

How Not to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist:

Francisco Peinado on Truthmakers for Negative Truths¹

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Much of recent metaphysical debate hinges on the notion of a truthmaker. According to David Armstrong's characterization, a truthmaker for a true proposition is "some existent, some portion of reality, in virtue of which that truth is true."² For example, Lucy is the truthmaker for the proposition that Lucy exists. And the fact that Lucy is running (if there is such a thing) might be the truthmaker for the proposition that Lucy is running. The idea of a truthmaker is often used to "regiment metaphysical inquiry."³ The thought is that asking what makes true propositions true is a good guide to ontological commitment.

Perhaps the most trenchant problem in contemporary truthmaker theory is the problem of negative truths: it is hard to see what could make negative truths true, and intuitively, such truths do not even need truthmakers. For example, it is hard to see what portion of reality could make it true that Pegasus does not exist, and intuitively, 'Pegasus does not exist' is true because Pegasus does not exist, not because something else does exist. Very roughly, there are three approaches to the problem of negative truths in the contemporary literature. Some philosophers posit exotic entities like totality facts and negative facts as

¹ All translations are my own. Seventeenth-century works are cited according to their original divisions. This paper descended from papers read at the 2013 Princeton Penn Columbia Graduate Conference, the 2015 Truth and Grounds conference in Ascona, Switzerland, and the 2015 NEH seminar, "Between Medieval and Early Modern" in Boulder, CO. Thanks to the respective audience members for helpful input. This paper has also benefited from the comments of several readers and interlocutors, including (but probably not limited to): Megan Embry, Peter King, Adam Murray, Martin Pickavé, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Marleen Rozemond, David Sanson and Jessica Wilson. Finally, a reviewer for this journal provided insightful comments that helped me clarify the paper considerably.

² D. M. Armstrong, *Truth and Truthmakers*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 5.

³ Armstrong, *Truth and Truthmakers*, 4.

truthmakers for negative truths;⁴ others argue that more mundane entities, like the world, are truthmakers for negative truths;⁵ others reject the assumption that generates the problem in the first place – the assumption that negative truths have truthmakers.⁶

Iberian and Italian scholastics of the seventeenth-century also had the notion of a truthmaker (*'verificativum'*), and they engaged in sophisticated debates about truthmakers for various problematic truths, including modal truths, tensed truths, and negative truths.⁷ In response to the problem of negative truths, seventeenth-century scholastics carved out roughly the same conceptual space that contemporary philosophers have carved out, typically endorsing one of three positions: (i) negative truths are made true by negative entities called 'lacks'; (ii) negative truths are made true by positive entities, including divine decrees; (iii) negative truths do not have truthmakers.⁸ While the conceptual space was broadly the same then as it is now, the details were developed quite differently. In this paper I explain how the third solution to the problem of negative truths was developed by Francisco Peinado (1633-1696).

⁴ Armstrong posits totality facts in *Truth and Truthmakers*; Stephen Barker and Mark Jago posit negative facts in "Being Positive about Negative Facts," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 85 (2012), 117–38.

⁵ Ross Cameron, "How To Be a Truthmaker Maximalist," *Noûs* 42 (2008), 410–21; Jonathan Schaffer, "The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 60 (2010), 307–24.

⁶ Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, and Barry Smith, "Truth-Makers," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 44 (1984), 289, 314ff.

⁷ On the advice of Sven Knebel, John Doyle was the first to translate *'verificativum'* as 'truthmaker'. See John Doyle, "Another God, Chimerae, Goat-Stags, and Man-Lions," *Review of Metaphysics* 48 (1995), 773, fn. 12. For more detailed discussions of truthmaking in seventeenth-century scholasticism, see Jacob Schmutz "Verificativum," in D. Calma, I. Atucha, C. König-Pralong, I. Zavettero (eds.), *Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach*, (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 739–748; Brian Embry, "Truth and Truthmakers in Seventeenth-Century Scholasticism," *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* 1 (2015), 196–216.

⁸ For discussion of this debate, see Tilman Ramelow *Gott, Freiheit, Weltenwahl. Die Metaphysik der Willensfreiheit zwischen Antonio Pérez S.J. (1599-1649) und G.W. Leibniz (1649-1716)* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 230–50; Sven Knebel, *Wille, Würfel und Wahrscheinlichkeit: Das System der moralischen Notwendigkeit in der Jesuitenscholastik, 1550-1700* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000), 175–79; Jacob Schmutz, "Réalistes, nihilistes et incompatibilistes: le débat sur les negative truthmakers dans la scolastique Jésuite Espagnole," *Cahier de philosophie de l'Université de Caen [Special issue titled 'Dire le Néant']* (2007), 131–78. For a detailed exposition of the first position, see Brian Embry, "An Early Modern Scholastic Theory of Negative Entities: Thomas Compton Carleton on Lacks, Negations, and Privations," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 23 (2015), 22–45.

In the contemporary literature the fully general truthmaker principle – “all truths have truthmakers” – goes by the name ‘Truthmaker Maximalism’. I will argue that Peinado effectively restricts the truthmaker principle to positive truths, thereby rejecting Truthmaker Maximalism. But the position that I attribute to Peinado is widely rejected in the contemporary literature. George Molnar calls restriction of the truthmaker principle “the way of ontological frivolousness” and “truly desperate.”⁹ Trenton Merricks puts a finer point on the objection. Writing ‘Truthmaker’ for a fully general truthmaker principle, he says:

The only reason to scale back Truthmaker to exempt negative existentials is that there do not seem to be truthmakers for negative existentials. Truthmaker theorists who proceed in this way have no principled objection to the cheater who, when confronted with her own apparently truthmakerless truths, scales back Truthmaker accordingly. For this cheater is simply adopting the strategy of the timid truthmaker theorist, concluding that since there do not seem to be any truthmakers for a certain kind of truth, none are required.¹⁰

Ross Cameron writes in a similar vein:

Either there’s something wrong with accepting truths that don’t have an ontological grounding or there isn’t: if there is, then *every* truth requires a grounding; if there isn’t, then *no* truth requires a grounding. Truthmaker theory is a theory about *what it is* for a proposition to be true; it’s not the kind of theory that can apply only in a restricted domain. What possible reason could one have for thinking of some propositions that they need to be grounded in what there is that doesn’t apply to all propositions? Why should it be okay for negative truths to go ungrounded and not okay for positive truths to go ungrounded?¹¹

The objection in these passages seems to be that restricting the truthmaker principle is *ad hoc*. What is needed is an independent reason to think that positive truths are grounded in reality, while negative truths are not.

My aim in this paper is to show (i) how Peinado restricts the truthmaker principle to positive truths, and (ii) how Peinado would answer the objection

⁹ George Molnar, “Truthmakers for Negative Truths,” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 78 (2000), 85.

¹⁰ Trenton Merricks, *Truth and Ontology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 40.

¹¹ Cameron, “How Not To Be a Truthmaker Maximalist,” 411-12.

from Merricks and Cameron. I will argue that Peinado provides independent reasons to think not only that negative truths do not have truthmakers, but that negative truths *cannot* have truthmakers. The paper proceeds as follows. In §2 I sketch a prevalent seventeenth-century theory of truth and truthmaking that is in the background of Peinado's discussion. This stage-setting will help to make sense of Peinado's positive view as well as the objections he considers likely to arise against his view. In §§3-4 I explain Peinado's view of negative truths and the reasons he gives for restricting the truthmaker principle to positive truths. In §5 I explain how he responds (or could respond) to select objections. As we will see, the claim that negative truths do not have truthmakers does not perfectly capture Peinado's position, but it is a good first pass, to be modified below in light of some problematic texts. For simplicity I will proceed through the next two sections as if Peinado's position is simply that negative truths do not have truthmakers. I will then introduce and accommodate the textual difficulty in section 4. It is also important to note that here I focus on negations of atomic propositions, entirely setting aside the problem of finding truthmakers for universally quantified truths. The reason for this choice is that scholastics did not treat quantifiers the way we typically do, and their treatment deserves a discussion of its own.

2. BACKGROUND

The fact that early modern scholastics did in fact have a notion of truthmaking that at least approximates the contemporary notion is clear from their characterizations of truthmaking.¹² Here are three examples (with 'truthmaker' translating '*verificativum*')

¹² The material in this section follows the more thorough discussion in Brian Embry, "Truth and Truthmakers in Early Modern Scholasticism," *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* 1 (2015), 196–216.

The immediate and formal truthmaker of a proposition is that by which a proposition is immediately and formally rendered true. (Francisco Peinado, 1633-1696)¹³

You have to say what it is for a proposition to be true and what is required in reality on the part of the object for the proposition to be true. The latter I call a truthmaker. (Giovannbattista Giattini, 1651)¹⁴

In all propositions some existence, or the ultimate actual truthmaker of the proposition, is affirmed. (Silvestro Mauro, 1619-1687)¹⁵

These passages suggest that for early modern scholastics a truthmaker is a portion of reality in virtue of which a truth-bearer is true.

The theory of truthmaking in the background of Peinado's discussion arises from a prevalent answer to the seventeenth-century scholastic disputation, 'What is truth?'. Before proceeding it will be useful to clarify what exactly this question about truth amounts to. 'What is truth?' is naturally understood in one of two ways. First, it might be asking for an analysis of what it is to be true. We could call this the 'analytic question'. An answer to the analytic question would fill in the right-hand side of the schema:

x is true =_{df} _____.

As a point of comparison, an analytic question is what philosophers typically have in mind when they ask, 'What is knowledge?', and it is what Socrates has in mind when he asks Euthyphro, 'What is piety?' When the early modern scholastics ask 'What is truth?', however, they are not primarily interested in the analytic question. Rather, they are interested in what I call the 'metaphysical question'. The metaphysical question asks what sort of thing truth is. Another way to put this question is to ask, in what ontological category does truth belong? Is truth a relation, a property, a being of reason, or something else

¹³ Peinado, *Disputationes in octos libros physicorum*, lib. 1, d. 7, s. 2, nn. 12, p. 177.

¹⁴ Giattini, *Logica*, q. 6, a. 5, p. 292.

¹⁵ Mauro, *Quaestionum philosophicarum liber secundus*, 170 (ad 5).

altogether? Because early modern scholastics were primarily concerned with the metaphysical question, I will begin with the metaphysical question, and then I will show how a prevalent answer to the metaphysical question entails an answer to the analytic question.

Early modern scholastics standardly conceive of truth-bearers as token mental acts.¹⁶ These mental acts go by various names, including ‘proposition’, ‘judgment’, ‘affirmation’, ‘cognition’, ‘mental act’, and sometimes just ‘act’. (Some of these terms can be seen in the above quotations about truthmakers). Going forward I will arbitrarily adopt the term ‘proposition’ for the relevant truth-bearing mental acts. But propositions in this sense are not abstract entities that provide semantic values for sentences. In the present context it is best to think of propositions as mental sentences. I will accordingly set off propositions with single quotation marks. The “content” of a proposition is its intentional object.

Many seventeenth-century scholastics use the language of parts and wholes to describe truth. The common view seems to have been that the truth of a proposition p is the mereological sum of p and its intentional object. Giuseppe Polizzi describes this sort of view in the following passage. (Polizzi is an opponent of the view, but his description is useful on account of being especially straightforward):

The first conclusion is that the object is not a part intrinsically composing formal truth and falsity. This is against Arriaga [...] Oviedo [...] and other contemporaries who think that truth is composed of two intrinsic parts, one of which is intrinsic to the proposition—indeed, it is the proposition itself—insofar as it affirms, for example, Peter’s running, and the other part is extrinsic to the proposition but

¹⁶ Gabriel Vázquez held the minority view that truth-bearers are something like the contents of mental acts. Suárez rejects Vázquez’s view, and subsequently Suárez’s view becomes the mainstream Jesuit position. See Vázquez, *Commentariorum ac disputationum in primam partem Sancti Thomae tomus primus* d. 76, ch. 1, pp. 452ff. Suárez rejects Vázquez’s view in *Disputationes metaphysicae* (Hereafter DM) 8.1 (XXV, 275-7.). The parenthetical reference indicates the volume and page number of the Vivès edition of Suárez’s *Opera*.

intrinsic to the truth, and it is the object existing in the way in which it is affirmed by the proposition.¹⁷

According to this passage, many seventeenth-century scholastics thought that truth is a composite entity. The parts of an instance of truth are (i) a true proposition, and (ii) that proposition's intentional object.

As far as I have seen, seventeenth-century scholastics do not provide semantics for determining the intentional objects of propositions. Most often they give examples. So for example, they say that the object of the proposition that Peter is running is *Peter's running*. Generally, the object of a proposition of the form '*a* is *F*' is *a's Fness*. So suppose that 'Peter is running' is about Peter's running. On the view described by Polizzi, if Peter's running exists, then the mereological sum of 'Peter is running' and Peter's running exists. Hence, it is true that Peter is running.

It should be noted that early modern scholastics tend to assume that we can think about things that do not exist. I can think about Peter's running even if Peter's running does not exist. In that case, the proposition that Peter is running would be false. The assumption that we can think about non-existent objects is controversial in the contemporary literature and may strike some as needing explication. Briefly, early modern scholastics standardly say that intentional objects that do not exist nonetheless have "objective being in the intellect".¹⁸ For simplicity we can think of "objective being in the intellect" as delimiting a Meinongian third realm. But it should be noted that there were further debates

¹⁷ Polizzi, *Philosophicarum disputationum tomus tertius*, d. 25, s. 4, n. 33, p. 366.

¹⁸ This is a standard line that can be found in many disputations on beings of reason. It can also be seen in this colorful passage by Arriaga: "First, it cannot be denied that some acts are false and others are true. Second, it cannot be denied that false acts are false because their objects do not exist in reality as they are affirmed by the acts, whereas true acts are true because their objects are as they are affirmed to be by the acts. These two claims are really most certain and cannot be denied by anyone. From these claims I infer, therefore, that there are some acts whose objects do not exist in reality. I will give you an example: 'A horse is rational'. The object of this act is a horse identified with rational, or a rational horse. But this horse does not exist in reality. Who would deny that? But it has being [*est*] through the intellect—that is, it is cognized by the intellect [...] Therefore the rational horse does not have being in reality, but only objective being in the intellect. (I really do not think this is denied by anyone, nor can it be)" (*Cursus philosophicus, Metaph.*, d. 6, s. 2, n. 8, p. 783).

about the ontological status of the third realm. Very roughly, some thought that objective being is reducible to some existing mental item, and others denied that objective being is so reducible.¹⁹ I do not want to enter that debate here, but I hope these sketchy remarks will help contemporary readers entertain the conceptual framework that supports the early modern scholastic debates about truthmaking.

I'll call the view described above by Polizzi 'the composite theory of truth'. As I understand it, the composite theory can be formulated as follows:

The Composite Theory of Truth: The truth of a proposition p = the mereological sum of p and the intentional object of p .

Given the above remarks about objective being, a worry now arises:²⁰ if merely objective beings can enter into composition relations, then every proposition will be trivially true just in virtue of having an intentional object. As far as I have seen, early modern scholastics did not explicitly address this worry. But one way to block the worry is to restrict composition to things that exist. This move is in keeping with the way the composite theory is often formulated in terms of propositions and their *existing* objects. (See the Polizzi quotation above and the first Arriaga quotation below.)

At any rate, the composite theory of truth appears to have been standard among seventeenth-century Jesuits, as suggested by the following remark from Luis de Losada:

The common opinion in our School is that truth consists in a complex of an act and an object.²¹

¹⁹ I take it this is what Suárez is concerned with at DM 54.2.3-4 (XXVI, 1019).

²⁰ Thanks to a reviewer for pressing this worry.

²¹ Losada, *Cursus philosophici prima pars*, t. 5, d. 2, ch. 1, n. 2 p. 231 (erroneously marked as p. 131). See also Mangold, *Philosophia recentior*, vol. 1, Ontology, diss. 4, a. 1, s. 4, n. 98, p. 96.

On the plausible assumption that the parts of truth are essential parts,²² the composite view of truth entails what I call the standard analysis of truth:

Standard Analysis of Truth: p is true =_{df} p exists and the intentional object of p exists.

The standard analysis is often endorsed explicitly. To give just one passage, Roderigo de Arriaga writes:

For a proposition to be true is nothing other than for it to affirm [for example] Peter's running, and for this to exist in reality. But this implies two things: the proposition and the *existence of the object*. [my emphasis]²³

It is not hard to see why early modern scholastics would have been attracted to the standard analysis of truth. Most early modern scholastics pay tribute to tradition by endorsing a conformity theory of truth. However, there was disagreement about how to understand the conformity theory. As Sebastián Izquierdo (1601-1681) tells us, "Both ancient and modern philosophers think that truth must be conformity between a cognition and the thing cognized, even if they are not in conformity in explaining what such a conformity amounts to."²⁴ The disagreement arises because the claim that truth is conformity is not very illuminating. The standard analysis dispenses with the mysterious notion of conformity and analyzes truth in terms of (i) intentionality and (ii) existence. Existence is arguably primitive, admitting of no further analysis.²⁵ And while it may be difficult to explain how intentionality works, most philosophers will accept the occurrence of intentionality, and it is therefore available in most

²² This idea is implicit in the quotation from Giattini above. In one place Polizzi claims that the parts of truth, on the composite theory, are like the body and soul of a human being, precisely because body and soul are not only parts but essential parts of a human being. (Polizzi, *Philosophicarum disputationum tomus tertius*, d. 25, s. 5, n. 49, p. 369).

²³ Arriaga, *Cursus philosophicus*, Logic, d. 14, s. 1, subs. 5, n. 27, p. 170.

²⁴ Izquierdo, *Pharus scientiarum*, t. 2, d. 3, q. 1, n. 3, p. 110.

²⁵ There was actually a debate about whether being is primitive. For the affirmative, see Giattini, *Logica*, q. 6, a. 2, p. 259ff.

philosophical toolkits. At any rate, if intentionality is a mystery, it is everyone's mystery, not only the conformity theorist's. The standard analysis of truth therefore improves on the conformity theory by reducing conformity to existence and intentionality.

The composite theory and the standard analysis of truth drive the account of truthmaking that is in the background of Peinado's discussion of truthmakers for negative truths. Many early modern scholastics speak of truthmakers both as parts of truth and as intentional objects of propositions. So the idea seems to be that a proposition's intentional object is that proposition's truthmaker because the proposition is true just in case that object exists.

The standard analysis of truth is fully general, so it entails that *every* truth has a truthmaker. Several seventeenth-century scholastics explicitly commit themselves to a fully general truthmaker principle. To reiterate the above quotation from Mauro, "in *all* propositions some existence, or the ultimate actual truthmaker of the proposition, is affirmed" (my emphasis).²⁶ And the author of an anonymous disputation on truthmaking tells us, "every act that is strictly true in the present ought to have a truthmaker strictly existing in the present."²⁷

The fully general truthmaker principle was often used to motivate realism about negative entities called 'negations' and 'lacks'. For example, Giambattista Giattini constructs the following truthmaker argument for the existence of negations:

It seems like you have to say that there are negations in reality.... This conclusion is proven because there must be a formal truthmaker for a negative proposition – for example, for the proposition by which I say "Light is not in the air". But this

²⁶ Mauro, *Quaestionum philosophicarum liber secundus*, 170 (ad 5). This claim does not entail that every proposition is true but that every proposition affirms the existence of a truthmaker. If I affirm the existence of Pegasus, my affirmation is true if and only if Pegasus exists. Similarly, if *p* affirms the existence of a truthmaker *T*, *p* is true if and only if *T* exists. Hence, every true proposition has a truthmaker.

²⁷ Anon., *Disputatio de obiecto et verificativo propositionum*, f. 220v.

truthmaker is not something positive. Therefore, it is a negation, distinct from everything positive.²⁸

Although he does not use the term ‘truthmaker’ in the following passage, Thomas Compton Carleton’s realism about negative entities is clearly motivated by the idea that truths have truthmakers. He writes:

That the man is dead, that the fire is extinguished, that Peter is not sitting and is not reading, that Paul is blind, and six hundred other such propositions, are no less true, really and mind-independently, than that the man lives, that Peter sees, &c. Therefore there must be something in reality from which the denomination [‘true’] comes to these propositions. But that could not be anything except negations.²⁹

As we will see, Peinado wants to excise negations from his ontology, and he wants to resist these truthmaker arguments for the existence of negations.

3. PEINADO ON NEGATIVE TRUTHS

Peinado’s view of negative truths is largely driven by a distinctive view of truth-bearers, which emerges in a debate about whether contradictory propositions p and $\neg p$ have the same intentional object. Peinado answers this question in the affirmative, his opponents in the negative. Peinado’s opponents typically claim that positive propositions are about positive entities, and negative propositions are about negative entities. More specifically, they claim that if p is about some positive entity x , then $\neg p$ is about the lack of x , where the lack of x is a *sui generis* negative entity that is incompatible with the existence of x .³⁰ I will call this the ‘object view’ of affirmation and negation, since it asserts that contradictory propositions differ according to their intentional objects. When paired with the composite view of truth, the object view entails that negative truths are made true by negative entities; indeed, it is noteworthy that Polizzi, an advocate of the

²⁸ Giattini, *Logica*, q. 6, a. 2, p. 265.

²⁹ Carleton, *Philosophia universa*, Logic, d. 18, s. 2, n. 6, p. 82.

³⁰ See Carleton, *Philosophia universa*, Logic, d. 18, s. 6, nn. 2-4, p. 84. For a detailed exposition of a seventeenth-century theory of lacks, see Embry, “An Early Modern Scholastic Theory of Negative Entities.”

object view, describes those who are opposed to the object view as motivated by the desire to reject negative entities.³¹ Note that on the object view, the term ‘not’ plays a role in determining the intentional object of a proposition: if ‘Peter is running’ is about Peter’s running, then ‘Peter is not running’ is about the lack of Peter’s running.

Others reject the assumption that ‘not’ plays a role in determining the intentional object of a proposition. This can be seen in the following passage by Luis de Losada.

In conditional acts, copulative acts, and disjunctive or vague acts, the particles ‘if’, ‘and’, and ‘or’ do not represent some conditionality, copulation, or disjunction or vagueness on the part of the object; they merely indicate a certain way of representing. The same thing must be said about the particle ‘not’ in negative acts.³²

According to Losada’s view, the disjunction ‘Peter is running or Paul is running’ is about Peter’s running on the one hand and Paul’s running on the other, and it represents those objects in a disjunctive way. Losada applies this view to negation. The idea is that if ‘Peter is running’ is about Peter’s running, then ‘Peter is not running’ is also about Peter’s running. Hence, contradictory propositions p and $\neg p$ differ not according to their intentional objects but according to a “way of representing” intentional objects. The relevant “way of representing” is often called a “*modus tendendi*”, which I translate henceforth as ‘intentional mode’.

Peinado illustrates distinct intentional modes with the case of love and hate. Love and hate have intentional objects, and they are different not because they have different intentional objects but because they are different ways of being cognitively related to their objects. Similarly, affirmation and negation are different ways of being cognitively related to an intentional object. I call this the ‘intentional mode view’ of affirmation and negation:

³¹ Polizzi, *Philosophicarum disputationum tomus tertius*, d. 50, s. 9, n. 160, p. 668.

³² Losada, *Cursus philosophici tertia pars*, Metaphysics, d. 4, ch. 3, n. 29, p. 157. See also Izquierdo, *Pharus scientiarum*, d. 2, q. 4, n. 171, p. 83; d. 2, q. 4, prop. 4, pp. 89ff; Lugo, *Disputationes scholasticae et morales*, d. 1, s. 3, nn. 13-14, pp. 3-4; nn. 17-25, pp. 4-5. Lugo’s discussion seems to have been influential on the intentional mode camp.

The intentional mode view: p and $\neg p$ have the same object and different intentional modes.

The fact that Peinado endorses the intentional mode view is clear from the following passage:

The affirmative and negative judgments mentioned above ['Peter exists', and 'Peter does not exist'] do not differ according to object, but both have for their object the existence of Peter. But they differ according to their intentional modes.³³

In this passage, Peinado says that the propositions 'Peter exists' and 'Peter does not exist' are both about the existence of Peter, and they differ only according to their intentional modes.

Peinado has several arguments for the intentional mode view. Here I will paraphrase two of them. Peinado thinks that we can deny content as well as affirm it. Using contemporary terminology, we could say that Peinado distinguishes between the force and the content of a proposition, and he further distinguishes between two kinds of force: positive and negative. The intentional mode view can account for these distinctions. The "content" of a proposition is its intentional object; the "force" of a proposition is its intentional mode. Thus, a positive proposition p affirms its object, and $\neg p$ denies its object. With this in mind, Peinado raises a dilemma for the object view. Consider the proposition that Peter does not exist. Does 'Peter does not exist' have an affirmative or a negative intentional mode? The advocate of the object view cannot say that 'Peter does not exist' has a negative intentional mode for the following reason: on the object view, 'Peter does not exist' is about the lack of Peter. So if 'Peter does not exist' had a negative intentional mode, it would deny the lack of Peter, and it would therefore be true when Peter exists, which is absurd. So the object view is committed to the claim that 'Peter does not exist' has an affirmative intentional

³³ Peinado, *De anima*, lib. 2, d. 3, s. 2.3, n. 25, p. 262.

mode. But in that case, the object view cannot account for the distinction between positive and negative force. On the object view, then, we can only ever affirm content; we cannot deny it.³⁴ This consequence of the object view is sometimes explicitly embraced. In a quotation we have already seen, Mauro claims that “in all propositions some existence, or the ultimate actual truthmaker of the proposition, is affirmed” (my emphasis).³⁵ Here Mauro explicitly states that all propositions are affirmative. But since we apparently can deny as well as affirm things, Peinado thinks we ought to endorse the intentional mode view of affirmation and negation.³⁶

Peinado also thinks that intentional objects are not fine grained enough to account for the difference between positive and negative propositions. This is because propositions with the same object might nonetheless differ with respect to polarity – one might be positive and the other negative. To see this, consider an example. According to the object view of negation, ‘Peter does not exist’ is about the lack of Peter. ‘The lack of Peter exists’ is also about the lack of Peter, yet ‘The lack of Peter exists’ is not syntactically negative. So here we have a positive and a negative proposition about the same intentional object. The intentional object alone therefore cannot discriminate between the positive and negative propositions. On the intentional mode view, however, ‘Peter does not exist’ is negative because it has a negative intentional mode, and ‘The lack of Peter exists’ is positive because it has a positive intentional mode.

Peinado’s view of negative truths is driven by his intentional mode view of negation, together with what I call ‘the aboutness constraint on truthmaking’.

³⁴ Peinado, *De anima*, lib. 2, d. 3, s. 2.4, n. 26, p. 262.

³⁵ Mauro, *Quaestionum philosophicarum liber secundus*, 170 (ad 5).

³⁶ Of course Peinado has not eliminated all the options with this argument. One might say, as Ockham apparently did, that propositions – rather than the objects of propositions – are the objects of affirmation and denial. On this view affirmation and denial are not built into propositions at all. This view does not appear to have been on Peinado’s radar, but it is not without difficulties. As Walter Chatton pointed out, the phenomenology of affirmation and denial tells against Ockham’s view, since we typically are not thinking about a mental act when we affirm or deny something. For more objections to Ockham’s view, see Susan Brower-Toland, “Facts vs. Things: Adam Wodeham and the Later Medieval Debate About Objects of Judgment,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 60 (2007), 597–642.

Aboutness Constraint: If T makes p true, then p is about T.

Recall that the standard analysis of truth entails that truths are about their truthmakers, so the aboutness constraint was widely accepted by Peinado's contemporaries. Peinado also accepts the aboutness constraint, as is clear from the following passage:

It seems obvious that no internal or external speech and no act of the intellect is rendered true by something that it does not say, by an object that it does not represent. For who would say that this act, 'Peter runs', is formally made true by the existence of God or by any other entity distinct from the running of Peter, which the act represents?³⁷

Peinado thinks that the aboutness constraint is "obvious," and he brings the obviousness out with an example. Imagine someone saying that God is the truthmaker for 'Peter runs'.³⁸ Peinado finds such a view obviously absurd. Peinado's diagnosis of the situation is that 'Peter runs' is about Peter's running, not God. More generally, true propositions are about the things that make them true. It is worth noting that many contemporary truthmaker theorists subject truthmaking to a relevance constraint due to worries about trivial truthmakers for necessary truths.³⁹ One way to cash out such a relevance constraint is to insist that truths be about their truthmakers.

Peinado's restriction of the truthmaker principle is driven by the intentional mode view of affirmation and negation and the aboutness constraint on

³⁷ Peinado, *De anima*, lib. 2, d. 3, s. 2.4, n. 32, p. 265.

³⁸ Some of Peinado's contemporaries thought that God's decrees are truthmakers for negative truths and tensed truths, and God himself is the truthmaker for all necessary truths. God's decrees are handy truthmakers because it is necessarily the case that if God decrees that p , then p is true. Against this, Peinado claims that propositions about ordinary creaturely objects ought to be made true by ordinary creaturely objects, not by God's decrees. See Mauro, *Quaestionum philosophicarum liber secundus*, qq. 47, 49, 51.

³⁹ The worry is that, absent a relevance constraint, anything can make true any necessary truth, since anything necessitates any necessary truth. But this trivialized truthmaking for necessary truths. See Greg Restall, "Truthmakers, Entailment, and Necessity," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 74 (1996), 333-34; Armstrong, *Truth and Truthmakers*, 10-12; Merricks, *Truth and Ontology*, 22-34.

truthmaking. Peinado nowhere gives an argument for the claim that negative truths do not generally have truthmakers. Instead, he proceeds piecemeal. His target is a particular version of the view that negative truths are made true by lacks.⁴⁰ The details of this theory are unimportant, for as we shall see, Peinado's argument generalizes. Peinado argues as follows:

A negative proposition (for example, 'Peter does not exist') does not have for its object the lack of Peter, but that existence which it negates [...] But no proposition is made true by something that is not its object [...] Therefore, a lack identified with something positive is not necessary for making negative propositions true.⁴¹

The argument here is simple: 'Peter does not exist' is not about the lack of Peter; so, by the aboutness constraint, 'Peter does not exist' is not made true by the lack of Peter. Peinado can run this kind of argument on any proposed truthmaker for 'Peter does not exist'. For example, suppose one of Peinado's opponents were to claim that 'Peter does not exist' is made true by God's decree that Peter not exist.⁴² Peinado will insist that 'Peter does not exist' is about Peter, not a divine decree. So 'Peter does not exist' is not made true by a divine decree. More generally, for any x ($x \neq$ Peter), 'Peter does not exist' is not about x , and 'Peter does not exist' is therefore not made true by x . Because 'Peter does not exist' is about Peter, Peter is the only thing that could make it true that Peter does not exist. But since Peter makes it true that Peter exists, Peter *cannot* be the truthmaker for 'Peter does not exist', on pain of contradiction. It follows that 'Peter does not exist' does not have a truthmaker. This argument generalizes. Hence, negative truths do not have truthmakers.

In order to make Peinado's commitments explicit, it is worth noting that the above argument hinges on the assumption that 'Peter exists' is true if its

⁴⁰ Some of Peinado's contemporaries claimed that negative truths are made true by lacks, but then they identified these lacks with positive entities in order to make them seem more respectable. That is the view in Peinado's sights here.

⁴¹ Peinado, *De generatione et corruptione*, lib. 1, t. s, d. 4, s. 2, n. 23, p. 211.

⁴² In fact, one of Peinado's opponents makes precisely that claim: Mauro, *Quaestionum philosophicarum liber secundus*, q. 49, pp. 197ff. For arguments against Mauro's position, see Giattini, *Logica*, q. 6, a. 2, pp. 260-65.

intentional object – Peter – exists (assuming the proposition, ‘Peter exists’ exists). Peinado needs a general version of this claim in order for the argument to generalize. I will call the general version ‘positive truth’:

Positive Truth: A positive proposition p is true if p exists and the intentional object of p exists.

Peinado’s opponents would have accepted Positive Truth because it follows from the standard analysis of truth. And although Peinado rejects the standard analysis of truth as conflicting with his view of negative truths, he accepts the standard analysis as restricted to positive truths. Hence, Peinado too accepted Positive Truth. The intentional mode view, the aboutness constraint on truthmaking, and Positive Truth together entail that negative truths do not have truthmakers.

4. A TEXTUAL DIFFICULTY

Unfortunately, Peinado does not explicitly say that negative truths do not have truthmakers. In fact, he sometimes states that negative truths *do* have truthmakers. For example, he says:

The truthmaker for the negative act, ‘Peter does not exist’, is Peter negatively represented by that act. Say the same thing about any other negative act.⁴³

The formal truthmaker of an affirmative proposition is the existence affirmed. Therefore, the formal truthmaker of a negative proposition is nothing other than the existence denied.⁴⁴

Far from endorsing the position I have attributed to Peinado, in these passages Peinado explicitly states that negative truths have truthmakers. Moreover, his claims about truthmakers for negative truths in these passages are deeply

⁴³ Peinado, *De anima*, lib. 2, d. 3, s. 2.4, n. 32, p. 266.

⁴⁴ Peinado, *De anima*, lib. 2, d. 3, s. 2.4, n. 34, p. 266.

puzzling. In the first passage Peinado says that ‘Peter negatively represented’ makes it true that Peter does not exist. Is Peter negatively represented the same thing as Peter? If so, how can Peter make it true that Peter does not exist? If not, what sort of thing is Peter negatively represented? The sense of the second passage seems to be that one existence makes contradictory propositions true. But if that is the case, then that one existence would make a contradiction true. So what is going on in these passages?

Peinado is aware of the fact that his view is non-standard and potentially confusing. In response to the worries I just raised about his position, he offers some clarification:

When we say, “A non-existent object makes a negative proposition true,” by this act we take the object negatively, since it is the same as to say, “The object does not exist, and the proposition says that and nothing else.”⁴⁵

This passage makes it clear that Peinado thinks that non-existent objects make negative propositions true. As he explains, when he says that a non-existent object makes a negative proposition true, he means that the proposition says that its object does not exist, and its object does not exist. So the idea seems to be that Peter, by failing to exist, makes it true that Peter does not exist. It therefore seems likely that when Peinado speaks of “Peter negatively represented,” he means something like “Peter, considered as non-existent.”

Peinado claims in several passage that non-existent objects are truthmakers for negative truths. In one such passage, he claims that the Antichrist makes it true that the Antichrist does not exist. He then considers the following objection:

When this act [‘The Antichrist does not exist’] is true, its truthmaker exists, for it is denominated ‘true’ from its truthmaker. But when this true act exists, the Antichrist does not exist. Therefore something else exists, which is its truthmaker.⁴⁶

Peinado responds to this objection by rejecting the major premise. He writes:

⁴⁵ Peinado, *De anima*, lib. 2, d. 3, s. 2.4, n. 37, p. 268.

⁴⁶ Peinado, *De generatione et corruptione*, lib. 1, t. 2, d. 4, s. 5, n. 55, p. 224.

I deny the major premise.... For if the truthmaker of a negative act – namely, its object – existed when the act exists, the act would be false; hence, for the act to be true, it is required that, when the true act exists, its truthmaker does not exist. On the contrary, the act is true precisely because its truthmaker does not exist.⁴⁷

In the face of the objection Peinado maintains quite explicitly that negative truths have truthmakers that do not exist. The Antichrist, by failing to exist, makes it true that the Antichrist does not exist.

Put this way, I think Peinado's view is still a bit confusing to contemporary ears. How can a proposition be made true by something that does not exist? Peinado's position can be illuminated with some terminology that was introduced by his colleague at the University of Alcalá, Juan de Ulloa Madritano (1639-1723). Madritano endorses Peinado's position, and to help explain the position he introduces a distinction between truthmakers in the positive sense and truthmakers in the negative sense. He describes truthmakers in the positive sense as follows:

The truthmaker of any act in the positive sense is that which the act is about [*attingitur per actum*], and additionally is such that when it exists, in proportion to the intentional mode, the act is true, and when it is absent, the act is false.⁴⁸

Based on this passage, truthmakers in the positive sense are what early modern scholastics standardly think of as truthmakers. For the sake of clarity, we can define a truthmaker in the positive sense as follows:

T is a **truthmaker in the positive sense** for $p =_{df} p$ is about T, and p is true if and only if T exists.

Madritano then describes truthmakers in the negative sense as follows:

⁴⁷ Peinado, *De generatione et corruptione*, lib. 1, t. 2, d. 4, s. 5, n. 55, p. 224.

⁴⁸ Madritano, *Prodromus*, d. 7, ch. 7, n. 53, p. 776.

A truthmaker in the negative sense I call that which the act is about and is such that the act is true if [and only if] it does not exist. Notice the difference here with a truthmaker in the positive sense.⁴⁹

Based on this passage and others like it, we can define truthmakers in the negative sense as follows:

T is a **truthmaker in the negative sense** for $p =_{df}$ p is about T, and p is true if and only if T does not exist.

And now we can express Peinado's view using the new terminology. Peinado's truthmaker principle states:

Peinado's truthmaker principle: Positive truths have truthmakers in the positive sense but not in the negative sense. (First order) negative truths have truthmakers in the negative sense but not in the positive sense.

Madritano nicely summarizes the Peinadian view of negative truths as follows:

You will say, so what is required for a negative proposition to be true? I respond that nothing is required in the positive sense, since negative propositions are not of the sort that strictly and properly *require* anything in order to be true; rather, they are of the sort whose truth is precisely prevented by something—namely, by the existence of their object.⁵⁰

So when Peinado says that 'Peter does not exist' is made true by Peter negatively represented, he means that Peter is the truthmaker *in the negative sense* for 'Peter does not exist'. And this amounts to the claim that 'Peter does not exist' is true because it is about Peter, and Peter does not exist.

⁴⁹ Madritano, *Prodromus*, d. 7, ch. 7, n. 54, p. 777. I add the material in brackets in light of other remarks made by Madritano, but nothing in this paper hangs on the addition.

⁵⁰ Madritano, *Prodromus*, d. 7, ch. 7, n. 59, p. 782.

5. OBJECTIONS

a. First objection: alethic pluralism

As we have seen, Peinado's truthmaker principle is largely motivated by his intentional mode view of affirmation and negation. Notice that the standard analysis of truth is not available to someone who endorses the intentional mode view. This can be seen by way of example. According to Peinado, 'Peter is running' is about Peter's running. From the intentional mode view, it follows that 'Peter is not running' is also about Peter's running. Hence, if the standard analysis of truth is correct, 'Peter is not running' is true if and only if Peter's running exists, which is obviously incorrect. So Peinado is not entitled to the standard analysis of truth.

As mentioned above, Peinado accepts the standard analysis of truth with respect to positive truths, but in order to accommodate his view of negation, he must modify the analysis with respect to negative truths, and this is precisely what he does:

For a negative act to be true now is for the act to exist now and for its object not to exist, since the act says that its object does not exist.⁵¹

So it seems that Peinado has distinct analyses of truth of positive and negative propositions. His analysis of truth for positive propositions is given by the standard analysis. And Peinado analyzes truth for negative truths as follows:

Negative Truth: A negative proposition $\neg p$ is true =_{df} $\neg p$ exists and the object of $\neg p$ does not exist.⁵²

So Peinado appears to be a sort of alethic pluralist. Yet Peinado's opponents commonly reject alethic pluralism. As Suárez writes, "truth ought to have the

⁵¹ Peinado, *De generatione et corruptione*, lib. 1, t. 2, d. 4, s. 5, n. 55, p. 224.

⁵² Peinado, *De generatione et corruptione*, lib. 1, t. 2, d. 4, s. 5, n. 55, p. 224.

same account [*ratio*] in every case.”⁵³ It is not clear exactly why Peinado’s opponents reject alethic pluralism. Perhaps they were concerned with theoretical parsimony. But it is worth noting that alethic pluralism has some problems well known from the contemporary literature. To give one example, we say that an argument is valid if and only if it is truth-preserving. If there is a unified analysis of truth, the concept of truth can help us explain validity. We can say that when an argument is truth-preserving, there is some one condition or property such that, if the premises satisfy it, then the conclusion satisfies it. But if there are different kinds of truth for different proposition types, it is no longer clear what truth-preservation amounts to. Further, if truth is different for positive and negative truths, it is unclear what we should say about the truth of a conjunction of a positive and a negative truth, or about iterated negations. Still further, Peinado thinks that every logical connective is an intentional mode,⁵⁴ and he presumably would want to make the same sort of moves with respect to other logically complex truths as he does with respect to negative truths. But then his analyses of truth must proliferate according to the infinitely many kinds of logically complex truths.

Unfortunately, Peinado does not respond to the charge of alethic pluralism. I will briefly deviate from the project of explaining Peinado’s account of truthmakers for negative truths in order to explain how someone attracted to Peinado’s account could provide an analysis of truth that preserves Peinado’s other commitments and dodges the charge of alethic pluralism.

The idea is to use a recursive analysis inspired by Alfred Tarski, with a correspondence theoretic base clause that helps preserve Peinado’s commitments

⁵³ DM 8.2.2 (XXV, 277). Some of Peinado’s opponents argue to the effect that someone who endorses the intentional mode view cannot account for truth. See Giattini, *Logica*, q. 6, a. 5, pp. 292-3; Polizzi, *Philosophicarum disputationum tomus tertius*, d. 50, s. 9, nn. 161-6, pp. 668-9.

⁵⁴ It is not clear what Peinado would say about the intentional modes of logically complex propositions with multiple logical connectives. Does such a proposition feature nested intentional modes? Or do the various logical connectives somehow work together to form a new intentional mode? It is not immediately clear how Peinado would answer these questions, or even what hangs on it.

about truthmaking.⁵⁵ For simplicity I want to start by assuming that there is only one logical connective, negation (\neg), and I want to set aside tense, modality, and other complicating syntactical features. I will understand atomic propositions to be propositions free of logical connectives – hence, only positive propositions are atomic. Focusing thus on a part of a language, we can define truth as follows:

The Recursive Analysis of Truth*

1. Where p is any atomic proposition, p is true if and only if the intentional object of p exists.
2. Where p is any proposition
 - a. $\neg p$ is true if and only if p is not true.

Clause 1 expresses Peinado's analysis of truth for positive truths. It therefore entails the first part of Peinado's truthmaker principle, that every atomic proposition has a truthmaker in the positive sense. The recursive analysis, together with the intentional mode view and the aboutness constraint, entails that negative truths have truthmakers in the negative sense but not in the positive sense. This can be seen as follows. Consider the negation, $\neg p$ of the atomic proposition p . According to clause 2, $\neg p$ is true if and only if p is not true. According to clause 1 p is not true if and only if its object does not exist. According to the intentional mode view of negation, the object of $\neg p$ is the object of p . So, $\neg p$ is true if and only if its object does not exist. Given the definition of 'truthmaker in the negative sense', it follows that $\neg p$ has a truthmaker in the negative sense (its object) but not in the positive sense. So the recursive analysis preserves Peinado's truthmaker principle. A further benefit of the recursive

⁵⁵ This idea is suggested in Mulligan, Simons, and Smith, "Truth-Makers". For brief discussion of the recursive correspondence theory of truth, see Marian David, *Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 119-124. David notes that someone adopting the recursive analysis cannot define the logical connectives in terms of truth, on pain of circularity. Special thanks to Adam Murray and Jessica Wilson for discussion here.

analysis is that it defines truth for iterated negation.⁵⁶ And crucially, it is not a form of alethic pluralism, precisely because it is recursive. It should be noted, however, that the recursive analysis does not fit well with the idea that primary truth-bearers are token mental sentences. If primary truth-bearers are token mental sentences, then the recursive analysis defines the truth of one token in terms of the truth of another token, and there is no guarantee that the second token exists. One way to avoid this problem is to pair the recursive analysis with the idea that primary truth-bearers are mental sentence types that exist even when their tokens do not.⁵⁷

As we have seen, Peinado and many of his contemporaries endorse an intentional mode view not only of negation but for of all logical connectives. For reasons similar to those explained in §3 above, it follows that the standard analysis of truth is not adequate with respect to molecular propositions. As far as I have seen, Peinado does not discuss molecular propositions involving conjunction and disjunction, but we can account for them in the recursive analysis by adding a clause for conjunction:

The Recursive Analysis of Truth

1. Where p is any atomic proposition, p is true if and only if the intentional object of p exists.
2. Where p and q are any propositions
 - a. $\neg p$ is true if and only if p is not true;
 - b. $p \wedge q$ is true if and only if p is true and q is true

⁵⁶ According to clause 2, $\neg\neg p$ is true if and only if $\neg p$ is not true; applying clause 2 again, $\neg p$ is not true if and only if p is true. And now according to clause 1, p is true if and only if its object exists. Putting all this together, we get $\neg\neg p$ is true if and only if the object of p exists. But according to the intentional mode view, the object of $\neg\neg p$ is the object of p . So $\neg\neg p$ is true if and only if its object exists. It follows that $\neg\neg p$ has a truthmaker in the positive sense.

⁵⁷ For a contemporary defense of the view that propositions are mental act types, see Scott Soames, *What Is Meaning?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

The remaining logical connectives can be defined in terms of conjunction and negation. Clauses 1-2b will tell us what is required on the part of the object(s) of a molecular proposition in order for that proposition to be true.

b. Second objection: privative propositions

One might wonder what Peinado would say about truths like 'Peter is blind'. Because 'Peter is blind' is syntactically positive, Peinado must assign it a truthmaker (if it is true), by his own lights. But it seems that 'Peter is blind' is in some sense negative. So it seems that Peinado must assign truthmakers to some negative truths.⁵⁸

I do not think that the above consideration presents any special problems for Peinado. His account of negative truths is neutral with respect to metaphysical theories of blindness, for example. Peinado insists that '*a* is *F*' is true just in case *a*'s *F*ness exists. Hence, Peinado can say that 'Peter is blind' is true just in case Peter's blindness exists. Nor does it follow that 'Peter is blind' is negative in Peinado's sense. Peinado's account of negative truths is an account of *syntactically* negative truths. Which truths are syntactically negative is built into the metaphysical structure of the truths themselves: the negative truths are all and only the ones with negative intentional modes.⁵⁹ Because 'Peter is blind' is affirmative, it is not negative in Peinado's sense.

As it turns out, Peinado rejects the existence of things like blindness and lacks more generally. For our purposes it does not matter why Peinado rejects the existence of lacks. The point I want to focus on is that because Peinado rejects the existence of lacks, Peinado claims that propositions such as 'Peter is blind' are literally false:

⁵⁸ Peinado considers this objection in *De anima*, lib. 2, d. 3, s. 2, subs. 4, n. 39, p. 268. For a contemporary version of the objection, see Molnar, "Truthmakers for Negative Truths."

⁵⁹ For simplicity I ignore iterated negation here, which these claims can easily be adjusted to accommodate.

These propositions seem to be affirmative: 'Peter fails to be [*deficit*]', 'Peter is excluded from things', 'There is a lack of Peter'. In these and similar propositions the verbs are alienated from their proper to their improper signification [...] For those verbs, properly taken, properly signify that the defect, exclusion, and the lack of Peter exist in reality [...] Thus all the above propositions, if they are not taken in a sense equivalent to negative propositions, are false.⁶⁰

I take it Peinado is making two moves in this passage. In one move, he is admitting that propositions like 'There is a lack of Peter' are literally false. In light of his analysis of truth for positive propositions, it is easy to see why Peinado would say that such propositions are literally false. 'There is a lack of Peter' is about the lack of Peter, so it is true just in case the lack of Peter exists. Peinado thinks that lacks do not exist; *a fortiori*, the lack of Peter does not exist. Hence, 'There is a lack of Peter' is literally false, even if Peter does not exist. Peinado would say the same sort of thing about 'Peter is blind'. (False because Peter's blindness does not exist, even if Peter cannot see.)

However, in the second move, Peinado claims that propositions like 'Peter is blind' can be taken as somehow equivalent to negative propositions, in which case they come out true. There is a question here how exactly syntactically positive propositions can be "taken in a sense equivalent to negative propositions". This has to do with Peinado's doctrine of alienation, which occurs when a verb receives non-standard signification in virtue of other terms in a proposition.⁶¹ A detailed discussion of the semantics of alienation would take us

⁶⁰ Peinado, *De generatione et corruptione*, lib. 1, t. 2, d. 4, s. 4, n. 39, p. 217. See also Peinado, *De anima*, lib. 2, d. 3, s. 2.3, n. 26, p. 263.

⁶¹ Peinado gives an explanation of alienation in his discussion of tense. See *De anima*, lib. 2, d. 6, s. 4, n. 66, pp. 400-01: "The verb in a proposition is often so affected by the character [*ratione*] of the particle placed on the part of the predicate that, although the verb itself properly signifies the present, nevertheless when it is conjoined with that particle it does not signify anything about the present, but about the past or future. Thus the verb 'is', taken in itself, signifies an existence of the present and nevertheless when it is conjoined with the particle 'dead' in this proposition 'Peter is dead', it does not signify that Peter presently exists, but that he existed in the past, since it is equivalent to this proposition, 'Peter existed, and does not now exist.'" In *Phys.* (lib. 1, d. 7, s. 2, n. 25, p. 183) Peinado attributes the alienation doctrine to Francisco Alonso (Alphonsus), who describes alienation as follows: "In propositions *de tertio adiacente* the verb 'to be' is sometimes taken from its proper signification to another signification. It happens this way in the following propositions: 'Peter is dead', and 'The Antichrist is future'. If the particle 'is' were placed without another predicate, it would signify that Peter and the Antichrist now exist. But because other

too far afield, and we need not understand the details of alienation in order to appreciate the *kind* of move, broadly speaking, that Peinado is making here. The claim is that a certain natural language sentence that we routinely treat as true turns out false upon closer metaphysical or scientific inspection. ('The sun is rising', for example.) However, there is a nearby sentence that more closely tracks the purported metaphysics and accordingly turns out true, and we treat the latter (true) sentence as somehow equivalent to the former (false) sentence. It is a difficult and controversial matter what could be the relationship between the true and the false sentence: alienation, regimentation, paraphrase, synonymy, analysis, translation, meaning, etc. At any rate, the sort of move Peinado is making in the above passage should be familiar to contemporary philosophers in the Quinean tradition, even if the details are not.

6. CONCLUSION

Peinado thinks that negative truths do not have truthmakers in the positive sense. In contemporary terminology, Peinado's view effectively restricts the truthmaker principle to positive truths. But contemporary philosophers often reject such a restriction of the truthmaker principle as *ad hoc*. It is now clear how Peinado would answer the charge of *ad hocitas*.⁶² Peinado would answer Cameron by saying that it is "ok for negative truths to go ungrounded" because the intentional mode view of affirmation and negation, the aboutness constraint on truthmaking, and the analysis of truth for positive truths jointly entail that negative truths do not have truthmakers in the positive sense. And Peinado

predicates are added to it, in the first place it signifies that Peter existed and now does not, and in the second place it signifies that the Antichrist does not exist now by will at some later time. The same goes for these propositions, 'Peter is possible' or 'Peter is not contradictory'. In these propositions the particle 'is', by reason of the predicate adjoined to it, is taken to signify that if Peter were to exist, a contradiction would not follow. Grammarians call this 'alienation', since, the copula is transferred from its proper to an alien signification because of an adjoined term." (Translated from Jacob Schmutz, *La querelle des possibles: Recherches philosophiques et textuelles sur la métaphysique Jésuite Espagnole, 1540-1767*, (unpublished dissertation, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 2003), vol. 2, 1091, fn. 33.

⁶² I have long felt that philosophers need an abstract form of *ad hoc*, and I prefer the scholastic barbarism 'ad hocitas' to the linguistic mongrel, 'ad-hocness'.

would simply deny Merricks's claim that "the *only* reason to scale back Truthmaker to exempt negative existentials is that there do not seem to be truthmakers for negative existentials." Although he agrees that there do not seem to be truthmakers for negative existentials, Peinado restricts the truthmaker principle because he independently endorses the intentional mode view of affirmation and negation, a certain analysis of truth for positive truths, and the aboutness constraint on truthmaking. Of the three doctrines, only the intentional mode view was not mainstream among his Jesuit contemporaries. And as we have seen, Peinado endorses the intentional mode view because he thinks it alone can account for the distinction between positive and negative force, and it alone can account for the difference between positive and negative propositions.

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