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The rationality debate from the perspective of cognitive-experiential self-theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 April 2001

Seymour Epstein
Seymour Epstein
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003 sepstein@psych.umass.edu
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Abstract

A problem with Stanovich & West's inference that there a nonintellectual processing system independent from an intellectual one from data in which they partialled out global intelligence is that they may have controlled for the wrong kind of intellectual intelligence. Research on cognitive-experiential self-theory over the past two decades provides much stronger support for two independent processing systems.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 23 , Issue 5 , October 2000 , pp. 671
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press

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