussão em profundidade sobre esse tema, cf. Kulstad 1991.

25 Rescher 1967, p. 126. Para uma visão crítica da posição de Rescher, cf. Kulstad 1991, pp. 145 e ss.

26 Sobre a relação entre "reflexão", "pensamento (racional)" e "apercepção", cf. o § 30 da *Monadologia*, no qual se mostra que só podemos ter acesso à ideia de "eu" se já temos as ideias de certas verdades necessárias (tais como as de substância, unidade, multiplicidade, etc.). Daí não se segue, no entanto, que os animais não tenham um tipo de apercepção não-conceitual de si mesmos, tal como é dito na seção 5 do capítulo 21 do Livro II dos *Novos ensaios*, onde Leibniz menciona o exemplo de um javali que "*s'apperçoit d'une personne*" e a persegue (AA VI, 6: 173).

27 Leibniz, *Novos Ensaios*, Livro II, cap. 9, § 1 (G V, p. 121).

28 E, supondo que essa tese seja mantida ao longo da filosofia madura de Leibniz, quando, mais tarde, na *Monadologia*, ele se referir a "mônadas nuas", destituídas de qualquer percepção clara e vivendo em um estado de "completo aturdimento", mesmo aí teríamos de reconhecer que se trata de um peculiar estado *de consciência*.

29 "Confesso que se Deus fizesse de tal forma que..." (G V, p. 224). A concessão expressa por essa formulação do § 18 ("Confesso que...") reaparece outras duas vezes até o final deste Capítulo, nos comentários do § 23 (G V, p. 226) e do § 29 (G V, p. 229).

30 Leibniz, G 5: 224.

31 Leibniz, G 5: 226. Note-se que por "Terra gêmea" Leibniz não entende aqui um mundo possível distinto do mundo atual, mas apenas uma outra porção do espaço qualitativa idêntica – ou melhor, extremamente semelhante – à porção do espaço em que habitamos. Como, porém, segundo Leibniz, o Princípio da Identidade dos Indiscerníveis vale tanto para a identidade de objetos no mundo atual quanto para a identidade transmundana, essa restrição do exemplo da "Terra gêmea" não traz informações relevantes para o argumento geral apresentado nesse trecho.

32 Vemos assim que, mesmo quando se apela para o "testemunho de outros", para suprir a ausência de lembrança (§ 9), é preciso ao menos que o sujeito ao qual se atribui identidade com uma pessoa do passado tenha consciência de que outros pensam que ele foi tal pessoa, ou seja, é preciso que ele seja informado desses testemunhos, o que reintroduz um certo papel imprescindível para a perspectiva de primeira pessoa (§ 9: "eu poderia sempre aprender dos outros sobre minha vida passada em meu estado precedente" (G V, p. 219); § 26: "se não sabemos nem pudermos jamais aprender a verdade, nem pela lembrança de sua memória, nem por alguns traços, nem pelo conhecimento de outro" (G V, p. 228), não poderia haver responsabilidade moral – ou, ao menos, não haveria castigo segundo a noção ordinária que temos desse último, pois talvez Deus pudesse aplicar castigos sem que os culpados soubessem as razões da punição, e sem que isso diminuísse a justiça divina. O ponto que nos interessa aqui, porém, não é teológico nem moral, mas diz respeito apenas à atribuição de identidade pessoal, o que, segundo Leibniz, não ocorreria nesse exemplo).

33 Cf. Leibniz, G 5: 48: "Pode-se mesmo dizer que, em consequência dessas pequenas percepções o presente é prenhe de futuro e carregado de passado [....] e que, na menor das substâncias, dois olhos tão penetrantes quanto os de Deus poderiam ler toda a sequência das coisas do universo".

34 Anth, AA 7: 135. Tradução portuguesa in Kant 2006, p. 35.

35 Kuehn 2001, p. 115. Ainda na *Antropologia*, no § 71, onde começa a parte intitulada "Observações antropológicas sobre o gosto", na sua seção A ("Do gosto da moda"), em uma classificação que não deixa de apresentar uma escala de valores, Kant afirma que "Estar *na moda* é uma questão de gosto: o *fora* da moda que segue um costume anterior, chama-se *antiquado*; aquele que valoriza o estar *fora* da moda é um *extravagante*. É, porém, sempre melhor ser um louco na moda do que um louco fora dela..." (Anth, AA 7: 245).

36 Anth, AA 7: 137.

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Sophie Grapotte

Lara Denis et Oliver Sensen présentent *Kant's Lectures on Ethics* comme le premier livre à examiner les cours de philosophie morale que Kant a dispensés[1] et à offrir, ce faisant, une *approche différente* du développement des idées, notions et concepts importants de la philosophie morale kantienne. Plus précisément, ce volume, avec les 15 études qui le constituent, se propose de faciliter l'accès à la matière, à la fois riche et complexe, que recèlent les notes de cours de philosophie morale et de venir ainsi accroître la compréhension que nous avons de la philosophie morale de Kant.

L'intérêt, pour l'historien de la pensée kantienne, d'une lecture et d'un examen des copies des cours dispensés par Kant de manière générale et des cours de philosophie morale en particulier nous semble indéniable. Ces copies constituent, assurément, une source d'information précieuse pour saisir, à la fois, la conception kantienne de la moralité (les concepts et notions centraux de la philosophie pratique kantienne) et l'évolution qu'elle connaît au fil des décennies, en particulier parce que Kant a abordé, dans le cadre de ses cours, les questions et les thèmes importants de ses écrits de manière plus détaillée et souvent plus accessible : il mobilise ainsi davantage d'exemples pour expliciter certains arguments ou certaines notions-clés qu'il développe en parallèle dans ses œuvres proprement dites (notamment dans la *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, la *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* ou encore dans la *Metaphysik der Sitten*), et il utilise en général un langage plus familier (il s'adresse à des "étudiants"). C'est pourquoi les copies de cours contribuent souvent à corriger l'opinion que l'on a d'un Kant "penseur purement abstrait". Il est notoire ainsi que, lors de ses cours, Kant n'aborde pas et ne présente pas seulement les principes *a priori* de sa philosophie morale, mais apparaît comme un « fin observateur de tous les aspects de la vie humaine » (p. 1), expliquant, par exemple, à ses étudiants comment préparer la polenta[2] ! Les copies de cours présentent également l'intérêt de nous donner un aperçu de l'enthousiasme avec lequel Kant cherchait à approfondir certaines

idées et nous montrent, comme le souligne J. B. Schneewind (p. XV), un Kant qui invite ses étudiants à profiter de la vie autant que possible (certes dans les limites établies par le principe moral) !

Cela étant dit, sans chercher à minimiser l'intérêt que revêtent les copies de cours pour l'historien de la pensée kantienne, il importe, au demeurant, d'avoir toujours à l'esprit que l'usage de ces copies n'est pas sans difficulté et qu'il doit toujours s'accompagner de la plus grande prudence. Très peu de notes, en effet, ont été prises directement "dans la salle de cours" (exception faite des copies de Herder) et la plupart ont été soit recopiées à la maison après le cours, soit, pire encore, à partir de copies[3] – la difficulté étant alors parfois de déterminer quelle est la copie originale à partir de laquelle les autres copies ont été réalisées, copie originale qui, de surcroît, est parfois perdue aujourd'hui. De manière générale, il nous semble important de ne jamais oublier que ces notes ont été (re)copiées par des étudiants, voire par des copistes "professionnels"[4] et qu'il ne s'agit donc pas de textes de Kant proprement dit. Ce pourquoi il serait, à notre sens, problématique de recourir à un argument présent dans une copie de cours pour relativiser ou rejeter un argument que Kant a développé dans ses œuvres, que ce soit la *Grundlegung*, la *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* ou la *Metaphysik der Sitten*.

L'un des principaux intérêts des copies de cours de philosophie morale est de nous permettre de reconstruire le développement d'un certain nombre d'arguments centraux de la philosophie pratique kantienne. En effet, les copies de cours dont on dispose actuellement appartiennent à des phases différentes (de 1763 à 1794), de sorte que mettre en parallèle le contenu que recèlent ces copies avec le contenu des œuvres publiées de Kant permet assez souvent de préciser à quel moment l'argumentation de Kant a évolué. Plus précisément, les études ici rassemblées s'appuient principalement sur quatre copies qui reflètent quatre grandes périodes de la carrière du professeur Kant : Herder (entre 1762-1764),[5] Collins (vers 1774-1777[6]), Mrongovius (1784-1785)[7] et Vigilantius (1793-1794).[8] Chacune de ces copies est présentée dans la *première partie* du présent recueil. Ainsi le *second chapitre*, « Herder : religion and moral motivation », prend pour objet les notes copiées par Johann Gottfried Herder.[9] Ces notes, « Praktische Philosophie Herder », sont les seules notes que nous ayons pour la période antérieure à 1770 et présentent, partant, l'intérêt d'offrir un accès extrêmement précieux à la première phase de la pensée morale de Kant. Plus particulièrement, dans ce chapitre, Patrick Frierson s'intéresse au rôle de la religion dans l'éthique kantienne des années 1760 et notamment au rôle de la religion dans la motivation morale. Frierson reconnaît que, si la religion ne peut pas offrir les motifs moraux premiers, directs, les motifs religieux jouent nonobstant un rôle important dans la motivation morale, la religion procurant des « *mediately* motivating grounds » qui préparent l'éthique (p. *39 sq*.). Le *troisième chapitre*, « Collins : Kant's proto-critical position », est consacré aux notes portant le nom de Georg Ludwig Collins. Précisément, Manfred Kühn examine le lien entre la pensée kantienne telle que présentée dans ces notes et les textes de Baumgarten, les autres cours publiés de Kant, les *Reflexionen* et l'œuvre "tardive" de Kant, en vue d'établir que la copie Collins permet de mettre en lumière le développement de la pensée kantienne en général et de sa philosophie morale en particulier. Kant, lors de ses cours de philosophie morale, a utilisé deux œuvres de Baumgarten, à savoir les *Initia philosophiae practicae primae* (1760) et l'*Ethica philosophica* (1740, 1751, 1763), usage

que l'on retrouve, selon Kühn, dans la division du cours Collins en deux parties, la première reposant sur les *Initia* de Baumgarten et la seconde sur l'*Ethica*. Comme Baumgarten, Kant opère la distinction entre « philosophie pratique universelle » et « éthique » proprement dite (alors que la première partie du cours traite des principes de la philosophie pratique et de l'éthique, la seconde, aborde les questions substantielles de l'éthique). Cette distinction entre « philosophie pratique universelle » et « éthique » sert également de fil conducteur à la lecture que nous propose Kühn de la copie Collins. Reprenant ainsi la division du cours en deux parties, celle qui repose sur les *Initia* de Baumgarten et celle qui repose sur l'*Ethica*, Kühn s'attache à établir que la partie du cours Collins qui traite de la « philosophie pratique universelle » correspond à ce que Kant présente dans la *Grundlegung* et dans la *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* et que la partie qui traite de l'éthique correspond à la matière de la « Doctrine de la vertu » de la *Metaphysik der Sitten*, de sorte que, selon Kühn, la partie du cours fondée sur les *Initia* permet d'expliciter le développement et la forme de la morale "fondationnelle" et la partie fondée sur l'*Ethica,* le développement et la forme "mature" de l'éthique kantienne.

La troisième phase importante de la carrière du professeur Kant est illustrée par les notes copiées par Christoph Coelestin Mrongovius. Pour être exact, Mrongovius est l'auteur de deux copies, nommées Mrongovius I et Mrongovius II. Cette dernière, la copie dite Mrongovius II présente un intérêt tout particulier dans la mesure où elle "restitue" le cours que Kant a dispensé à l'hiver 1784/1785 alors qu'il venait d'achever la rédaction de la *Grundlegung* et de la remettre à son éditeur. Le *quatrième chapitre* de ce recueil (« Mrongovius II : a supplement to the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* » de Jens Timmermann) vise ainsi à mettre en évidence le lien entre ces notes et la *Grundlegung* et notamment à démontrer que ces notes de cours peuvent aider à comprendre l'argumentation de la *Grundlegung* eu égard à un certain nombre de points et concepts importants tels que la valeur de l'action, l'impératif catégorique et l'autonomie, pour n'en citer que quelques-uns.

La quatrième et dernière phase est illustrée par la copie Vigilantius, datée 1793/94, période à laquelle a été publiée la *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, véritable charnière entre la publication de la *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (1788) et celle de la *Metaphysik der Sitten* (1797). La copie Vigilantius présente notamment l'intérêt de nous offrir un accès à la "dernière" conception morale de Kant. Le dernier texte qui compose la *première partie* de ce recueil, « Vigilantius : morality for humans » est consacré à la copie « Metaphysik der Sitten Vigilantius », qui occupe une place toute particulière dans la philosophie pratique de Kant dans la mesure où, selon Robert Louden, la conception de la métaphysique des mœurs que Kant mobilise prend l'être humain comme son propre objet – perspective que l'on rencontre certes dans la *Metaphysik der Sitten* et dans la *Religion*, mais que Kant semble avoir adoptée beaucoup plus clairement dans le cours copié par Vigilantius.

Le présent volume a également pour objectif d'éclairer le *contexte* de la philosophie morale kantienne. Du début des années 1760 au milieu des années 1790, Kant a utilisé deux ouvrages dans le cadre de son cours de philosophie morale de Baumgarten : les *Initia philosophiae practicae primae* et l'*Ethica philosophica*. Ces deux "manuels" constituent proprement l'arrière-fond à partir duquel Kant a développé son vocabulaire, ses questions et ses positions.[10] C'est

précisément à ce « *background* » et à la relation des cours de Kant avec les textes de Baumgarten que Kant utilisait comme "manuels" de cours qu'est consacré le tout *premier chapitre* de ce recueil. Dans « Kant's lectures on ethics and Baumgarten's moral philosophy », Stefano Bacin s'attache à démontrer que les motifs pour lesquels Kant a choisi les textes de Baumgarten pour dispenser ses cours de philosophie morale sont d'ordre proprement philosophique. C'est, par exemple, ce qu'il ressort lorsqu'on compare la notion d'obligation chez Baumgarten et dans les cours de Kant, comparaison qui permet de saisir ce que Kant considérait comme problème fondamental dans la philosophie morale, mais aussi que la conception de l'obligation de Baumgarten n'apporte pas une solution pertinente satisfaisante aux yeux de Kant.

Kant dispensait son cours de philosophie morale à partir de deux œuvres de Baumgarten : les *Initia philosophiae* et l'*Ethica*. Cet usage de deux textes différents fournit le lien entre la *deuxième* et la *troisième partie* du présent volume. Selon les éditeurs (p. 4-5), les chapitres rassemblés dans la *seconde partie* commentent les thèmes abordés dans les « Introductions » des *Vorlesungen* et dans les sections correspondantes de l'*Initia* de Baumgarten, alors que les chapitres de la *troisième partie* commentent les thèmes discutés en réponse à l'*Ethica*.

Plus précisément, les chapitres rassemblés dans la *seconde partie* portent sur un certain nombre de thèmes préliminaires et/ou qui jouent un rôle important dans la phase fondationnelle de la philosophie pratique kantienne : le souverain Bien, la notion d'obligation, les lois permissives et l'imputation. Dans le *chapitre VI*, « Ancient insights in Kant's conception of the hightest good », Stephen Engstrom aborde le concept central de souverain Bien en s'attachant tout particulièrement à démontrer que l'affirmation dans les écrits tardifs de Kant de la valeur du bonheur et de l'importance de son insertion dans une vie vertueuse exprime une conception de la moralité et du bonheur largement antérieure, que l'on rencontre dans la *Grundlegung*, mais aussi avant, et que Kant a pris la question du souverain Bien comme point de départ de sa philosophie morale. Dans le *chapitre VII*, « Kant's history of ethics », Allen W. Wood se propose d'établir que la conception kantienne de la raison est historique et que Kant a développé une théorie intéressante de l'histoire de l'éthique, qu'il a exposée dans ses cours de philosophie morale, mais pas dans ses œuvres publiées. Selon cette perspective, Kant considérait l'éthique ancienne comme une éthique de l'idéal et l'éthique moderne, en revanche, comme une éthique des principes. Dans le *chapitre VIII*, « Moral obligation and free will », Oliver Sensen analyse la conception kantienne de l'obligation et sa relation à la liberté et à la loi morale telle qu'elle ressort des cours de philosophie morale. Les chapitres IX et X sont consacrés à des questions qui ont un impact important sur la philosophie kantienne du droit, précisément : le *chapitre IX* (« The elusive story of Kant's permissive laws » de Sharon Byrd) est consacré au thème de la loi permissive, alors que le *chapitre X*, « On the logic of imputation in the Vigilantius lecture notes » (de Joachim Hruschka), s'attache à replacer la notion d'imputation dans son contexte historique (en relation notamment à l'usage que font de cette même notion Pufendorf, Wolff, Achenwall ou encore Baumgarten).

Les chapitres qui composent la *troisième partie* abordent des thèmes qui relèvent de l'éthique proprement dite en relation à l'*Ethica* de Baumgarten, notamment la nature et le fondement des différentes sortes de devoirs, l'estime de soi, la vertu et la maitrise de

soi. Précisément, dans le *chapitre XI* (« Freedom, ends, and the derivation of duties in the Vigilantius notes »), Paul Guyer s'efforce d'établir, en s'appuyant sur la copie Vigilantius, en quoi l'affirmation que les devoirs parfaits envers soi-même sont dérivés du concept de liberté (voir AA 17 : 601) vaut, dans le système kantien, pour les autres sortes de devoirs. Dans le *chapitre XII* (« Proper self-esteem and duties to oneself »), Lara Denis explicite la conception kantienne de l'estime de soi et sa relation aux devoirs envers soi-même, à partir principalement des copies Collins et Vigilantius et de la « Doctrine de la vertu ». Le *chapitre XIII* (« Virtue, self-mastery, and the autocracy of practical reason » d'Anne Margaret Baxley) s'arrête sur ce que les cours de philosophie morale nous enseignent eu égard aux attributs essentiels de la moralité en général et de la réalisation des devoirs envers soi-même en particulier : estime de soi, amour de l'honneur, maîtrise de soi, autocratie et vertu. Les chapitres XIV et XV sont consacrés à l'amour et aux vices contraires à notre devoir d'aimer autrui, précisément le *chapitre XIV* (« Love » de Jeanine Grenberg) explicite la conception kantienne de l'amour d'autrui à partir de sa conception de l'amour de soi alors que le dernier chapitre de ce volume, le *chapitre XV* (« Love of honor, emulation, and the psychology of the devilish vices » de Houston Smit et Mark Timmons) explicite les vices diaboliques en relation à l'estime de soi et à l'amour de l'honneur.

Notons que Laura Denis et Oliver Sensen font suivre ces 15 études d'une liste des œuvres citées (p. 277-287) et d'un bref index indiquant les entrées de quelques notions importantes et des noms propres (p. 288-289), permettant ainsi de se repérer plus facilement au sein de ce volume.

En conclusion, on pourrait assurément reprocher à ce volume de n'offrir qu'un accès superficiel aux cinq (principales) copies de cours aujourd'hui disponibles (« Praktische Philosophie Herder », « Praktische Philosophie Powalski », « Moralphilosophie Collins », « Moral Mrongovius II », « Metaphysik der Sitten Vigilantius ») et à leurs différentes variantes,[11] rassemblées dans le tome 27 de l'édition de l'Académie sur plus de 1500 pages, de ne procéder qu'à un survol (bien) trop rapide de ces copies et des thèmes importants que Kant a abordés dans le cadre de ses cours en parallèle au développement de la pensée morale qu'il nous a livrée dans ses œuvres publiées. Mais ce serait oublier l'ambition "modeste" des éditeurs qui, d'emblée, précisent qu'il ne s'agit nullement pour eux d'offrir avec ce volume un commentaire exhaustif, mais simplement un « guide critique » (p. 3) pour s'orienter à travers les notes de cours de philosophie morale.

Notes

1 Cours dispensé à 28 reprises, de l'hiver 1756 (cours intitulé « Ethik » selon le catalogue des cours) au printemps 1794 (cours intitulé « Metaphysik der Sitten oder Allgemeine praktische Philosophie samt Ethik nach Baumgarten »).

2 Voir, par exemple, AA 27 : 395, 1523.

3 On distingue, par suite, trois sortes de manuscrits, que l'on peut identifier à un certain nombre d'indices. 1) Le *Mitschrift* ou *Urschrift* est le manuscrit préparé dans la salle de cours. Ces notes "originales" ont la spécificité de contenir beaucoup d'abréviations et phrases tronquées, d'avoir été rédigées avec une écriture "rapide", généralement au crayon, sur des morceaux de papier. Parmi les manuscrits disponibles, rares sont ceux qui ont été rédigés dans la salle de cours. 2) Le *Reinschrift* est un manuscrit préparé à la maison à partir de notes prises en cours, dont le texte est, par conséquent, plus "propre", contenant peu (ou en tous les cas

nettement moins) d'abréviations et de phrases tronquées, généralement écrit à l'encre, comportant moins de fautes d'orthographes et d'erreurs grammaticales. De plus, les marges sont en général soigneusement tracées et les titres souvent calligraphiés. L'objectif était de produire un manuscrit qui soit plus facile à lire, mieux organisé, contenant peu d'erreurs. 3) L'*Abschrift* est un manuscrit copié à partir d'autres copies, soit en vue d'un usage personnel, soit, le plus souvent, en vue d'être vendu à d'autres étudiants. Il arrive que de telles copies ne contiennent pas les erreurs que recelait le texte à partir duquel elles ont été copiées, mais l'objectif était simplement de *re*produire un texte – et le copiste était parfois trop ignorant pour apporter quelque correction. Les indices qui signalent que nous avons affaire à un *Abschrift* sont notamment la présence de « blancs » là où le texte était illisible, la répétition fréquente de mots ou de lignes. Les fautes d'orthographe dans les noms propres ou les termes philosophiques suggèrent non seulement que le copiste n'a pas assisté au cours, mais que, de surcroît, la matière dispensée ne lui était pas familière.

4 Selon Erich Adickes, copier et assembler des livres de notes des cours de Kant était une branche fleurissante de l'industrie à Königsberg (voir notamment E. Adickes, *Ein neu aufgefundenes Kollegheft nach Kants Vorlesungen über physische Geographie*, Tübingen : J. C. B. Mohr, 1913, p. 8).

5 La copie intitulée « Praktische Philosophie Herder » est datée 1763/64 ou 1764/65.

6 Précisément les notes originales de ce cours proviendraient d'un cours dispensé à l'hiver 1774/75 ou à l'hiver 1776/77, et auraient été retravaillées en 1784/85.

7 Il s'agit de la copie qui porte cette description en page de titre : « Die Moral des HE Prof Kant / gelesen / nach Baumgartens Practische Philosophie / im Winterhalben Jahre Mich. 1784 / bis Ostern 1785 ».

8 Cette copie ne porte pas de titre, mais on peut lire en haut de la première page « Bemerkung aus dem Vortrage des Pr. Kant über *Metaphysic des Sitten* », avec cette indication en marge : commencé le 14 oct. 1793/94.

9 Immatriculé à l'Université de Königsberg le 10 août 1762, il reste à Königsberg jusqu'au 22 novembre 1764.

10 Sur ce point, je me permets de renvoyer à E. Kant, *Réflexions sur la philosophie morale,* précédé de A. G. Baumgarten, *Principes de la philosophie pratique première* (introduction et traduction par Luc Langlois en collaboration, pour la traduction, avec M. Robitaille et É. Jade-Poliquin, Paris : Vrin, 2014), qui offre à la fois la première traduction en français des *Initia philosophiae practicae primae* que Kant utilisait comme manuel de cours et la première traduction en français d'un très grand nombre de réflexions rédigées par Kant – dans les marges, entre les lignes ou encore sur des feuilles intercalaires… – dans les *Initia*.

11 Parmi ces variantes, on mentionnera notamment « Moralphilosophie Kaehler », « Moral Brauer [Nach Menzer] », « Moral Mrongovius » (c'est le premier des deux jeux de notes qui portent le nom de Mrongovius).

Alix Cohen: *Kant's Lectures on Anthropology. A Critical Guide*. Cambridge University Press, 2014, 270 pp. ISBN: 978-1-107-02491-5.

Lidia Gasperoni[1]

Il volume edito da Alix Cohen mira a far emergere l'importanza della pubblicazione delle *Vorlesungen über die Anthropologie* di Kant nel volume XXV dell'Akademie-Ausgabe, edito nel 1997 da Reinhard Brandt e Werner Stark e la traduzione inglese delle *Lezioni* nella Cambridge Edition nel 2006. La rilevanza storica e filosofica di queste lezioni vuole essere così messa in luce e svincolata da quel carattere accessorio rispetto agli scritti critici e all'*Antropologia* stessa, che la hanno caratterizzata per molto – e forse troppo – tempo. Il destino di queste riflessioni antropologiche nell'ultimo decennio è già iniziato a cambiare e si è aperta una nuova fase di ricerca sul ruolo da esse svolto nell'intero sistema kantiano. Il volume curato da Cohen ha sicuramente il merito di continuare questo dibattito e arricchirlo di nuovi contributi che vado qui a riassumere in breve.

Come rileva la curatrice, le *Lezioni di Antropologia*, che pur hanno accompagnato a lungo l'attività di insegnamento di Kant, mostrando un aspetto più accessibile e popolare del suo pensiero filosofico, sono state a lungo ignorate. Il volume di Cohen intende in primo luogo mostrare come le *Lezioni* possano contribuire alla comprensione dell'evoluzione del pensiero kantiano poiché esse costituiscono una costante importante nell'insegnamento e nello sviluppo della filosofia di Kant che le tenne fino al 1796, quindi anche in quelle fasi teoriche in cui il suo pensiero è cambiato radicalmente. In secondo luogo il volume mira a mettere in relazione la riflessione antropologica e la sua definizione "pragmatica" con la filosofia critica che sono ritenute da alcuni pensatori come discrepanti, da altri invece come due dimensioni complementari del sistema filosofico kantiano. Questa questione, spesso sottovalutata, è di estremo interesse perché, come sottolinea Cohen, ci aiuta a definire quell'ambito della conoscenza empirica che nella prima *Critica* viene certamente indagato ma spesso ridotto alla questione della determinazione delle condizioni a priori che la rendono possibile. L'antropologia sarebbe quindi un

importante completamento della filosofia critica e non una sua appendice.

Il volume si compone di una serie di contributi di alcuni dei più noti studiosi del pensiero kantiano e le sue intenzioni iniziali sono quelle di fornire una prima valutazione complessiva delle *Lezioni* di Kant. Il primo saggio di Werner Stark mostra come nelle *Lezioni* Kant, anche influenzato dalle opere di Jean-Jacques Rousseau, conferisca all'educazione un ruolo fondamentale nella definizione dell'essere umano studiato da un punto di vista empirico.

Nel saggio "*Self-cognition and self-assessment*" Makkreel interpreta la definizione del senso interno nell'*Antropologia* come la capacità di sentire *self-assessment*, dimensione per altro necessaria per definire la maturità degli individui. In questo senso l'autore individua nelle *Lezioni* un'evoluzione specifica del pensiero kantiano rispetto alla nozione di auto-conoscenza: "self-cognition is not learning what inner sense has passively assimilated but determining what reason can actively appropriate as part of a project of self-assessment and character formation" (37).

In "*Kant on the phenomenology of touch and vision*" Gary Hatfield considera uno dei nodi tematici più importanti delle *Lezioni*, ossia la definizione dei sensi. Hatfield si concentra in particolar modo sul senso della visione e dell'udito, ricostruendo la classificazione dei sensi che Kant esclude dall'analisi della filosofia trascendentale ma che è un aspetto importante per comprendere l'articolazione della conoscenza da un punto di vista pragmatico. Questo livello di analisi ha, come ben osserva Hatfield, un fondamento teorico poiché si concentra non sui singoli individui bensì sulla natura stessa di essere umano e, in questo senso, si trova al limite tra le discipline filosofiche che Kant definisce. Una descrizione pragmatica della sensibilità è quindi ben lontana da un'analisi meramente fisiologica dei sensi (41), aspetto fondamentale per l'analisi della vista e dell'udito cui l'autore dedica la seconda parte del suo saggio.

Jankowiak e Watkins nel saggio "*Meat on the bones: Kant's account of cognition in the anthropology lectures*" tornano al tema della sensibilità come un ambito di confine dal quale sviluppare una visione comprensiva della conoscenza, al di là dei limiti che Kant definisce nella *Critica della ragion pura*: "By showing how the transcendental faculties are manifested at the level of actual, concrete experience, the anthropology transcripts can help to illuminate Kant's understanding of the operations and functions of the human mind" (59). Gli autori riprendono quindi il tema della distinzione tra vista e udito, definendo queste modalità sensibili come un'ulteriore condizione, di natura empirica, dell'esperienza e si concentrano anche sulla funzione svolta dal senso del tatto. Un aspetto interessante dell'analisi di Jankowiak e Watkins concerne la distinzione tra possibile e attuale: mentre il compito della *Critica* sarebbe quello di indicare cosa sia necessario all'esperienza per essere possibile, le riflessioni antropologiche avrebbero il compito di spiegare quali siano le condizioni affinché queste possibilità diventino attuali. Questa capacità di attualizzazione di possibilità riguarda anche la funzione dell'immaginazione e dell'intelletto, mostrando il loro valore concreto ed empirico. In conclusione, le *Lezioni* antropologiche sarebbero complementari alla prima *Critica*: "The empirical elaborations of Kant's theory of cognition found in the anthropology transcripts are therefore a valuable resource for attaining a fuller understanding of Kant's larger project" (75).

Questa funzione complementare e necessaria delle riflessioni antropologiche emerge anche nel saggio "*The anthropology of cognition and its pragmatic implications*" in cui Alix Cohen spiega che, data la nostra natura di *embodied human beings,* è necessaria non solo la critica della ragione pura ma anche un'antropologia della ragione empirica per spiegare la concezione Kantiana della conoscenza. Questo aspetto antropologico sarebbe stato secondo Cohen, curatrice dell'intero volume, ampliamente trascurato, mentre è fondamentale per spiegare la natura della conoscenza e la sua dimensione soggettiva e incorporata, aspetto già messo in luce nel libro del 2008 di Angelica Nuzzo *Ideal Embodiment*,[2] con cui sarebbe stato interessante confrontarsi.

Nel saggio "*Affects and passions*" Frierson considera l'evoluzione delle nozioni di affetti e passioni nelle *Lezioni* sull'antropologia, definendo in particolar modo la loro relazione con la libertà e l'azione morale. La connessione tra libertà e inclinazione è il tema anche del saggio di Paul Guyer "*The Inclination toward freedom*" in cui l'autore afferma: "Kant's anthropology lectures clearly recognize that we each have a powerful inclination on behalf of *our own* freedom; the question is whether this is simply an inclination that must be suppressed for us to become moral, or whether it can be transformed into a favorable attitude toward the freedom of all. Our conclusion can only be that while there may be hints of the latter idea in Kant's lectures, it is hardly fully developed" (118). Una delle nozioni che per Guyer si rivela centrale è quella di entusiasmo.

La definizione dell'inclinazione è oggetto anche del saggio di Allen W. Wood "*Empirical desire*" in cui si propone una sorta di tassonomia degli stati affettivi che entrano in relazione e, in alcuni casi, possono entrare in competizione con la nostra capacità di controllarli a livello razionale. Susan Meld Shell si concentra sull'*Antropologia Friedländer* e discute la possibilità di definire Kant un "vitalista" che potrebbe contribuire a superare da una prospettiva antropologica quello che viene ritenuto il dualismo tra ragione e natura in Kant.

Nel saggio "*Indispensable education of the being of reason and speech*" Felicitas Munzel ritorna alla funzione dell'educazione per individuare i principi che guidano a livello metodologico la facoltà di giudicare in ambiti molteplici, dal pensiero teoretico fino a quello morale ed estetico. Le lezioni antropologiche sono rilevanti proprio perché mostrano la relazione fondamentale tra moralità ed educazione nello sviluppo delle facoltà dell'essere umano e dimostrano quanto il pensiero kantiano fosse inserito nel dibattito della sua epoca a partire da Rousseau. In che modo Kant si inserisca in questo dibattito concernente temi come la secolarizzazione, l'animismo e il pessimismo storico, è il punto di partenza del saggio di Catherine Wilson "*Kant on civilisation, culture and moralisation*", mentre Robert Louden nel saggio successivo si concentra sull'idea del cosmopolitismo e la definizione del carattere della specie umana. In particolar modo Louden si concentra su alcuni concetti cardine del pensiero antropologico kantiano come "*Keime*", "*Anlagen*" e "*Bestimmung*" che traduce con "destino" e che per Kant costituisce lo sviluppo appropriato delle predisposizioni di ogni creatura. In che modo questo sviluppo possa riferirsi alla predisposizione dell'essere umano ad agire in senso cosmopolita rimane però la questione aperta del saggio che sarebbe di certo interessante approfondire ulteriormente.

Il saggio di Zammito conclude il volume e si interroga, a partire dalla *Caratteristica*, su quale sia il valore pedagogico e antropologico delle *Lezioni* kantiane. Alla fine del saggio

Zammito pone forse quella che è la domanda di carattere teorico più importante rispetto al pensiero antropologico kantiano che vorrei qui sottolineare: vale a dire se Kant avesse dovuto integrare la sua filosofia critica con la riflessione antropologica. Questa domanda mi sembra il punto centrale nel definire la metodologia e l'interesse con cui vogliamo rivolgerci alle riflessioni antropologiche kantiane; punto che però nel volume di Cohen tende a non prevalere sulle ricerche immanenti alle *Lezioni* stesse.

Vorrei concludere questa recensione proprio con alcune riflessioni di carattere metodologico. Il volume si propone di fare luce sull'importanza delle *Lezioni di Antropologia*, affermandone quindi l'*attualità*. Che le lezioni siano attuali nel pensiero kantiano, il che significa che siano degne di una maggiore ricerca, anche alla luce delle traduzioni in lingua inglese, è un aspetto che il volume in esame pone sicuramente in luce. Ma l'attualità delle riflessioni antropologiche può essere intesa ancora in due modi diversi, a mio avviso ugualmente importanti e degni di diventare oggetto di una riflessione filosofica più ampia. Il primo riguarda l'attualità delle *Lezioni* nel porre in luce alcuni aspetti della filosofia kantiana e farne motivo di revisione dell'intero sistema critico. Il secondo significato dell'attualità delle *Lezioni* concerne la possibilità riflessione non solo immanente alla filosofia kantiana bensì anche rivolta all'antropologia filosofica contemporanea e, estendendone i suoi confini, anche per la teoria della conoscenza. Alcuni saggi del volume di Cohen toccano, attraverso l'analisi delle *Lezioni,* temi attuali della riflessione filosofica, come quello dell'*Embodiment*, del determinismo e della libertà, ma anche temi più legati al contesto culturale di Kant come quello della definizione della razza e della distinzione di genere.

Questi due diversi significati dell'attualità delle riflessioni antropologiche kantiane interessano soprattutto a mio avviso la definizione della sensibilità che, così come viene definita da Kant nelle *Lezioni,* potrebbe motivare un nuovo approccio alla riflessione critica, in particolar modo rispetto alla teoria della conoscenza elaborata nella prima *Critica*. In particolar modo rispetto al tema della definizione della sensibilità si potrebbe sostenere, per esempio, che l'attualità delle riflessioni kantiane si estenda al di là della ricerca, necessaria ma non sufficiente, strettamente legata ai suoi testi. La prima parte del libro di Cohen si occupa di indagare il ruolo che i sensi svolgono nella conoscenza, un tema che Kant – come già accennato – nella prima *Critica* non integra nell'estetica trascendentale che si occupa della definizione di spazio e tempo come intuizioni pure, isolate euristicamente dalla percezione empirica nel suo aspetto sensoriale. L'*Antropologia* ha il merito di approfondire invece come le modalità sensoriali contribuiscano alla formazione della conoscenza e le *Lezioni* arricchiscono questo tema con importanti riflessioni sul senso della vista, dell'udito e del tatto nella costituzione del linguaggio e delle figure. Come evidenzia Hatfield quest'analisi della sensibilità non è di carattere fisiologico ma pragmatico: non si occupa del funzionamento fisiologico dei sensi bensì della loro funzione nel processo di costituzione di una conoscenza sensibile. Al riguardo anche Jankowiak e Watkins sottolineano come queste riflessioni rappresentino delle condizioni necessarie per attualizzare quelle potenzialità che la prima *Critica* definisce ma che forse potrebbero condurre ad una sua estensione, integrazione e revisione alla luce anche del dibattito contemporaneo a Kant. Inoltre proprio questa visione della sensibilità potrebbe indurci a riconsiderare la nozione attuale di *Embodiment* nelle teorie a noi contemporanee.

Vorrei terminare questa recensione con una domanda che il volume di Cohen, indagando da prospettive diverse le *Lezioni,* ha il merito di suggerire a chi cerca in Kant e nel dibattito che la sua filosofia ha generato, un indice di orientamento nelle sfide teoriche del nostro tempo: l'antropologia kantiana è un mero tassello mancante o una sfera della filosofia kantiana che esercita al contempo un elemento di revisione, attualizzazione e, forse, radicalizzazione della stessa? Non è proprio forse questo aspetto più pubblico del pensiero kantiano che ci chiede di indagare oggi la validità e la possibilità di estensione dei limiti della filosofia trascendentale?

Note

1 Technische Universität Berlin

2 Angelica Nuzzo, *Ideal Embodiment*. Indiana University Press, 2008.

Rezension zu Hans Heinz Holz: *Leibniz in der Rezeption der klassischen deutschen Philosophie*, hrsg. von Jörg Zimmer, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2015.

Ansgar Lyssy

Hans Heinz Holz hat maßgeblich zur Leibniz-Forschung beigetragen. Nach seinem Tod im Jahre 2012 hat Jörg Zimmer einige seiner kürzeren, verstreut publizierten Arbeiten zu Leibniz in zwei Bänden zusammengetragen und neu herausgegeben. Der vorliegende Band versammelt einzelne Aufsätze zu Leibniz und seinem historischen Kontext, etwa in Bezug zu Pascal, oder in der Rezeption durch Lessing, Gottsched, Hegel, Marx, Schelling und Feuerbach. Den Worten des Herausgebers zufolge soll es sich hierbei um Arbeiten zur Rezeptionsgeschichte handeln, wobei das historische Material anhand einer Problemgeschichte strukturiert ist (Vorwort, S. 9). Die Rezeption soll durch die strukturellen Übereinstimmungen der Problematik gedacht werden: Leibniz wird in diesen Texten auf einen anderen Denker bezogen, weil und insofern dieser dieselben Probleme behandelt oder weil Leibnizsche Ansätze neu aufgegriffen und überarbeitet werden; dabei wird Leibniz' eigentliche Philosophie oftmals schlichtweg nicht verstanden (so Holz über Gottsched, siehe S. 50 ff.) oder unzureichend rezipiert, weil die relevanten Texte gar nicht vorlagen (so bei Hegel, siehe S. 83). Die beiden Texte zur Natur bei Leibniz und zu Leibniz und Pascal fallen nicht in dieses Schema.

Diese Texte sind wertvoll für die Forschung, weil sie inhaltlich und methodisch originell sind. Die Rezeption Leibnizens in der klassischen deutschen Philosophie hat bislang immer noch zu wenig Aufmerksamkeit erfahren und dieser Band wird hier willkommene Ansätze liefern. Die Methode, Rezeptions- und Problemgeschichte zu verbinden, ist sachlich angemessen, auch wenn Holz' häufig anachronistische Rückprojektion eines durch Hegel und Marx geprägten Dialektikbegriffes auf Leibniz nicht jedermanns Sache sein mag.

Dieses Insistieren darauf, Leibniz als Vorläufer von Hegel und Marx zu lesen, ist einer politischen Absicht geschuldet, nämlich Leibniz vor konservativer Inanspruchnahme zu schützen (siehe S. 55). In dieser Perspektive aber kann (und soll) Leibniz' Position gar nicht unvor-

eingenommen und historisch angemessen rekonstruiert werden, sondern stets mit Blick auf das, was man aus Leibniz' Philosophie gemacht hat und wohl auch mit Blick darauf, was man mit ihr noch machen kann. Holz sieht in Leibniz' politischer Philosophie einen Vorläufer eines „sich radikalisierenden vorrevolutionären Bürgertums" (S. 90), das über eine „klassenkämpferische Perspektive" (ibid.) verfügt. Durch eine solche Einordnung in einen sozialhistorischen Rezeptionskontext wird aber unterschlagen, dass Leibniz die Monarchie keineswegs ablehnte, ja stets befürwortet hat; dass Leibniz auch in den Kontexten politischer Meinungsbildung eine höhere Bildung ebenso für notwendig hielt wie Frömmigkeit; und dass auch die hier angeführte Methode der Argumentation problematisch ist, Leibniz zum Vordenker auch derjenigen Philosophen zu machen, die seine politischen Fragestellungen und Begriffe oftmals nur in Vermittlung, nur oberflächlich oder einfach gar nicht kannten. In diesem Zusammenhang überrascht es dann auch nicht mehr, dass Holz behauptet, dass bei Leibniz „das theologische Motiv ins [revolutionär] Fortschrittliche gewendet" (S. 111) wurde, und zwar deshalb, weil die Menschenwürde aus der Unsterblichkeit der Seele hergeleitet werden kann (ibid.). Dabei wird natürlich übergangen, dass zwischen diesen Argumenten zahlreiche andere Prämissen eingefügt werden müssen und demnach eine solche Schlussfolgerung überaus problematisch ist. Schließlich gibt es ja in der Geschichte der Philosophie und der Theologie keinen Mangel an Denkern, die zwar die Unsterblichkeit der Seele anerkennen, aber dennoch einigen Menschen die Würde aberkennen – aus rassistischen oder sexistischen Motiven heraus oder weil man bestimmte, am westlichen Denken orientierte Zusatzkriterien hinzunahm.

Es wird also deutlich, wie hier in dem Versuch, Leibniz zum Vordenker bestimmter Ideologeme zu machen, die dafür notwendigen systematischen Zusammenhänge derart vereinfacht werden müssen, dass sie nur in einer bestimmten politischen Perspektive plausibel sind und wohl kaum einer historisch neutralen Überprüfung standhalten können. Dies ist für denjenigen Leser kaum überraschend, der sich bewusst hält, dass Holz überzeugter Marxist war und dieser Leser wird kaum überrascht sein, dass Holz sich in seinen Überlegungen auf die Schriften von Marx und Engels stützt – sogar Mao Tse Tung wird zitiert (bspw. S. 65).

Diese politische Perspektive sei an einem Beispiel illustriert. In Leibniz' Philosophie nimmt der Begriff der Kompossibilität eine wichtige Rolle ein: Kompossibilität steht für die modale Verträglichkeit mehrerer Entitäten oder Begriffe, die sich nicht gegenseitig ausschließen. Holz argumentiert nun, dass dieser leibnizsche Begriff der Kompossibilität vermittels der Dialektik von Hegel und Engels eine „Konkretisierung" bzw. „Anwendung" (S. 66) erfährt und in der marxschen Idee mündet, dass sich das Privateigentum an Produktionsmitteln kraft der selbst hervorgebrachten Widersprüche aufheben wird (ibid.). Diese Idee, dass Leibnizens *modallogisches* Prinzip der Kompossibilität in der genannten *sozial-* und *geschichtsphilosophischen* These von Marx mündet, überzeugt aber selbst dann nicht, wenn man einen Zusammenhang zwischen Theorie und Praxis als gegeben und notwendig erachtet. Selbst wenn man, wie Holz dies unternimmt, Leibniz' These einer fortschreitenden Zunahme der Welt an Vollkommenheit mit hinzunimmt – die bei Leibniz ja nur durch einen anthropomorphen und personalen Gottesbegriff legitimiert wird, mit dem Marx wohl kaum etwas hätte anfangen können –, dann ergibt sich immer noch keine Selbstaufhebung des Privateigentums, sondern lediglich eine gegen ein Optimierungslimit konvergierende Verbesserung der Produktionsmittel. Schließ-

lich wäre eine Welt, die derartige *logische* Widersprüche enthält, dass diese zur *ontologischen* Selbstaufhebung führen, wohl kaum eine Welt, die den im leibnizschen *Discours de Métaphysique* angegebenen Schöpfungskriterien (Effizienz der Welt im Hinblick auf Mittel und Resultat etc.) entspricht; zudem fallen die leibnizschen Argumente zur Perfektion der Welt und der Logik der Weltenwahl ohne den sie stützenden Gottesbegriff ohnehin zusammen.

Kurz, die von Holz vorgelegte Lesart ist ein Resultat des Versuches, verschiedene Positionen in einer vor allem ideologisch geprägten Interpretationshaltung so aufeinander zu beziehen, dass ein gemeinsamer Problemkontext durch einen intellektuellen Kraftakt konstruierbar ist, wobei alle offenkundigen und systematisch relevanten Differenzen ignoriert werden müssen. Eine solche Interpretationshaltung mag vielleicht in den marxistischen Kreisen der 1960er, denen Holz angehörte, durchgehen, heute aber erscheint sie nicht mehr anschlussfähig. Es mag zwar eine noble Intention gewesen sein, mit einer solchen Interpretation Leibniz davor zu schützen, von einer politisch rechten Burschenschaft vereinnahmt zu werden, aber dies wird weder dem politisch durchaus paternalistisch gesinnten und proto-kapitalistisch denkenden Leibniz gerecht, noch den Ansprüchen, die man an eine historisch saubere Aufarbeitung systematischer oder rezeptionsgeschichtlicher Zusammenhänge anlegen möchte.

In diesem Zusammenhang ist auch anzumerken, dass die in diesem Band versammelten Texte keineswegs aktuell sind, sondern zum Teil noch aus den 1950ern und 60er Jahren stammen und der Band demnach nicht durch die maßgeblichen Erkenntnisse der Leibnizforschung der letzten Jahrzehnte geprägt wurde. Es ist äußerst bedauerlich, dass der vorliegende Band keine Angabe der originalen Publikationsdaten und -orte enthält, denn dies mag dazu führen, dass nicht wenige Leser die hier enthaltenen Texte für neuere Arbeiten halten. Hier hätte auch die kurze Einleitung von Jörg Zimmer dem unvorgebildeten Leser weiterhelfen können. Leider finden sich zudem auch auf dem Buchrücken irreführende Angaben, etwa wenn es heißt: „Welchen Einfluss hatte er [Leibniz] z. B. auf die Theorien Pascals, Hegels oder Kants?“ – Es findet sich zwar ein Aufsatz zum Einfluss Pascals auf Leibniz, der natürlich nicht umgekehrt verlaufen konnte, aber es findet sich kein Text, der die Rezeption Leibnizens durch Kant mehr als nur in einem vereinzelten Nebensatz behandelt.

Schließlich ist festzuhalten, dass diese Kollektion wohl dem Respekt vor einem gelehrten und originellen Denker geschuldet ist, dass aber viele dieser Texte kaum noch anschlussfähig sind in der gegenwärtigen Leibnizforschung. Das ist bedauerlich, denn viele der historischen Analysen und Bemerkungen sind originell und markieren immer noch erste Schritte in einem historisch bislang kaum vermessenen Gebiet. Schade nur, dass die historische Analyse so durch ihre politische Ausrichtung verzerrt wird.

G. Banham, D. Schulting and N. Hems (a cura di), *The Bloomsbury Companion to Kant*, Bloomsbury, London-New Dehli-New York-Sydney 2015, 432 pp.

Francesco Valerio Tommasi

È nota la tesi di Hegel secondo cui non è possibile qualcosa come una introduzione alla filosofia; la condizione di chi vuole apprendere questa disciplina sarebbe infatti analoga a quella di colui che impara a nuotare: è assurdo pensare di poterlo fare senza entrare in acqua. Anche per la filosofia, dunque, bisognerebbe confrontarsi senza mediazioni con il pensiero e con la tradizione. Ciò appare tanto più vero nel caso dello studio della storia della filosofia e del pensiero di un autore. Infatti è evidentemente paradossale avvicinarsi agli scritti di qualcuno senza leggerli. Ogni sintesi o parafrasi risulta problematica, in quanto immediatamente riduttiva. Solo il confronto analitico con i testi può rendere ragione in modo adeguato di una proposta teorica, dei suoi dettagli, delle sue sfumature e anche delle sue eventuali difficoltà, incongruenze o dei mutamenti di opinione nel tempo – per cui è altresì inevitabile, per familiarizzare con un pensiero, affrontarlo nella sua completezza. Ad una comprensione piena è poi ovviamente necessaria anche la lettura dei testi in lingua originale. Così, il tenere corsi di lezioni, o forse, ancor di più, il lavorare alla stesura di traduzioni, si presentano sovente come i mezzi migliori per entrare veramente in confidenza con la proposta di un autore: lezioni e traduzioni rappresentano infatti contesti nei quali la comprensione è messa alla prova dalla necessità di restituzione ad altri. Ma la conoscenza diretta e complessiva dei testi, anche nella lingua originale, ancora non basta. Solitamente è anche indispensabile avere familiarità con le opere del contesto, e dunque con le fonti e con gli interlocutori. Infatti, il significato di alcune questioni e di molti termini anche tecnici non può altrimenti essere chiarito.

Tutte queste riflessioni su cui si stiamo intrattenendo – guarda caso – in sede introduttiva, rappresentano banalità per chiunque abbia una qualche dimestichezza con il lavoro storico-filosofico. Tuttavia si tratta di banalità che mettono immediatamente in questione la sensatezza di un progetto di testo di "compendio" dedicato ad un autore; e dunque anche dell'opera

che qui presentiamo. È possibile veramente qualcosa come un "manuale" o una "introduzione" al pensiero di un filosofo? Non ci si deve forse tuffare direttamente nel mare aperto delle sue pagine? Per altro verso, tuttavia, occorre anche riflettere sul fatto che tale tuffo non può essere incauto o sprovveduto. Non si può imparare a nuotare se non in acqua, ma ci sono diversi modi di iniziare a muovere le prime bracciate. Se utilizzati in modo corretto, allora, gli strumenti introduttivi e di ausilio possono affiancare in modo efficace lo studio diretto dei testi, fornendo dei primi elementi di contestualizzazione e di avvicinamento, soprattutto per gli studenti che sono agli inizi. Introduzioni, compendi o manuali possono fornire la grammatica di riferimento, la cornice, a partire da cui avvicinarsi all'autore; insegnano i movimenti corretti – per restare ancora e sempre nella metafora hegeliana – da compiere prima del vero e proprio ingresso in acqua. Il termine di *companion* usato per il titolo di questo volume, se inteso nel senso letterale di "accompagnamento", indica quindi il modo giusto di utilizzarli. Non sono testi sostitutivi dello studio dell'autore, né da premettere tout court alla lettura dello stesso, ma devono affiancarlo. Rettamente utilizzati e, con la prudenza relativa al loro intrinseco e strutturale limite, possono allora essere molto importanti; financo, "salvare la vita".

In questo caso, siamo in presenza di una buona "ciambella di salvataggio". Si tratta della della seconda edizione, con significative aggiunte e revisioni, di un compendio pubblicato già nel 2012 come *The Continuum Companion to Kant*. Il testo è curato da studiosi anglosassoni, e vi hanno contribuito prevalentemente (anche se non esclusivamente) autori di quella estrazione geografica e linguistica. Anche il pubblico di riferimento principale va dunque rinvenuto in quel contesto, come la stessa *Introduzione* chiarisce. Quelle pagine infatti si aprono con un riferimento alle parole pronunciate da Wilfrid Sellars nel 1970 in occasione dell'*Eastern meeting of the American Philosophical Association*, in cui si notava il sempre crescente interesse per Kant nello «*English speaking world*». Questo elemento si riflette altresì sulla scelta della bibliografia che, seppur anche in questo caso non univocamente orientata in tal senso, risente comunque evidentemente di un attenzione particolare alla lingua inglese. In questo caso, tuttavia, la scelta appare piuttosto penalizzante, sin dalle presentazione generale delle traduzioni delle opere di Kant, i cui riferimenti si limitano appunto all'inglese. Proprio chi ha lavorato sui testi in originale conosce invece l'importanza di poter verficare traduzioni in lingue diverse, anche per osservare nel dettaglio il passaggio tra le varie lingue del lessico tecnico nel corso della storia della filosofia, in particolare durante la modernità e proprio all'epoca di Kant.

Il privilegio accordato alla lingua inglese risulta marcato poi anche nella scelta della letteratura secondaria. In questo ambito, solo per fare un esempio e limitarci alla lingua italiana, non si possono non notare mancanze oggettivamente rilevanti – come quelle di Bobbio, di Capozzi, di Garroni, o di Olivetti – dovute probabilmente alla oramai purtroppo scarsa capacità degli studiosi di avvicinarsi alle lingue straniere. Ma chi scrive non può non ricordare come Norbert Hinske sia solito raccontare ai colleghi che ha dovuto imparare proprio l'italiano per poter affrontare adeguatamente la letteratura su Kant, e leggere, ad esempio, i lavori di Tonelli o Cesa. Inoltre, un discorso analogo potrebbe essere fatto anche con la letteratura secondaria francese, comunque non assente nel volume: giusto per citare un paio di casi che saltano all'occhio, spiccano in bibliografia la mancata citazione del volume ancora oggi fondamentale di Ferrari sulle fonti francesi del pensiero kantiano o di quello di Marty sulla questione

dell'analogia. Per tacere poi della bibliografia in lingua spagnola e portoghese – recentemente anche di provenienza sudamericana, anzitutto argentina e brasiliana – che sta progressivamente guadagnando un posto importante negli studi su Kant e che qui è pressoché del tutto ignorata.

Oltre ad esplicitare questo ambito culturale e linguistico di riferimento privilegiato, l'*Introduzione* del compendio chiarisce poi anche l'impostazione che struttura il testo: contrariamente a molti altri volumi introduttivi – ancora, principalmente in lingua inglese – che sono apparsi negli ultimi anni nel panorama editoriale filosofico e dunque anche sul pensiero di Kant (sia considerato complessivamente, sia rispetto ad ambiti tematici o ad opere), questa pubblicazione dichiara di voler seguire in tutto e per tutto un'organizzazione sistematica. Non è strutturata perciò secondo un criterio biografico-cronologico (che, per chi è educato a lavorare storicamente, risulta comunque meno arbitrario) né convoca gli studiosi che contribuiscono a redigere, ciascuno, un saggio introduttivo ed esplicativo su un argomento specifico. Si procede invece attraverso uno schema tematico, con parti e capitoli redatti collettivamente. Questa impalcatura radicalizza la pericolosa ambiguità insita nello strumento del compendio, e di cui si diceva in apertura. Per un verso, infatti, costringe ancora di più entro maglie statiche e potenzialmente troppo soggettive una realtà dinamica, come il pensiero di un autore – e quello di Kant in modo particolare – affrontabile solo da un punto di vista genetico. Ancora una volta, come vedremo tra poco, è molto forte il rischio per cui *qui incipit numerare, incipit et errare.* Per altro verso, naturalmente, tale criterio espositivo veramente e letteralmente manualistico può aiutare a trovare direttamente argomenti o questioni su cui risulta di interesse immediato avere un primo sguardo panoramico.

L'architettura con cui è costruito il volume si articola come segue: una prima parte dedicata ai *Key Writings*, che comprende un solo capitolo dedicato ai *Key Works*, rispetto al quale – al di là della stranezza del doppio titolo – la scelta concreta delle opere descritte si potrebbe prestare immediatamente a discussioni (perché limitarsi a due sole opere precritiche – il *Beweisgrund* e la *Dissertatio* del 1770? Perché, tra le opere successive, escludere l'*Antropologia* e la *Logica*? Non sono forse opere chiave?). Una seconda parte è dedicata invece al *Contesto storico*, e presenta due capitoli: uno dedicato al *Contesto storico e filosofico* e l'altro alle *Fonti ed influenze*. Anche in questo caso, rispetto agli elenchi proposti, ci si potrebbe chiedere perché ad esempio Lambert venga considerato tra gli autori del "contesto", assieme, tra gli altri, a Mendelssohn, Eberhard, a Spinoza e agli "aristotelici", mentre Herz sia considerato una "fonte", assieme, tra gli altri, a Baumgarten, Crusius, Descartes e Platone. Vi è poi una quarta parte, dedicata ai *Key Themes and Topics*, che anche comprende un solo capitolo, stavolta omonimo. In questa sessione si scelgono una serie di lemmi tecnici – da *Aesthetic Judgement* sino a *Will (Choice)* – di cui si procede a fornire un chiarimento, con riferimento ai passi principali dei testi kantiani e a qualche titolo bibliografico di approfondimento. Questa sessione, che rappresenta una sorta di breve lessico dei concetti e termini chiave, possiede una particolare utilità, grazie proprio al continuo rimando ai testi. Il lettore è infatti incoraggiato a confrontarsi direttamente con le pagine kantiane e a verificare i passaggi che contribuiscono alla spiegazione e all'interpretazione complessiva dell'espressione di cui si tratta, che viene inoltre descritta molto spesso nella sua evoluzione diacroniaca e storica. Vi è poi una quinta parte, che anche ha un solo omonimo capitolo, dedicata alla *Ricezione e all'influenza*, e che ripercorre molto utilmente alcune tappe

fondamentali dei dibattiti sorti a seguito della pubblicazione delle opere: in questa rassegna panoramica si parte ancora dalla *Dissertatio* del '70, per arrivare a Rawls e Korsgaard, passando naturalmente attraverso Reinhold, Hegel, Schopenhauer, il Neokantismo e Heidegger. Si nota qui un importante motivo di interesse degli autori del compendio, manifestato sin dalle citate righe con cui si apriva l'*Introduzione*: l'attualità del pensiero kantiano. Tale interesse non è comuque sproporzionato e si bilancia adeguatamente con le pagine sulle fonti ed il contesto. Per cui, nel complesso, uno dei punti di forza del volume sembra rinvenibile nell'equilibrio tre impostazione storica e orientamento speculativo, entrambi presenti nello studio attuale di Kant.

Solo, talora, vi sono problemi di strutturazione interna: in questo capitolo appena citato vi è una trattazione dedicata alla recensione Garve-Feder, come momento della ricezione del pensiero di Kant. Ma la stessa recensione era stata già analizzata anche proprio nel capitolo sul contesto storico e filosofico. Talora il criterio sistematico con cui è impostato il volume rischia così anche di generare qualche sovrapposizione, e, più in generale, problemi di orientamento. Questo non solo per quanto attiene alle sessioni tematiche e all'esposizione vera e propria, ma anche e sopratutto per la bibliografia, ordinata nella quinta parte (sesto capitolo) altresì secondo un criterio sistematico. Alcuni testi che potrebbero essere utili per un argomento non sono rinvenibili nella sezione corrispondente, perché magari categorizzati già in un altro ambito. Ma evidentemente impossibile è ridurre molti testi ad una tematica unica, imposta tra l'altro secondo un elenco che, se pur ragionevole, non è comunuque esente dal rischio di arbitrarietà. A volte, quindi, il lettore può rischiare di trovare nel volume meno di quanto effettivamente contiene; e se la schematizzazione dei temi trattati dovrebbe favorire il rinvenimento degli argomenti di effettivo e specifico interesse, talora invece rischia, al contrario, di ingenerare dispersione.

Sono molto e diverse le cautele che vanno dunque tenute presente nel servirsi di questo strumento, così come, d'altronde, di testi analoghi. Soprattutto, va accantonata ogni pretesa o illusione di esaustività e di eccessivo dettaglio. A partire da questo presupposto e da siffatta consapevolezza, il compendio risulta sicuramente utile e potenzialmente molto prezioso per chi si avvicina allo studio di Kant, permettendo una discesa meno rischiosa nelle acque a volte agitate del pensiero critico e della filosofia trascendentale.

Kant, Réflexions sur la philosophie morale et Baumgarten. Principes de la philosophie pratique première, introduction et traduction par Luc Langlois, Paris: Vrin, 2014, 419 pp.

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Le présent ouvrage propose une traduction annotée et précédée d'une longue Présentation (33 pages) de deux textes complémentaires, qui marquèrent, bien qu'à divers titres, la philosophie pratico-morale allemande du milieu du XVIII[e] siècle - les *Réflexions sur la philosophie morale* de Kant et les *Principes de la philosophie pratique première* de Baumgarten - par Luc Langlois, en collaboration avec Mathieu Robitaille (pour la traduction des *Réflexions*) et Emilie Jade-Poliquin (pour la traduction des *Principes*). Les *Réflexions* de Kant ne constituent pas un ouvrage à proprement parler, mais un ensemble de notes et remarques rédigées par Kant, en lien avec son enseignement en philosophie morale qui s'étala sur plus de 30 ans, souvent inscrites dans les marges (ou sur des feuillets séparés) du principal manuel que Kant utilisait comme fil directeur de ses cours de philosophie morale à l'Université de Königsberg, à savoir les *Initia philosophiae practicae primae* d'Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (Halle, édition de 1760). Ces deux textes sont donc inséparables dans la mesure où le premier, reflet direct des enseignements de morale de Kant, s'inspire largement du second, dont il propose de larges commentaires. La présentation concomitante de ces deux textes permet à la fois d'apprécier l'influence des *Principes* de Baumgarten sur Kant et la manière dont Kant intègre, en se les réappropriant et en les infléchissant, à sa propre philosophie morale des thèmes empruntés à Baumgarten. La présentation conjointe des deux textes, en miroir l'un de l'autre, constitue un apport précieux pour la recherche et permet de mieux comprendre la genèse de la philosophie morale de Kant à partir de ses multiples héritages baumgarteniens. Selon le traducteur Luc Langlois, « Cet ouvrage [les *Principes* de Baumgarten] est si intimement lié à l'enseignement de Kant et à l'évolution de sa pensée morale que nous avons choisi de le traduire et d'en faire une partie intégrante de ce travail d'édition » (Présentation, p. 7). Les *Réflexions sur la philosophie morale* représentent quelque 300 pages dans le tome XIX de l'Edition de l'Académie royale de Prusse et correspondent au tome VI du *Handschriftlicher Nachlass* rassemblant les notes et brouillons de Kant édités par Erich Adickes à la fin du XIX[e] siècle et au début du XX[e] siècle.

C'est à E. Adickes et surtout à son successeur, Friedrich Berger, que l'on doit l'établissement du texte de ces *Réflexions* dans le cadre du tome XIX de l'Edition de l'Académie que F. Berger fit paraître en 1934.

Si ces *Réflexions sur la philosophie morale* sont indissociables de l'enseignement moral de Kant – très régulier au cours de sa carrière –, elles ne recoupent toutefois qu'en partie les cours de morale dispensés par Kant de 1756 à 1794 (selon la datation d'Emil Arnoldt). Alors qu'on ne connaît l'enseignement moral (et l'enseignement en général) de Kant qu'indirectement, *via* les cahiers de notes de ses étudiants copistes, qui circulaient abondamment dans l'Université Albertina de Königsberg, attestant du grand prestige dont le Professeur Kant a joui très tôt, la mise en parallèle de ces *Réflexions* et des *Principes* de Baumgarten, qui en furent durant près de 30 ans le support pédagogique essentiel, permet d'en éclairer maints aspects. Le présent travail vient donc utilement compléter l'édition par Paul Menzer en 1924 de la *Vorlesung Kants über Ethik*, déjà traduite par Luc Langlois sous le titre *Emmanuel Kant, Leçons d'éthique* (Paris Librairie générale, coll. « Le livre de poche », 1997). Afin de saisir les évolutions de la pensée morale de Kant, il convient ainsi de confronter non seulement les présentes *Réflexions* (vol. XIX) aux *Principes* de Baumgarten, mais encore aux notes de cours relatives aux enseignements moraux de Kant, notes pour la plupart rassemblées dans les tomes XXVII (regroupant notamment les diverses versions de la *Praktische Philosophie* : Herder, Powalski, Collins, Vigilantius, ainsi que le *Naturrecht Feyerabend*) et XXIX (contenant les deux morales *Mrongovius* I et II) de l'Edition de l'Académie. La pensée morale de Kant s'exprime en effet en quatre lieux au moins: les cahiers de notes de cours, les réflexions manuscrites de Kant, ses ouvrages publiés, ainsi que sa correspondance. Les *Réflexion*s ici traduites constituent selon Luc Langlois un « véritable laboratoire d'idées » (p. 9) pour l'élaboration de la pensée morale de Kant: on y trouve par exemple dès les feuillets de 1760 les premiers linéaments des concepts d'obligation, d'impératif catégorique ou encore de la distinction qui s'approfondira dans la suite (en particulier dans les *Fondements de la métaphysique des mœurs* de 1785) entre prudence et morale, ainsi que les premiers développements consacrés par Kant aux thèmes de l'origine rationnelle des commandements moraux ou de l'accord universel des volontés, dont l'impératif moral fait l'objet *via* l'affirmation en nous d'une loi morale. Les présentes *Réflexions* (doublées des cahiers de notes de cours) constitueraient ainsi la « véritable matrice » (p. 10) des concepts-clés de la pensée morale kantienne.

Le trait dominant de ces réflexions morales étant le dialogue constant que Kant y mène avec Baumgarten justifie la traduction corrélative des *Principes*, en seconde partie de l'ouvrage. Baumgarten est l'un des auteurs de prédilection de Kant dans ses cours non seulement de morale, mais encore de métaphysique. Si l'influence de Wolff, Crusius, Hutcheson ou Rousseau est bien connue et souvent rappelée, celle de Baumgarten l'est moins, en dehors du champ de l'esthétique, où elle a été maintes fois soulignée. L. Langlois prend ici le contrepied d'une interprétation selon laquelle l'influence de Baumgarten sur la morale de Kant serait minime, voire nulle (soutenue par exemple par Josef Schmucker dans *Die Ursprünge der Ethik Kants* de 1961). A côté des *Initia*, il faut aussi mentionner l'*Ethica philosophica* (1740-1763) du même Baumgarten.

L. Langlois montre de façon convaincante que les *Initia* de Baumgarten, loin de se contenter de paraphraser *la Philosophia practica universalis* de Wolff (que Kant citera encore dans sa Préface aux *Fondements de la métaphysique des mœurs*), constituent une source essentielle et originale du kantisme moral. S'il arrive à Kant de se référer à d'autres manuels de philosophie morale de l'époque, notamment dans son cours du semestre d'hiver 1763-54 aux *Elementa philosophiae recentioris* de Baumeister, c'est Baumgarten qui reste la référence constante et centrale de ses cours de morale. On trouve trace de cette étroite filiation entre Baumgarten et Kant en morale dans les textes publiés de Kant, et dès 1759 dans ses *Considérations sur l'optimisme*, et de leur affinité philosophique plus générale dans la *Critique de la raison pure*, qui loue en Baumgarten « l'excellent analyste » (A 21 / B 35). Selon Kant en effet, Baumgarten se caractérise en général par un grand talent de distinction, de décomposition et de comparaison des concepts. Kant admire plus précisément dans le moraliste Baumgarten à la fois l'*Aufklärer* rationaliste et l'influence d'une éducation piétiste, qui lui rappelle la sienne propre. Kant rejoint son illustre prédécesseur plus généralement sur la défense de l'autonomie du questionnement et de la recherche en philosophie, loin de toute tutelle exercée par les autorités. Il trouve enfin chez Baumgarten des éléments qui serviront de briques constitutives pour sa propre philosophie morale, comme les concepts de responsabilité, d'obligation morale (comprise comme nécessité pratique absolue), ou encore une doctrine non sensualiste du bonheur, ouverte à la dimension esthétique du bien (dont on trouvera écho au § 59 de la *Critique de la faculté de juger,* où Kant fera du beau « le symbole du bien ») et qui accorde une large place au concept de Souverain Bien. Enfin, Luc Langlois situe l'héritage de Kant vis-à-vis de Baumgarten dans l'admiration qu'il avait pour Baumgarten Professeur, génial inventeur de toute une terminologie morale encore essentiellement latine – Baumgarten rédigeant quasi exclusivement ses manuels en latin –, enseignant réputé dans l'Allemagne de l'époque et qui contribua à former nombre de grands esprits du siècle (Eberhard, Garve, Herder, Lambert, Lessing, Maimon, Mendelssohn, Nicolai, Tetens ou encore Winckelmann). Kant vit en Baumgarten aussi sans doute l'un des tout derniers représentants d'une philosophie savante de langue latine, qu'il n'allait pas tarder lui-même à germaniser avec quelques autres, comme Meier.

Le présent volume, qui comporte également un Glossaire des principaux termes utilisés par Kant dans ses *Réflexions* et par Baumgarten dans ses *Principes*, ainsi qu'une Bibliographie et une Table des matières, constitue un très précieux outil pour les études tant kantiennes que baumgarteniennes et pour la connaissance des liens, souvent négligés, entre ces deux auteurs.

Notes

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