

best one can find are suggestive analogies like the following: «The paradigm for the Judeo-Christian conception of human free choice is the free choice of God in creating» (p. 99). However, the authors also wish to argue, in an implausible attempt to render God's «universal and perfectly efficacious divine causality» (p. 98) compatible with human free choice, that «the creator-creature relationship is *unique*; no other cause-effect relationship could be like it» (p. 101). It follows that all the above analogy has to offer it its suggestiveness: one can learn absolutely nothing about the particular features of human choice from its supposed «paradigm».

The book contains treatments of some of the different positions which have been taken in the freewill controversy, and of self-referential phenomena. The authors conclude: «To the extent that the present experiment is a success, we think the method of self-referential argument gives good promise of further important success». They fail to demonstrate this promise.

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ROBERT O. JOHANN, ed., *Freedom and Value*, New York, Fordham University Press, 1976, 186 pages, \$ 12.50 cloth; 5.00 paper.

This book consists of nine essays written by members of the Department of Philosophy at Fordham University which deal with the nature of and value of human freedom and its relations with other human values. As editor Johann indicates, «all the contributors are as one in their defense of man's freedom and dignity, and their rooting it in his rational nature» (p. viii). However, there are some interesting differences of opinion and emphasis among the contributors which deserve serious notice and consideration. At the risk of committing grievous errors of omission, I shall attempt first to summarize the main themes of each essay.

In «Freedom as Value», W. Norris Clarke, S. J. defines freedom as «an ontological power or capacity for free choice, for self-determination over one's conscious actions» (p. 1). Clarke deals primarily with the question whether freedom is «an ultimate or absolute value by itself», and concludes that it is not always such an intrinsic good but takes on such worth only when it is exercised (as opposed to being an unactualized potentiality) and only when it is a choice of good (as opposed to choice of evil). The act of freedom has intrinsic worth only when it is freedom for the good. Clarke does not deny that we may freely choose evil, only that such an act has positive value, thus setting himself in opposition to those who view all acts of freedom as having positive value, such as Sartre, Rawls and his co-author Charles Kelbley who wrote the concluding essay in this book. Clarke explores the relation of his idea of freedom for the good to many other themes such as (1) God as the final or infinite good, and the relative worth of lesser finite goods, and (2) the problem of the relation of will and intellect.

In «Ethics as a Philosophy of Freedom», Joseph V. Dolan, S. J. agrees with Norris Clarke that only freedom for the good has positive worth, and in rejecting «the doctrinaire and ultimately absurd quality of the existentialist exaltation of freedom of choice as the absolute value — a willing for willing's sake» (p. 26). Dolan, who wishes to make the un-existentialistic point that «choice should be enlightened» (p. 26), explores in more detail the problem of the relation of will and intellect and concludes as Clarke had done that «choice is a unified act of intellect and will» (p. 29). Dolan also explores the problem of the relation of free choice to subconscious motivation, temperament, and character and concludes that although these elements of human personality may limit human freedom, they do not totally obviate human freedom and responsibility.

Robert O. Johann brings into focus the problem of the «standpoint for reflection» taken by the philosophizing philosopher in his «Freedom and Morality from the Standpoint of Communication». Johann indicates that philosophers *may* philosophize from three perspectives, that of the abstracted thinker as such, that of the agent whose actions affect other agents, and that of the communicator as the «co-source of a dialogue». But he thinks that philosophers *should* adopt the latter stance since it involves the first two without their respective liabilities and since it is the standpoint of freedom itself. Johann defines freedom as «our capacity to communicate» (p. 53) and as «our capacity to mean what we say and do» (p. 54). He expects thereby to bypass all the problems involved in thinking of freedom as causally originative choice, though he actually only raises new problems instead of avoiding all the old ones. Johann concludes his essay with a discussion of the choice to adopt the moral point of view, maintaining that it «is the only fully rational course to take» (p. 57).

Both Johann and Leonard C. Fieldstein stress the importance of intentionality as an element in free and responsible selfhood. Fieldstein, in his «Personal Freedom: The Dialectics of Self-Possession», writes that «to be free... is to be aware of oneself as actively orienting oneself toward oneself in relation to an object» (p. 72). Fieldstein also contributes to the discussion of freedom a much needed emphasis on the temporal and developmental essence of free and responsible selfhood. «The self achieves its freedom by stages» (p. 77), he holds; and he explains in some detail how personal freedom develops and unfolds itself in time through free attachments to the true, the beautiful, the good, faith, hope and love.

In his essay on «Human Autonomy and Religion Affirmation in Hegel», Quentin Lauer, S. J. give much more attention to religious affirmation than to human autonomy. As Lauer indicates, Hegel was concerned with the supreme value of autonomy of reason, not the autonomy of choice or will. Lauer focuses on this problem: autonomous reason is subject to no higher authority than itself, according to Hegel, so how can Hegel present a religious philosophy at all? Lauer's answer is given in a detailed exposition of Hegel's concept of God as Reason, of the development of human religious consciousness, and his «demythologization» of Christian theology. Lauer ends up being remarkably sympathetic to Hegel!

Vincent M. Cooke develops an astute critical analysis of Robert Paul Wolff's anarchism in his essay entitled «Human Autonomy and Political Authority». Cooke goes successfully between the horns of Wolff's dilemma of political authority versus human autonomy by showing that not all political authority is necessarily irrational and not all obedience to a political authority involves the authoritarian stance of obeying merely «because he tells you to do it». *Some* political authorities may have good reason for commanding obedience to which we may freely assent, in particular those authorities who promote «human interests and needs which cannot be provided for by the individual himself», such as the needs expressed in the U. S. Constitution «to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity» (pp. 114-115).

The problem of the social and political context of human freedom also occupies the attention of Andrew C. Varga, S. J. in his «Social Conflicts of Freedom and Value» which is devoted to a discussion of threats to human freedom posed by technology, conflicts between freedom and human values in both capitalistic and socialistic economies, the value of freedom of expression in constitutional democracies, and the tension between the practice of political freedom and the attempt to impose social control through such modern techniques as psychosurgery and behavior modification.

The possibility of developing a more liberal, flexible and developmental Thomistic social ethics is addressed by Gerald A. McCool, S. J. in his «Duty and Reason in Thomistic Social Ethics». McCool rejects the rigidities of the

social ethics developed by « traditional Thomism » as represented by Jacques Maritain and looks to a further development of the possibilities for growth in moral knowledge opened up within what he calls « transcendental Thomism » as represented by the work of Kark Rahner and Bernard J. F. Lonergan.

The final essay by Charles A. Kelbley entitled « Freedom from the Good » is one which many contemporary philosophers will find most interesting, for it deals with the place afforded to freedom within the intricacies of John Rawl's *A Theory of Justice*. The essay involves much explication of Rawl's position, as all such essays must, with special emphasis on the reasons why the rational choosers of a system of justice in the « original position » must be as free as possible from having any conception of the good and are entitled to have only (or at least primarily) a concept of the right. As Kelbley explains, there are many complicated reasons for this, which I do not have space here to explore. But I do wish to focus on the point specially stressed by Kelbley, namely that persons in the « original position » must be as free as possible from all other conceptions of the good because freedom is itself

« a value in its own right, consisting precisely in its independence of other values. Freedom is an absolute value in the sense that it is the condition *sine qua non* of a human life. But insofar as the exercise of freedom must be judged by the criteria of the right, it is a relative value; individual liberty is limited by what is right and just, not by what is good. Importantly, the foregoing analysis has tried to show that, quite apart from the goodness or badness of its objects, freedom has a value and is worth preserving even when its objects are not worth preserving. This is why it is impossible to judge freedom first and foremost in terms of the good » (pp. 182-183).

But just to the extent that Rawl's position does presuppose that freedom is such as « absolute value » *it is teleological and it is judging freedom to be first and foremost among all other human goods*. This is one reason why the alleged « rationality » of his original position is question begging, and will always seem irrational and unacceptable to thinkers such as Clarke, Dolan and others who hold that freedom must take its chances along with all other human values as possible objects of rational commitment, and who judge that it is an intrinsic good only when it is freedom for the good.

The dispute about the value of freedom itself, whether it is always *an* intrinsic good, and if so whether it is always *the highest* intrinsic good is perhaps the most philosophically significant issue brought into focus by this book. I regret that the book did not contain at least one good defense of determinism, for freedom cannot have much value for us if we do not have any.

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WILLIAM L. ROGE, *The Cosmological Argument*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1975. Pp. x 274. \$ 13.50.

This is an excellent study that demands and repays close reading. The title is inevitably a misleading one, since it is part of Rowe's method to emphasize that there is no single Cosmological Argument, but a series of distinct but similar arguments which have commonly been lumped together in a way that inhibits fair evaluation. Almost all the book is in fact a detailed scrutiny of the extended argument for God's existence found in Samuel Clarke's *A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, which dates from 1704. His reason for selecting this version is that it is « the most complete, forceful, and cogent presentation of the Cosmological Argument we possess ». While I for one am