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*For John Llewelyn,
who asked about Bobby*

CHAPTER 8

Facing Animal Research
Levinas and Technologies of Effacement

SOPHIA EFSTATHIOU

This chapter proposes that encountering the Other through the face can be conditioned by social and built technologies.¹ In "The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights," Emmanuel Levinas relates his experience as a prisoner of war, held in a forced-labor camp in Nazi Germany. He contrasts being denied his humanity by other humans, "called free" (*DF*, 152), while being recognized as human—indeed as a friend—by a dog the prisoners named Bobby. The episode suggests that though the concept of the face applies to humans, the face is not enough for *facing*, at least not in the setting of the camp. By contrast, the prisoners seem able to face and be faced by Bobby, even if Levinas remains inconclusive about whether the face applies to animals elsewhere. It follows that the face is operating less like a property, and more like a capacity, a mode as Levinas calls it. But what conditions encountering an Other in this mode? If the face is neither sufficient for facing, nor prior to it, then what conditions facing (or effacing)? I propose that social structures, techniques, architectures, professional roles, and so on matter in coming to face (or efface) the Other. I conclude this from analyzing human-animal encounters in a scientific space of exception: the animal lab.²

Building on empirical accounts of animal research,³ I propose that animal research is populated by what I call "technologies of effacement." These include: (1) built architectures; (2) entering and exit procedures; (3) protective garments and equipment; (4) identification and labeling techniques; and (5) experimental protocols. These technologies serve other manifest ends, but they operate to

condition encounters between humans and animals in the lab: they help block the face of humans and animals.⁴ Following Levinas in *Totality and Infinity*, I understand “face” to mean not only the ordinary “head-face,” but an expressive, bodily or body-based surface that “exudes” or communicates the inner being of the Other. This includes visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, or other sense-scapes that communicate the inner, “secret” being of the Other. Technology blocking the human and animal face is implicated in the distinctive normative challenges of animal research. Technologies of effacement sustain an ethos of the ordered at the expense of an ethics of the Other, notwithstanding that effacement is never total. This makes the ethics of the face and the ethos of analytic science crash head-on, begging for a response, practically and philosophically. A *humanimal* research ethics would go beyond simply butting human benefits against animal suffering, and would consider the particularities of human-animal relationships in the lab.

The chapter is structured as follows: I first outline key normative tensions arising from working with animals in research. I then describe a concept of the face and of the contingency of facing, following Levinas. The last section proposes that animal experimentation is structured through five types of technology that block the face during human-animal encounters. I conclude with an urge toward a humanimal research ethics.

Normative Tensions in Animal Research

Animal research is hard and it is hidden. It is hard epistemologically, as it involves getting inferences to cross “species” boundaries, aggravating epistemological problems by generalizing from observations based on tokens of a presumed type.⁵ It is also hard because it requires the practical attention, skills, and social organization common to all large-scale experimental labor.⁶ But animal research is hard in a further, special way: it involves working with, or rather against, the will of other animals. Consider this account, of the graduate student whom the science and technology studies scholar Nicole Nelson calls “Alex.”

The rats that I was microinjecting in the series of experiments that I’ve done so far, they just—I just couldn’t take it. I was almost in tears over these guys, because they hate it . . . And you talk to people and they’ll tell you, “Oh, you know, what you should do is wrap a towel around them so that you get a better grip and they don’t fight as much.” And it’s like, well, it’s not the fighting that’s the problem with me or whether or not it’s wrapped in a towel; it’s the fact that

I know I’m causing these animals physical pain right now, and that just really bothers me. And it doesn’t just bother me from a moral perspective—I don’t know if this is what you had in mind—but it bothers me from [a perspective of] “Oh my God, I’m just creating so much stress in these animals right now and then I’m going to go and test them!” How can I realistically say that that super stress that I just gave it—I’m talking about a two-minute injection where they’re squirming and squealing the whole time—and then I put them in the box and say, “Hey, show me what you’ve learned, but don’t let stress affect you.” It’s just ridiculous.⁷

We can hear the frustration in Alex’s voice. First, he is struggling emotionally. Alex relates that he was “almost in tears” over these (rat) guys because “they hate it.” “[T]hey just—I just couldn’t take it.” The “squirming and squealing” of “these guys” made to take a microinjection that lasts for two minutes flow into Alex’s own distress around administering that injection, and his frustration with having to pretend that stress does not matter. Why should Alex be doing this type of work? The obvious answer is for the research: to promote his and his team’s scientific aims; for Society’s ultimate benefit. However, at that point further tensions show up.

Leaving aside the moral and emotional difficulty of the work, there is the question of how to relate this problem to other colleagues. When “you talk to people” what “they tell you” in effect blocks the struggle communicated. Prefaced by a routine “Oh, you know,” his colleagues propose to tell him what he should already know to do: “wrap a towel around them”—devise a cover, so that he gets “a better grip,” and they “don’t fight” as much. Alex rejects his colleagues’ advice as beside the point: he “knows” he is “causing the animals physical pain right now.” And that “just really bothers” him, not only from a moral perspective, but from an epistemological one. And this is a further aspect of the emotional and practical challenges of animal experimentation: their epistemological significance. How can one reasonably expect an intervention where the animals are visibly physically distressed for a whole two minutes not to affect their physiology and measured outcomes? Alex thinks it’s “just ridiculous.”

Crucial for my analysis is the communication of a perceived duplicity. Alex communicates what happens as a kind of farce. He and the animals first go through these distressing injections, and then he is to “put them in the box” and tell them, in a new (happy, teacherly) voice: “Hey, show me what you’ve learned, but don’t let stress affect you” (*MH*, 9). The ridicule made of the researcher and his animals, the joke played on them is that they work in a frame expecting them to both suffer the stress, and pretend that it does not

affect them. Indeed, after this exchange, Alex corrects his own reaction as exaggerated, since the rats' test results appeared "normal" (MH, 9). Perhaps the effects of animal stress are incorporated into existing baselines for normality.

As Vinciane Despret explains, human-animal relationships as well as the expectations of the researcher can affect research results with animals, not unlike the case of physician bias/placebo effects in the case of research with humans.⁸ In the experimental setup she describes, rats presumed to be either "bright" or "dull" were tested in their abilities to figure out a maze. In fact, there was no difference among the rats. Researchers were just told that their rats were bright or dull; and went on to coach the animals and obtain results that fit their expectations. Despret claims that the human-animal relationship, researchers' and animals' responses to each other and to the situation can indeed steer results in an expected direction.

Another testimony of conflicting roles/identities around animal research engagements is offered by Mette Svendsen and Lene Koch's account of necrotic enterocolitis research in Denmark.⁹ This infectious disease of the colon affects prematurely born babies and is studied using newborn piglets. The research involves inducing early labor, removing the piglets from their mother, infecting the piglets with the microbe and isolating them in heat chambers to observe the disease progression. The exchange below regards the piglets that had survived with this painful condition up to day five of the experiment and were to be sacrificed.

As someone enters the room, Morten [a researcher] shouts: "Welcome to the slaughterhouse." A lab technician, Tina, comments, "You say 'slaughter.' Yesterday, I said to my friend: 'Tomorrow we are going to murder pigs,' and she answered: 'Can't you say that you put them down [*affiver dem*]?' 'No,' I said, 'we murder them [*dræber grise*].'" Laura [a lab technician], who is labeling pieces of intestine, interrupts: "No, you are wrong. What we do is that we put them down." While the three of them obviously disagree about how to describe the act that has just happened, they also laugh. Lone [a researcher] grabs a small container and jokingly begs Morten. "May I have my piece?" "You vulture!" comments Laura ironically. Lone gets her piece of intestine, puts the container in her pocket and leaves for the cell lab. [Professional roles added].¹⁰

What is, perhaps playfully, but actively broached here is an instability, a shakiness in the roles that humans and animals assume in the lab. The researcher called Morten, who is already in the sacrifice room, humorously,

perhaps farcically, greets newcomers with a "Welcome to the slaughterhouse!" The lab technician, Tina, counters Morten. She relates what she told her friend (in anticipation): it is not slaughter but *murder* ("We are murdering pigs tomorrow"). The friend, perhaps feeling Tina's distress, asks whether she could not call it something different ("put them down?"). Tina insists: "No, we murder them." Another technician, Laura, disagrees with Tina ("What we do is that we put them down"). Another researcher, Lone, interrupts and requests from Morten her piece of scavenged kill. "You vulture!" Laura responds.

The episode demonstrates the vacillating relationships between humans, piglets, and piglet parts. Staff of different professional roles take on or assign each other the roles of farmers, of murderers, of pet owners, or of vultures and scavengers. The animals become respectively farm-reared animals to be slaughtered, ailing pets to be put down, people (unjustly) murdered, or kill, a quarry that will go to waste unless consumed. The ethical responsibilities of the pet owner, the farmer, the murderer, and vulture all come up in the attempt to pin down what the animal research team is responsible for doing. Humor operates to vent emotion while shielding team members from feelings of sadness and guilt.

What makes animal research especially vexed is that such tensions typically stay hidden. The work itself is often hidden geographically, happening in protected locales for fear of actions by animal rights activists, while within the institution and among its personnel, details about the work are communicated in specific ways with specific audiences. Tora Holmberg and Malin Ideland call the strategies used to control information flow between research contexts and different publics *technologies of secrets*.¹¹ On an institutional level Holmberg and Ideland note a tension between protecting personnel from activist interventions, while being transparent, informing the public, and inviting its support for animal research. Institutional technologies of secrets include keeping animal houses unmarked, in effect marking them by a lack of signs and windows (SL, 8; 13–14), or keeping ethics committees hard to reach. But other strategies are personal, for instance, telling white lies and withholding information from people one does not know very well, "because there are maniacs, you know" (SL, 8). Holmberg and Ideland see a tension in how informants relate their experiences—on a personal level characterizing themselves as open, welcoming discussion, having integrity—while also reporting their own shame and being shamed by others. In their book *The Sacrifice: How Scientific Experiments Transform Animals and People*, Lynda Birke, Arnold Arluke, and Mike Michael similarly report that people in animal research struggle with being considered "unprincipled or shameless" and feeling "stuck behind the barricades."¹²

Animal research staff can face pressures from lay publics. However, pressure also comes from scientists drawing sharp lines between "science" and "ethics"

for fear of contaminating the former. Carrie Friese reports on a train journey she had with the professor she calls "Elspeth" who was traveling to a conference. A student in their compartment called out that he would not attend any "ethics" panel sessions because "all he cared about was the science";¹³ his loud declaration embarrassed Elspeth. She had developed a new telemetric measurement device to be implanted in animals' bellies under anesthesia instead of a surgically inserted tether, a rubber tube that would be permanently attached to animals' backs and to a computer.¹⁴ The technique improved the experience of the animals, who were markedly more active, but also enhanced what philosophers of science would call the "external validity" of experimental results, that is, their translation to clinical settings, as most humans do not go around attached to computers (at least not physically).

In sum, we find at least four types of interconnected, normative challenges around human-animal encounters in the lab, vexed by different levels of secrecy: first, how to feel; second, how to work; third, how to learn with/from animals; and fourth, how to talk about all of the above. These normative, emotional/moral, social/professional, epistemological, and communicative/political challenges affect how one learns from animals, and vice versa. These tensions escape current animal research ethics guidelines that contend with harm-benefit calculations, where harm goes to animals and benefits to society. The golden rule for animal research is often summed up in the so-called three Rs: reduce the number of animals in research; replace more with less "sentient" organisms; and refine the experimental setup, enriching it with toys or enhancing the animal's welfare, where possible.¹⁵ Nowhere in these guidelines are the humans' encounters with animals in research considered ethically significant in themselves.

The next section uses the philosophical insights of Emanuel Levinas to bring forth these encounters as ethically relevant. The central analytic concept I use is that of the face.

Front, Habitus, and Face

Let me first define a face by what it is not. The sociologist Erving Goffman develops the concept of a *front* in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. He defines a front as follows:

[O]ne may take the term 'personal front' to refer to the other items of expressive equipment, the items that we most intimately identify with the performer himself and that we naturally expect will follow the performer wherever he goes. As part of personal front we may include: insignia of office or rank; clothing; sex, age and racial char-

acteristics; size and looks; posture; speech patterns; facial expressions; bodily gestures; and the like. Some of these vehicles for conveying signs, such as racial characteristics, are relatively fixed and over a span of time do not vary for the individual from one situation to another. On the other, some of these sign vehicles are relatively mobile or transitory, such as facial expression, and can vary during a performance from one moment to the next.¹⁶

Goffman says that people have and develop "fronts" and that we meet others in our professional lives through a front (*PS*, 34–36). He specifically talks of medical doctors and nurses assuming different fronts vis-à-vis patients in the clinic, a more formal or informal manner, that are yet still both frontal in the same way (*PS*, 51–53).¹⁷

A related concept is that of *habitus*. Developed by Pierre Bourdieu, *habitus* conveys how one habitually inhabits and perceives the world through one's body. *Habitus* is shaped by physical and social—class, cultural—environments, and it in turn shapes how distinctions and classifications are made: it is "a structured and structuring structure."¹⁸ Perhaps bridging the idea of a *habitus* with that of professional fronts is the proposal of Bourdieu that there is such a thing as *disciplinary habitus*, elaborated more recently as *epistemic habitus* to emphasize what epistemic methods and paradigms professionals are trained to trust.¹⁹ These ideas are crucial for understanding the social constitution of embodied, profession-specific beliefs and practices, and how these in turn can be structuring social relations. They can help pick out the performed characters of a practice and its ethos. But the concepts of *habitus* and front differ from that of the face. Indeed, as I understand it, the face can crack through fronts and punctuate *habitus*.

Like *habitus*, the face is embodied, and, like a front, it is surface-like. What is special about the face, however, is that encountering it raises a moral question: *How are you doing?*²⁰ The face, unlike one's front or *habitus*, is expressive of a particular, unique, though undoubtedly multiply classifiable, being. Encountering the face comes with a kind of moral qualia grounded in a relational, communicative experience with the Other.²¹ Psychologists and neurologists now study special responses to facial expressions, as well as humans' and animals' capacities to read faces as signs of empathy.²² Emmanuel Levinas is one of the first philosophers known to credit faces with this type of power.

Levinasian Faces

Levinas's contribution to ethics is quite ingenious: According to him, what binds me ethically to the Other is not sameness or kinship—I do not have

a responsibility to you because you are my child or friend—but rather radical Otherness. How can this radical difference be understood? Levinas calls it a “secrecy” or “inner life.”

The real must not only be determined in its historical objectivity, but also from interior intentions, from the *secrecy* that interrupts the continuity of historical time. Only on the basis of this secrecy is the pluralism of society possible. It attests this secrecy. We have always known that it is impossible to form an idea of the human totality, for men have an *inner life* closed to him who does, however, grasp the comprehensive movements of human groups. (TI, 57–58; emphasis added)

Now, if we accept that other living beings, apart from humans, can present us with such hidden, inner lives, then what Levinas calls secrecy means that there is something left over when we try to comprehend individuals as (just) part of a social whole.²³ If this type of secrecy is common among us, then why should we think of it as a point of difference? Though it might be a feature that we can think of as shared, the shared feature is the impossibility of *it* being shared. Furthermore, otherness is radical for Levinas: it does not admit of degrees. There can be no order according to how much “more Other” beings are.²⁴

The alterity of the other does not depend on any quality that would distinguish him from me, for a distinction of this nature would precisely imply between us that community of genus which already nullifies alterity. (TI, 194)

Though the concept of otherness implies a kind of other-than structure, that is, *something* to be other than, the basis of Otherness is radical (rooted, cutting deep), for each and all.

How can we tell whether someone is the Other? Levinas says that this is a matter not of epistemology, but of ethics. As Peter Atterton notes,²⁵ relating to the Other is not a matter of making a kind of inference, for example, based on noticing similarities, that here is some other person. Rather, what the ethical encounter consists of is a *direct experience of a self in the expressiveness of the Other*. This primary expressiveness Levinas calls “the face.”

The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding *the idea of the other in me*, we here name face. This *mode* does not consist in

figuring as a theme under my gaze, in spreading itself forth as a set of qualities forming an image. The face of the Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me, the idea existing to my own measure and to the measure of its *idea-tum*—the adequate idea. It does not manifest itself by these qualities, but *kath'auto* [i.e., in person, *per se*]. It expresses itself. (TI, 50–51)

So, Levinas defines the face as a mode in which the Other presents himself to me, which exceeds any one conception of the Other. How, then, is the face *expressed*? The face is “given” through “speech” (*parole*): “The face speaks. The manifestation of the face is already discourse” (TI, 66). However, the way the face speaks need not involve language: “Saying opens me to the other, before saying something said, before the said that is spoken in this sincerity forms a screen between me and other. It is a saying without words . . . silence speaks” (TI, 170). Thus, for Levinas speech is not necessary for encountering the Other, and it could even create “a screen,” despite its sincerity. Expressing the face happens further through the eyes and body. As Levinas notes: “The eyes break through the mask—the language of the eyes, impossible to dissemble. The eye does not shine; it speaks” (TI, 66). And further: “In the face the existent *par excellence* presents itself. And the whole body—a hand or a curve of the shoulder—can express as the face” (TI, 262).

Levinas thus concedes that the following aspects express the face: eyes, as well as embodied movement. These modes are available to animal Others. In “The Animal Interview,” when directly asked whether animals have a face, Levinas professes ignorance, though a conditional ignorance: “I do not know how to answer that question, since more specific analyses are needed” (AI, 4). Perhaps what Levinas is after, what a more specific analysis would offer, is what conditions *encountering* a face, that is, how a face is faced (or effaced). Levinas rejects the idea that the face applies to a flea: “It’s an insect, which jumps, eh?” (AI, 4). Still, the specification of who the flea is through what Levinas proposes it does (“jumps, eh?”) flags this as a matter for consideration. Were the flea trying to escape from a pool of water, or hide from a scratching claw, might one consider it differently? I turn to another essay for some guidance.

On Facing Animals: Emmanuel Meets Bobby

Levinas discusses the *expression* of the face in eyes, bodies, silence: this is how the face is given. But what is needed to “receive” the face? What is involved in *facing*, understood as encountering the Other through the face?

In the essay "The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights," Levinas recounts his experience as a prisoner of war, protected from Nazi atrocities by his French uniform.

[T]he other men, called free, who had dealings with us or who gave us work or orders or even a smile—and the children and the women who passed by and sometimes raised their eyes on us—stripped us of our human skin. We were subhuman, a gang of apes. (*DF*, 152–53)²⁶

One imagines the force of those raised eyes, or the giving of orders or "even a smile" as "stripping" the prisoners "of their human skin." The torture of giving something (recognition, a smile) only to take it away. The pain and nakedness felt have nothing to do with physical violence—the uniform protected them against that. It is rather the denial of the prisoners' "secrecy" that Levinas communicates. Those people were perhaps seen, yet considered known; they were marked, they were prisoners and French; not German. They could be banded together in thought, as another kind of (human) animal. In this type of encounter both prisoners and captors become unfree.

Levinas notes the prisoners' thinking, pains, laughter, sickness, "the work of our hands and the anguish of our eyes," "all that passed between parentheses" (*DF*, 153). The parentheses were offered literally by the walls of the encampment, the construction of a space perceived as "nowhere" (*DF*, 153),²⁷ but also by their human captors: "[b]eings entrapped in their species; despite all their vocabulary, beings without language" (*DF*, 153). Both prisoners and those "called free" are seen to be constrained: shut "in a class," deprived of expression, condemned to "being 'signifiers without a signified,' and from there to violence and fighting" (*DF*, 153). They are deprived not of the face understood as a property, as something had; if we follow Levinas, *all humans* (perhaps all living beings) have that. What gets denied is the face understood as a capacity and accomplishment: *the expression and encounter of the Other through the face*.²⁸ And what is it that brackets facing? Whatever it is, Bobby remains immune to it.

Levinas recounts that "a stray dog [*un chien errant*]" entered our life." This "mistaken," errant dog diverged from the humans' behavior. Bobby appeared at the prisoners' morning assembly and when they returned from work. He jumped on them with joy and barked, happy to see them. For him they were (his) people. Levinas tries to make sense of this dog: the one they called "Bobby," giving him an exotic (singular) name "as one does with a cherished dog" (*DF*, 153).

The naming of the dog introduces the natural into the realm of rights, of reason and justice. However, that is subsequent to the human-animal encounter. What Emmanuel and his camp mates accomplish in the naming is an ethics

of the face; and that is because the dog accomplishes that first, too. In that sense, and though Levinas purports to have been literal in this story, the dog is "Emmanuel" (Hebr. Immanuel): bearing the message of "god with us," he recognizes and holds the Other's "secret," the silence (or happy barking), the face. Bobby, like his ancestors, which Levinas sees in the dogs of Egypt, keeping silent while Jewish slaves escaped, helps these prisoners get free: free from their own namelessness in encampment.

Now I hope that we have not been carried too far away from the lab. The crux of Levinas's "entire" philosophy is that "with man, there is something more important than my life, and that is the life of the other. That is unreasonable. Man is an unreasonable animal" (*AI*, 5). Using animals to reason with, in the lab, faces this type of unreason; and systematically evades it.

I use *face* to denote the extended/expressive face, expressive through bodily or body-based surface that "exudes" or communicates the inner being of the Other. The face includes visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, or other sense-scapes that communicate the inner, "secret" being of the Other.

Technologies of Effacement: How to Systematically Avoid Facing Others

I propose that the normative struggles that staff working with animals experience are partly due to a vacillating ethical stance: both facing and effacing animals. Facing animals need not bar killing them. Levinas discusses the face as in fact the only thing that might inspire murder, that is, total negation.

Murder exercises a power over what escapes power. It is still a power, for the face expresses itself in the sensible, but already impotency, because the face rends the sensible. The alterity that is expressed in the face provides the unique "matter" possible for total negation. I can wish to kill only an existent absolutely independent, which exceeds my powers infinitely, and therefore does not oppose them but paralyzes the very power of power. The Other is the sole being I can wish to kill. (*TI*, 198)

The challenge is that in the case of animal research, it is not clear that anyone *wishes* to kill these animals. People certainly do kill animals, *but the act of killing seems to lack intention*. The episode in Svendsen and Koch, where staff consider the act of killing, as slaughter, murder, as euthanasia, or as someone else's doing communicates this kind of uncertainty. Without this wish for total

negation, the act of murder becomes a problem.²⁹ But perhaps this missing wish to kill *each* animal indicates something further: killing, in this context, rides on a kind of negation, a blocking of the face, or what I call *effacement*.

Technologies of effacement are techniques, tools, and procedures manifestly developed to support rational, in this case epistemological, engagements with other animals. They also operate to sustain effacement: impeding the *direct experience* of the Other by modifying sensory-symbolic, visual, olfactory, tactile, auditory, or sonic features the Other presents with. Technologies of effacement help to script encounters with individual animals as tokens of a type. They are premised on an assumption common in experimental science that the particular can be made to speak of the general. That is the opposite of encountering the Other, the “secret” of Levinas: it is an encounter with the ordered, the “known” or “knowable.” Though I am not making any claim about the epistemological superiority of either of the two stances, they imply different ethics.

What follows is based on my own engagement as an “embedded philosopher” with a biomedical research facility in a Scandinavian university, which included six months of following animal research experimentations, from animal training through sacrifices and subsequent processing of samples in the spring and fall of 2012. My informants withdrew their consent for me to share empirical material, including photos and interviews collected in that period, so my references remain vague. I discuss five types of what I understand as technologies blocking the human and animal face. These are: (1) built environments and architecture; (2) entering and exiting procedures; (3) personal protective clothing and equipment; (4) naming and identification techniques; and (5) experimental protocols. I propose that effacement does not always result in a missing face, but rather in a new, added face.

Architectures and Built Environments

As already mentioned, animal research facilities are characterized by secure locations. The animal house might be geographically secluded, located underground, and behind doors that are unmarked and require access codes to enter. The space of the laboratory is a clinical, surgical space: smooth, often metallic surfaces promote sanitization and sterilization, and pale and cold colors (white, light green, grays, and blues) evoke something ethereal canceling out the reds and pinks of flesh and blood. Animal houses are not designed as the homes of integral animals. They facilitate spotting, processing, and eliminating bodily fluids, microbes, contaminants, and so forth that might have a higher chance of being encountered here.

Animals are often in temperature- and light-controlled rooms, lacking windows. The natural waking cycle of laboratory rodents is the opposite of

humans: they are nocturnal. Thus, rodent rooms will be kept dark during the day so that the animals are awake when experimenters want to work with them. Though labs are often dubbed “animal houses,” one rarely sees or hears these animals except when inside experimental rooms. There are no windows, no displaying of animals for its own sake as in a zoo. Rather the staff encounters the animals in work situations during feeding, examining, training, or experimenting. Soundscapes here are, in general, muffled sounds absorbed rather than let out. One is more likely to hear doors opening and closing mechanically, the beeping of codes as they are punched in, and human conversation than hear the animals. When staff members bump into each other, there are standard greetings but little sustained conversation. Actions here are mostly oriented toward the work at hand, namely, experiments. The sacrificial situation is markedly different: teamwork is in train, and camaraderie, joking, “make-believe” singing or shouting out of organ names as they get passed out, weighed, and measured makes the sacrifices socially one of the liveliest phases in the research. But I’ll say more about added faces later.

The built environment blocks the animal and human face by holding bodily movements, senses, and the gaze tied to the experimental situation and precluding viewing or hearing the Other until and unless one is working with her. I remember how relieved I was to discover a window, looking out to a river, in a common staff room within the animal house. It was a one-way window, but the sense of the outside, of a river—even if it was, atypically for Scandinavia, littered—made me realize that I had been holding my breath in these rooms. The blocking of perspective, of closed doors and corridors leading movements to experimental rooms that keep animals and researchers hidden, creates a sense of enclosure if not entrapment. Built space helps constitute another type of secrecy: this is manifestly driven by concerns of hygiene and security, as what is needed to extract the real “scientific” find from messy reality and politics, but it is also where the face is obstructed—constituted as irrelevant, if not polluting.

Entering and Exit Procedures and Special Garments

Entering and exiting these facilities involves special procedures for sanitizing the body. The populations of animals held in animal houses are often bred for specific conditions, frequently from genetically identical strains. Animals are highly standardized and sensitivities to pathogens can affect whole cohorts. Strict standards for hygiene are crucial for limiting the traffic of contaminants into and out of the lab. Entering and exiting the lab happens in liminal, in-between spaces. The function of these rooms is, on the one hand, to hold staff members’ personal items, clothes, boots, umbrellas, and so on, and, on the other hand, to offer staff, once undressed and washed, clean laboratory uniforms,

clogs, masks, hats, and gloves. This "personal protective equipment" (PPE) is not personalized. Items come in standard sizes that generally are a bit too loose or too tight. One tolerates that for a short while.

The effect of this preparation is dual. On the one hand, there is the purpose of hygiene, achieved via new, exterior cover for these interior spaces. On the other hand, there is the effect of having donned gear that expresses much less of one's style than one's personally chosen cool shirt, or jewelry, or favorite colors, streamlining instead exterior looks to match the known, expected professional uniform. Much like the uniforms that "protected" Levinas and his campmates, these uniforms function to protect people not only physically but symbolically. Their actions with/on animals in these locales are ones that would create intense reactions outside the lab ("What? You are touching a rat!"). Uniforms and equipment physically block the expressiveness of the face, hats hiding hair and haircuts, goggles shielding eyes, gloves sheathing fingers and touch, masks muffling the voice and mouth; a known, same look prevails. And yet, one does not thereby become unrecognizable. I remember feeling the gaze of a male technician, looking at me as if I were a woman. I was so startled—I thought this could not have happened while I had my lab clothes on. Of course, one's gender, race, and individuality do not disappear just because of a uniform. My reaction though showed that I was not preparing to be looked at like *that*. (Does one ever *prepare* for that? Probably, when making oneself look "attractive"; though that seems like another fiction of control.) Still, the liminal, in-between spaces and new garb create the opportunity not only for shielding built interiors from germs, but for shielding the moral integrity of staff working on animal experimentation, at least by dressing as professionals.

Uniformity also characterizes the animals' appearance, though not by means of uniform clothing. Common laboratory animals, like rats and mice, are typically bred from the same strain, and thus look similar to each other. Often laboratory animal strains will have uniformly colored fur, making individuals difficult to tell apart. It would seem silly to propose that there might be some identifying bows or clothes for the lab animals, and yet such garments are not unheard of for pets.

Identification and Labeling Techniques

Michael Lynch wrote a seminal paper on how a "naturalistic" animal gets rendered into an "analytic" animal through laboratory sacrifices.³⁰ The paper compares laboratory sacrifices to sacrifices in other, social-anthropological settings where they amount to transforming the profane into the sacred, using the animal as

an intermediary between the human and the divine. Lynch argues that the scientific sacrifice has that same character of mediating between the profane or mundane, and the scientific. To turn the naturalistic animal into an analytic object, special identification and labeling techniques are used.

The same inscription [the animal's identifying number] was previously written in a number of different places: on a tag affixed to each rat's cage while the animal was still alive, on the rat's tail (written with a marking pen) just prior to its sacrifice, on a jar of preservative fluid in which the decapitated head was placed, on a disk of plastic in which dissected fragments of the brain were embedded, and on the container in which electron micrographic sections were stored. Each of these sites marks a stage in the selection and processing of the animal's remains.³¹

Preferred ways of identifying laboratory animals include numbers and graphic signs, such as lines drawn on tails or holes punched in ears. Instead of "exotic" names, fit for "cherished" animals, laboratory animals are identified as items in an order of numbers or lines. They each get a unique number, though there is nothing about *that* number that fits *them*. Rather, what gives meaning to the number are practices of counting, of ordering items into predefined spaces, whether these be cages in the animal house, the experimental room, the spreadsheet holding information about the animal's performance on the test, or the vial holding his clavicle or aorta. *That* rat is already those samples, even before his body gets dismembered. Interestingly, naming animals is more common in fields of behavioral research with "higher" animals, such as primates. Perhaps this means of effacement is unwarranted when individual behavior is under study, indicating the type of relational attention that otherwise gets blocked. According to some studies, using proper names for laboratory animals affects how closely laboratory staff relates to an animal.³² In human societies, proper names are usually reserved for people, pets, and—because they are respected for their power—storms.

To be sure, even when animals are identified numerically, one could get to know them. A number need not prevent a special relationship with some animals, especially those encountered regularly. The active one becomes "the athlete," the lazy one "the academic." Still, identification methods that use the logic of a series (of numbers, letters, lines, holes) help to efface each animal, making it a token of a known type instead of a radically other individual. For similar reasons, some species of animal may be preferred as experimental

models because they are taken to all “look the same”: for instance, mice, rats, or fish.³³ One rarely finds these animals as pets: their face then can get more easily blocked by a front, their presumed type or species.

Experimental Protocols

Human-animal engagements in the lab follow a protocol. Protocols are like recipes: they offer instructions for how, how often, using what techniques, and with what cohorts one should engage to test a hypothesis. Protocols carve out the time humans and animals spend together into tasks. The manifest aim of following a clear routine is to create a procedure that can be easier to track causally, to validate, and to replicate scientifically. In practice, however, experimental protocols operate to script engagements between humans and animals, streamlining them to the scientific task at hand; this means that often the same procedure will be followed with each animal, in either the test or the control groups, repeatedly. Further, engagements between humans and animals that are not dictated by the protocol could be seen as unnecessary: petting, massaging, or talking with the animals might be frowned on as “unprofessional,” if not as confounding research results.

Crucially scripting human-animal engagements through a protocol might inhibit the kind of spontaneity that would occur when facing the Other. But also, specific techniques block the human and animal face in the lab. For instance, picking up a rat from the root of her tail is a technique that is preferred by researchers though distressing for the rats. One reason why it may be preferred by staff is that the technique helps block the animal face. Unlike holding a rat in one’s palm, which the rat prefers, picking her up from her tail prevents you from feeling tiny clawed paws grasp back on your fingers. (They are warm and sharp!) The rat becomes like a teacup you hold by the tail, giving the impression (especially if you don’t look at her swiveling) that she is disembodied, not there. Or recall the case of Alex. Wrapping the animal in a towel, as “people” say, functions not only as a material bondage, but also as a barrier between the animal and human face, shielding the Other’s face from speaking against one’s grip.

Ironically, even anesthesia affects the animal face: anaesthetized eyes lose their shine. The process aims for the animal to lose his sensibility to the painful procedures that ensue, but the limpness of the body and dullness of his eyes help convince the experimenter that the Other is not fully “there,” enabling the experimenter to perform the procedures culminating in the cutting and delegated, distributed progressive killing of an animal during sacrifices.³⁴ Indeed it becomes hard to say when exactly the animal dies, as he gets progressively emptied of

organs. Still, the face can speak through the body, the blood flowing, the heart beating even once it is excised.

While blocking the animal face is part of doing research, so is reading the face, first, to comply with regulations for minimizing animal suffering, and second to draw accurate inferences regarding how test procedures affect the animals. Perhaps not surprisingly, facing experimental animals has been subject to standardization and automation via the mouse and rat “grimace scales,” implemented in Rodent Face Finder[®] software.³⁵ These scales have the stated aim of translating pain research results from rodents to humans, figuring out whether pain relief is achieved in the rodent or not. The scales use a standard set of markers on rodents’ faces, for example, the scrunching of their noses, or narrowing of the eyes, the drawing back and flattening of ears or whiskers.³⁶ Now, an instrument such as a grimace scale has obvious benefits once it comes to the ethos of the ordered: it enhances measurability by codifying visual aspects of human-animal encounters into particular variables that can then be ordered in a series or scale, allowing for measurement, generalization from individuals to populations, and replication.

However, by now you know what I will say: the projection of a scale on the animal face is a prime example of a “frontal” encounter with the Other. What you are bound to find is expected, a grimace, fitting somewhere on a scale. Meeting the shiny eyes of the Other becomes, if actual, a problem. As we read in the description of the software developed to automate reading these face-frames, Rodent Face Finder[®] “successfully automates the most labor-intensive step in the process.”³⁷ What is this arduous step? “Grabbing individual face-containing frames from digital video, which is hampered by uncooperative subjects (not looking directly at the camera) or otherwise poor optics due to motion blurring.”³⁸ It is hard to reduce the animal to a “frame,” or a front, when it is moving, or looking away. Photography holds the potential to mediate encounters with the face (a reason why some photographs are so haunting), yet what gets mediated here is what Michel Foucault has called the medical, ordering gaze.³⁹ This automation need not exclude an empathetic response—such as euthanizing an animal suffering “too much.” Still, the labor saved is that of facing the Other. Facing is not equivalent to empathy: it involves meeting radical *otherness*, bringing a kind of groundlessness as an aspect of the encounter: an openness, a silence—what comes before empathy, or sorrow, or dread.

Laboratory procedures and instruments producing “inscriptions” operate in a similar manner. The ready-labeled containers, test tubes, vials, or spreadsheets help to funnel the unexpected singular animal into a context structured already by scientific assumptions about what matters.⁴⁰ The bench equipment provides, as does a built architecture, a material environment that guides the body and

its movements, and orders the gaze to hold some aspects of the experience and name them, while discarding others. The flesh may be sticking to the bone, warm, but you just need to cut it out, and put it into the vial. Throw the rest of the animal in the trash.

Added Faces

Laboratory technologies are built structures, tools, techniques, and procedures enveloped in logos, in a rationale for their design and use. I have been describing how some of these technologies operate as technologies of effacement, blocking the human and/or animal face, and structuring encounters between humans and animals according to an ethos of the ordered. I see it perhaps as a symptom of such a process of effacement that what I call “added faces” may show up in these spaces. It is tempting to see these add-on faces as fronts—as surfaces hiding, or glossing over the Other’s interiority in ways that align with some professional ethos. However, and perhaps to be a bit more precise about the kind of texture these add on, I would rather keep calling them *added faces*, in that they provide symbols of some inner, emotional, or moral being that humans and animals have or acquire in the lab and that do not immediately strike one as developed as part of a professional practice. Added faces are found across all the preparations I mentioned.

Once it comes to the built environment, added faces may take the shape of decorations. These could be posters, images of wildlife or of natural surroundings, aiming to counter the artificiality of the animal house and make it more home-like for animals. For instance, images of wild snow-bunnies were hanging in one of the animal houses I visited. These wild relatives of the captives in the lab offered a kind of balm for the gaze, perhaps a reassurance of things being otherwise elsewhere, much like a window to an ideal landscape.

Adding faces to personal protective equipment could take the form of personalizing uniforms, or styling the wearing of the uniform. It might also involve expressions of humor, flirting, or joking as strategies that succeed in venting emotion and in performing personality, while at the same time evading hurtful or stressful encounters and building rapport with others on the team. Such behavior has been observed among medical staff working in acute situations.⁴¹ These behaviors can be seen as adding an alternative, happy face to oneself, enacting work as if it were fun, palatable, and natural. Faces can be added through other laboratory equipment. Especially evocative was a plastic (or polystyrene) foam block where rodents’ paws would get pinned after anaesthetization so that the first incision down the chest can be made. A smiley face

was drawn on the plastic foam so that, once the animal’s body is passed to the next person, the foam block smiles back. And so on.

Added faces may also be found in the form of cartoons. In her account of the development of the Jackson Lab experimental mouse, Karen Rader mentions that the lab director C. C. Little wrote to Walt Disney to ask him to produce some promotional imagery for the lab—unsuccessfully.⁴² A blow-up photocopy of a smiling Disney character, *Ratatouille*, with holes drawn on the rat’s ears was used to guide staff on how to punch holes in rodents’ ears, how many holes to punch, and where in order to tell the animals apart. The imagery manages to add face to an invasive labeling procedure. Imagery used in scientific presentation slides will often include stock images of the strain of animal used in high definition; sometimes images of the animals under study appear as part of the evidence or methods presented. Rarely are animals presented for their own sake, as in the case of family vacation slides. Rather, cartoon characters of the animal in question, dressed in a lab coat may appear, saying something pleasant or funny to the scientific audience, like “Thank you for your attention!”

Staining and Remaining Faces

Levinas identifies something persistent about what is existent in the face.

The primordial signifyingness of the existent, its presentation in person or its expression, its way of incessantly upsurging outside of its plastic image, is produced concretely as a temptation to total negation, and as the infinite resistance to murder, in the other qua other, in the hard resistance of these eyes without protection—what is softest and most uncovered. (TI, 262)

Effacement cannot be total for Levinas. Perhaps for him what resists negation is the divine: “In the face the Other expresses his eminence, the dimension of height and divinity from which he descends” (TI, 262). I doubt Levinas would find divinity in a rat, but I cannot forget a particular one. She tried to escape the experimenter’s grip on her way to the anesthesia chamber, and in that instant I could not but hope with her. Her inability to escape that grip, and my inability to move, all became a message from her, facing me—both of us hoping in our hopelessness.

Caught in this vacillating, split gaze, from the fascia to the face, humans and animals in the lab cannot but get tangled up in what Donna Haraway calls “sharing suffering.”⁴³

Conclusion: Toward Humanimal Research Ethics

The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics. (TI, 43)

Within a Levinasian frame, ethics becomes an accomplishment: that of breaking up one's habituated behavior, stumbling at the Other's face. Current ethics guidelines call attention to aspects worthy of consideration in the experimental situation ("Reduce, replace, refine!"). However, the effect of such guidelines is often to create new mnemonics that flow by without capturing the type of silence that Levinasian ethics mandates.

A humanimal research ethics is an ethics of the human-animal relation itself, premised on the possibility of humans and animals encountering each other through the face.⁴⁴ Humanimal research ethics claims that harms and benefits cannot be considered for one side alone, for just the animal or the researcher. In that sense, the point is neither to develop professional ethics to help the humans cope, nor to make animals more comfortable. Rather humanimal research ethics involves stumbling on the particularities—good, bad, or visceral—of encountering the Other through her face. It offers a frame where humans can share suffering with the animals, irrespective of whether their research aims are achieved or whether society approves or disapproves. A humanimal research ethics would leave space for facing each other in research, as animals.

Smart and passionate philosophers have developed principled positions for how to relate to animals (e.g., animal rights, utilitarianism, care ethics). These approaches have power. But they can also become philosophical tropes that lack a face. As Niklas Forsberg so eloquently asks,

Is it possible that we sometimes turn to arguments to hide our own weaknesses? Do we at times turn to abstract theorizing in order not to face reality? And, if so, how does that affect philosophy, how we do philosophy? (These are questions, not answers. I'm asking, not asserting.) This much seems to be true: philosophical clarity may require a form of writing that enables us to absorb the intimate details of our lives in language.⁴⁵

So to finish, I present two texts about my encounters with animals, facing each other:

[My pet dog,] Pavlo has a small warm soft silky body. When I wake up I go to him, and I kneel on the floor by his pillow and I embrace him, I cover his body with mine, my head on the crook of his belly, his head in the crook of my neck, his face breathing into my heart. And we rest there happy to not be fully woken up.

I read somewhere that dogs do not like hugs. But mine seems to envelop me instead.

The orchestrated movement of humans, animals and organs within the sacrificial dance is impressive, timed, precise, and exhausting. The joking atmosphere, the calling out of organ names as they are repeatedly extracted, weighed and preserved, the carrying forward, singing (instead of crying or screaming) is no antidote to how heavy one feels. Afterward.

The red that takes over the white as rats get cut open, again and again—that is what I see. And the one who tried to escape.

Notes

1. A broader version of this argument that includes phenomenological approaches to the face/front distinction is published in German as Sophia Efstathiou, "Im Angesicht der Gesichter: *Technologien des Gesichtsverlusts* in der Tierforschung," in *Philosophie der Tierforschung, Vol. 3: Milieus und Akteure*, eds. Matthias Wunsch, Martin Böhnert, and Kristian Köchy; trans. Franz Mutschler (Freiburg/München, Germany: Karl Alber Verlag, 2018), 375–419.

2. According to Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), camps articulate a political exception by providing the physical spaces where the law is suspended. In this sense, and given that general laws for animal welfare are suspended in the space of the lab, these spaces might be thought of as examples of camps.

3. I will be working with Nicole C. Nelson, "Model Homes for Model Organisms: Intersections of Animal Welfare and Behavioral Neuroscience around the Environment of the Laboratory Mouse," *Biosocieties* 11, no. 46 (2016), doi10.1057/biosoc.2015.19; Mette Svendsen and Lene Koch, "Potentializing the Research Piglet in Experimental Neonatal Research," *Current Anthropology* 54, no. 57 (2013): 118–28; Carrie Friese, "Realizing Potential in Translational Medicine: The Uncanny Emergence of Care as Science," *Current Anthropology* 54, no. 7 (2013): 129–38; Tora Holmberg and Malin Ideland, "Secrets and Lies: 'Selective Openness' in the Apparatus of Animal Experimentation," *Public Understanding of Science* 21, no. 3 (2010), 354–68; Lynda Birke, Arnold B. Arluke, and Mike Michael, *The Sacrifice: How Scientific Experiments Transform Animals and People* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2007).

4. For a discussion of the critical work done by noticing differences between manifest (defined) and operative (used) concepts of X, see Sally Haslanger, "What Are

- We Talking About? The Semantics and Politics of Social Kinds," *Hypatia* 20, no. 4 (2005): 10–26.
5. For epistemological issues around model organism, see: Soraya De Chadarevian, "Of Worms and Programmes: *Caenorhabditis elegans* and the Study of Development," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 29 (1998): 81–105; Robert Meunier, "Stages in the Development of a Model Organism as a Platform for Mechanistic Models in Developmental Biology: Zebrafish, 1970–2000," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences* 43 (2012): 522–31; Rachel A. Ankeny et al., "Making Organisms Model Humans: Situated Models in Alcohol Research," *Science in Context* 27 (2014): 485–509.
 6. Consider the history of the Jackson lab, as described in Karen Rader, *Making Mice: Standardizing Animals for American Biomedical Research 1900–1955* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).
 7. Nicole C. Nelson, "Model Homes for Model Organisms: Intersections of Animal Welfare and Behavioral Neuroscience around the Environment of the Laboratory Mouse," *Biosocieties* 11, no. 46 (2016), doi10.1057/biosoc.2015.19: 8–9. Hereafter cited as *MH*.
 8. Vinciane Despret, "The Body We Care For: Figures of Anthro-zoo-genesis," *Body and Society* 10, no's. 2–3 (2004): 111–34.
 9. Mette Svendsen and Lene Koch, "Potentializing the Research Piglet in Experimental Neonatal Research," *Current Anthropology* 54, no. 57 (2013): 118–28.
 10. *Ibid.* 125–26. Note that because of Denmark's tradition of pig farming, cultural and historical relationships to piglets may be distinctive in this context.
 11. Tora Holmberg and Malin Ideland, "Secrets and Lies: 'Selective Openness' in the Apparatus of Animal Experimentation," *Public Understanding of Science* 21, no. 3 (2010): 354–68. Hereafter cited as *SL*.
 12. Lynda Birke, Arnold B. Ariuke, and Mike Michael, *The Sacrifice: How Scientific Experiments Transform Animals and People* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2007), 154–55.
 13. Carrie Friese, "Realizing Potential in Translational Medicine: The Uncanny Emergence of Care as Science," *Current Anthropology* 54, no. 7 (2013): 129–38. The episode I discuss is described on p. 134.
 14. *Ibid.*, 131–32.
 15. William M. S. Russell and Rex L. Burch, *The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique* (1959). Available at: http://altweb.jhsph.edu/pubs/books/humane_exp/het-toc. Last accessed: 05.09.17.
 16. Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1959), 34. Hereafter cited as *PS*.
 17. For more on "fronts" and "frontality," see David Morris, "Faces and the Invisible of the Visible: Toward an Animal Ontology," *PhaenEx* 2, no. 2: 124–69, and Elizabeth Behnke, "From Merleau-Ponty's Concept of Nature to an Interspecies Practice of Peace," in *Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology and Animal Life*, ed. H. Peter Steeves (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 93–116. Morris contrasts the "logic of the face" to what he calls a "frontal logic," which reduces things to fronts for other things, as lacking inner depth or life. Articulating Behnke's notion of "frontality," Morris

identifies it as "an attitude in which nature, being, space, duration, and so on are posited as objects, over-against a subject who surveys them from above or the outside, and in which nature is posited as a totality of things that are spread out outside of one another, with no internal relations" (145)—a logic that infuses the ontologies of modern science.

18. Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste* (New York and London: Routledge, 1984), 170 (see also the figure on 171).

19. Mathieu Albert, Susanne Laberge, and Brian David Hodges, "Who Wants to Collaborate with Social Scientists? Biomedical and Clinical Scientists' Perception of Social Science," in *Collaboration across Health Research and Medical Care: Healthy Collaboration*, eds. Bart Penders, Niki Vermeulen, and John N. Parker (London: Ashgate, 2015), 59–80.

20. David Morris, "Faces and the Invisible of the Visible: Toward an Animal Ontology," *PhaenEx* 2, no. 2 (2007): 124–69.

21. Facing could be understood more broadly as the type of process enabling the experience of normative qualia, that is, values that are understood as intrinsically experienced. This would make *value-ing* instances primary to determining a valued value.

22. The literature here is vast, but I offer some suggestions. British neurophysiologist Jonathan Cole argues that the face is crucial for interpersonal relatedness, and that empathy requires the embodied expressiveness of the face, though he primarily considers humans; see "Empathy Needs a Face," *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 8, no's. 5–7 (2001), 51'68; also *About Face* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998). Work on primates suggests that the face has a role in communication and empathy, for example, mother-to-infant communication parallels human mother and infants via exaggerated facial expressions, that are then mimicked by the infant, as reported in Pier Francisco Ferrari et al., "Reciprocal Face-to-Face Communication between Rhesus Macaque Mothers and Their Newborn Infants," *Current Biology* 19, no. 20 (November 3, 2009): 1768–72. See also Marina Davila Ross et al., "Rapid Facial Mimicry in Orangutan Play," *Biological Letters* 4, no. 1 (February 23, 2008): 27–30. Even more fascinatingly, some recent work suggests that facial recognition need not exclude invertebrates, even ones lacking neocortex-like cells, such as fish. See Cait Newport et al., "Discrimination of Human Faces by Archerfish (*Toxotes chatareus*)," *Nature Scientific Reports* 6 (2016) (article number 27523).

23. Note that a similar idea, of the real making itself known to perception in part through its hiddenness, is an idea that we find in Husserl, with whom Levinas studied in Freiburg in 1928. A typical example is of an object, such as a cup, which makes itself apparent to our perception only by showing part of its surface, what painters call perspective (see Morris, "Faces and the Invisible of the Visible").

24. Thus, as Peter Atterton argues in "Levinas and Our Moral Responsibility toward Other Animals," *Inquiry* 54, no. 6 (2011): 633–49, Derrida is wrong to claim that animals are "more" Other than humans (634–36).

25. *Ibid.*, 637.

26. Atterton (this volume) notes that Levinas gestures to the animals, the band of apes, in what appears to be a derogatory manner, as "less" than human, though he may just be communicating a common perception that being treated as if they were apes by these people meant being treated as less than human, since most people think that apes are quasi-human.

27. Levinas here echoes the exclusionary thinking of racism: of considering the camp as a no place, with no people, not mattering. Reversely in the recognition (even of a dog) the prisoners can find a home—that is, having a home is implicated in having a friend.

28. From an epistemological perspective, one might say that encountering “proves” the having of a face. I would thus be tempted to claim that facing is epistemologically prior to the face, even if we accept with Levinas that the face is not known epistemically, that its mode of expression is ethics.

29. See also Tora Holmberg’s auto-ethnography of taking an animal research training course in “A Feeling for the Animal: On Becoming an Experimentalist,” *Society and Animals* 16 (2008): 316–35. Holmberg justifies her killing an animal, delegating murder, by stating that someone else would have killed the animal if she hadn’t. Lynda Birke, Arnold B. Arluke, and Mike Michael also note this kind of stance among science students, and characterize it as a case of denial or distancing in *The Sacrifice: How Scientific Experiments Transform Animals and People* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2007). I here attribute this type of denial to, in part, the systematic effacement of humans and animals involved in the research.

30. Michael Lynch, “Sacrifice and the Transformation of the Animal Body into a Scientific Object: Laboratory Culture and Ritual Practice in the Neurosciences,” *Social Studies of Science* 18, no. 2 (1988): 265–89.

31. *Ibid.*, 271. I have been thinking of the transfiguration of the everyday into the scientific as *found science*, by analogy to found art. See Sophia Efstathiou, *The Use of ‘Race’ as a Variable in Biomedical Research*, PhD thesis (University of California, San Diego, 2009). Found science arises through what I think of as a two-part process of finding and founding entities in scientific contexts of space and interest. In my vocabulary, the rat thus becomes a found model, by being founded in a context of modeling spaces and interests.

32. Hal Herzog, “Ethical Aspects of Relationships between Humans and Research Animals,” *ILAR Journal* 43, no. 1 (2002): 27–32.

33. Arnold B. Arluke and Frederic Hafferty, “From Apprehension to Fascination with ‘Dog Lab’: The Use of Absolutions by Medical Students,” *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 25, no. 2 (1996): 201–25, discusses the training of medical students using dogs, and the challenges of encountering dogs.

34. See *ibid.*

35. D. J. Langford et al. “Coding of Facial Expressions of Pain in the Laboratory Mouse,” *Nature Methods* 7, no. 6 (2010): 447–49; S. G. Sotocinal et al., “The Rat Grimace Scale: A Partially Automated Method for Quantifying Pain in the Laboratory Rat via Facial Expressions,” *Molecular Pain* 7, no. 55 (2011), doi: 10.1186/1744-8069-7-55.

36. These types of images are also used to train personnel to recognize when and what care is needed for animals, for example, how big a tumor should be allowed to get, what types of behaviors like scratching or biting may be signals of distress, and so on.

37. Sotocinal et al., “The Rat Grimace Scale: A Partially Automated Method for Quantifying Pain in the Laboratory Rat via Facial Expressions,” *Molecular Pain* 7, no. 55 (2011), doi: 10.1186/1744-8069-7-55: 1 of 10.

38. *Ibid.*, 2 of 10.

39. Michel Foucault, *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, trans. Alan Mark Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).

40. I have elsewhere called this type of equipment “founding tools” because they are used to establish or institute a nonscientific thing as part of science; see Efstathiou, *The Use of ‘Race’ as a Variable in Biomedical Research*, PhD thesis (University of California, San Diego, 2009). Here I am interested in the loss of the face incurred during such a founding process.

41. See Kate Watson, “Gallows Humor in Medicine,” *The Hastings Center Report* 41, no. 5 (2011): 37–45; Gitte Koksvik, *Blurry Lines and Spaces of Tension. Clinical-Ethical and Existential Issues in Intensive Care: A Study of Three European Intensive Care Units*, PhD thesis (Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 2016). See also Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1959), on “disruptions” of a projected definition of a situation that may include jokes and humor (25).

42. Karen Rader, *Making Mice: Standardizing Animals for American Biomedical Research, 1900–1955* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

43. Donna Haraway, *When Species Meet* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 69–94.

44. Thank you to Robert Meunier for stressing this point.

45. Niklas Forsberg, “Different Forms of Forms of Life: A Philosophical Introduction,” in *Language, Ethics and Animal Life: Wittgenstein and Beyond*, eds. Niklas Forsberg, Mikel Burley, and Nora Hämmäläinen (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 1–15.