


SYMPOSIUM
POLITICAL LIBERALISM VS. LIBERAL PERFECTIONISM



EDITORIAL PREFACE

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Most contemporary moral philosophers and political theorists recognize the difficulty of finding mutually acceptable terms of cooperation in societies characterized by deep disagreement about what is of general value in life. Taking such disagreement seriously, supporters of Rawls's political liberalism claim that a conception of justice should be freestanding and not grounded on the various comprehensive values present in society. Opposing this view, liberal perfectionists claim that principles of justice and political institutions ought to be built upon a set of key liberal values, defining what is objectively good for human beings. There is a growing discussion about the consistency of the 'political' understanding of liberalism and on whether perfectionism can legitimately belong to the family of liberal doctrines.

This first volume of the new series of *Philosophy and Public Issues* addresses these issues through a discussion on the relationship between political liberalism and liberal perfectionism. In the first part of the volume, Jonathan Quong presents his recent *Liberalism Without Perfection* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011), addressing questions by Jerry Gaus, Ben Colburn, Joseph Chan and Michele Bocchiola. In the second part, we host four papers critically engaging with contemporary liberal perfectionist theories.

With the new series of *Philosophy and Public Issues*, we hope to contribute to the contemporary philosophical discussion about moral and political problems, continuing the tradition of *Filosofia e questioni pubbliche*, which was animating the Italian debate since 1992.

Sebastiano Maffettone – Gianfranco Pellegrino – Michele Bocchiola

Editors of *Philosophy and Public Issues*