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The Constructibility of Artificial Intelligence (as Defined by the Turing Test)

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Abstract

The Turing Test (TT), as originally specified, centres on theability to perform a social role. The TT can be seen as a test of anability to enter into normal human social dynamics. In this light itseems unlikely that such an entity can be wholly designed in an“off-line” mode; rather a considerable period of training insitu would be required. The argument that since we can pass the TT,and our cognitive processes might be implemented as a Turing Machine(TM), that consequently a TM that could pass the TT could be built, isattacked on the grounds that not all TMs are constructible in a plannedway. This observation points towards the importance of developmentalprocesses that use random elements (e.g., evolution), but in these casesit becomes problematic to call the result artificial. This hasimplications for the means by which intelligent agents could bedeveloped.

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Edmonds, B. The Constructibility of Artificial Intelligence (as Defined by the Turing Test). Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9, 419–424 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008363224791

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