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Imagination in the Experience of Art

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Extract

In this paper I shall not be concerned with the imagination as insight, but only with certain aspects of ‘magical’ imagination, that division of the concept which centres upon the notion of an image. In the Philosophical Investigations (II xi) Wittgenstein makes the extremely interesting remark that when a printed triangle is seen, for instance, as a mountain, it is as if an image came into contact, and for a time remained in contact, with the visual impression (i.e. with the object as seen by me). He goes on to say that in a picture a triangular figure may have some such aspect permanently — in the pictorial context we would read the figure at once as a mountain — but that we can make a distinction between ‘regarding’ and ‘seeing’ the figure as the thing meant. I take him to be contrasting those common experiences in which we see a figure in a picture as depicting a person, or as a ‘picture-person’, with those rarer experiences, referred to by art-critics when they talk of ‘presence’, in which it seems as if the person depicted in the picture is there before us ‘in the flesh’, and I assume that, like Sartre, Wittgenstein would suppose that imagination plays a part in experiences of this latter kind. In this paper I shall be concerned not with this sense of the presence of the object depicted, but chiefly with types of imaginal experience in which the image which seems to come into contact with what is perceived is an image of something which is not depicted or described in the work, but which nevertheless achieves a certain strength of presence. I shall consider, also, some types of imaginal experience which we would not naturally describe as an image's coming into contact with what is perceived. Though I shall relate some of the examples I discuss to my starting-point in Wittgenstein, I do not claim to be elaborating Wittgenstein's remark in a manner which would have been acceptable to him. My aims are to give some indication of the nature and scope of the imaginal experience of art, to defend the aesthetic relevance of this type of experience, and to suggest why the imaginal experience of art has been, and still is, valued.

Type
Papers
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1972

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References

page 89 note 1 For a more complete account see also Meager, R., ‘Aesthetic Concepts’, British Journal of Aesthetics, 10 1970Google Scholar; and my ‘Aesthetic Theory and the Experience of Art’, Proc. Arist. Soc. 19661967.Google Scholar

page 90 note 1 An Essay on Landscape Painting (John Murray, 1959) p. 34.Google Scholar

page 91 note 1 The Art of Appreciation (Oxford University Press, 1970) p. 186.Google Scholar

page 91 note 2 Quoted in Forge, A., Soutine (Spring Books, 1965) pp. 38–9.Google Scholar

page 92 note 1 See: Form in the Visual Arts', British Journal of Aesthetics, summer 1971, pp. 215–36.Google Scholar

page 96 note 1 Critique of Judgement, ed. J. C. Meredith, bk II, § 51, p. 183.Google Scholar

page 96 note 2 Op. cit., §49, pp. 175–80.

page 97 note 1 Cathedrals of France, trans. Geissbuhler, E. C. (Beacon Press, 1965) p. 162.Google Scholar

page 97 note 2 In Arberry, A. J., Mystical Poems of Rūmī (University of Chicago Press, 1968) p. 107Google Scholar. I interpret the last line of the poem to mean: ‘What you drink is really your own new imagination …’. See Arberry, , p. 191.Google Scholar

page 98 note 1 Philosophers sometimes write as if the work was never fresh, and will never become stale no matter how often we experience it.

page 101 note 1 See, for example, Thomas B. Hess's account of his response to Soutine, 's Hill at CéretGoogle Scholar, quoted in Forge, A., p. 39.Google Scholar

page 101 note 2 See, for example, his account of his response to Soutine, 's Page Boy at Maxim'sGoogle Scholar, in Forge, A., pp. 30–1.Google Scholar

page 101 note 3 Op. cit, § 49, p. 177, 1. 15.

page 104 note 1 Swann's Way, Part II, trans. Moncrieff, C. K. Scott (Chatto and Windus, 1960) p. 183Google Scholar. This passage is discussed by Merleau-Ponty, M., in The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Lingis, A. (Northwestern University Press) pp. 149–51.Google Scholar

page 104 note 2 The Art of Appreciation (Oxford University Press, 1970) p. 186.Google Scholar