Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
Douglas on values: From indirect roles to multiple goals
Introduction
Over the past fifteen years, Heather Douglas has published a series of influential pieces that challenge the “value-free” ideal for scientific reasoning (see e.g., Douglas, 2000, Douglas, 2003, Douglas, 2008, Douglas, 2009). In the process, she has stimulated a wave of interest in the argument from inductive risk (e.g., Biddle and Winsberg, 2010, Brown, 2013, Elliott, 2011a, Elliott, 2011b, Steel, 2010, Steel and Whyte, 2012, Steele, 2012, Wilholt, 2009, Winsberg, 2012). According to this argument, scientists are forced to make value judgments when choosing the standards of evidence required for accepting hypotheses (Churchman, 1948, Rudner, 1953). While it is relatively uncontroversial that values can legitimately influence many aspects of science (e.g., decisions about what research projects to pursue or how to apply scientific findings), the inductive-risk argument goes further by showing that even the appraisal of hypotheses should not be value-free.1
Douglas contextualizes the inductive risk argument in a broader framework. First, she emphasizes that scientific practice is permeated by numerous small-scale decisions that must be made under inductive risk (see e.g., Douglas, 2000). Second, she argues that scientists have ethical responsibilities to avoid causing negligent harm to others as a result of the way they make these decisions (Douglas, 2009). Finally, she insists that while scientists ought to consider the harmful consequences of making erroneous decisions (an “indirect” role for values), they should not slant their reasoning with the goal of bringing about consequences that they find appealing (a “direct” role for values) (Douglas, 2009).
The next section of the paper distills this framework into four major claims. Section 3 then introduces an important problem with Douglas’s account. Namely, her distinction between direct and indirect roles for values, which is an important element of her approach to regulating values in science while rejecting the value-free ideal, is ambiguous between two interpretations. Section 4 argues that both interpretations have significant weaknesses. Fortunately, Section 5 shows that two elements of her account that have previously received much less emphasis (namely, her comments about the goals of science and the ethics of expertise) provide resources for developing a promising new account of values in science.
Section snippets
Douglas’s four major claims
In recent papers (e.g., Douglas, 2000, Douglas, 2003, Douglas, 2008) and a book (2009), Douglas has developed a prominent challenge to the ideal of value-free science, together with a positive account of how values can be incorporated in science while maintaining scientific integrity. This section distills the major elements of her account into four important claims. These claims do not exhaust all the features of her account, but they do capture most of its crucial components. By analyzing
Direct and indirect roles: the problem of ambiguity
While the four claims identified in Section 2 provide a systematic and innovative approach for regulating values in policy-relevant science, they ultimately face a significant difficulty. The problem is that the Direct and Indirect Roles claim, which serves as an important element of Douglas’s approach to regulating values in the assessment of hypotheses while rejecting the value-free ideal (Douglas, 2008, Douglas, 2009), is problematic. This section highlights the fact that the distinction
The consequential interpretation
Not only is Douglas’s distinction between direct and indirect roles ambiguous, but it also faces a dilemma: both the logical and the consequential interpretations have significant weaknesses. Let us first consider the consequential interpretation, because it represents Douglas’s own unique way of interpreting the distinction. Recall that when she discusses the indirect role for values, she frequently emphasizes not only that scientists should weigh uncertainty but that they should focus only on
Reformulating Douglas’s account
If the criticisms of the Direct/Indirect Roles claim in Sections 3 Direct and indirect roles: the problem of ambiguity, 4 Direct and indirect roles: a dilemma are convincing, then Douglas’s account of values in science needs to be reconsidered. Central to her 2009 book was the claim that the value-free ideal for science could be rejected while maintaining the integrity of science as long as scientists allowed themselves to be influenced by values only in the indirect role and not in the direct
Conclusion
This paper has distilled Douglas’s influential account of values in science down to four major claims: Inductive Risk, Value Permeation, Ethical Responsibility, and Direct/Indirect Roles. The first three claims provide an important challenge to the traditional value-free ideal for scientific reasoning. However, the Direct/Indirect Roles claim, which has served as an important part of Douglas’s approach to regulating values in science while she abandons the value-free ideal, turns out to be
Acknowledgments
I thank Heather Douglas, Daniel McKaughan, Daniel Steel, and two anonymous reviewers for very helpful feedback on earlier versions of this paper.
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