Abstract
A putative example (not Kant-style) of the “synthetic a priori” is examined with a view to, not establishing whether or not it truly belongs to that category but to drawing a philosophical lesson from the fact that it, or a similar proposition, is no longer indisputably empirically true. The example is “No surface is at the same time and for the same observer red all over and green.” An example is provided of how philosophy could deal with such recalcitrant evidence as may crop up and contradict such seemingly self-evident “synthetic a priori.”
About the author
Wojciech Żełaniec (b. 1959) is a professor at the University of Gdańsk 〈zelaniec@aol.com〉. His research interests include social and legal philosophy, metaphysics, and semiotics. His publications include “Sull'idea stessa di regola costitutiva” (2005); and “Perché il ‘veridico’ non è molto meglio che il ‘mentitore’” (2007).
©[2013] by Walter de Gruyter Berlin Boston
