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Kant and the Maltreatment of Animals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

Elizabeth M. Pybus
Affiliation:
University of Glasgow
Alexander Broadie
Affiliation:
University of Glasgow

Extract

In Philosophy 51, October 1976, 471–472, Professor Tom Regan takes ud to task for our attack on Kant's theory concerning the moral status of animals. The ground of Regan's criticism is that ‘… it is clear that Kant does not suppose, as… Broadie and Pybus erroneously assume that he does, that the concept of maltreating an animal, on the one hand, and, on the other, the concept of using an animal as a means, are the same or logically equivalent concepts’ (p. 471). Regan argues that Kant does not say that we should avoid treating animals as a means. Rather, he claims, Kant's view is that we have an indirect duty not to maltreat animals, since in maltreating them we treat, or run the risk of treating, as a mere means rationality in ourselves or in others.

Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1978

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References

1 ‘Kant's Treatment of Animals’, Philosophy 49, 10 1974, 375383.Google Scholar