Abstract
To understand a term or other symbol, I argue that it is generally neither necessary nor sufficient to assign it a unique determinate reference. Independent of and prior to investigation, it is frequently indeterminate not only whether a sentence is true, but also what its truth conditions are. Nelson Goodman's discussions of likeness of meaning are deployed to explain how this can be so.
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Elgin, C.Z. Interpretation And Understanding. Erkenntnis 52, 175–183 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005565825835
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005565825835