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Interrogative Belief Revision in Modal Logic

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Abstract

The well known AGM framework for belief revision has recently been extended to include a model of the research agenda of the agent, i.e. a set of questions to which the agent wishes to find answers (Olsson & Westlund in Erkenntnis, 65, 165–183, 2006). The resulting model has later come to be called interrogative belief revision. While belief revision has been studied extensively from the point of view of modal logic, so far interrogative belief revision has only been dealt with in the metalanguage approach in which AGM was originally presented. In this paper, I show how to model interrogative belief revision in a modal object language using a class of operators for questions. In particular, the solution I propose will be shown to capture the notion of K-truncation, a method for agenda update in the case of expansion constructed by Olsson & Westlund. Two case studies are conducted: first, an interrogative extension of Krister Segerberg’s system DDL, and then a similar extension of Giacomo Bonanno’s modal logic for belief revision. Sound and complete axioms will be provided for both of the resulting logics.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Kungshuset, Lundagård, 222 22, Lund, Sweden

    Sebastian Enqvist

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  1. Sebastian Enqvist
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Enqvist, S. Interrogative Belief Revision in Modal Logic. J Philos Logic 38, 527–548 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-009-9101-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-009-9101-2

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