Abstract
Although there is a history in urban thought wherein scholars view cities as technologies, the encompassing character of such views inherently limits them. In turn, their usefulness does not efficiently support the kind of thinking that is required to deliver worthwhile outcomes that can promote social justice and human flourishing. However, narrowing the focus through examining municipalities as technologies offers possibilities that can help us achieve such goals. To maximize the utility of this endeavor, employing the structural-ethics approach provides a way to assess urban technologies to achieve success. In this paper, the author explores the ideas above, revealing how they advance our thinking when it comes to remaking, planning, and building existing and future cities. The article concludes by linking these claims to other lessons in urban studies and geography.
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Notes
For an example of urban ontology, see Weissman (2011). Cities, Real and Ideal: Categories for an Urban Ontology. Heusentamm, Germany: Ontos Verlag. For a discussion on the city as a process, see Varzi (2019). What is a city? Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy (online available; print version is forthcoming).
It is worth noting that ontology does play a role when it comes to the related ethical concerns of the city and the municipality. For instance, when comparing the complexity of “the city” to the reduced complexity of “the municipality,” it seems reasonable to hold that less complexity would make it easier to identify ethically problematic situations.
There are also many philosophers who argue for a value-neutral position. See Peterson and Spahn (2011). “Can technological artifacts be moral agents?”. Science and Engineering Ethics, 17(3), 411–424. And, Pitt 2014. “Guns do not kill people; values in and/or around technologies.” In P. Kroes & P.P. Verbeek (Eds.), The moral status of technical artifacts (pp. 89–102). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer.
I can imagine someone claiming: “you are committing the strawperson fallacy because you are not directly making an argument against technological agency.” Yet, this criticism misses the point: I have no interest in making technological-agency arguments. There is no need to do so because the inherent nature of the structural ethics approach bypasses the need to discuss agency.
For intellectual and philosophical purposes, an exploration wherein agency remained in view could benefit this discussion, an exercise that falls outside of the scope of this paper.
I review these points in different contexts elsewhere. For more information, see Epting, S. Danger in the Rocks? Thinking through Land Use and Naturally-Occurring Asbestos with Structural Ethics, Ethics and the Environment (forthcoming).
For a thorough presentation of this kind of research, see Bettencourt et al. (2007). Growth, Innovation, Scaling, and the Pace of Life in Cities. Proceeding of the National Academy of Science 104 (17), 7301–7306.
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Epting, S. On Municipalities as Technologies. Philos. Technol. 34, 863–873 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-020-00438-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-020-00438-z