

A Moorean solution to Laura Valentini's ideal theory paradox?

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Abstract. This paper presents an attempt to solve Laura Valentini's ideal theory paradox, in a way which makes me think of G.E. Moore but I shall leave the classification of the solution to the experts. I also discuss the claim that philosophy is so easy.

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Laura Valentini presents a paradox for us to solve:

- (a) Any sound theory of justice is action guiding.
- (b) Any sound theory of justice is ideal.
- (c) Any ideal theory fails to be action guiding.

It seems we must conclude that there cannot be a sound theory of justice. But we don't want to. Can we solve this paradox by taking an ideal theory and trying to realize it and then, if successful, saying, "Look we did." It is a Moorean approach to the paradox even.

(Or is it? Anyway, I presume it is natural to conclude against (c) in this event. I fear someone will say that philosophy is so easy. Well, the paradox has been around for a while; where is this Moorean approach to it? And also you only solve the paradox by this route after doing various things beyond writing this paper.)

Reference

Valentini, L. 2009. On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory. *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 17 (3): 332-355.