Abstract
What is it for a speech act to be sincere? The most common answer amongst philosophers is that a speech act is sincere if and only if the speaker is in the state of mind that the speech act functions to express. However, a number of philosophers have advanced counterexamples purporting to demonstrate that having the expressed state of mind is neither necessary nor sufficient for speaking sincerely. One may nevertheless doubt whether these considerations refute the orthodox conception. Instead, it may be argued, they expose other ways of elucidating sincerity in speech. “Sincerity in speech” is ambivalent between a number of different conceptions. Against this background this paper presents two alternative conceptions, viz., Sincerity as Spontaneity and Sincerity as Presenting Oneself as one takes Oneself to be and develops a third conception which we may call Sincerity as a Communicative Virtue. This conception emphasizes the speaker’s intention in communicating her attitudes and the need to be properly justified in saying what one does.
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Notes
The connection between expressing and showing will be developed in what follows.
Whether simply expressing a state of mind that one does not have is either necessary or sufficient for speaking insincerely is a question that we will return to below.
It may be argued that whether a sincere speech act shows the speaker’s state of mind is not orthodox. What is orthodox is the idea that a sincere speech act expresses the speaker’s actual state of mind. However, the relevant notion of showing is not meant to be very controversial. For instance, “showing that” is not meant to imply making something perceptible. Rather, it is meant to capture the sense in which a sincere assertion may enable propositional knowledge, at least in appropriately situated thinkers. It is in this sense that a sincere assertion that p may show the speaker’s belief that p. See Green (2007a). Nothing important, however, depends on this. If it is denied, then “Sincerity as Showing” should simply be conceived of as a label denoting the orthodox view. It is primarily meant to capture the sense in which sincerity guarantees that the speaker has the state of mind that the speech act in question functions to express, i.e., the sense in which one cannot, e.g., sincerely assert that p without actually believing that p. An anonymous reviewer raised this matter.
It may be objected that this would be an example of a person who only pretends to express his gratitude. In this connection it is important to distinguish “S is expressing gratitude” from “S is expressing his gratitude.” The possessive formulation presupposes that S is experiencing gratitude, the non-possessive formulation does not. Still, it may be further objected that “Thanks” did not express any gratitude at all, but just purported to express it. That, I would respond, simply fails to acknowledge that there is a weaker notion of expression according to which it is quite possible to express a state of mind that one does not have.
See Eriksson (forthcoming) for discussion.
A similar idea is defended by Bach and Harnish (1979). To express a state of mind, according to Bach and Harnish, is roughly for the speaker to intend the interlocutor to take the speaker’s utterance as a reason for thinking that the speaker has the attitude.
It may be argued that we should understand Green’s use of “expressive” as closely related to an evidential notion of expression. This is suggested by Green (2007b, p. 281, n. 8) where he seems to find the differences to be a question of nomenclature. However, Green’s treatment of Davis (2003) and Bach and Harnish (1979) in Green (2007a) as rival self-expression conceptions speaks against this. Again, see Eriksson (forthcoming) for a more thorough discussion.
However, even if certain words and sentences when used conventionally express states of mind, it may still be possible to express states of mind in virtue of intentionally indicating them. For instance, it seems quite possible to express, e.g., ingratitude by saying “Thanks” but this is not something we can accomplish merely in virtue of conventions. Rather, it requires that the speaker does something that reliably indicates that she is experiencing ingratitude, e.g., saying “Thanks” using a particularly intonation or the like. In other words, it seems as if there are both conventional and non-conventional means of expressing states of mind through the use of words.
These arguments were suggested by an anonymous reviewer.
A problem is that “truthful” sometimes is used pretty much as synonymous with “sincere.” Here I intend “truthful” to be taken as an antonym to “lie” where lying requires saying something false (together with an intention to deceive one’s interlocutor). Of course, not everyone is of the opinion that lies are necessarily false, but merely require that the speaker issues “an intentional deceptive message in the form of a statement” (Bok 1978, p. 15), i.e., saying what he thinks is false (together with an intention to deceive one’s interlocutor). However, a problem with the latter view, is that it is difficult to see what the speaker lies about if what he says is true (although he believes it is false). Suppose Jane believes that Bush still is the American president, but wants to deceive John about the facts. Jane therefore says “Obama is the American president” (which is true) and since Jane is an authority on politics John acquires the belief that Obama is the American president. Did Jane lie to John? If this is your intuition, what did Jane lie about? It seems odd to say that she lied about who is the American president. She tried to lie about this, but failed. My intuition is that Jane is insincere in what she says, but she does not lie—although she tried to.
See Ekman (2009) for an alternative view.
It may be argued that Williams does not think that it is possible to spontaneously assert a belief that is not one’s actual belief. On the other hand, there are passages which suggests that he is open to the possibility that a spontaneous assertion that p may be caused by, e.g., a desire that p rather than a belief that p (83). However, unless the speaker has the belief, Williams would presumably deny that the assertion is sincere (71, 73).
It may be argued that this conception implies that young children, who are known not to have a theory of mind, including of their own, cannot be sincere when they perform speech acts. According to this conception, this may well be right. My own intuitions are divided, but I tend to find it quite difficult to see that very young children are, in the relevant sense, truthful or deceitful. Indeed, part of the reason why may well be that they lack an adequate conception of other minds. See Breheny (2006) for a thorough discussion of the kind of role that a theory of mind plays in different accounts of communication.
See also Green (2007a, p. 11).
It may be argued that Moran’s example does not plausibly demonstrate that the student’s beliefs do not enter in as an object of concern at all. If the teacher wants to know whether the student has understood, then he will be concerned with the student’s beliefs. What else could understanding be? Well, it could be used to mean that the student is capable of explaining the causes and effects of certain events, drawing certain inferences and so on given what was said in the lectures. In some sense, it may nevertheless be argued, the student’s beliefs will enter in as objects of concern. Be that as it may, given the student’s communicative aim I still see no reason to think that sincerity or insincerity (in the relevant sense) will be an issue. This is what my use of Moran’s example is meant to illustrate. An anonymous reviewer pressed this objection.
This should be evident given a counterfactual case where her beliefs about the Civil war are different. In such a scenario it seems plausible to think that what she says will not change. Hence, her actual beliefs about the Civil war do not really seem to matter.
See also Green 2007a, p. 61.
It should be noted that I am not saying that questions about the sincerity of what is said do not arise unless the speaker is intending to inform someone. Suppose I am being interrogated by some crooked cops who are absolutely sure I did the crime. I realize this, and so realize that I have no chance of convincing them of my innocence. Suppose further that I am in fact innocent. When I assert “I’m innocent” it seems plausible to think I am sincere in what I say, in spite the fact that I have no intention of informing the cops of my state of mind. To have such an intention, I would have to believe it was possible to convince them, but I do not believe it possible. It may be agreed that I am given the circumstances, in a sense, speaking sincerely, but in another sense developed in this section, what I say is not communicatively sincere.
This label was suggested by an anonymous reviewer.
Other relevant examples include, for instance, a person who says “Someone has been reading you mail” implying that it is not the speaker who is the culprit.
This example was suggested to me by Richard Vester.
This example is taken from Davis (2003).
See, e.g., Eriksson (forthcoming) for discussion.
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Acknowledgment
I am grateful to everyone who has commented on earlier drafts of this article. Special thanks to the anonymous reviewer for Philosophical Studies for provided many invaluable suggestions and to Jan Österberg for inspiring me to think hard about these matters in the first place.
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Eriksson, J. Straight talk: conceptions of sincerity in speech. Philos Stud 153, 213–234 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9487-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9487-2