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Plant, Bob
2017.
On the Domain of Metaphilosophy.
Metaphilosophy,
Vol. 48,
Issue. 1-2,
p.
3.
Article contents
Continental Insularity: Contemporary French Analytical Philosophy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 January 2010
Extract
People outside France have always wondered why analytical philosophy has had so little influence in this country, while it has gained currency in many other European countries, such as Germany and Italy, not to speak of Northern Europe, where the analytical tradition is strongly established. This can be explained only by a particular conjunction of historical, cultural, sociological and maybe economical factors, which it would be too long to detail here. If there are natural characters of nations, there is no reason to believe that there are no philosophical characters of nations. As Hume said, the characters of nations can have physical as well as moral causes. As for the physical causes, everybody in Britain knows how insular the Continent can be. So if there is such a thing as French analytical philosophy, nobody will be surprised to learn that it is very insular. Before presenting some of the work done by French philosophers related to the analytical tradition, let me try to give what I take to be some of the moral causes of their insularity.
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- Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 21: Contemporary French Philosophy , March 1987 , pp. 1 - 19
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References
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17 Ibid.
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30 Cf. Bouveresse, Jacques, ‘La philosophie et les fondements’, Archives de philosophie 43, No. 1 (1980), 1–32.Google Scholar
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39 The question whether Wittgenstein's philosophy can be interpreted as a transcendental philosophy has been much debated. For a recent account, see Lear, J., ‘Leaving the World Alone’, Journal of Philosophy, LXXIX, No. 7, (07 1982), 382–403.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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42 e.g. Kripke.
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