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Cartwright and Otte on Simpson's Paradox

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Ellery Eells
Ellery Eells*
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin-Madison
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Abstract

Richard Otte (1985) has recently criticized the resolution of Simpson's paradox given by Nancy Cartwright (1979). He argues that there are difficulties with the version of the theory of probabilistic causality that Cartwright has developed, and that there is a way in which Simpson's paradox can arise that Cartwright's theory cannot handle. And Otte develops his own theory of probabilistic causality. I defend Cartwright's solution, and I argue that there are difficulties with the theory of probabilistic causality that Otte proposes.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 54 , Issue 2 , June 1987 , pp. 233 - 243
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I thank Elliott Sober for a number of useful comments, and the American Council of Learned Societies for financial support.

References

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