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Knowing How to Know That

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Abstract

Many virtue-based approaches to propositional knowledge begin with the ability and achievement intuitions. In this paper, I rely on this pair of intuitions to explore the relationship between knowing how and knowing that. On the view that emerges, propositional knowledge is a kind of success through cognitive know how. Rather than simply equating know how with ability, I reveal deeper connections between both kinds of knowledge by focusing on the role of self-regulation.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank John Greco, Bryce Huebner, Colin Hickey, Trip Glazer, and Lillian Chang for their comments and encouragement on earlier version of this paper.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, 215 New North Hall, 37th and O Streets, N.W., Washington, DC, 20057, USA

    Benjamin Elzinga

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Elzinga, B. Knowing How to Know That. Erkenn 87, 1987–2001 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00286-5

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