Abstract
An agent may abandon an initiated action plan, although he doesnot acquire new information or encounter unforeseen obstacles.Such dynamic inconsistency can be to the agent';s guaranteeddisadvantage, and there is a debate on how it should rationallybe avoided. The main contenders are the “sophisticated” andthe “resolute” approaches. I argue that this debate is misconceived,since both approaches rely on false assumptions about theperformability of action plans. The debate can be reformulated,so as to avoid these mistaken assumptions. I try to show that sucha reformulation must rely on certain implausible claims.
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Carlson, E. Dynamic Inconsistency and Performable Plans. Philosophical Studies 113, 181–200 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023978327000
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023978327000