1 Correction to: Philos Stud https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01507-x
In the original publication of the article, some of the references were published incorrectly. The corrected references are provided below.
References
Enoch, D. (2014). A defense of moral deference. Journal of Philosophy, 111, 229–258.
Enoch, D. (2018). Review of David Sobel’s From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism. Ethics, 128, 672–677.
Enoch, D. (2019). How Principles Ground. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 14, 1–22.
Enoch, D., & Weinshtock-Saadon, I. (forthcoming). ‘‘Oh, All the Wrongs I Could Have Performed! Or: Why Care about Morality, Robustly Realistically Understood’’. Forthcoming in David Copp and Paul Bloomfield (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Enoch, D. Correction to: Thanks, We’re good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable. Philos Stud 178, 2357 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01537-5
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01537-5