¹ For an expression of a similar relationship, between understanding and practical wisdom, see 1143a6–8.

² I refer to the following books by author's last name only: Cook Wilson, J., On the Structure of the Seventh Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Chapters I–X (Oxford 1879Google Scholar: 1912 reissue with a postscript on the authorship of the parallel versions); Dirlmeier, F., Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik, ‘Aristoteles, Werke …’, ed. Grumach, E., vi ³ (Darmstadt 1964)Google Scholar; Gauthier, R.-A. et Jolif, J.-Y., Aristote, l'Ethique à Nicomaque ² (Louvain/Paris 1970)Google Scholar; Greenwood, L. H. G., Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Six (Cambridge 1909)Google Scholar; Hamlyn, D. W., Aristotle's De Anima, Books II and III, (Oxford 1968)Google Scholar; Hicks, R. D., Aristotle, De Anima (Cambridge 1907)Google Scholar; Jaeger, W., Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles (Berlin 1912)Google Scholar; Moraux, P., Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen I, (Peripatoi ed. Moraux, , v: Berlin/New York 1973)Google Scholar; Ramsauer, G., Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea (Leipzig 1878)Google Scholar; Rassow, H., Forschungen über die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles (Weimar 1874)Google Scholar; Rodier, G., Aristote, Traité de l'âme (Paris 1900)Google Scholar; Ross, W. D., trans. of Eth. Nic. in The Works of Aristotle … ix (Oxford 1925)Google Scholar; id., Aristotle, De Anima (Oxford 1961); Stewart, J. A., Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Oxford 1892)Google Scholar; Theiler, W., Aristoteles, Über die Seele, ‘Aristoteles, Werke …’,ed. Grumach, E., xiii (Berlin 1959)Google Scholar; Torstrik, A., Aristotelis De Anima (Berlin 1862)Google Scholar; Zell, Carolus, Aristotelis Eth. Nic. libri X (Heidelberg 1820)Google Scholar.

³ I take the point of this difficult sentence to be that the objects of judgement, viz. equitable acts (τὰ ἐπιєικῆ), are coexstensive with all good acts, although only those that involve other people—i.e. with all just acts; hence judgement itself and men of good or sympathetic judgement are properly said to be concerned with the objects of practical wisdom (albeit only in relation to other people), which is what the sentence is intended to prove. Commentators disagree on the precise relation between this sentence and the preceding one (what is Aristotle trying to prove?), and on the gender of τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων (masculine or neuter?). The answers to these two questions that are implied in the proposed interpretation are, for the former question, that of Dirlmeier (465), and for the latter, that of Stewart (ii 90–91).

⁴ This suggestion, which must remain a suggestion only, should be seen against the background of the general problem of parallel passages in Aristotle, and this problem in its turn belongs under the historical problem of the genesis and transmission of the Aristotelian texts. The problem of parallel passages was brought into focus by Torstrik (1862), in connection with the De Anima, and Rassow (1874), in connection with the Nicoma-chean Ethics. The wider problem of the character of our received text was clarified by Jaeger's remarks, in his dissertation on the Metaphysics (1912), on the genre and original purpose of an Aristotelian text (Jaeger 131–48) and by the later discussion of the question of what happened to the text between the moment it left Aristotle's hands and the moment when it had found its final expression in the manuscripts as we have them. For a summary of this discussion see, e.g., Moraux (1973) 3–94. From the very start of scholarly debate concerning these questions there has been agreement about the framework within which they should be seen: we have (a) Aristotle himself writing and possibly adding to his written text; (b) an editor, piously or not so piously, putting together whatever material was available to him, and finally (c) the scribes mechanically copying the received text (compare, e.g., Rassow 49–51). How to divide the text within that framework is a matter of continued debate. Work relevant to the discussion of parallel passages in the Ethics, apart from Rassow's, is that of Cook Wilson (1912) and the edition of Gauthier and Jolif (1958–9), whose translation reflects a reorganised text that well summarises earlier observations on parallel passages and other textual inconcinnities.

⁵ Compare De An. 428a19–24. Some commentators, e.g. Ross (287) and Theiler (137), accept Torstrik's suggestion (173) that the passage contains two versions of a single argument, and that (a19) ἀλλὰ—πολλοίς (a22) is the later version, (a22) ἔτι—δ' οὔ (a24) being the earlier one. They therefore indicate in their texts that ἔτι—δ' οὔ should not be considered. Others, however, e.g. Rodier (ii 422), Hicks (464) and Hamlyn (132), seeing that ἔτι—δ' οὔ makes an additional point, take these lines to be the later version; but believing the two arguments to be sufficiently distinct for both to be in place, they reject Torstrik's suggestion of a single argument. However, since (a20) οὐκ ἐνδέχєται—πιστєύєιν (a21) seems to be mere explanation of the meaning of the preceding ἕπєται, the argument of ἀλλὰ—πολλοῖς may fairly be said to be totally absorbed by that of ἔτι—δ' οὔ, which in addition makes a real further step by going from πєιθώ to λόγος. If this is correct, may we not wish to prefer a conflation of the two views mentioned, saying (a) that ἔτι—δ' οὔ, or rather: (a22) πάσῃ,—δ' οὔ (a24), is the later version; (b) that it was intended by Aristotle to replace ἀλλὰ—πολλοῖς, with ἀλλὰ being inserted into the new version from the old one, and (c) that an editor, instead of complying with Aristotle's intention, inserted the new version into the text he found by means of an ἔτι, thus producing our text?

⁶ I am grateful to Sten Ebbesen, University of Copenhagen, and J. L. Ackrill, Jonathan Barnes and Lesley Brown, Oxford, for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this note.